



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Warwick Mill, Middleton

273 No. Apartments, Commercial Floor
Space/Units & Restaurant

FOR: Kam Lei Fong (UK) Limited

VERSION A: 30th June 2023

REFERENCE: 2015/0387/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The following areas have been identified as a concern and should be addressed (see section 3.3 for more details).

- Defensible space should be provided to ground floor apartment windows.
- Slot windows should be protected from damage.
- Access control and physical security of the buildings should be carefully considered.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development, and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



Patrick Babb

Consultant

e: patrick.babb@designforsecurity.org

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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located on the fringe of Middleton town centre, in the borough of Rochdale. The development site is loosely bound by Oldham Road to the North, Ashton Lane, Wince Brook and adjacent properties.

Warwick Mill, the building that occupies the site, is a grade II listed building and the adjoining railings are also protected. The mill building site and associated buildings have been vacant for more than 10 years.

A large Tesco food store lies to the North of the site and the majority of development to the north is retail/commercial. Development to the East and South of the site is predominantly housing (generally flats/terraced housing).



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
14	17	100	258	138	22	8	24	22	14

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate is high for the Rochdale Division, but it is important to consider the specific location of the proposed site when analysing the crime statistics. The site is situated in the town centre, which has a dense concentration of retail establishments, licensed premises, and restaurants. Consequently, there is an elevated level of crime and disorder in this area. The highest reported offences include less severe injuries, theft, and vehicle-related crimes, with a notable concentration of incidents to the north of the proposed site, where the town centre is situated.
- 2.1.2 Incidents of less serious woundings have been documented throughout the local area, primarily in the form of assaults and public order offenses, which represent the most frequent types of violent offences. These offences predominantly occur during the late evening/early hours of the morning when licensed premises are closing, and alcohol consumption plays a contributory role. Furthermore, offences to the south and northeast of the proposed site are primarily domestic disputes transpiring within residential settings.
- 2.1.3 Instances of theft primarily occur in and around the shopping centre to the north, as well as near the petrol station situated across the road from the proposed site. Offenders often target unsecured items, particularly mobile phones within the shopping centre, along with products from local businesses. The offences occurring at the petrol station predominantly involve fuel theft.
- 2.1.4 The most frequently reported vehicle-related crimes involve theft from motor vehicles and vandalism. These offenses are primarily concentrated in the large parking lots surrounding the town centre. The methods employed by offenders include breaking the glass to gain entry, as well as scratching paintwork and removing vehicle registration plates.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to apartments
Possible Solution - All apartment entrance doorsets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24).
- 2.2.2 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.
Possible Solution - There should be access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.
- 2.2.3 Posing as a legitimate customer and gaining access to staff only areas by means of tailgating staff and exploitation of insecure doors.
Possible Solution – Any staff-only areas should operate on an access control system with access restricted to authorised personnel.
- 2.2.4 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors to gain access into communal areas and apartments
Possible Solution – All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publicly accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, to prevent them from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Any accessible windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.

- 2.2.5 Forcing open shutters using implements and bodily force to gain access.
- 2.2.6 Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to a recognised security standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR2). Shutters certified to a burglary resistant standard are able to withstand prolonged, opportunist, attacks by criminals.
- 2.2.7 Theft of personal property from tabletops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

Possible Solution - A particular issue in restaurants/cafes is the theft of personal effects; handbag and mobile phone theft is a particular issue. Consideration should be given to fixing clips or simple hooks to the underside of tables to allow customers to secure bags or jackets to the table while keeping it in view; a more secure option than, for example, tabletops or back of chairs, where belongings can be liable to theft.



The internal layout of the premises can also help deter theft by promoting surveillance and creating an uncluttered, environment, avoiding pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of

internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

2.3 Risk Factors - Apartments

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.5 Risk Factors – Licenced Premises/Restaurant





The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property

- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.






- 2.6.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **24% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **26% lower** than Greater Manchester and **6% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.6.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **318% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **355% higher** than Greater Manchester and **387% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.6.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **157% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **216% higher** than Greater Manchester and **370% higher** than England & Wales.

- 2.6.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **183% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **267% higher** than Greater Manchester and **540% higher** than England & Wales.

2.7 Domestic Burglary Risk Analysis


The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The highest likelihood of residential burglary in the nearby area occurs on Tuesday between midnight and 3:30 am. Perpetrators tend to focus on homes during these early morning hours when it's dark and there is minimal pedestrian activity. This creates a perception among offenders that the chances of getting caught or recognised are reduced.
- 2.7.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
 - Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
 - Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
 - Posing as a legitimate tradesperson and gaining unlawful access to the property.
 - Entering apartment buildings and accessing communal areas by means of tailgating residents/ exploiting insecure doors.

2.8 Burglary Risk Analysis - Retail

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



2.8.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Rochdale retail premises remains at a similar rate during the week, with a slight peak on Monday and Wednesday.



2.8.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning when it is dark, the majority of such premises are closed/unoccupied, streets are quiet, and offenders perceive a lower risk of being witnessed.

2.8.3 **Point of Entry:** When offenders have targeted Rochdale retail premises, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Shutters have been forced open with tools/implements, bodily pressure and vehicles to gain access or to target doors/windows behind them.
- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using implements and bodily pressure.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Where entry points were 'legitimate' or 'unknown', offenders are likely to have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have penetrated through walls and roofs using tools to gain access to premises.

2.9 Theft Risk Analysis - Retail

The data below relates to thefts within/against retail, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.





2.9.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Rochdale retail premises peaks on Thursday.

2.9.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or personal property stolen from customers (e.g. purses/wallets, mobile phones etc.). Theft of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.

2.10 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



2.10.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks during the afternoon and into the evening. Offenders often target vehicles during the day in town centres as vehicles are left unattended for long periods of time, often out of sight of the owner, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal


3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises of the change of use of the existing mill building (Warwick Mill) to apartments, with commercial uses at ground floor, and the erection of a new building (The Loom) adjacent the existing mill building to provide commercial units at ground floor and apartments above. There will be a restaurant to the East of Warwick Mill with a large outside eating area.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will increase residential activity in the local area. Areas of high activity can deter offenders if they feel that they could be seen committing a crime or behaving antisocially.
- 3.2.2 The main entrances to the buildings are in prominent locations where they can easily be seen by residents on approach. The buildings have active frontages which will illuminate the street scene.
- 3.2.3 There is a secure line preventing access to residential aspects of the development to members of the public and the commercial parking areas/restaurant, podium, and landscaped areas can be secured when not in use (i.e. at night) reducing the potential for offenders to gain access to these spaces where they could operate without being seen.
- 3.2.4 Vacant sites can often attract antisocial behaviour and criminality including loitering, alcohol/drug consumption, flytipping, trespassing, and criminal damage. The redevelopment of the site will reduce the potential for misuse around the building.
- 3.2.5 Mixed-use developments generate activity throughout the day and evening/night, deterring potential offenders from targeting apartments during daytime due to the presence of commercial units. The proposed restaurant and apartments will both generate beneficial activity at various times, benefiting the development as a whole.
- 3.2.6 Defensible space will be provided to apartments with vulnerable low level windows, reducing the potential for these windows being targeted by criminals or those with antisocial intent.
- 3.2.7 The communal entrance to Warwick Mill will be in full view of the reception desk, allowing staff to vet those entering the building. The entrance to The Loom building will be adjacent the site office, giving a staff presence in close proximity to the building.
- 3.2.8 The site hoarding has been installed for a long period of time and has not been damaged/defaced.
- 3.2.9 Wince Brook forms a natural barrier to the rear of the site which will prevent intrusion into the site from the South.
- 3.2.10 The commercial units and the residential aspects of the building are self-contained, reducing the potential for unauthorised access between used.



3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Apartments

- 3.3.1 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating with an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- 3.3.2 The entry into the buildings must be regulated by a video intercom system to enable residents to screen visitors before granting them access. Unrestricted trade access into the building should be prohibited.
- 3.3.3 Unrestricted access throughout the development should not be granted to postal workers. They should only be allowed access to the designated post rooms, or alternatively, mail/parcels should be delivered directly to the concierge.
- 3.3.4 The doors leading to the bicycle storage areas should be equipped with an access control system that can be operated using a resident's key card or fob. Access to the cycle stores should be restricted to genuine users and not extended to every resident of the building or block. The cycle stands should enable both wheels and the frame to be secured, such as with a Sheffield stand or a similar option. Two-tier systems are acceptable, but they should allow for locking both the wheels and the frame (refer to the opposite image for more information). Basement car parking and bicycle parking areas should be illuminated in accordance with BS 5489 - see table L1 for more details.
- 3.3.5 Bicycle stands in the landscaped areas should be illuminated to deter criminals from targeting parked bicycles.
- 3.3.6 Access into and around the building should operate on a robust access control system. There should be two access controlled doors between the public realm and the circulation core. On a development of this size it is highly recommended that either each floor has an access controlled door (restricted to residents of that floor), or the lifts should only take residents to the floor of their apartment (in conjunction with the access control system).
- 3.3.7 Access into the amenity spaces, landscaped terraces, should operate on access control to restrict these spaces to residents and legitimate visitors. The access control system in these areas should be fully auditable so that access logs can be examined in the event of an incidents, or if there is any damage.
- 3.3.8 The development should be covered with a comprehensive CCTV system covering the main entrances, elevations of the buildings, entrance to the car park, car parking areas, reception areas, and the vehicular/pedestrian gates.
- Commercial Units/Restaurant**
- 3.3.9 The proposed retail units should have the infrastructure for the easily installation of an alarm, CCTV system, and access control, to allow a future tenant to install these during the fitout of these units.
- 3.3.10 The opening hours of any licensed premises should be in keeping with similar users as the local area and reflect the residential nature of the buildings.



Table L1: Lighting requirements for multi-storey/enclosed car parks

Areas	Av. lux	Min. lux	Uniformity
Parking bays and lanes	75	50	0.6
Ramps, corners and junctions	150	75	0.5
Vehicular entrances/exits	75 (night) 300 (day)	n/a	n/a
Pedestrian areas (stairs, lobbies etc)	100	50	0.5
Open roof level	30	10	0.33

Please Note:

- The Av (average) lux is the maintained average horizontal illuminance on the floor
- The Min (minimum) lux is the minimum horizontal illuminance at any location
- Reference should be made to BS 5489 part 9, for further information and guidance
- There may be scope for compromise on the above levels due to external factors

-
- 3.3.11 Any external seating areas should be closed at a reasonable time (i.e. 10pm) to prevent excessive noise pollution in the area. Any external furniture should be capable of being removed and stored inside the premises.
 - 3.3.12 Restaurant opening hours should be in keeping with the local area and mindful of the residential nature of the upper floors of the buildings. The external seating area should be closed at a reasonable time so that it does not become a source of nuisance to residents. Smoking areas should be positioned where the limit of any associated noise is reduced for residents of the buildings.
 - 3.3.13 Access into the public car parking areas should be restricted when the commercial uses are closed, to reduce misuse of these spaces.

Landscaping/external spaces

- 3.3.14 A comprehensive CCTV system should be installed to cover all external doors, elevations, car park entrances, and external spaces.
- 3.3.15 All public routes, external doors and gates should be illuminated to a high standard. There should be illumination of elevations where possible to create a safe environment and deter offenders or those antisocially minded from operating.
- 3.3.16 Any existing boundaries should be inspected for damage and repaired/replaced where necessary. Any new boundaries should generally be to a height of 2000mm-2400mm in height to prevent them from being easily climbed by an offender. Boundaries should be of robust construction (i.e. metal railings) and not be positioned near climbing aids (i.e. lighting columns and telecom cabinets).
- 3.3.17 Vehicular and pedestrian gates should be to a minimum height of 2000mm and operate on an access control system to restrict access to residents and genuine users. Gates should be well designed to avoid any climbing aids such as horizontal midrails, exposed hinges, or locking mechanisms. The gates should be installed close as possible to ground level to prevent crawling underneath.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

The following recommendations are made on this understanding and should apply to all new and replacement features introduced as part of the proposed development of Warwick Mill. If the identified security risks cannot be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the building and its occupants / users will be dependent on effective management and deployment of an on-site security presence and / or monitored alarms / CCTV.

All new-build elements should be constructed in accordance with the following standards in order to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to

access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.

- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Communal entrances
 - Communal areas
 - Bicycle stores
 - Circulation cores
 - Amenity space
 - Staff only areas
 - Parcel rooms

4.6 Bicycle Parking Areas

- ☐ Doors in to the cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners)..
- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.
- ☐ It is essential that good sightlines are maintained throughout the development to allow residents and visitors to actively survey the area for potential threats. Low level planting should not be in excess of 1000mm in height and tree crowns should fall no less than 2400mm to aid sightlines and natural surveillance.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Doors within the basement parking area should be illuminated with a dedicated lighting source.
- ☐ Elevations of the building should be illuminated.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.
- ☐ Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

5 Physical Security (Commercial Units)

5.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2. Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main sliding entrance doors should be capable of being controlled by reception staff if required (e.g. at night) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby.
- ☐ Sliding/revolving doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All doors/frames to staff areas/stores/offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

5.2 Windows, Building Fabric & Shutters

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

5.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.4 Alarms

- ☐ The commercial units should have intruder alarms installed or the infrastructure for tenants to easily install an alarm.

5.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - External doors
 - Staff areas

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable, and up to date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 6.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
- Regular inspection, service, and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained, and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.

6.1.3 Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place, such as 24-hour concierge / security patrols.

6.1.4 Communal / amenity space. Areas of public open space have the potential to attract nuisance and anti-social behaviour. The robust management of such spaces is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. All communal or amenity areas not under the ownership of individual residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space is not detrimental to its surroundings.

7 Construction

7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
06/06/2023	Laura Miller	CIS application confirmed
03/07/2023	Laura Miller	Progress update
70/07/2023	Laura Miller	CIS issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
WM PA-101 LGF	Proposed Lower Ground Floor Plan	26/06/2023	
WM PA-102 UGF	Proposed Upper Ground Floor Plan	26/06/2023	
WM PA-103 1F	Proposed First Floor Plan	26/06/2023	
WM PA-104 2F	Proposed Second Floor Plan	26/06/2023	
WM PA-105 3F	Proposed Third Floor Plan	26/06/2023	
WM PA-106 4F	Proposed Fourth Floor Plan	26/06/2023	
WM PA-107 Roof Plan	Proposed Roof Plan	26/06/2023	
TL-PA- 201 Elevation Levels	Elevation Levels	June 2023	
TL-PA-101 Ground Floor	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	June 2023	
TL-PA-102 1st Floor + Podium	Proposed First Floor and Podium Plans	June 2023	
TL-PA-103 2nd to 7th Floor	Proposed Second to Seventh Floor Plans	June 2023	
TL-PA-104 8th Floor	Proposed Eighth Floor Plan	June 2023	
TL-PA-105 9th Floor	Proposed Ninth Floor Plan	June 2023	
TL-PA-106 Roof Plan	Proposed Roof Plan	June 2023	
WM PA 201 Section A-A	Proposed Section A-A	June 2023	
WM PA 202 Section B-B	Proposed Section B-B	June 2023	
WM PA 203 Section C-C	Proposed Section C-C	June 2023	
WM PA 204 Section D-D	Proposed Section D-D	June 2023	
WM PA-301 North Elevation	Proposed North Elevation	June 2023	
WM PA-302 South Elevation	Proposed South Elevation	June 2023	
WM PA-303 East Elevation	Proposed East Elevation	June 2023	
WM PA-304 West Elevation	West Elevation	June 2023	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		