



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

LAND ADJACENT TO HORNBY STREET, HEYWOOD

12 no. COTTAGE FLATS TO PROVIDE HOMELESS & SUPPORT ACCOMMODATION

FOR: Cornerstone Place & Rochdale Borough Council

Greater Manchester Police

VERSION B: 11/12/2023

designforsecurity

REFERENCE: 2023/0526/CIS/01

Land adjacent to Hornby Street, Heywood

URN: 2023/0526/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

Such short-term accommodation facilities attract a more transient group of residents who, if not sensitively managed, can both generate and attract crime and disorder problems that may directly impact on the amenity of neighbouring residents. The overall security of the development will be heavily reliant on the continuous effective management of the accommodation, rather than just the physical measures recommended in the report.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- General boundary treatments, including secure enclosure of rear courtyard spaces, retained/replaced alleygates to rear of site and defined defensible space to frontages along Hornby Street.
- Single-storey eaves/roofs designed to discourage scaling.
- Control of access into/around the scheme, including secure postal delivery arrangements.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.1 Crime Rate Comparison	
	2.2 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis	
	2.3 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
	2.4 General Risk Factors for Residential Schemes	
	2.5 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	10
	3.1 Proposed Development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Points for Further Consideration	
4	Physical Security	12
	4.1 Doors & Access Controls	
	4.2 Windows	
	4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	4.4 Alarms	
	4.5 Boundaries	
	4.6 Lighting	
	4.7 CCTV	
	4.8 Landscaping	
	4.9 Other	
5	Management & Maintenance	15
6	Construction	15
7	Useful References	15
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact Register.....	16
B	Associated Documents.....	16
C	CIS Version History	16
D	Glossary	17

1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the west side of Hornby Street, in the Heywood area of south-west Rochdale.



The site is currently formed by a narrow strip of grass along the street frontage, with concrete panel fencing to the rear and a gated rear access alleyway between the landscaped strip and the rear of the terraced residential properties fronting onto Stanley Street to the west.

There is an informal pedestrian access route across the northern part of the site, linking Hornby Street to a vehicular/bin access route off Stanley Street.

To the immediate north of the site are semi-detached residential properties that front onto Stanley Street and have enclosed private gardens along Hornby Street. There is also a similar vehicular/pedestrian rear access route to the immediate south of the site linking Hornby Street and Stanley Street, running to the rear of the terraced residential properties fronting onto King Street to the south. There is some evidence that crime and disorder has occurred in this area, including damage to the adjacent garage window and lighting/CCTV installed by residents.

Terraced residential properties often front directly onto the street, meaning their front elevations are not protected by any defensible space – leaving windows/doors exposed to nuisance, anti-social behaviour, unauthorised access (if left insecure) and attack. Residents vehicles must be parked on street as they cannot be parked within the curtilage of the dwellings – leaving them exposed to damage/attack. Rear communal alleyways can also leave terraced dwellings vulnerable to unseen rear access and many of them across Greater Manchester have been fitted with communal alleygates as a result – including the alleyway to the rear of the site. Additional panels have also been fitted underneath the gates to account for the change in ground levels and to prevent unauthorised access through the gaps underneath the gates.

On the opposite side of Hornby Street from the site is a small area of grassed open space, Harwood Park Primary School and its enclosed playground. As a result, the site benefits from limited levels of direct overlooking along Hornby Street.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2022 to 31st October 2023.



2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
38	12	75	338	20	<5	<5	36	17	5



- 2.1.1 The general volume of recorded crime in the local area over the last 12 months has been above average for the Rochdale division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage, vehicle crime and domestic burglary being the most prevalent.
- 2.1.2 Crimes have occurred through the local area, including on the primary residential streets surrounding the site, with a particular hotspot around/off Bridge Street/Market Street/Dawson Street/York Street to the north – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported types of less serious wounding taking place, with disputes between known associates and cases of domestic violence most commonly reported. Criminal damage to vehicles and dwellings has accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences taking place in the local area. Offenders have smashed windows and damaged bodywork of vehicles, as well as smashed glazing to dwellings and commercial premises.
- 2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential scheme to provide homeless and support accommodation, the more detailed analysis below will look at local residential burglary and vehicle crime.

2.1 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relate to crimes committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2017.





- 2.1.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **31% higher** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **33% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **36% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.1.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **2% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **16% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **121% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.



- 2.1.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **22% higher** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **38% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **68% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.1.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **28% higher** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **42% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **73% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.


2.2 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Tuesday and is lowest on Friday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of domestic burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, late at night and around midday. Offenders often target properties at night, when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and they perceive a lower risk of being witnessed or identified. During the day, when residents are more likely to be away from home (at work or otherwise), offenders can perceive a lower risk of being disturbed.

Local Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry




2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure by residents (particularly front doors).
- There have been a number of incidents where the means of entry was unknown/legitimate – this is likely to have been when offenders have targeted insecure doors or windows unnoticed or have tailgated/posed as legitimate visitors to gain access to apartments.
- Windows have also been prised open, but to a lesser extent.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.


2.3 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Local Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Local Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.3.1 Theft from a motor vehicle and criminal damage to a vehicle has accounted for the majority of all vehicle crime in the local area. Offenders have used tools to remove vehicle registration plates, as well as smashed glazing to gain entry/cause damage and used sharp implements to damage vehicle bodywork.

2.3.2 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Monday and Wednesday. During the day, the risk peaks in the late afternoon/early evening. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at these times when people in the area park on-street or in open car parks in the local area to work in/visit the district centre. Owners are rarely able to overlook their own vehicles and offenders know that they may be left for long periods of time – leaving them vulnerable. At night, when it is dark and streets are generally quieter, offenders also often perceive a lower risk of being observed or identified.

-
- 2.3.3 Vehicles parked within open communal areas or on-street, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within the curtilages of individual properties or within secure garages.

2.4 General Risk Factors for Residential Schemes

- 2.4.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.5.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure by residents (particularly front doors).

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

All individual internal apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

- There have been a number of incidents where the means of entry was unknown/legitimate – this is likely to have been when offenders have targeted insecure doors or windows unnoticed or have tailgated/posed as legitimate visitors to gain access to apartment blocks.

Possible Solution - A robust access control system should be in place to allow staff/residents to vet visitors to the upper floor units before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The communal entrances should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access.

The locks to dedicated external entrance doors should be fitted with split-spindles (see Section 4.1), essentially meaning they are key only entry and are secure from the exterior of the dwelling when shut. This will ensure that they cannot be left open and accessible.

- Windows have also been prised open, but to a lesser extent.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors.

Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' can provide a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties (see Section 4.5). Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal

damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour. All private spaces to the sides/rear of dwellings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access (see Section 4.5). Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.6).

- **Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.**

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should ideally be small and set well-away from locking points.

Again, unauthorised access to the rear of properties should be deterred by robust boundaries and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes/publicly accessible areas to their rear where possible.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a two-storey terrace of 12 no. cottage flats, consisting of 8 no. 1B2P apartments at ground floor level and 4 no. 1B2P apartments at first floor level, to provide supported accommodation for young people aged between 18 & 25 with a housing need, at risk of homelessness and/or has been via the homelessness pathway and faced with one or more of the following;
- Separation and loss from no longer being able to remain with their family;
 - A range of historical experiences which include but is not limited to:
 - Victim of and/or witness to trauma, abuse or neglect;
 - Family breakdown;
 - Parental drug and alcohol issues;
 - Parental mental health or disability issues; and/or
 - Challenging behaviours which have developed from their experiences.
 - Multiple needs including but not limited to:
 - Drug and alcohol issues;
 - Anger management issues;
 - Low self-esteem;
 - Self-harm;
 - Mental health (either diagnosed or undiagnosed);
 - Learning disability (either diagnosed or undiagnosed);
 - Domestic abuse issues;
 - Offending issues; and/or
 - Financial or Child exploitation issues.
- 3.1.2 Access to the accommodation will be managed by the Local Authority, with each referral assessed on a case-by-case basis. The site will have designated staff visiting and on-site management with 2 FTE Workers and 0.5 Manager, in addition to a multi-agency team providing young person support across a number of sites. Off-site out-of-hours support/assistance will be provided by an on-call manager, with the number provide to all residents.
- 3.1.3 The units themselves will front towards Hornby Street, with the ground floor units served by their own dedicated external entrances off the street and a private external courtyard to their rear. The first floor units will be served by 2 no. stair cores with communal entrances off the street. The overlooking distances for the existing terrace to the rear of the site has dictated the layout and orientation of the first floor units. The existing gated alleyway will remain, with a single-storey ancillary space at the southern end of the proposed terrace. Bin and cycle stores will be incorporated into the rear of each of the dwellings (with the roofscape continued over the single-storey stores), accessed via doors within the secure yards.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The units will present active frontages to Hornby Street, enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the street.
- 3.2.3 The footprint of the units has been kept relatively simple, with no accessible doors/windows hidden within deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack unseen).

-
- 3.2.4 The dedicated entrances to the ground floor units and the communal entrances serving the first floor units will be located where it will be capable of being seen from the street, maximising surveillance over them and any visitors coming to/from them.
 - 3.2.5 Staff will likely be on-site much of the day, providing formal guardianship over the development and allowing staff to monitor and manage residents and visitors - deterring anti-social behaviour and allowing for an immediate response to any incidents. Off-site out-of-hours support/assistance services will also be provided for residents.
 - 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the scheme and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The rear courtyards/gardens to the ground floor units must be enclosed and defined as private space by 2100mm high walls or close-boarded timber fencing and gates if required (see Section 4.5 for more information). The existing alleyway must remain gated to prevent unauthorised access to the rear of the proposed units, as well as the existing terraced houses fronting onto Stanley Street (also see Section 4.5 for more information). The front elevations of the units (along Hornby Street) should be protected by some defensible space defined by low-level railings and planting, to funnel passing pedestrian movement away from the residential windows/doors.
- 3.3.2 The single storey bin/cycle stores to the rear of the dwellings will directly abut the rear alleyway, incorporated underneath sloping roofspaces. It is recommended that the single-storey eaves/roofs along the alleyway (and to the ancillary space to the south of the terrace) are designed to discourage unauthorised access/scaling as much as possible (see Section for more information 4.3).
- 3.3.3 The communal entrances serving the first floor units should be formed by security-certified doorsets secured with electronic multi-point locks, capable of being operated remotely via a robust access control system (see Section 4.1). There should at least be an audio entry phone system (ideally video) linked to each apartment, so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access. In addition to a robust access control system for visitors, there should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that ensures access to the first floor is not required (again, see Section 4.1 for more information).
- 3.3.4 Such short-term accommodation facilities attract a more transient group of residents who, if not sensitively managed, can both generate and attract crime and disorder problems that may directly impact on the amenity of neighbouring residents. In addition to appropriate physical security measures, it is essential that a suitable management plan has been developed and then designed into the scheme from the outset, in order to clearly demonstrate that crime and disorder issues have been considered and reasonable measures implemented to ensure that the development provides a safe and secure place for future residents.
- 3.3.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff, residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

In addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3, the following checklist forms the physical security requirements for the scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

Ground Floor Units

- ☐ The dedicated external entrance doorsets to the ground floor units must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. They should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key. Full instructions should be provided to residents to ensure that they understand that the key must be used to fully lock/secure the door. They should also have either fixed sidelights or door viewers. Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within the doors should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 008 (TS 008) and should be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Any rear doorsets (including to the bin/cycle stores) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2.

First Floor Units

- ☐ The communal entrance doorsets serving the first floor units must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. They should be single-leaf, self-closing and controlled by means of an audio entry phone system (ideally video - with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set within each apartment), so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ Postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled communal entrances.
- ☐ The rear communal doorsets providing access to the rear yard must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, self-closing/locking and operated by resident key-fob. The doorsets to the bin/cycle stores must also be security-certified to one of the above standards.
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ **Other**
- ☐ Doors should be secured/operated with keys of fobs issued to residents and staff. Key-coded locks are not recommended as they can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed. Given the likely transient nature of the residents of the scheme, resident keys must be retrieved from departing tenants and fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by staff to ensure that misuse is prevented.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ All ground floor and any other easily accessible opening lights (i.e. accessible above single-storey elements) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside), limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor and any other easily accessible glazing (i.e. accessible above single-storey elements) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ The design of any single storey elements should be carefully considered to ensure they cannot be easily scaled to cause nuisance/damage (e.g. high and rounded or overhanging eaves). There should be no features of the dwellings (such as projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting brickwork/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids onto the roof of dwellings.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Ideally, each apartment should have an intruder alarm to comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems; or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.
- ☐ If intruder alarms are installed, they should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover all accessible rooms with windows. On or off-site staff should be alerted if an intruder alarm is triggered.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The sides/rears of the dwellings should be enclosed with walls, railings or close-boarded timber fencing and gates to a height of 2100mm. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings/fencing should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. Any gates to private space should be self-closing and 'slam-to-lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key or fob operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut. Exposed hinges and large apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds. The hinges should also not provide footholds and the gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ The narrow/hidden space to the north of the terrace should not be accessible to the public. This space must be secured with fencing/gates to prevent unauthorised access and prevent it from being used as a link between Hornby Street and Stanley Street.
- ☐ The existing 2400mm high alleygates securing the alleyway to the rear of the site must be retained or replaced, in order to continue to prevent unauthorised access to the rear of the existing/proposed dwellings.
- ☐ The front gardens of the dwellings along Hornby Street should be defined and segregated by low-level walls/railings, to an approximate height of 1200mm. The design of any low walls/railings should be carefully considered to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them – which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *all external facades of the terrace, including all entrances*.
- ☐ If a CCTV system is to be installed, consideration should be given to allowing on or off-staff to monitor the system, to ensure there can be an immediate response to any incidents recorded.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around building entrances/frontages, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Any landscape features (hard or soft) to communal areas of landscaping should not impede natural surveillance of/from dwellings or reduce the effectiveness of lighting or any CCTV provision. There should also be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within designated/intended areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people, dwellings and vehicles (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over any boundary treatments or up to upper floor windows. The security of fences and buildings can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.9 Other

- ☐ The proposed cycle stores should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place while retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the accommodation must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations to the facilities management team.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a residential development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (e.g. boundary treatments, lighting, access controls, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.3 Any amenity areas should be subject to an effective maintenance contract, to ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.
- 5.1.4 All high value equipment within communal/staff areas (e.g. computers, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
4 th October 2023	Triangle Architects	Receipt of CIS instruction form & early plans (more to follow)
4 th October 2023	Triangle Architects	Quote issued & request for additional info
7 th to 8 th October 2023	Triangle Architects	Email correspondence re: details of the scheme
13 th November 2023	Triangle Architects	Confirmation of instruction/fee
22 nd November 2023	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
22 nd November 2023	Triangle Architects	Receipt of additional information – plans to follow
5 th December 2023	Triangle Architects	Version A of CIS issued
7 th December 2023	Triangle Architects	Receipt of amended plans & email correspondence re: timescales

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
23-031 SK01	Location Plan	Aug 2023	P01
23-031 SK02	Existing Site Plan	Aug 2023	P01
23-031 SK03	Constraints and Opportunities Diagram	Aug 2023	P01
23-031 SK12	Proposed Site Plan – Option 3	Aug 2023	P01
23-031 SK20	Typical Flat Type A	Sept 2023	P01
23-031 SK21	Typical Flat Type B	Sept 2023	P01
23-031 02	Proposed Site Plan	24/11/2023	P02
23-031 11	Proposed Block Plan	28/11/2023	P02
23-031 21	Proposed Block Elevations	28/11/2023	P02

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Minor revisions made to scheme, including removal of communal bin/cycle stores and cycle/bin storage incorporated to the rear of each dwelling	11/12/2023

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk