



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

JUNCTION GARAGE, GREENHILL ROAD, MIDDLETON, ROCHDLE
RESIDENTIAL (24 no. HOUSES)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: J Walker Homes Ltd

VERSION A: 12/07/2023

REFERENCE: 2023/0310/CIS/01

Junction Garage, Greenhill Road, Middleton, Rochdale

URN: 2023/0310/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- General boundary treatments, including:
 - Secure enclosure of private gardens, including enclosure/overlooking of rear driveway on corner plot, and defensible space to define and segregate front gardens/driveways.
 - Robust definition/protection to exposed side/rear boundaries of the Plots abutting the publicly accessible open land/footpath to the east, south and west of the site.
 - The side/rear access alleyway serving the mews properties should be gated at its outermost point.
- Clear separation from Smethurst Street and retention of existing alleygates between the terraced properties fronting onto Greenhill Road and the site itself.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the south side of Greenhill Road (to the west of Smethurst Street and the east of Church Road) in the Middleton area of south Rochdale.

The north-western portion of the site is occupied by a flat roofed former garage building, which is derelict and boarded-up/secured with shutters, with an area of hard standing in front of it (along Greenhill Road). The south-western portion of the site is formed by mature trees and overgrown/scrub vegetation. The remainder of the site is occupied by a number of industrial/outbuildings, storage containers and polytunnels enclosed with a combination of welded-wire mesh fencing, chain link fencing, concrete panel fencing and metal gates.


Crime and anti-social behaviour are often more likely to occur if an offenders presence does not attract attention and a place feels like it is not under supervision. Such derelict sites can often encourage loitering/gathering and foster nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal activity. If signs of disorder (such as graffiti, smashed glazing etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse and trigger a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality - giving the impression that such sites are not owned or cared for by anybody and that crime and disorder is tolerated.

To the immediate north of the site is a row of terraced residential properties fronting onto Greenhill Road. The rear communal alleyway could leave the terraced dwellings vulnerable to unseen rear access and, as such, has been gated to prevent unauthorised access (as many across Greater Manchester have been).

To the east is an unadopted terraced residential street (Smethurst Street) with the properties directly overlooking the site itself. To the west are also terraced residential properties fronting onto Church Road, which have rear in-curtilage parking driveways or garages accessed off an unmade route along the perimeter of the site.

The southern boundary of the site abuts an area of open space/scrub vegetation, a poorly overlooked pedestrian route linking Castle Street to Fildes Street, a low-level block of flats and a brewery site.

When open land or routes exist to the rear of sites and dwellings, they can often leave them vulnerable to unauthorised access (particularly when they benefit from little/no natural surveillance) – as they can provide easy access/escape routes for offenders to utilise unseen. Routes to the rear of dwellings can also experience nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and can leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly after dark.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2022 and 31st May 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary





Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
18	7	40	161	19	<5	6	14	11	<5

2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is relatively high, particularly when it is considered that the local area includes some areas of open space, transport infrastructure and large scale industrial sites – which lower the density of development in the area and typically attract fewer crime and disorder incidents. The most prevalent types of recorded crime have been less serious wounding, criminal damage and vehicle crime – with particular concentrations around/off the main arterial route of Grimshaw Lane (B6189) and the primarily residential streets to the north (around/off Baytree Lane/Fern Close/Tonge Roughs/Vicarage Lane).

2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will focus on domestic burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **18% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **17% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **15% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **37% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **26% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **42% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **14% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **4% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **17% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **15% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **5% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **15% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.




- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Wednesday, Friday and Saturday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of domestic burglary increases during the early hours of the morning when it is dark, streets are quiet and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:
- Secure doors and windows have been forced open with bodily pressure and implements.

- Offenders have targeted insecure ground floor windows and doors (particularly front doors) to gain entry to properties without being noticed.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to gain entry.

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Monday/Tuesday and Friday/Saturday and fluctuates throughout the day – peaking during the early hours of the morning – when offenders perceive a lower risk of being witnessed.
- 2.4.2 Vehicles parked within open, communal areas or on streets, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked on the driveways of individual properties or within secure garages/parking facilities.

2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Theft from gardens, sheds, or garages
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Secure doors and windows have been forced open with bodily pressure and implements.

