

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Crimble Hall

10 Houses

For: Richmond Berkeley Ltd

Version A: 22/12/20

Ref: 2020/0621/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

Crimble Hall

2020/0621/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

Given the largely residential nature of this neighbourhood, the proposed development seems appropriate for this site. The houses are well laid out from a crime prevention perspective and we are happy to support the proposals subject to adoption of the recommendations set out in section 3.3 of this report, which will enhance the security of the development and encourage stewardship of the streetscape. The principal recommendations relate to:

- Boundary treatment to the side and rear of properties
- Effective street lighting

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Rochdale Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design (SBD) accreditation.



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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is surrounded by farmland situated off Bury Road on the outskirts of Bamford, Rochdale.

The area is a mix of low rise residential properties along or off Bury Road. The majority of the surrounding landscape is farm land.

The development site occupies former Crimble Hall pub and events venue.

The site is served well by a number of public transport bus routes, with bus stops located on Bury Road adjacent to the proposed road junction on Bury Road.

Locally the site is set within undulating farm land. The road connection to Bury Road is via a single track leading to a f

The boundaries around the site are formed via a mix of timber fencing, barbed wire & dense hedgerows and mature trees.

The site has very good vehicle connections to Rochdale and Bury.

The site is approx. 4km south west from Rochdale town centre, 1.5km from Bamford village and 6km east of Bury town centre.




1 – View of proposed site from the main vehicle entrance point.


2 – View of proposed site entrance gates & road to neighbouring farm.


3 – View out from the proposed site


4 – View of the timber fencing between the neighbouring property


5 – View towards the main entrance of Crimble Hall.


6 – Existing on-site garages


7 – Existing extension to the rear of Crimble Hall.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 2018 to 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
13	<5	<5	10	<5	<5	<5	<5	<5	<5

2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is low for Rochdale; however the location of the proposed site should be taken into consideration. This low volume of crime is typical of undeveloped areas, with large areas of open land, thus reducing the volume of foot fall in the area and decreasing the opportunities for criminals. The majority of offences have occurred to the north, where a residential estate is located, around Bury and Rochdale Old Road. Less serious woundings and domestic burglary have been the highest recorded offences taking place. These crime types are typical of residential areas.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Windows have either been prised open by offenders or the glazing in them has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any accessible residential windows at street level should be protected by some defensible space, to define them as entirely separate from the street and protect them from unauthorised access, as well as damage, nuisance and anti-social behaviour.

2.2.2 Doors (all kinds) were forced open using implements.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to BS PAS 24 security standard. PAS 24-rated doors are very difficult to force open. All ground floor or otherwise accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

2.2.3 Offenders have targeted doors when they have been left insecure

Possible Solution - All individual cluster flats/apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance door-set (see appendix 2), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour

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- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

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2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Rochdale and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2019.

Comparison of Domestic Burglary Rates at Site (Km), Rochdale, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), Rochdale, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), Rochdale, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), Rochdale, and Greater Manchester



2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **84% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **84% lower** than Greater Manchester and **80% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **65% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **62% lower** than Greater Manchester and **56% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **92% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **90% lower** than Greater Manchester and **86% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **67% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **57% lower** than Greater Manchester and **33% lower** than England & Wales.

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2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.

Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Friday during the late evening and early hours of the morning. Offenders often target properties during the late evening and early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

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2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Monday and Tuesday during the afternoon (12:30pm - 1:30pm) and early hours of the morning (12am - 3am). Offenders often target vehicles during the early hours of the morning when they are left unattended for long periods of time, creating low risk opportunities for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development seeks to construct 7 new build residential properties and the conversion of the existing Crimble Hall into a residential house.

3.1.2 The proposed layout will provide a new road around the existing Crimble Hall with each property having off-street parking in to the side or in front of the house.

3.1.3 Each property will have extensive garden space to the front and rear of the property.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development will bring a currently vacant site into use and provide additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night. The development will result in the removal of a disused building and site which might otherwise become a greater target for vandals and increasingly an eyesore. Such sites can attract further criminal behaviour, which may affect surrounding properties.

3.2.2 The design of the dwellings has been kept simple, with no front doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).

3.2.3 The houses have habitable room windows to their front elevations, maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.

3.2.4 The houses will be served by off-road parking spaces and double garages, allowing residents to secure/overlook their own vehicles and limiting opportunities to criminals.

3.2.5 The development will help to continue to repopulate this part of the town and add to the general activity throughout the day and at weekends.

3.2.6 The mix and size of properties will offer a broader range of individuals and families the opportunity to live within the town centre fringes of Rochdale and Bury. A diverse resident population brings with it a likelihood of a level of activity around the development throughout the day, and a greater prospect of a more stable population as residents may be more likely to remain. Residents who remain for the long term are more likely to develop social ties with the area and with other long term residents who then have more of a vested interest in the maintenance and security of the development. Developments with greater social cohesion, and active management, tend to be less prone to the effects of crime and disorder.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Definition of front gardens. Definition of frontage. Front and side garden boundaries should be well-defined to indicate ownership, using low walls, railings, planting and / or surface materials, and discourage intruders from approaching the dwellings and parked vehicles, or taking short cuts.

3.3.2 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation and parking arrangements for larger vehicles.

3.3.3 Bin storage – A space and structure should be identified within the enclosed gardens to accommodate waste bins, avoiding the need for free-standing bins in any location.

3.3.4 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ French/double doors or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors in to garages and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ Rear boundaries should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- ☐ Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.
- ☐ The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

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- [ ] Gates in to the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
    - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
    - A key operable deadlock
- [ ] If residents are likely to use these gates when leaving their property, then the gates must be lockable from both sides.

4.6 Landscaping

- [ ] In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- [ ] Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- [ ] Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- [ ] There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.7 Lighting

- [ ] External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.
- [ ] Lighting in parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 lux with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- [ ] Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- [ ] Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 Other

- [ ] Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas. Smart meters are acceptable.
- [ ] Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- [ ] Any garden sheds must be securely fixed to a concrete foundation and the shed door fitted with a certificated ‘Sold Secure’ Silver Standard padlock, hasp and staple (coach bolted through the shed structure). The shed door should be at least 44mm thick so that the door can be locked into the doorframe using either a mortise deadlock or mortise sash lock certificated to BS 3621: 2007.
- [ ] There have been incidents involving metal theft from the area. Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and metal pipework and wiring should not be visible.

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5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
02/10/20	Client	CIS instruction received
09/11/20	Client	Client confirmed & Fee agreed
19/11/20	DfS	Invoice issued
13/11/20	DfS	Site visit
27/11/20	DfS	CIS complete

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
L(-1)001	Location Plan	Mar 20	
	L(-1)001 Site Layout as existing		
	L(-1)002 Site Layout as proposed		
	L(-1)002 Site Layout as proposed_Rev03		
	L(-2)002 House Type Plans as proposed		
	L(-2)002 Typology Plans as proposed		
	L(-2)101 Crimble Hall Plans as existing Part 1		
	L(-2)102 Crimble Hall Plans as existing Part 2		
	L(-2)103 Crimble Hall Plans as proposed Part 1		
	L(-2)104 Crimble Hall Plans as proposed Part 2		
	L(-3)001 Site Section AA		
	L(-3)002 Site Sections BB & CC		
	L(-3)002 Typology Sections		
	L(-4)002 House Type Elevations		
	L(-4)002 Typology Elevations		
	L(-4)101 Crimble Hall Elevations as existing Part 1		
	L(-4)102 Crimble Hall Elevations as existing Part 2		
	L(-4)103 Crimble Hall Elevations as proposed Part 1		
	L(-4)104 Crimble Hall Elevations as proposed Part 2		
	L-1001-Location-Plan		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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