



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

HANSON PLACE, GORRELLS WAY, ROCHDALE
INDUSTRIAL EXTENSION & NEW BUILD (TOTALLING 2,110sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Hanson Springs Ltd.

VERSION A: 09/10/2024

REFERENCE: 2016/0432/CIS/02

Hanson Place, Gorrells Way, Rochdale

URN: 2016/0432/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements recommended

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Section of chain link fencing to south-west of site perimeter should be replaced with more appropriate security fence and the narrow, hidden route to the rear of the new building (A) should be gated to prevent unauthorised access. A comprehensive survey of the remaining perimeter fencing is also recommended to address any weaknesses.

If these issues are addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit


The site lies at the north-eastern end of Gorrells Way, approximately 2km to the south-west of Rochdale town centre.

The site is bounded by similar industrial premises to the south (accessed off Gorrells Way/Gorrells Close), the Rochdale to Manchester railway line to the west and Edinburgh Way/the Rochdale Bypass and a short section of Rochdale Canal (with no towpath) to the east.

The site is occupied by Hanson Springs Ltd. – a manufacturer of springs. The site currently contains two large industrial/office buildings, external storage areas and ample parking for staff, visitors and HGVs.

The site is bounded by high walls and Palisade fencing, as well as dense vegetation/mature trees along the adjacent railway line and dual-carriageway. There is a small portion of the site to the south-west that is enclosed with chain link fencing, with secured vehicular gates adjacent to the site entrance.

There is a 24/7 staffed security lodge at the entrance to the site off Gorrells Way, with an automatic vehicle arm barrier operated remotely by the security staff.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2023 to 31st August 2024.



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
7	9	24	90	24	<5	5	14	7	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall volume of crime in the local area over the past 12 months has been below average for the Rochdale division. The study area does include large scale industrial premises, large areas of open space and transport infrastructure, which lower the density of development and typically attract fewer crime and disorder incidents.
- 2.1.2 The majority of recorded crimes have occurred to the north (around the existing supermarket and retail/leisure park) and to the east (around/off the existing residential estates). The most prevalent types of crime have been less serious woundings – with assaults, harassment and public order offences being the most commonly reported. These incidents have mainly involved disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed industrial scheme, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Rochdale Industrial Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Rochdale industrial premises remains relatively consistent – peaking slightly on Thursday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary rises in the afternoon, peaking late at night and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target industrial premises at these times when it is dark, industrial areas are typically quiet, units are often closed or operate with fewer staff and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

Rochdale Industrial Burglary – Point of Entry





2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** When targeting Rochdale industrial premises, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Offenders have damaged or forced shutters upwards to gain unauthorised access or to gain access to doors and windows behind them.
- In a number of cases, the point of entry was 'unknown'. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors or employees before gaining access to back-of-house/staff areas and stealing property unnoticed.
- Doors have been forced open using tools/implements or when they have been left insecure by members of staff.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

2.3 Theft (Rochdale Industrial Premises): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



2.3.1 **Day & Time Range:** The greatest risk of theft at Rochdale industrial premises is experienced during the working week (i.e. Monday to Friday). During the day, the risk peaks during the late afternoon and into the evening. There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property from within buildings (e.g. cash, mobile phones, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from warehouses or service/storage yards.

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site between 1st September 2023 to 31st August 2024.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Monday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks around midday and during the early hours of the morning. Offences are likely to peak during the afternoon as vehicles are likely to be left unattended and out of sight of the owner whilst they attend work, creating a perceived low risk opportunity. At night, offenders often target vehicles in residential areas when it is dark, streets are quiet and they perceive a lower risk of being observed/detected.

2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:
- Burglary
 - Robbery to business
 - Theft of personal belongings at work
 - Criminal damage to property and vehicles
 - Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
 - Arson
 - Cycle theft
 - Employee theft
 - Theft of/from parked vehicles
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Rochdale industrial premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Offenders have damaged or forced shutters upwards to gain unauthorised access or to gain access to doors and windows behind them.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.1) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

- In a number of cases, the point of entry was 'unknown'. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors or employees before gaining access to back-of-house/staff areas and stealing property unnoticed.

Possible Solution – There should be a robust access control system in place to ensure that callers to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Sections 4.1). All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

- Doors have been forced open using tools/implements or when they have been left insecure by members of staff.

Possible Solution - Although the location of doors should be considered (ideally placed where they can be readily observed, so that potential criminals would be more easily detected), it is inevitable that some will be located where they will benefit from lower levels of natural surveillance. All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 3.3, 4.7 & 4.8) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- Theft of materials, tools or plant equipment from warehouses/service yards

Possible Solution - The integrity of the boundary treatments should be evaluated and regularly checked for defects. Inappropriately parked vehicles/trailers and other externally stored items can obscure the spread of lighting and CCTV coverage, creating potential areas of intense shadowing and blind spots. It is recommended that this is considered in the external arrangement, and 'no store/park' areas specifically identified to avoid inadvertently blocking surveillance. Storage/parking areas close to boundaries should also be avoided as they may mask any damage to perimeter fencing.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a new industrial storage building and an extension of an existing industrial building (totalling 2,110sqm.), as well as reconfiguration of the existing car park.
- 3.1.2 The new building (A) will be located within the western portion of the existing site and will be used for storage and small scale welfare facilities for staff (including break room canteen, kitchen and W/Cs). The proposed extension (B) will be located to the southern end of Building 2 and will be used for the business's manufacture of springs, which they supply worldwide.
- 3.1.3 The existing car park will be reconfigured slightly to allow for the new building and extension, along with improved hard landscaping to the main entrance of Building 1 and new tree planting along the eastern elevation of Building 1 (along Edinburgh Way). The existing perimeter fencing and security lodge at the single point of entry off Gorrells Way will be retained.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will sit within an existing industrial site with established security protocols, including secure perimeter fencing and a 24/7 staffed security lodge to control access to the site.
- 3.2.2 The footprint of the proposed new build and extension are simple, with no recesses that could provide cover for covert criminal activity. The industrial buildings will also be sufficiently tall enough to make unauthorised access to the roof difficult.
- 3.2.3 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design/construction of the extension and new build. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design/specification of the development can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 It is highly recommended that a comprehensive survey of the existing perimeter fencing is undertaken, to ensure that any external features (such as immediately adjacent trees/branches) that may form climbing aids are removed or pruned and that any damaged/missing pales are repaired or replaced where necessary. The pales of Palisade fencing can often be vulnerable to damage or penetration, particularly when they are secured with rivets, rather than anti-tamper bolts. Although it is noted that new/replacement perimeter fencing is not part of the proposed scope of works, if any damaged perimeter fencing is to be replaced in the future, it is highly recommended that high security, rigid panel, welded-wire mesh fencing is used (please see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers), to an approximate height of 2400mm, which would offer a greater level of security and is much harder to scale, penetrate or damage than Palisade fencing. If Palisade fencing must be used, it should be of rivetless construction, ideally with the bottom of the pales buried in concrete (although it is noted that this may not always be possible). Care should also be taken to ensure that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates and there should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing.
- 3.3.2 At present, the south-western corner of the site is bounded by chain link fencing, which is not considered an appropriate type of security fencing as it can be easily bent, cut etc. It is highly recommended that the perimeter fencing in this location is replaced with SBD compliant welded-wire mesh fencing or Palisade fencing (see above for more details).

- 3.3.3 The proposed new building (A) will sit close to the perimeter boundary of the site, with a narrow route between its rear elevation and the south-western boundary – obscuring sight lines that currently allow effective monitoring of the area. It is highly recommended that secondary fencelines/gates (approx.. 2100mm high) are incorporated to prevent unauthorised access to the narrow, hidden space to the rear of the new building. If panic mechanisms are required on the inner face of any pedestrian gates for escape purposes, they should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the fencelines/gates. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- 3.3.4 The proposed new building and extension sit within an existing site, with established security protocols in place. As long as the appropriate physical security measures are incorporated into the construction of the buildings (see Section 4), the proposed scheme is considered acceptable. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff.



4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the recommended physical security measures for the proposed scheme.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Sectional loading bay doors/roller shutter doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ Any internal doors/frames to individual offices, changing rooms, stores etc. should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a deadlock, to allow them to be secured when unoccupied.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Any ground floor/accessible windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards)
- ☐ Any ground floor and any other easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor/accessible glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass. If any vision panels required within the loading bay doors cannot include laminated glazing, they should include a material of a similar strength (e.g. multi-layer acrylic/polycarbonate or hammerglass) to ensure they are resistant to shattering and penetration.
- ☐ The construction of the walls of the proposed buildings should also be carefully considered to ensure they are not vulnerable to damage or penetration. Consideration should be given to a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack. Where possible, the external walls of the buildings should be protected by crash-barriers to prevent damage by vehicles.
- ☐ As much as possible, the design of the eaves of any single-storey elements should discourage climbing (e.g. rounded or overhanging) and there should be no features of the building itself, or nearby hard/soft landscaping features, that may provide climbing aids onto the roof.

4.4 Access Controls

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads (which can be easily observed/shared and are rarely changed). The following doors should operate on access control:
 - All external doors where regular staff access is required.
 - Any internal doors providing access to obvious high risk areas e.g. server rooms, storage areas, staff changing facilities/lockers etc.

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- ☐ The electric locking system to be used should be fully auditable (i.e. allowing the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work and keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.5 Alarm

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the proposed buildings, linked to contacts on all doors, shutters and windows, with a signal terminating at a security control room or an Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC), to alert staff if anyone attempts to gain unauthorised access.

4.6 Parking Areas

- ☐ Lighting to parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ The surface of parking areas should be even tarmac or concrete. The integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and shutters
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *Acceptable Standard* that will allow for *Identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *Overview* and *Recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

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- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [the main entrance to the site](#), [all external elevations/circulation areas](#), [all A/C doors](#) & [all vehicle/cycle parking areas](#).

4.9 Other

- ☐ The position of ancillary structures, parked trailers and any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
- Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
 - Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.
 - Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
 - Their potential to obscure damage to fencelines.
- Any proposed lighting columns, street furniture, tree/shrub planting etc. within or external to the site perimeter should also be reviewed in relation to the above issues.
- ☐ Any external bin/recycling stores should be secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ Any lockers within staff changing facilities must be robust/secure and all users should be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs insecure/unattended.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 There should be a comprehensive security regime in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV etc.)
 - A weekly physical check of all perimeter fencing to check for evidence of breaches
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.3 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, tools, plant/equipment etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site and the buildings, but also to deter unauthorised access to restricted/authorised staff only areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
11 th September 2024	Roman Summer	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plan
11 th September 2024	Roman Summer	Quote issued & request for further information
12 th September 2024	Roman Summer	Confirmation of instruction/fee. Receipt of current plans – currently work in progress. More to follow
21 st September 2024	Roman Summer	Receipt of updated plans
2 nd October 2024	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
188 PLN L 09	Location Plan (SUPERSEDED)	Sept 24	A
188 PLN L 09	Location Plan	240918	B
188 PLN L 11	Existing Site Plan	Sept 24	-
188 PLN L 08	Sketch Block Masterplan	Sept 24	-
188 PLN L 10	Block Masterplan	Sept 24	-
188 PLN L 12	Proposed Site Plan	Sept 24	-
188 PLN P 03	Proposed New Build Plans	Sept 24	-
188 PLN P 04	Existing Plans	Sept 24	-
188 PLN P 05	Proposed New Build Plans	Sept 24	-
188 PLN E 02	Proposed Elevations Option 2	Sept 24	-
188 PLN E 03	Proposed Extension Elevations	Sept 24	-
188 PLN E 04	Existing Extension Elevations	Sept 24	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk