



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT: PRELIMINARY

SITE FORMERLY OF TACK LEA WORKS & SHEPPERD MILL,
GREENBOOTH ROAD, NORDEN, ROCHDALE

OUTLINE RESIDENTIAL SCHEME (APPROX. 56 no. HOUSES)

For: Castleton Property Company Ltd.

Version A: 06/01/21

Reference: 2009/0402/CIS/04

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity



Site Formerly of Tack Lea Works & Sheppard Mill, Greenbooth Road, Norden, Rochdale

URN: 2009/0402/CIS/04

The 'Crime Impact Statement: Preliminary' Explained

The 'Crime Impact Statement: Preliminary' has been created to accompany outline planning applications where layout is not considered (i.e. the proposal is only at the 'red line' stage). This part of the process will provide your design team with the contextual crime information, and site-specific design considerations needed to develop the layout and appearance of the proposal.

Reserved Matters Applications

Reserved matters applications, where layout is to be considered, will require a full Crime Impact Statement, which will appraise the design and layout of the developed proposals. Please contact us when work commences on the layout of the scheme for us to develop your preliminary report into a full Crime Impact Statement.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

We have no objection to the development of this site for residential use from a security perspective. However, the considerations and general recommendations within this report (see Section 3.2) should be addressed when the design team develop more detailed proposals.

A full CIS report should be prepared when the design of the scheme has progressed and an assessment of the details and specifications can be made. This is most productive well in advance of any future full/reserved matters planning application, so that any subsequent alterations do not cause delay to the submissions.

Please get in touch with Design for Security if you have any queries regarding the contents of this document, or the security standards referred to therein.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site is located off Edenfield Road (A680)/Greenbooth Road, in the Norden area of north-west Rochdale. It is the former site of Tack Lea Works and Sheppard Mill, which is currently occupied by derelict works buildings, large areas of hard standing and scrub vegetation. There is also a brook running through the site (Woodhouse Lane Brook), which joins the brook running along the southern and western edges of the site (Norden Brook). The northern portion of the site slopes upwards and the northern boundary is formed by steep landscaped banks and a retaining wall.

To the north of the site is wooded open space and to the east are large, detached residential properties accessed off Heap Road - both of which are at a higher ground level from the site itself.


The south-eastern portion of the site abuts Edenfield Road (A680), with an access point off it. The street frontage is formed by low walls, with residential properties, landscaping, a fish and chip restaurant, a public house and a park on the opposite side of Edenfield Road from the site.

The south-western and western portion of the site abuts Greenbooth Road - a narrower, cobbled, unlit street off Edenfield Road. There is a short terrace of residential properties to the south and a number of commercial buildings built over the culverted brook running along the western boundary of the site.

Greenbooth Lane is a narrow route that benefits from limited levels of activity, footfall, passive surveillance and direct overlooking. As a result, surveillance opportunities over the western portion of the site are limited. The eastern portion of the site can be seen from Edenfield Road, which is a wider/busier route.

Open land or routes to the sides/rears of dwellings and buildings can often lead to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and can leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly after dark. Adjacent sites/properties can also often be very vulnerable to unauthorised access, as they can provide easy access/escape routes that usually benefit from poor levels of natural surveillance.

Derelict sites can often experience loitering/gathering and foster nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal activity. Crime and anti-social behaviour are usually more likely to occur if an offenders presence does not attract attention and a place feels like it is not under supervision. If signs of disorder (such as damage, graffiti etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can attract further abuse and trigger a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality - giving the impression that such sites are not owned or cared for by anybody and that crime and disorder is tolerated.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded 2019 to 2020.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
13	<5	12	25	<5	<5	<5	5	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is relatively low. However, the study area includes large areas of open space that is not densely populated and, therefore, attracts fewer crime and disorder incidents. The most prevalent types of crime being less serious wounding, domestic burglary and criminal damage. The majority of offences have taken place to the east (around the commercial parade fronting onto Edenfield Road) and on the surrounding residential estates to the east and west.
- 2.1.2 As this Preliminary Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed outline residential scheme, the more detailed analysis below will look at residential burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparisons

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2019.

- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **48% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **49% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **35 % lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **61% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **57% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **51% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **75% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **69% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **55% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **59% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **47% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **16% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.

- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary peaks on Wednesday and Thursday. During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target properties at these times when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.
- 2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have been forced open using bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.
 - Glazing has been smashed within doors and windows.
 - Offenders have entered private gardens and forced entry into garden sheds.

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Wednesday and Saturday. During the day, the risk peaks during the afternoon and into the evening. Offenders often target vehicles during the day when they are left unattended and are not overlooked for long periods of time. Vehicles parked within open communal areas or on-street, where they are publicly accessible and sometimes cannot be easily/directly overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within the enclosed curtilages of individual properties or within secure garages.
- 2.4.2 Theft from a motor vehicle and criminal damage to a motor vehicle have been the highest recorded vehicle offences. Offenders have smashed glazing or have used devices to gain entry to vehicles. In cases of criminal damage offences, glazing and paint/body work have been targeted.

2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Crime Summary

- 2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting residential properties and parked vehicles are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have been forced open using bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (i.e. to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

The locks to the front entrance doors of houses should be fitted with split-spindles, essentially meaning they are key only entry and are secure from the exterior of the dwelling when shut. This will ensure that they cannot be left open and accessible.

All private spaces to the sides/rear of dwellings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime.

- Glazing has been smashed within doors and windows.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Any glazed panels in or around doors should ideally be small and set well-away from locking points.

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- Offenders have entered private gardens and forced entry into garden sheds.

Possible Solution – Again, unauthorised access to the rear of properties should be deterred by robust boundaries and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes/publicly accessible areas to their rear where possible.

Any sheds should be of robust construction (i.e. minimum 38x50mm planed timber frame; floor and roof constructed from minimum 11mm boards; and minimum 11x125mm tongue & grooved board walls and door), with coach-bolted hinges, two hasp and staples to meet 'Sold Secure' Silver and two padlocks to meet 'Solid Secure' Silver or LPS 1654 SR1.

- Vehicles have been targeted when parked on the street or within publicly accessible communal parking areas

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes.

3 Design Considerations

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is for an outline residential scheme, comprising of approximately 56 no. detached houses.
- 3.1.2 Although an illustrative masterplan site plan has been prepared, approval for the layout of the development is not being sought at this stage. The indicative layout shows that access to the scheme will be off Edenfield Road to the south-east. The proposed houses will front onto a single access road running from the south-east to the north-west of the site, as well as two short shared drives/cul-de-sacs off it.
- 3.1.3 The following issues are highlighted at this stage and should be addressed in the detailed design of the scheme.

3.2 Recommendations

- 3.2.1 It is highly recommended that there is only one way into/out of the scheme (off Edenfield Road) and there is no additional vehicular or pedestrian link onto Greenbooth Road to the north-west. Any such link could provide an easy access/escape route for criminals to utilise unseen and could leave adjacent dwellings and parked vehicles vulnerable to attack. A single access/egress point off Edenfield Road will be well-overlooked, will concentrate legitimate activity and make scheme less likely to attract crime - leaving criminals feeling more vulnerable to detection.
- 3.2.2 The dwellings should front directly onto the access road/cul-de-sacs in order to create 'active frontages' and maximize surveillance over other dwellings, parked vehicles, visitors and external spaces. The proposed dwellings should all have habitable room windows to their front elevations (at ground floor level) and their design should be kept simple, with no front doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack). Routes directly to the rear of dwellings, where they would benefit from little/no overlooking or natural surveillance and may leave the dwellings themselves vulnerable to unauthorised rear access unseen, should be avoided.
- 3.2.3 The boundary treatments to the houses are vitally important to secure them, any parked vehicles and prevent unauthorised access to private spaces. The sides (including gables up to or as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the houses should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access, particularly robustly where adjacent to publicly accessible space (see below). The front elevations of dwellings should be protected by some defensible space, creating garden areas/driveways that are clearly defined as separate from the adjacent public highways and each other, in ownership/control of the residents themselves. Encouraging residents/legitimate users to feel a sense of ownership and responsibility for their surroundings can make an important contribution to community safety and crime prevention. Uncertainty of ownership can reduce responsibility and increase the likelihood of crime and anti-social behaviour going unchallenged.
- 3.2.4 Many of the proposed dwellings will back onto publicly accessible vegetated banks or brooks - where offenders may be able to gain unauthorised access to the rear of the dwellings unseen - leaving them potentially vulnerable to rear access burglaries. As well as particularly robust boundary definitions, it is also highly recommended that belts of mature defensive planting is used on the public side of potentially accessible side and rear boundaries, to discourage damage, scaling or penetration of boundary treatments to private space. The location of boundaries should be amended where possible to allow for this requirement. Care should be taken to ensure that any existing or proposed ground level changes or trees do not inadvertently create climbing aids over boundaries to private space.
- 3.2.5 It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Any driveways/garages provided to the rear of individual properties, where vehicles would be hidden from view from the residents themselves (e.g. on corner plots), should ideally be incorporated into the rear gardens of the dwellings behind high fencing/vehicular gates or the boundaries to private space should be visually permeable (e.g. formed by railings) to allow residents to overlook their own vehicles.

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- 3.2.6 Physical protection measures should be incorporated into the constructed of the dwellings (including Secured by Design compliant doors, windows, glazing etc.) in order to make it harder for an offender to commit a crime and raising the risk of detection (see Section 4.1 for more information).
 - 3.2.7 A successful lighting scheme deters and reveals potential intruders and reduces the fear of crime. Lighting levels should be good, but not oppressive and evenly distributed. Lighting should be provided to all roads/footpaths, parking areas and to the front/rear of all dwellings.
 - 3.2.8 Any proposed landscaping features (hard or soft) in front of dwellings/buildings or around parking areas should not impede natural surveillance off/from the buildings/spaces or create climbing aids over any boundaries. Future soft landscaping growth and maintenance must be taken into account at the design stage.
 - 3.2.9 The phasing of building works and bringing into use parts of the site while others are undeveloped or under construction can significantly affect security. Uncompleted access roads/footpaths should be secured until such time as they are completed and surveillance opportunities are maximised from occupied dwellings. Care should also be taken to ensure that any hoardings erected around development sites do not create secluded passageways and blind spots, or become targets for criminal damage. It is recommended that while construction work progresses and occupancy levels of completed properties are low, an on-site security presence or off-site monitoring is maintained.

4 Useful References

4.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. The latest SBD guidance relating to new residential developments can be found at <http://www.securedbydesign.com/industry-advice-and-guides/>.

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
3 rd December 2020	Olive Group	Receipt of CIS instruction form & layout plan
4 th December 2020	Olive Group	Confirmation of instruction/fee
23 rd December 2020 to 4 th January 2021	Olive Group	Email correspondence re: timescales
31 st December 2020	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
102	Planning Layout	09.12.19	A1
-	Design & Access Statement. Former Tack Lea Works & Shephard Mill, Rochdale. Proposed Residential Development.	Sept 2020	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status	Revisions Made
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk