



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land at Junction of Sir Isaac Newton Way Michael
& Faraday Avenue

Petrol Filling Station & 2 No. Drive-Through Units

FOR: EG GROUP LTD

Greater Manchester Police

VERSION A - 22nd December 2023

designforsecurity



Land at the Junction of Sir Isaac Newton Way & Michael Faraday Avenue

2023/0288/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed redevelopment is in close proximity of residential developments which could potentially give rise to conflict (i.e. noise disturbance and antisocial behaviour) and this should be carefully considered. Further consideration should be given to the following points to enhance the security of the buildings:

- Opening hours should consider the close proximity of residential properties nearby.
- There should be a robust access control system, CCTV, and intruder alarm, to all buildings.
- The buildings should be built to Secured by Design standards to ensure a high level of security is achieved.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development and it is highly recommended that these are considered for the proposed units and the wider outline proposals.



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
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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Kingsway area of Rochdale.

The site is roughly rectangular and the boundaries are defined by Wallis Avenue to the North, to the East by Michael Faraday Avenue, to the South by Sir Isaac Newton Way, and to the West by the Hornet Public House.

The site is currently seeded and the boundary with the public footway is currently undefined, with the site directly abutting the pavement. There is a vehicular access point into the site which is taken from Wallis Avenue. There were some signs of flytipping at the access point which can be seen on the top-right photo; however, there was no other evidence of antisocial or criminal behaviour.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2022 to 30th November 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
12	<5	22	92	13	<5	<5	11	5	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months has been below average for the Rochdale division, with less serious wounding having been most commonly reported. These offences have been occurring throughout the local area, with a small hotspot of offences occurring at Kingsway Park High School to the southwest of the proposed site. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings, with the majority of offences involving disputes between known associates and students from the school, as well as some cases of domestic violence.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Opening secure doors (all door types) using bodily pressure and implements to access the premises.
Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4.2) which are designed to withstand a prolonged attempt to gain entry.
- 2.2.2 Breaking glazing in doors and windows, mainly to the front of the premises, using implements to gain access.
Possible Solution – Any ground floor or easily accessible glazing should contain a pane of laminate glazing, which cannot be easily smashed or shattered to gain entry.
- 2.2.3 Entering premises as legitimate customer and tailgating staff/ exploiting insecure doors to access staff only areas.
Possible Solution – Personnel gates or turnstiles should restrict access from the office foyer into the circulation core of the building. Any external doors should operate on an access control system.
- 2.2.4 Forcing open shutters using implements and bodily force to gain access.
Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to a recognised security standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR2). Shutters certified to a burglary resistant standard are able to withstand prolonged, opportunist, attacks by criminals




2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer/staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Rochdale Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Rochdale retail premises remains consistently high, with a slight peak on Monday and Wednesday. During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning when it is dark, the majority of such premises are closed/unoccupied, streets are quiet and offenders perceive a lower risk of being witnessed.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** When offenders have targeted Rochdale retail premises, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Shutters have been forced open with tools/implements, bodily pressure and vehicles to gain access or to target doors/windows behind them.
- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using implements and bodily pressure.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Where entry points were 'legitimate' or 'unknown', offenders are likely to have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have penetrated through walls and roofs using tools to gain access to premises.

2.5 Theft (Rochdale Retail): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against retail, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Rochdale retail premises peaks on Thursday. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or personal property stolen from customers (e.g. purses/wallets, mobile phones etc.). Theft of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Monday in the afternoon (13:00-14:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time during the working week when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time whilst they are at work, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Full Planning Permission for the erection of a Petrol Filling Station inclusive of 4 Jet Wash Bays and 1 Roll Over Car Wash, 2no. Drive-Through units (Class E) with circulatory routes, associated car parking, landscaping and other works.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The existing site is vacant, which can generate antisocial and criminal behaviour. On the day of my site visit there was evidence of flytipping. These activities are usually to the detriment of local resident particularly those who overlook the site. The development of the site will reduce the potential for misuse and introduce a capable guardian (i.e. the staff of these businesses) which will be able to monitor the site and report any incidents.
- 3.2.2 The mix of uses proposed on the site will generate activity during different times of the day and the evening, deterring offenders from targeting the site and not allowing antisocial behaviour to go undetected.
- 3.2.3 The adjacent public house will be busy during the afternoon and into the evening which will generate activity in the local area to the benefit of the site.
- 3.2.4 The site is well overlooked by residential properties allowing for mutual surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.5 The of the buildings will allow for staff and customers to have a wide range of views across the site and surrounding area, allowing for high level of natural surveillance of the surrounding areas.
- 3.2.6 The building footprints relatively simple and do not contain any recessed areas or similar which could provide an area of concealment for an offender, or someone anti-socially minded, to exploit.
- 3.2.7 The proposed parking areas for the drive-through restaurant are overlooked from inside these buildings.
- 3.2.8 The drive-through restaurant to the North of the site is set back from the public highway and the residential properties beyond, reducing the potential for noise disturbance.
- 3.2.9 There are no external eating areas associated with the drive through units.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The site is overlooked by houses to the north. It is highly recommended that the proposed opening hours of all buildings on the site should consider the nearby approximately of residential buildings, to ensure that local residents are not unduly affected by noise disturbance which may occur during the night. There is a neighbouring public house (The Hornet) which is open until 11pm. It is highly recommended that the internal areas open to the public within the drive-through units close at the same time, or earlier, so that the proposed development do not have the potential to cause additional noise disturbance beyond what is currently established.
- 3.3.2 There should be privacy measures installed (i.e. vegetation at the edge of the site) so that the drive through windows, to the North of the site, do not directly overlook residential properties, to the detriment of those residents.
- 3.3.3 The footpaths through the site should be illuminated with dedicated lighting or ambient lit from nearby street lighting. Vegetation surrounding the footpaths should be kept to a minimum to improve sightlines.
- 3.3.4 The proposed parking areas should be illuminated to a high standard (i.e. in accordance with BS 5489), any directional arrows or one-way systems should be clearly demarcated, and all bays should be clearly marked. Consideration should be given to providing larger parking spaces to easily accommodate larger vehicles such as SUVs and reduce the risk of conflict.
- 3.3.5 Bicycle parking should be positioned where it can be easily seen from inside the building it is associated with. They should be illuminated to a high standard to deter offenders from targeting bicycles.

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- 3.3.6 The wider site and the individual buildings (internally & externally) should be covered with a comprehensive CCTV system. If the internal fit-out is being carried out by the end user, then there should be the infrastructure for one to be easily installed.
 - 3.3.7 Each building should be fitted with a monitored alarm system. If the internal fit-out is being carried out by the end user, then there should be the infrastructure for one to be easily installed.
 - 3.3.8 All back-of-house areas should be secured with an access control system to restrict access to staff and prevent members of the public accessing these spaces. Lockers should be provided for staff to secure their personal belongings whilst at work.
 - 3.3.9 Safes should be stored in secure rooms within the building, preferably within a solid blockwork room with a security rated doorset. Safes should be certified under AiS and rated for the maximum amount of cash that will be on site at any time.
 - 3.3.10 The buildings should be built to Secured by Design standards to ensure a high level of security.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

5 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

5.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ Sliding doors must be certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

5.2 Windows, Curtain Walling, Cladding & Shutters

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any shutters must be tested and certified to STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.
- ☐ Solid block walls should be provided behind any cladding to a height of 2400mm to prevent attacks to the cladding to gain access to buildings.

5.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover each building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room. If the internal fit-out is being carried out by the end user, then there should be the infrastructure for one to be easily installed.

5.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - External doors
 - Doors into the rear service passageway

5.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

5.7 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ Lighting to car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

5.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

5.9 Other

- ☐ Staff lockers should be provided so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security and maintenance regime for the management of the units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing the units, including staff arrival and departure.
 - Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
 - Details of staff security training.
 - Location and management of any smoking areas.
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc.
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc.
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 6.1.2 All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 6.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

7 Management & Maintenance

- 7.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal

-
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

8 Construction

- 8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 8.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
01/12/2023	Bruce Risk	CIS application received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
1826-1	Site Location Plan		
1826-7	Existing Site Layout		
1826-8c	Planning		
1826-9 PFS	Building Plans & Elevations		
1826-10a	Drive Through Unit Plans & Elevations		
1826-11a	Drive Through Unit Plans & Elevations		
1826-12	Petrol Canopy		
1826-13	Car Wash and Jet Wash Bays		
1826-16	Proposed Site Elevations		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		