



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Bowlee Driving Range, Heywood Old Road

Bowlee Park Driving Range

For: **Improve my Golf Ltd**

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: **01/07/24**

design**for**security

Ref: **2024/0190/CIS/01**

Bowlee Driving Range, Heywood Old Road

2024/0190/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported / security additions advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to expose any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime within the proposal.

The proposed development is welcomed. The design of the scheme is very positive from a pedestrian safety perspective, with an interest in maintaining a safe and secure environment.

Given the low levels of crime in the area currently, it is also likely that offenders will be attracted to the development. Consequently, the site and the premises within it will need to be secure, with security an integral element of the design and management of the development.

The following issues have been identified as potential generators of insecurity, and must be addressed as described within the report (see Section 3.3 for more details):

- Secure staff & user cycle hoops location
- Installing fencing and gates to secure the perimeter of the site when the development is closed for business.
- Installing appropriate lighting, CCTV and intruder alarm systems
- Any Storage containers that meet the LPS 1175 standard (or to the principles of LPS 1175) should be used.

Our support for this scheme is subject to the above issues being satisfactorily addressed, as described within the report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is presently in use as a golf driving range with associated car parking.

Bowlee Driving range is situated on the outskirts of Middleton, accessed off the A6045.

The M60 is located to the south of the site and provides good transport access to the wider areas of Greater Manchester. Heywood Old Road provides a number of bus stops and routes in close proximity to the site.

The site is bordered by public rights of way to the North, east and Southern borders leading to Bowlee Community Park.

Immediate neighbours of the site are the David Llyod leisure centre to the North and Bowlee Garden centre to the West.

The sites boundaries contain a mix of metal railings, palisade and chainmesh fencing. Beyond the fencing is dense hedgerows, bushes and trees.


The main vehicle entry point is controlled with a metal gate which is open during business hours.

There was elements of small scale fly-tipping at sections of the public footpaths.

The footpaths lead to the Langley area, a large overspill housing estate to the East of the site.

Immediately South of the site are green farmland.

The site appears well maintained.



1 – View towards the site.



2 – Vehicle control methods & public footpath.



3 – Main avenue leading to the A6045.




4 – Public footpath along the Northern boundary.



7 – Public footpath along the Southwest boundary.



6 – Evidence of small scale fly-tipping.



5 – Main car park.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2023 to 31st May 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	<5	21	64	11	<5	<5	<5	5	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months is low for the Rochdale division, with less serious wounding and criminal damage having been most commonly reported. Offences have mostly taken place within the residential neighbourhoods to the east of the proposed site around Windermere Road. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place, the majority of which has involved disputes between known associates and neighbours. In cases of criminal damage offences, offenders have mainly targeted vehicles by using objects to smash the glazing in the windows and damage the bodywork.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **USports Facilities: Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements/tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.**

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.6, 4.8 and 4.9) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, users or passers-by.

- 2.2.2 **Sports Facilities: Windows have also been targeted, with offenders prised them open, removing the beading/glazing or smashing the glazing to gain unauthorised access.**

Possible Solution - All windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, external bars or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

- 2.2.3 **Sports Facilities: Offenders have gained access to insecure rooms/areas unnoticed, before targeting school equipment.**

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access to all areas. All visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the school. Reception staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day. Effective access controls within the buildings should assist in restricting entry to vulnerable areas.

- 2.2.4 **Sports Facilities: Shutters have been forced upwards to gain unauthorised access or to access doors/windows behind them.**

- 2.2.5 *Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.*


2.3 Risk Factors - Leisure

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Controlled access (staff/user only)
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Employee theft
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space

2.4 Non-Burglary Risk Analysis (Leisure Centres)

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres, and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.





2.4.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at leisure facilities in the Greater Manchester area peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon/early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.2 Point of Entry: The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

2.5 Theft Risk Analysis (Leisure Centre/Gyms)



The data below relates to thefts within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres, and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at leisure facilities within the Greater Manchester area peaks on Tuesday but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Tuesday in the afternoon (16:00-17:00). Offenders often target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended for long periods of time whilst the owners are at work, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Full planning submission for the redevelopment of the Former Bowlee Park Driving Range including a new adventure golf facility, additional driving bays at first floor level and improved access with increased parking spaces.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will generate greater legitimate activity over longer periods will help to increase informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 The proposed masterplan will see the development of a long-standing empty plot. The redevelopment of the site will remove a site which provides no street level activity.
- 3.2.3 The new development will create a controlled entrance area allowing staff to observe user movement in, out and around the proposal. Increasing the staff control of the entrance and improvements in natural surveillance within the scheme provides a safe and enjoyable experience for all users.
- 3.2.4 The increased activity, improved lighting and natural surveillance associated with the development will greatly enhance the experience of the range of uses and pedestrian environment in this area of Trafford.
- 3.2.5 Opening the views across the zones and courts will facilitate mutual surveillance between the parks and the public realm spaces around.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Secure the rear boundaries of the development with suitable high robust fencing. Particularly where the fencing line abuts the new containers.
- 3.3.2 Buildings used to accommodate the business and any storage containers used should meet the LPS 1175 standard (or at least adhere to the principles of LPS 1175 certification), to allow management staff too securely store stock and close up the units overnight.
- 3.3.3 Avoid measures that could aid climbing onto the roofs of units to by-pass formal security measures.
- 3.3.4 Install a CCTV system to monitor the site throughout the day and night. External areas around the buildings should be capable of surveillance by staff from inside the premises. Where direct views are not possible, a monitored CCTV system should be visible on a screen at the reception point.
- 3.3.5 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- 3.3.6 Flat roof areas of the structures may attract inappropriate attention outside operational hours. This may become a health and safety issue as well as a crime and anti-social behaviour problem. The buildings should include design features that will minimise the risk of unwanted access to the roof, for example: avoidance of footholds on window ledges; rounded roof edges; widened eaves; an absence of balustrades; careful placement of pipework, bins, storage boxes or electrical boxes that might assist climbing.
- 3.3.7 Arson risk. Buildings should be of particularly robust construction and fire resistant / fireproof materials should be used. Fire resistance should be integral to the buildings, as in this isolated location, a fire could be well-established before it can be detected and extinguished.

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- 3.3.8 Cycle parking. Short-stay cycle parking for patrons should be located where it can be easily overlooked from within the building.
 - 3.3.9 All rooms should be capable of locking, so that access within the buildings can be restricted.
 - 3.3.10 The layout of the building should include adequate space to accommodate secure storage space for staff and patron's personal belongings while at work (e.g., lockers).
 - 3.3.11 Climbing aids - The design of the building should include no external climbing aids that may allow an offender to gain access to upper levels or areas of roof. The position of adjacent features such as fencing, play equipment and storage containers should not provide a potential step up.
 - 3.3.12 Bin store. The proposals for storage of waste are not clear from the plans supplied for assessment. Bin stores located within publicly accessible space are frequent targets for theft, criminal damage and can provide cover for other criminal and antisocial behaviour. It is advised that they are located behind a secure fence line accessible to site staff only. The position of the bin store must not obstruct views or provide potential hiding places.
 - 3.3.13 Any equipment / street furniture should be designed to withstand casual acts of vandalism. When selecting or designing items, consider how easily and quickly they can be repaired or replaced following damage.
 - 3.3.14 Signage and orientation. Routes leading to and from facilities must be obvious to site users. Disorientation can provide legitimacy for an offender to be present in a restricted area. Clear signage should be provided throughout the leisure centre, which will help to direct people to where they need to go and discourage entry to restricted areas.
 - 3.3.15 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Any sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All internal doors / frames to offices and stores should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a 5 lever mortise deadlock (to BS 3621 / EN 12209), so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any shutters to protect ground floor openings must integrally-mounted and be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ The intruder alarm should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ Secure boundary treatments should generally be 2400mm/3000mm high and of welded wire mesh construction.
- ☐ There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the fence, to reduce the potential for crawling into secure areas.

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to

allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places.

- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ Use of loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes along Turn Moss Road / within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 Car parking

- ☐ Lighting to car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes / directions clearly signed.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: **Main entrances, building perimeter, synthetic pitch, cycle parking.**

4.10 Other

- ☐ Any externally mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire-resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ Any areas of flat roof should use a system approved by Secured by Design (see www.securedbydesign.com) or include reinforcement such as expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors / televisions, portable sports equipment, tools etc.) should be property-marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the building. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.
- ☐ Timber building features must be robust and fire-resistant. A reinforced lining such as welded steel mesh can enhance the security of the building fabric.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
 - Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
28/05/24	RALA	CIS instructed
17/06/24	RALA	CIS confirmed
17/06/24	RALA	Drawings issued
17/06/24	GMP	Invoice issued
08/07/24	Client	Invoice paid
04/07/24	DfS	Site visit
05/07/24	DfS	CIS completed
08/07/24	DfS	CIS Issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
BDR-RALA-0019_	BowleeDrivingRange_proposed_rachelQDJH4	28/05/24	
BDR-RALA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-(00)-	Existing ground floor site plan	28/05/24	
BDR-RALA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-(00)-	Proposed Ground Floor Site Plan	28/05/24	
BDR-RALA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-(00)-	Existing ground floor plan	28/05/24	
BDR-RALA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-(00)-	Proposed Ground Floor Site Plan	28/05/24	
BDR-RALA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-(00)-	Proposed first floor	28/05/24	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk