



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

806-810 MANCHESTER ROAD, CASTLETON, ROCHDALE
RESIDENTIAL (10 no. APARTMENTS)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: R & M Residentials

VERSION A: 08/11/2022

REFERENCE: 2022/0468/CIS/01

806-810 Manchester Road, Castleton, Rochdale

URN: 2022/0468/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Security improvements/additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme will be considered acceptable if the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The raised, sheltered platform to the rear of the building has the potential to foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues close to residential doors/windows. It is highly recommended that the secondary external entrances to the ground floor apartments are removed and replaced with windows (which would be far less vulnerable to unauthorised access/being left insecure) and the platform is replaced by a single stair serving just the rear communal entrance.
- The potentially vulnerable ground floor residential windows along Manchester Road should be protected by balustrades, bars or planters, in order to deter unauthorised access, criminal damage and nuisance – particularly given the surrounding takeaways and the guard rails/pedestrian crossing directly in front of the building.
- Robust control of access into the building, including a secure system for the delivery of post.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the south-west side of Manchester Road in the Castleton area of south-west Rochdale.

It has been vacant for some time, following the demolition of the previous building, leaving an unkempt site with dilapidated timber hoardings along the site frontage.

Such derelict sites can sometimes foster nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal activity. Crime and anti-social behaviour are often more likely to occur if an offenders presence does not attract attention and a place feels like it is not under supervision. If signs of disorder (such as graffiti, damage etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse and trigger a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality - giving the impression that such sites are not owned or cared for by anybody and that crime and disorder is tolerated.


The site is situated on the main throughfare through the district centre of Castleton, which is busy with vehicular traffic and pedestrian footfall. There are a number of retail/commercial units, hot food takeaways and vacant units fronting onto Manchester Road within the immediate locale of the site, as well as a number of terraced residential properties.

Hot food takeaways can provide legitimate activity and surveillance opportunities, but can also be focal points for nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues - particularly late at night and when residential properties are in close proximity.

The entrance doors to the existing terraced residential properties to the north-west of the site have been secured with external grilles along Manchester Road, indicating they may have experienced crime and disorder issues in the past.

The site backs onto an unmade rear access road to the south-west, which provides access to the rear of the terraced properties to the north-west and access to the flats above the commercial premises to the south-east, which are also served by an enclosed parking area at the end of the route. The route is also backed onto by the rear gardens of the residential properties fronting onto Hanover Street.

Publicly accessible routes to the rear of buildings/sites can leave adjacent sites/properties vulnerable to unauthorised rear access, as they can provide easy access/escape routes that often benefit from little/no natural surveillance.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2021 to 31st August 2022.



2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
24	5	43	319	31	<5	6	11	16	<5

- 2.1.1 In the last 12 months, the most prevalent types of recorded crime in the local area have been less serious wounding and criminal damage.
- 2.1.2 Offences have been concentrated around/off the main arterial route of Manchester Road and the primarily residential streets to the south-west (around/off Heywood Road/Heape Street) and the south-east (around/off Albion Street). Assaults, public order offences and harassment have been the highest recorded less serious woundings taking place in the area, often involving domestic disputes and incidents between known associates. Criminal damage offences have targeted dwellings and vehicles, with offenders primarily smashing glazing in windows, as well as damaging internal doors within properties and damaging vehicle bodywork.
- 2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will look at local residential burglary and vehicle crime.


2.2 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.




- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **3% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **2% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **equal to** the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **2% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **15% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **120% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (km), Rochdale and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (km), Rochdale and Greater Manchester




- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **18% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **8% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **12% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **32% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **24% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **8% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.


2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Domestic Burglary – Time Range





Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Tuesday and Saturday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning. Offenders frequently target residential premises at night when it is dark and streets tend to benefit from less activity, footfall, surveillance and overlooking than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:
- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure (particularly front doors).
 - Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Wednesday and over the weekend.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning (when offenders perceive a lower risk of detected) and in the afternoon/early evening (when commuters or people visiting the district centre park within public car parks or on-street, where they are not overlooked by their owners and are often left unattended for long periods of time). Vehicles parked within open communal areas or on-street are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within the curtilages of individual properties or within secure garages/parking facilities.

2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:
- Domestic burglary
 - Bogus callers and distraction burglary
 - Criminal damage to property and vehicles
 - Anti-social behaviour
 - Theft of/from parked vehicles
 - Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
 - Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
 - Neighbour disputes
 - Poor maintenance of access control systems
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure (particularly front doors).

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the apartment block before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should ideally be small and set well-away from locking points.

Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' can provide a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties. Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour. All private spaces to the sides/rear of the apartment block should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access (see Section 4.5). Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.6).

- Vehicles have been targeted for theft of, theft from and criminal damage when parked on-street or within open car parks