Possible Solution - All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1/4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

All private spaces to the sides/rears of the dwellings should be robustly enclosed (see Section 4.5), particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the

front and rear of the dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.6).

- Offenders have targeted insecure ground floor windows and doors (particularly front doors) to gain entry to properties without being noticed

Possible Solution - The locks to the front doors of houses should be fitted with split-spindles, essentially meaning they are key only entry and are secure from the exterior of the dwelling when shut. This will ensure that they cannot be left open and accessible (see Section 4.1). All ground floor/accessible windows should be fitted with key-operated locks and opening restrictors (see Section 4.2).

Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' can a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties (see Section 4.5). Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

Again, unauthorised access to the rear of properties should be deterred by robust boundaries and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes/publicly accessible areas to their rear where possible.

- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to gain entry

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should ideally be small and set well-away from locking points.

- Vehicles have been targeted for theft of, theft from and damage, particularly when parked on-street

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Any surface communal parking areas serving apartments or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured with automatic gates/shutters to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect 24 no. 2 storey semi-detached and mews houses, with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The proposed dwellings will front onto Greenhill Road and a new cul-de-sac access road taken off Greenhill Road. Each of the dwellings will have enclosed private gardens and will be served by off-road parking driveways to their front, side or rear.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring provide additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The proposed houses will front onto Greenhill Road and the proposed access road, resulting in good levels of surveillance of and from dwellings and parked vehicles.
- 3.2.3 The houses will have habitable room windows to their front elevations (at ground floor level), maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.
- 3.2.4 The design of the dwellings has been kept simple, with no front doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).
- 3.2.5 Many of the proposed houses will be served by in-curtilage off-road parking spaces to their front/side, allowing residents to secure/overlook their own vehicles and limiting opportunities to criminals.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The boundary treatments to the houses are vitally important to secure them, any parked vehicles and prevent unauthorised access to private spaces. The sides (including gables up to or as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the houses should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access, particularly robustly where adjacent to publicly accessible space (see below). The front elevations of dwellings should be protected by some defensible space, creating garden areas/driveways that are clearly defined as separate from the adjacent public highways and from each other, in ownership/control of the residents themselves (see Section 4.5 for more information). The following site specific boundary issues should also be addressed:
 - A number of the side/rear boundaries of the proposed properties will directly abut the open space to the west, the footpath/open space to the south and the open space to the east. These areas/routes are not well-overlooked and could provide the means for offenders to gain unauthorised access to the rear of dwellings, attack them and escape unseen, as well as leaving them exposed and susceptible to nuisance/anti-social behaviour and criminal damage. In addition to particularly robust boundary definitions (see Section 4.5 for more information), it is highly recommended that the boundaries themselves are protected by belts of mature defensive planting (i.e. densely branched, thorny shrubs) to discourage access, damage and scaling. The location of boundaries should be amended where possible to allow for these requirements. Where this is absolutely unachievable, the boundaries themselves will need to be more robust (again, see Section 4.5 for more information). Care should also be taken to ensure that any changes in ground

levels or adjacent trees do not inadvertently form climbing aids over the boundaries to private space.

- The off-road parking driveway for the corner plot to the north-west of the site (at the junction of Greenhill Road and the proposed access road) will be located to the rear of the property/garden where the parked vehicles cannot be easily overlooked by the residents themselves, leaving them potentially vulnerable. Although they may be overlooked to some degree from the adjacent dwellings, this is not as effective as the owners themselves acting as 'capable guardians' overlooking their own immediately adjacent vehicles. It is highly recommended that the driveway is incorporated into the rear garden of the property behind 2100mm high vehicular gates (lockable from both sides) or, at the very least, the adjacent rear garden boundary should be partially visually permeable to allow residents to overlook their own vehicles (see Section 4.5 for more information).
- The communal rear access alleyway running to the side/rear of mews dwellings should be gated at its outermost point, to prevent unauthorised access to where the rear of dwellings could be attacked unseen and ensure that anyone attempting to gain unauthorised access can be clearly seen from the street.

3.3.2 The proposed site/cul-de-sac access road should be defined and enclosed as entirely separate from Smethurst Street by 1800-2100mm high fencing or railings, in order to ensure all pedestrian and vehicular access to and from the site is via Greenhill Road to the north-west of the site and is well-overlooked by the proposed dwellings. It is highly recommended that the proposed cul-de-sac access road (with only one way in and out of the development) is defined by a symbolic barrier at the entrance (e.g. brick pillars, change of road surface texture/colour etc.) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents, psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate reason from entering. The existing alleyways securing the rear alleyway between the terraced properties fronting onto Greenhill Road and the site itself should be retained, in order to prevent unauthorised, hidden access to the rear of the existing and proposed properties.

3.3.3 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doorsets must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. Any external french/double doors, sliding doors or bi-folding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key. Full instructions should be provided to residents to ensure that they understand that the key must be used to fully lock/secure the door.
- ☐ Front doors should also have either fixed sidelights or door viewers. Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential. Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ All ground floor and any potentially accessible first floor opening lights above any single-storey elements (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside), limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ All ground floor and any potentially accessible first floor glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms


- ☐ Each house should ideally have an intruder alarm, or at least a dedicated non-switched fuse spur to allow for the installation of an alarm. If alarms are installed, they should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems; or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover all rooms with windows.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The sides (including gables up to/as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the houses should generally be enclosed with 2100mm high walls or robust close-boarded timber fencing. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and fencing panels should have the panels fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. Boundaries to private space that are adjacent to publicly accessible space must have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base. Any side/rear pedestrian gates to the private spaces of the houses should also be 2100mm high and should be fitted with either a pad-lockable bolt (to the mid-point of the internal face) or a key operable deadlock. Sub-divisional rear boundaries should be 1500-1800mm high.

- ☐ The exposed and potentially vulnerable rear boundaries of the Plots abutting the open space/footpath to the west, south and east should be protected by some low-level defensive planting (i.e. densely branched, thorny shrubs) on their public side where possible, in order to deter damage, penetration and scaling. If this is absolutely unachievable, the boundaries themselves should be particularly robust - formed by 2100mm high double-skinned close-boarded timber fencing, with no framing/horizontal elements on the private side of the fence that would create a climbing aid, and ideally with a 300mm robust trellis above (totalling 2400mm). Care should be taken to ensure ground level changes do not inadvertently aid scaling boundaries or leave large gaps underneath fencing panels. Any retaining structures should not have features that may aid climbing (such as sloping, terracing or footholds etc.) and any boundaries formed by a combination of retaining walls and fencing should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.

- ☐ The rear off-road parking driveway serving the property at the junction of Greenhill Road and the new access road should ideally be incorporated into the rear garden behind 2100mm high steel-framed vehicular gates (either double-gates or bi-folding gates) that are lockable from both sides (see opposite for example). If not, the rear boundary of the dwelling should be formed by 1200mm high walls and 900mm railings above, in order to allow the residents to overlook their own vehicles. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railing/timber fencing should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.



- ☐ Any communal side/rear access alleyways should be gated at their outermost point to prevent unauthorised access to where the dwellings could be attacked unseen. The gates themselves should be 2100mm high, self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut.
- ☐ The gardens/driveways to the front/side of the dwellings should be defined/segregated by low-level walls/railings to an approximate height of 1200mm. The design of any low boundaries should be carefully considered to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them – which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should also have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to the proposed access road should be to adoptable standards (to comply with BS 5489).
- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of all houses, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED, metal halide or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around dwelling entrances/frontages and around parking driveways, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people, dwellings and vehicles (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

-
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

Other

- ☐ Ideally, meter cupboards should be remotely read or located to the fronts of houses only and not in the private areas, in order to deter bogus callers.
- ☐ There should be no other features of the dwellings (such as projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting brickwork/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as trees, lighting columns, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids over boundaries to private space or up to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (such as boundaries, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
14 th June 2023	J Walker Homes Ltd	Receipt of CIS instruction form & site plan
20 th June 2023	J Walker Homes Ltd	Quote issued & request for additional information
3 rd July 2023	J Walker Homes Ltd	Instruction to proceed & receipt of additional plans
4 th July 2023	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
JWL/JuncGara	Site Location Plan	Jun 23	-
M4996 sk 08	Proposed Site Layout	Mar 23	-
M4996 sk 09	Boundary Treatment Plan	Jun 23	-
M4996 (00) 001	House Type Designs	19/06/23	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk