



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

1 Tower Street

11 No. dwellings

For: **KLASH PROPERTIES LTD**

Version A: **07/02/24**

Ref: **2022/0191/CIS/03**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

1 Tower Street

2022/0191/CIS/03

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported with recommendations made.

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in sections 3.3 and 4. The principal recommendations relate to securing the site, and the houses buildings appropriately. The recommendations are summarised as follows:

- Appropriate boundary treatments to the front and rear of the houses.
- Lighting to the front and rear of the premises and the access road.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application subject to the design team suitably addressing the recommendations contained in the report (Sections 3.3, 4 & 5), and will seek the inclusion of a planning condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.


The site is located on Tower Street, which is located in Heywood on the outskirts of Rochdale.

The perimeter of the site to Tower St and Brunswick St abuts the public footpath.


The south and east sides of the perimeter abut access roads. The other side of the access road to the east is St. James Church and the south is an open green space. All sides are open and easily accessible by the public.

Bolton town centre is approx. 5km to the west of the site.


The immediate surrounding area is mix of residential and industrial. The residential part offering a mixture of private and social housing typologies. Tower St contains a number of commercial premises, with residential estates formed along the road.




1 – View of the existing site.



2 – View along the south boarder of the site



3 – View along the north boarder of the site down Tower Street



7 – View of the existing site and neighbouring premises.



6 – View down fox street.



5 – View perimeter wall of the church showing the litter



4 – View from the south east corner of the site along Brunswick Street

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2023 to 31st December 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
36	11	94	452	47	10	10	20	21	5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months is above average for the Rochdale division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft having been most commonly reported. These offences have been occurring throughout the local area, particularly at locations close to the junction of Bury Street with Market Place where there is a number of restaurants and retail outlets, increasing the opportunity and potential targets for offenders.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have occurred throughout the local area, particularly at the hotspot mentioned above. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates as well as some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles has been the highest recorded criminal damage taking place. In cases of criminal damage to dwellings offenders have targeted glazing in windows by using objects to smash and damage them, as well as using bodily pressure to cause damage to external doors. Offenders have also targeted glazing within vehicles as well as damaged the body work.
- 2.1.4 Theft offences have mostly taken place at the hotspot of offences around the junction of Bury Street with Market Place whereby offenders have primarily targeted insecure items, bags and parcels left unattended, as well as having used pickpocketing techniques in order to remove items from the person such as credit cards and mobile phones.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by

- 2.2.2 Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

Possible Solution - A robust access control system should be in place to prevent tailgating by intruders. The main entrances should be located in a highly visible position and well-lit to deter offenders from trying to break-in. Apartment doors should not be positioned in recesses and should be readily visible along the internal corridors. Additionally, where postal deliveries are made to an internal rack of mailboxes, a double door entry system should be used, and the secondary door set should also be certified to recognised security standard and include a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system (N.B it is advised that postal / delivery personnel should not have free access inside the block). French windows / sliding doors opening on to insecure space at ground level should be avoided.

- 2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution – All ground floor / accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards. All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed

elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high and robust fencing with lockable gates so that rear windows are only accessible to residents.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Rochdale and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2017.




- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **27% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **29% higher** than Greater Manchester and **32% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **37% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **61% higher** than Greater Manchester and **207% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **57% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **77% higher** than Greater Manchester and **115% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **6% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **19% higher** than Greater Manchester and **44% higher** than England & Wales.


2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks Thursday late at night and in the morning (00:00-01:00 and 05:00-06:00). Offenders often target dwellings late at night and in the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using implements and bodily pressure.
- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as "unknown", it is likely that the offender has exploited insecure windows or doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is peaks on Tuesday just after midnight (00:00-01:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles late at night when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises of the demolition of the existing building and clearing of the site to make way for the construction of the 2 No. blocks of terrace houses. Block 1 consisting of 6 houses and block 2 consisting of 5 houses.
- 3.1.2 Block 1 faces Brunswick Street with off road parking via individual driveways for each house and block 2 faces Tower Street also with off road parking via individual driveways for each house.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will bring legitimate activity to a currently vacant site that is vulnerable to criminal damage and other abuse. Redevelopment with housing and repopulation of the site should help to create a sense of ownership and responsibility and improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 The entrances to the houses are in obvious locations and are readily apparent on approaching the building.
- 3.2.3 The layout of the development is broadly acceptable with regards to designing out crime and there are no areas that are concerning.
- 3.2.4 Bins will be positioned in secure rear gardens where they cannot be subject to misuse.
- 3.2.5 All dwellings will have driveway or a parking space. Vehicles parked on driveways are less likely to be targeted by offenders than when parked on the road or in communal parking courts.
- 3.2.6 Driveways are generally positioned where they can be overlooked from within the dwelling. The layout of the development allows residents can easily view other resident's parked vehicles allowing for mutual surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can appear hostile and increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Any new boundaries abutting private rear gardens should be a minimum of 1800mm high (the top 300mm can incorporate trellis). Boundaries adjacent publicly accessible space should be 2100mm high with a hardwearing blade (i.e., gravel board). All boundaries should be of robust construction such as close boarded timber.
- 3.3.2 A gate should be added to access the rear garden on plot 1.
- 3.3.3 The shared access road to the south of plot 1 should be illuminated to a high standard, to reduce the potential for crime and fear of crime.
- 3.3.4 Front gardens should be well defined with a low boundary treatment or low-level planting (i.e., to an approximate height of 1000mm).
- 3.3.5 The proposed front and rear of dwellings should be illuminated to a high standard, to reduce the potential for crime and fear of crime.
- 3.3.6 It is highly recommended that the proposed dwellings be built to Secured by Design standards detailed in section 4 of this report.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, or LPS 2081 SRA
- ☐ Any external French/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ Rear boundaries should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- ☐ Rear boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure. Rear/side boundaries adjacent a public footpath should be protected with a strip of defensible planting.
- ☐ Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.
- ☐ The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

-
- ☐ Gates into the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
 - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
 - A key operable deadlock

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Parking spaces at the side of dwellings should be illuminated.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ The proposed access road should be illuminated to adoptable standards.

4.8 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
03/01/24	C Tamworth Planning	CIS Application form and Drawings
07/01/24	DfS	Quote Issued
10/01/24	C Tamworth Planning	Client Confirmation
06/02/24	DfS	Site Visit
07/02/24	DfS	CIS Complete

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
1001	Location Plan		
1002	Existing Site Plan		
1004	Proposed Site Plan		
1005	Block 1 Proposed Floor Plans		
1006	Block 1 Proposed Elevations Section and 3D View		
1007	Block 2 Proposed Floor Plans		
1008	Block 2 Proposed Elevations Section and 3D View		
1010	External 3D View 1		
1011	External 3D View 2		
1012	External 3D View 3		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk