



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

1 Drake Street, Rochdale

33 No. Apartments & GF Commercial Unit

FOR: CASSEL & FLETCHER

VERSION A: 12th February 2025

REFERENCE: 2013/0074/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

1 Drake Street, Rochdale

2013/0074/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed residential-led mixed use development is acceptable in general; however there are a number of points that should be considered which can be found in section 3.3 where there are a number of recommendations made which would enhance the security of the development and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



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Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
	2.3 Risk Factors – Residential	
	2.4 Risk Factors - Retail	
	2.5 Crime Rate Comparison	
	2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis	
	2.7 Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail): Risk Analysis	
	2.8 Theft (Retail): Risk Analysis	
	2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	11
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security (Residential).....	12
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Windows	
	4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	4.4 Alarms	
	4.5 Access Control	
	4.6 Lighting	
5	Physical Security (Commercial Unit).....	13
	5.1 Doors	
	5.2 Windows, Building Fabric & Shutters	
	5.3 Glazing	
	5.4 Alarms	
	5.5 Access Control	
6	Management & Maintenance	14
7	Construction	14
8	Useful References	14
	8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix


A	Contact register	15
B	Associated Documents.....	15
C	CIS Version History	15

1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the town centre area of Rochdale.

The site is roughly rectangular and the boundaries are defined by Smith Street to the North, Farriers Chambers to the East, to the South by The Wellbeing Centre/Mind, and to the West by Drake Street.

The site is located in a prominent town centre area, with the main Metrolink station for the town centre positioned to the North opposite the site. Beyond the Metrolink Station to the North is the main retail area of the town centre, the Riverside Centre and to the East of the site is the main bus interchange. Drake Street and Smith Street have a number of retail units, restaurants/licensed premises, and takeaways.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2024 to 31st December 2024.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
18	46	117	859	118	40	31	47	17	13

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months has been high for the Rochdale division, with less serious wounding, theft and criminal damage having been the most reported offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town, or city centres where there is often a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues. These offences have taken place all throughout the local area, particularly at locations close to and around the junction of Drake Street with Smith Street, Constantine Road and South Parade.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have occurred all throughout the local area, particularly at the hotspot mentioned above as well as at another hotspot to the north around Yorkshire Street. Assaults, public order and harassment offences have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place. These offences have mainly involved disputes between known associates or customers within retail outlets, restaurants or bars, with many offences occurring in the evening/late at night and alcohol consumption often being a factor.
- 2.1.3 In cases of theft offenders have targeted insecure items such as bags and coats left on benches or tabletops in bars, restaurants and public spaces. There have also been cases of offenders using pickpocketing and distraction methods in order to remove items stored on the person such as credit cards and mobile phones. These offences have mainly occurred around Rochdale town centre tram stop.
- 2.1.4 Criminal damage to vehicles and properties have been reported throughout the town centre. Offenders have targeted vehicles by using objects or implements in order to smash the glazing in windows, scratch or dent the bodywork and slash tyres on cars. In cases of damage being done to properties offenders have also used objects to damage the front windows and doors of restaurants, commercial outlets and dwellings, which have mainly occurred during disputes.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Theft of parcels from accessible areas

Possible Solution – A secure parcel store should be provided for residents within the ground floor lobby area, accessible by fob and covered by CCTV.

2.2.2 Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to apartments

Possible Solution - All apartment entrance doorsets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24).

2.2.3 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.

Possible Solution - There should be access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.

2.2.4 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors to gain access into communal areas and apartments

Possible Solution – All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publicly accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, to prevent them

from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Any accessible windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.

- 2.2.5 Posing as a legitimate customer and gaining access to staff only areas by means of tailgating staff and via insecure doors.

Possible Solution – There should be a robust access control system to prevent members of the public from gaining entry to back of house/staff only areas. Signage should be deployed to demarcate staff only areas.

- 2.2.6 Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the doors/windows behind.

Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR2).

2.3 Risk Factors – Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems





2.4 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.5 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **5% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **4% lower** than Greater Manchester and **1% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **294% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **362% higher** than Greater Manchester and **783% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **191% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **229% higher** than Greater Manchester and **300% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **125% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **151% higher** than Greater Manchester and **204% higher** than England & Wales.

2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.






2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Friday in the afternoon (16:00-17:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings at this time when they are often empty whilst the owners are out at work. Offenders have also targeted dwellings on Saturday after midnight (00:00-02:00), which is when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point is recorded as "unknown", it is likely that the offender has exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors.

2.7 Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.





2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Rochdale retail premises remains consistently high, with a slight peak on Monday and Wednesday. During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning when it is dark, the majority of such premises are closed/unoccupied, streets are quiet, and offenders perceive a lower risk of being witnessed.

2.7.2 **Point of Entry:** When offenders have targeted Rochdale retail premises, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Shuttters have been forced open with tools/implements, bodily pressure and vehicles to gain access or to target doors/windows behind them.
- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using implements and bodily pressure.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Where entry points were 'legitimate' or 'unknown', offenders are likely to have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have penetrated through walls and roofs using tools to gain access to premises

2.8 Theft (Retail): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against retail, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Rochdale retail premises peaks on Thursday. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or personal property stolen from customers (e.g. purses/wallets, mobile phones etc.). Thefts of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.

2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Wednesday in the afternoon (16:00-17:00). Offenders often target vehicles in the afternoon during the working week when they are usually left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time whilst they are at work.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is of 33 no. apartments on the first floor and above, and a ground floor commercial unit.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The entrance to the apartments is located in a prominent location where it can be easily seen on approach. The entrance will be subject to high levels of passive surveillance from those passing by on foot.
- 3.2.2 The entrance to the commercial unit will similarly be positioned where it can be well overlooked and easily seen on approach.
- 3.2.3 The commercial unit will provide an active frontage to Smith Street and will overlook the Metrolink station opposite.
- 3.2.4 Apartments will be positioned at first floor and above where they are less likely to be disturbed by noise generated by the nighttime economy.
- 3.2.5 The existing recessed entrances on Drake Street are gated when not in use, reducing the potential for misuse.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Residential

- 3.3.1 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- 3.3.2 Access into the buildings should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- 3.3.3 To prevent tailgating into the building there should be a secure lobby, with a residents/visitors passing through a second access control security rated door before they can enter the stair/lift core of the building.
- 3.3.4 The main entrance to the building should be illuminated to deter loitering and to allow it to be easily seen when it is dark.
- 3.3.5 Postal workers should not be allowed unfettered access throughout the development. Postal workers should be granted access only to the postal lobby with a fob issued to Royal Mail.
- 3.3.6 There should be a parcel store or locker for parcels to be stored securely if they are delivered when a resident isn't home, rather than being left insecure in communal areas of the building.

Commercial unit

- 3.3.7 Any alterations to the fabric of the building should be to Secured by Design standards (below).
- 3.3.8 The commercial unit should have intruder alarms installed or the infrastructure for tenants to easily install an alarm.
- 3.3.9 The infrastructure should be provided for tenants to install a CCTV system and access control.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ External apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer and have a split spindle or fixed handle.
- ☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems

-
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
- Communal entrances
 - Post/parcel room
 - Circulation cores

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

5 Physical Security (Commercial Unit)

5.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2. Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main sliding entrance doors should be capable of being controlled by reception staff if required (e.g. at night) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby.
- ☐ Sliding/revolving doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All doors/frames to staff areas/stores/offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

5.2 Windows, Building Fabric & Shutters

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

5.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.4 Alarms

- ☐ The commercial unit should have intruder alarms installed or the infrastructure for tenants to easily install an alarm.

5.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
- External doors
 - Staff areas
- ☐ If access control is to be fitted out by the tenant then the infrastructure for tenants to easily install an access control system should be provided.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 6.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
16/01/2025	Lynsay Ewart	CIS application received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
BM/0125/DRAKE/ PL2	EXISTING FIRST SECOND AND LOFT PLANS PL2		
BM/0125/DRAKE/ PL3	EXISTING FRONT SIDE ELEVATIONS AND ROOF PLAN PL3		
BM/0125/DRAKE/ PL4	EXISTING REAR ELEVATIONS AND SECTION AA' PL4		
BM/0125/DRAKE/ PL1	EXISTING SITE AND GROUND FLOOR PLAN PL1		
BM/0125/DRAKE/ PL13	FIRST FLOOR REMOVALS PLAN PL13		
	Location Plan		
BM/0125/DRAKE/ PL15	LOFT LEVEL REMOVALS PLAN PL15		
BM/0125/DRAKE/ PL11	PROPOSED CROSS SECTION AA' PL11		
BM/0125/DRAKE/ PL6	PROPOSED FIRST FLOOR PLAN PL5		
BM/0125/DRAKE/ PL9	PROPOSED FRONT AND SIDE ELEVATIONS PL9		
BM/0125/DRAKE/ PL8	PROPOSED LOFT LEVEL PLAN PL6		
BM/0125/DRAKE/ PL12	PROPOSED LOFT SECTION AND ROOF PLAN PL12		
BM/0125/DRAKE/ PL10	PROPOSED REAR AND SIDE ELEVATIONS PL10		
BM/0125/DRAKE/ PL5	PROPOSED SITE AND GROUND FLOOR PLAN AREA SCHEDULE PL5		
BM/0125/DRAKE/ PL5	PROPOSED SITE AND GROUND FLOOR PLAN PL5		
BM/0125/DRAKE/ PL14	SECOND FLOOR REMOVALS PLAN PL14		
	1 DRAKE STREET DESIGN AND ACCESS STATEMENT		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		