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving apartments or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured with automatic gates/shutters to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a 3 storey building, comprising of 10 no. residential apartments, with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The main communal entrance to the building will be off Manchester Road. A secondary communal entrance will be located to the rear of the building (off the existing unmade shared access road) via steps up to a raised landing area underneath the projecting upper floors of the building, which will also provide access to 2 no. secondary external entrances to the ground floor apartments. A small amenity space, parking for 3 no. vehicles and a refuse storage area will also be provided to the rear of the building.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The building will have habitable room windows to its front and rear elevations, providing surveillance opportunities over the parked vehicles, any visitors to the block and towards the street/access route.
- 3.2.3 Many of the apartments will be provided above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively deterred. This also reduces the potential impacts of any excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.4 The parking spaces serving the building will be directly overlooked by habitable room windows, allowing residents to directly overlook their own vehicles.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The access route to the rear of the building is narrow, unmade/unlit and benefits from limited levels of passive surveillance and direct overlooking, which could leave partially hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles potentially vulnerable to attack unseen. However, it is noted that the neighbouring properties feature upper floor residential flats with access points and parked areas accessed off the route, which does increase the levels of activity and footfall along it. As proposed, the scheme includes a raised platform serving a rear communal entrances, as well as secondary entrances to the ground floor apartments. This platform, which is sheltered underneath the projecting upper floors of the building, has the potential to foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues close to residential doors/windows. Given that the ground floor apartments are already served by the front and rear communal entrances, it is highly recommended that the secondary external entrances to them are removed and replaced with security-certified windows overlooking the route and parking area (fitted with laminated glazing and opening restrictors – see Section 4.2 & 4.3), which would be far less vulnerable to unauthorised access/being left insecure. This would also eliminate the need for the raised, sheltered platform, as the communal entrance could just be served by a single stair. The rear elevation, undercroft and parking area to the rear of the building must be well-lit (see Section 4.6) and the amenity space and refuse stores must be securely enclosed to prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.5).

- 3.3.2 As proposed, the ground floor windows to the apartments along Manchester Road (i.e. to Apartments 1 & 2) will front directly onto the street and will not be protected by enclosed by any defensible space – leaving them exposed and vulnerable to unauthorised access, damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour (e.g. people banging on windows as they walk by - particularly late in the evening/at night when the surrounding hot food takeaways are likeable to be at their busiest), as well as a lack of privacy for residents. The guard rails and pedestrian crossing directly in front of the building are also likely to result in funnelling pedestrian movement in close proximity or people congregating directly adjacent to the residential windows. Ideally, such windows should be protected by defensible space (defined by low railings and planting), in order to deter unauthorised access/nuisance/anti-social behaviour and funnel any pedestrian movement away from them. Clearly defined defensible space between such residential windows and the public realm provides a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and acts as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny if they enter or cross the space. Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage. However, it is noted that this is not achievable at this site. It is therefore highly recommended that at least

the lower half of the windows are protected by balustrades, ornate bars or planters (see opposite for some examples), to provide a visual deterrent and deter criminal damage



and nuisance, as well as provide a degree of privacy for residents. When residents do not feel comfortable or feel unduly overlooked from the street, they can often leave curtains/blinds shut 24/7 - impacting upon levels of surveillance over the public realm and activity along the frontage of the building. It is preferable for any such balustrades/bars/planters to be fixed within the window reveal where possible, with no gaps/steps that could inadvertently create climbing aids to upper floor windows. The windows themselves must also be security-certified and laminated (see Sections 4.2 & 4.3) and should ideally be non-opening, or fitted with opening restrictors and key operated locks if they must open.

- 3.3.3 The main communal entrance to the apartment building for residents and visitors should be that which fronts directly onto Manchester Road, where surveillance opportunities over residents, visitors and the entrance itself are maximised. It should be formed by security-certified, single-leaf doorset, capable of being operated via a robust electronic access control system (see Section 4.1). In addition to a robust access control system for visitors, there should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that ensures access to all floors of the building is not required (again, see Section 4.1 for more information). The rear communal entrance to the building should be for the use of residents only.
- 3.3.4 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted for use under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main communal entrance doorset (off Manchester Road) must be security-certified to one of the above standards, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. It should be single-leaf, self-closing and controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents or staff can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ Ideally, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. If this is not possible, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries without providing access to all floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ The rear communal doorset to the rear of the building must also be security-certified to one of the above standards, be self-closing and controlled by means of resident key-fob only (i.e. no visitor access).
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. These doors should have either a door viewer or a fixed sidelight, containing laminated glazing.
- ☐ Internal doors/frames to any offices, stores or plant areas should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by resident/staff key-fob.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ All ground floor opening lights accessible from single-storey elements (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ The exposed and potentially vulnerable ground floor windows to the apartments along Manchester Road should be protected as described within Section 3.3.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be no other features of the building (such as projecting canopies/window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting brickwork/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, handrails, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Each apartment should ideally have an intruder alarm to comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems; or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.

Alarms should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows.

- ☐ If intruder alarms are not to be provided, there should at least be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur installed to each apartment, to allow future residents to connect an alarm if required.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The private amenity space to the rear of the building should be enclosed with 1800-2100mm high walls or robust close-boarded timber fencing (with the top 300mm consisting of robust integral trellis if required). Any pedestrian gate should also be to the same height and should be fitted with either a pad-lockable bolt (to the mid-point of the internal face) or a key operable deadlock.
- ☐ The external refuse store serving the building should be similarly enclosed with 1800-2100mm high walls, railings or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and self-closing, steel-framed, 'slam to lock' gates (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key or fob operated from both sides). A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around building entrances and parking areas, any low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and any tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (such as access-controls, fencelines/gates, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
16 th September 2022	AJ Cocker Associates	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
20 th September 2022	AJ Cocker Associates	Quotation issued
22 nd September 2022	AJ Cocker Associates	Confirmation of instruction/fee & receipt of Design & Access statement
6 th October 2022	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
4 th to 7 th November 2022	AJ Cocker Associates	Email correspondence re: timescales

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A309-03	Location Plan	May 2022	-
A309-01	Proposed Building and Site Plans	May 2022	-
A309-02-A	Proposed Elevations	09/09/22	A
-	Heritage Statement	-	-
-	Design and Access Statement	-	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk