

Trammell Crow Company

Heywood Stores Manchester Road

Crime Impact Statement
October 2022





CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Redevelopment of the site comprising the demolition of all existing units and erection of new storage and distribution units (Use Class B8) with ancillary office space, vehicular, pedestrian and cycle access, external yards, parking, landscaping and associated works

AT Manchester Road, Heywood, Rochdale

FOR: Trammell Crow Company Logistics Ltd

VERSION B: 12.10.22

2022/0284/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

Design for Security welcome the investment in the site and support the proposed development. The scheme has been well-considered from a crime prevention perspective and we are happy to support it. Our support is subject to the developer making reasonable endeavours to comply with the recommendations and security specification set out in sections 3.3 and 4 of the report. The main recommendations are as follows:

- Consider retaining the existing or installing a new security lodge at the entrance to the development, and employing security staff at the entrance and/or have dedicated staff remotely monitoring the development outside of business hours
- Retain perimeter fencing, ensuring the design, height and material used in any replacement or new boundary fencing minimises the risk of damage or penetration by offenders and add defensive planting to supplement the fencing as appropriate
- Install security-rated external doors, roller shutters, window frames and laminate glazing when constructing the units
- Use access control systems to regulate movements into and through each unit, where appropriate
- A monitored intruder alarm should be installed to each unit
- A monitored CCTV system should be installed
- Cycle stores should be weatherproof

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will make representations to Rochdale Planning requiring, where feasible, adherence to the security recommendations set out in the report and inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.

Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*

Consultant

e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

Contents

1	The Site and Surroundings.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood around the site	
	2.2 Crime at industrial & warehouse premises in Rochdale	
	2.3 Modus operandi used in burglary, theft and criminal damage at industrial and warehouse premises in Rochdale and measures to reduce risk	
	2.4 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns	
3	Development Appraisal	9
	3.1 The proposed development	
	3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal	
	3.3 Recommendations to enhance the security of the development	
4	Physical Security	13
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Window frames & shutters	
	4.3 Glazing	
	4.4 Intruder alarm	
	4.5 Access control	
	4.6 Boundary fencing	
	4.7 Lighting	
	4.8 Landscaping	
	4.9 CCTV	
	4.10 Car Park	
5	Management & Maintenance	14
6	Secured by Design (SBD)	14

Appendix

A	Contact Register	15
B	Associated Documents.....	15
C	CIS Version History	15
D	Glossary	16

1 The Site and Surroundings

The development site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The site, edged in red on the plan, is located on the western side of Manchester Road in Heywood, Rochdale. Manchester Road, A6045, connects the towns of Middleton, south-west of the site, to Heywood, a shorter distance to the north-east. A new, 2.2km road, connecting junction 19 of the M62 to the Heywood Distribution Park, about 1km west of the site, has been constructed and will open to traffic imminently. The link road crosses Manchester Road immediately south of the site, where a light controlled junction will control the flow of traffic, and closely follows the site boundary before heading due west towards the Distribution Park. The land opposite the site access, on the eastern side of Manchester Road, is used for livestock grazing. Comprising a series of culs-de-sac, including Bader Drive and White House Close, there is a small housing estate to the east of the site. Some these houses and bungalows have windows on their rear or side elevations that overlook the site. The sports fields of Newhouse Academy, a secondary school, are situated immediately north of the site. There is an area of scrubland west of the site. This land, as well as land south of the link road and grazing east of Manchester Road, is included in the 128-hectare masterplan for South Heywood. As well as the link road, the masterplan envisages the construction of 140,000m² of employment space, a school, 1,000 homes and recreational spaces. The approved plans indicate that housing will be built on the scrubland west of the site.


A view of the site from the junction of Manchester Road and the new M62 link road



The gated entrance to the site with security lodge and vehicle barriers



A view of some of the storage buildings on the site



Looking north across the new link road towards the site



Scrubland west of the site earmarked for residential development



The rear windows of houses that face Bader Street overlook the site



The irregularly-shaped development site measures approximately 11.3 hectares. It is currently occupied by a series of nine warehouse buildings of differing sizes, with a combined floorspace of around 32,000m², as well as a number of ancillary buildings, including a facilities block, gatehouse and sub-stations. The warehouses are evenly spaced throughout the site and are currently used for storage of archived paperwork. Files and records are retrieved and returned daily. The sole means of access into the site is located at the south-eastern corner at Manchester Road. The entrance is secured with a pair of 2000mm high, steel-framed and wire-mesh, vehicle gates and a separate, similarly-styled, pedestrian gate. Immediately on entering the site, there is a manned security lodge and automated vehicle barriers, which are used to control progress of vehicles into and out of the site. The site's perimeter is secured with a 2000-3000mm high, chain-link fence embellished with barbed wire. There are series of roads and paths around the site that facilitate access to each building and areas of hardstanding used for parking and servicing. The periphery of the site and much of the space between the buildings is landscaped, including many mature trees that effectively screen the site from the surroundings.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2021 and 30th June 2022.

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood around the site

All crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Crimes involving the use or threat of violence	Theft (including shoplifting)	Robbery	Drug related offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
5	<5	<5	29	11	<5	<5	<5	<5	<5

2.1.1 There have been 79 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is very much lower than the average for a typical neighbourhood within Rochdale.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded, i.e., those that amounted to 5% or more of the total, were:

- crimes involving the use, or threat, of violence - 57%
- vehicle-related crime -16%
- burglary - 14%
- criminal damage to property - 8%.

2.1.3 The streets where crime was most likely to occur were:

- Newhouse Road – 27 offences
- Banks Croft - 4 offences
- Salisbury Avenue – 3 offences
- Manchester Road - 2 offences



2.1.4 By local standards, there was something of a concentration of crime at Newhouse Academy but not an unusual number or type of offences for a large, secondary school.

Crime at industrial and warehouse premises

2.1.5 There were no recorded offences committed at Heywood Stores or any other industrial premises in the area analysed.

Vehicle crime

2.1.6 There were just 7 vehicle related offences recorded during the period analysed. Offences tended to occur on a Thursday, and in the afternoon and early evening.





2.2 Crime at industrial & warehouse premises in Rochdale


The data below relates to crime carried out at industrial & warehouse premises in Rochdale during the year preceding the pandemic.

- 2.2.1 There were 153 crimes recorded at industrial and warehouse premises in the borough of Rochdale during the period analysed. The most commonly recorded crime was burglary (42% of the total), followed by vehicle related crimes (19%) and theft (11%). There were just 12 incidents involving the use or threat of violence and 9 of criminal damage. There were 3 recorded incidents of arson.

Burglary





- 2.2.2 The risk of burglary at industrial and warehouse premises is greatest in the middle of the week and on Saturday. The risk is greatest in the evening and during the night.



- 2.2.3 Doors were forced in just under half of all burglaries carried out at industrial and warehouse premises in Rochdale; slightly less involved offenders forcing shutters. Offenders entered premises via a window on ten occasions, whilst the walls and a roof of premises were breached three times. There were seventeen incidents that involved offenders gaining entry to premises without using force before committing burglary, suggesting doors or windows were not secure or the offender was in a building for legitimate reasons before committing the crime.

Theft



- 2.2.4 The risk of theft is small. It fluctuates throughout the week being greatest on Monday, Wednesday and Thursday and during the late afternoon and into the evening. There are two common occurrences of theft – that of personal property from within buildings and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from service/storage yards.

2.3 Modus operandi used in burglary, theft and criminal damage at industrial and warehouse premises in Rochdale and measures to reduce risk

2.3.1 Ram-raiding walls, gates and shutters and penetrating walls and the roof

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing walls, roofs shutters and gates:

- security-certified roller shutters and fencing/gates (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible - sliding gates tend to be more secure than hinged gates;
- steel frame buildings clad in profiled metal sheet should include a 2000mm high brick or blockwork base or a suitably robust inner layer of attack resistant material, e.g., expanded metal panels;
- roofs should be high enough that they are not easily accessible, comprise of a security-rated roofing system or include a sandwich of materials which makes them difficult to penetrate; and,
- anti-ram bollards or vehicle barriers (ideally, that meet the BS PAS 68 standard) should be installed in front of gates and shutters.

2.3.2 Shutters have been forced upwards by offenders

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;
- where size limits the availability of certified shutters, intruder alarms, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings; and,
- anti-ram bollards or barriers should be deployed to help secure the most vulnerable shutters.

2.3.3 Doors have been forced open with tools and locks have been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 sr2 standard – security rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- external doors should be placed where they can be readily observed by staff or monitored readily by CCTV and fitted with alarm contacts; and,
- the deployment of visible security patrols, appropriately high boundary fencing to control access to a site, CCTV and lighting can also deter offenders.

2.3.4 Entering a building via unsecured doors and windows.

To minimise the risk of offenders committing rime by entering via unsecured windows or doors

- external doors should be self-closing and lock upon closure; and,
- windows should have opening restrictors and key operated locks fitted:

2.3.5 Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via windows:

- windows should be avoided on secluded elevations;
- window and glazed doors should be fitted with laminate glass, which, because of its structural properties, is extremely difficult to break and penetrate sufficiently to reach in and open locks; and,
- security shutters or grilles, certified to the LPS 1175 sr2 standard, should be fitted to all windows.

2.3.6 Theft of employee and company property

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing personal property from the business premises:

- tall, robust, fencing and gates (preferably fitted with access controls) should be used to secure the perimeter of a development
- access control systems should be employed to prevent unauthorised personnel from entering buildings - especially offices and staff rooms, where sensitive information, expensive equipment, or staff belongings may be stored;
- if external storage of materials is necessary, consideration should be given to storing valuable plant or machinery in suitably secure containers or hoppers e.g., steel containers;
- overt signage should be used to warn against casual entry, referring visitors to appropriately located, visible reception areas; and,
- include space for employees to store personal/valuable items securely e.g., lockers or lockable drawers.

2.3.7 Theft of bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing bicycles from business premises:

- there should be a limited number of well-supervised, entry points into the site;
- the perimeter should be secured with tall fencing and gates;
- secure, weatherproof cycle parking should be available to employees and visitors;
- cycle parking should be located in well-supervised places; generally, some distance from the site perimeter and, ideally, out of view of passers-by.

2.3.8 Committing criminal damage to buildings and fencing

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via windows:

- access onto the site outside of business hours should be restricted by robust perimeter fencing and gates, i.e., steel railings or welded wire mesh; and,
- unprotected windows should be avoided on secluded elevations.

2.3.9 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol or visit during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be suitably arranged to prevent forced access onto the site and theft; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with tracking devices.

2.4 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?

- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood where very few crimes are committed;
- crimes that directly affect affecting industrial and business premises across Rochdale are not common;
- there is only a single point of entry into Heywood Stores, and it is secured with automated vehicle barriers and a manned gatehouse at the entrance;
- visitors are asked to report to the gatehouse and wear an ID lanyard whilst on site;
- perimeter fencing is appropriately secure all around the site;
- windows of neighbouring houses overlook parts of the site;
- there is on site management of the business park, with suite wide lighting and CCTV coverage; and,
- the security qualities of buildings on the site are reasonable; and,
- there is little of value stored at the site.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- premises on isolated business parks, such as Heywood Stores, with very large boundaries can be vulnerable to breaking and entering or trespass, particularly if: a) the quality of the parks boundary fencing is not consistently high and robust; b) perimeter fencing is erected on poor ground, where intruders can undermine the it; and c) fencing is affected by the growth of nearby trees and shrubs, i.e. tree and plant growth directly interferes with the fence structure or trees, in particular, or provide an aid with which to scale the fence, or obscure sightlines, which provides cover for offenders to interfere with the fence out of view of staff or CCTV; and,
- the buildings on the site lack the sophisticated security measures that many modern industrial buildings possess, making them a possible target for offenders.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development involves:

- clearance of all buildings on the site;
- widening of the site access onto Manchester Road;
- setting out circulation route through the site;
- construction of three (B8 use) warehouse units with offices, parking and servicing;
- retention of perimeter fencing, sub-stations and gas housing; and,
- peripheral landscaping and erection of acoustic fencing.

Units 1 and 2

3.1.2 Units 1 and 2 comprise a single, portal-framed building, clad in composite panels and divided into two equal parts. The building will be located at the south-eastern part of the site with Unit 1 facing the entrance to the site on Manchester Road. Both units will have a gross external area of 4,722m², which includes a 4,137m² warehouse, 505m² offices and an 80m² plant deck.

3.1.3 The warehouse element of each unit will be 14.1m high, whilst the offices, which project outward from the warehouse in both units, will be 5.0m high. Each warehouse will have 3no., elevated, loading docks, and 3no., level-access, vehicle entrances, all secured with sectional shutters, as well as 4 personnel/means of escape doors. To allow some light to penetrate the two warehouses, there will be expanses of translucent panels in the walls above the loading docks. Entry to the offices in both units will be gained

through a pair of aluminium-famed, glazed doors set within an expanse of curtain walling. The offices will also have a line of windows on each of the north-west and south-east elevations overlooking the service yard or circulation route through the site and some of the car parking provision.

- 3.1.4 Externally, each unit will have a generous service yard, a refuse store (located at the edge of the service yard adjacent to the warehouse), a 10 space, cycle store (located adjacent to the office entrance), a 40-space car park and 2 motorcycle parking spaces. A circulation road will circumnavigate the building.

Unit 3

- 3.1.5 Unit 3 will be a portal-framed building, clad in composite panels and located at the western half of the site. It will have a gross external area of 36,309m², which includes a 33,758m² warehouse, 1,964m² offices and a 587m² plant deck. The warehouse element will be 19.1m high.
- 3.1.6 There will be two separate offices - a two-storey, hub office, located centrally on the western elevation of the building, and a three-storey, main office, located at the south-western corner. Entry into the main office can be gained via a series of steps at ground level or via a detached, enclosed staircase and a bridge that spans the site entrance, to entrance doors at first floor level. The hub office entrance is at ground level and accessed via a series of steps. Offices will have windows and, in the case of the main office, a large expanse of curtain walling. To allow some light to penetrate the warehouse there will be expanses of translucent panels in the walls above the loading docks. The office elements will be 10.1m and 14.1m high respectively.
- 3.1.7 Access into the warehouse is concentrated at the western elevation, where there will be 38no., elevated, loading docks and 4no., level-access vehicle entrances, all secured with sectional shutters, as well as 5 personnel/means of escape doors.
- 3.1.8 The service yard will be located on the western side of the building. Access to the service yard will be controlled by staff based in a gatehouse and 2400mm high gates. There will be 56 trailer parking bays in the service yard as well as a refuse store, sub-station, and a sprinkler tank and pumphouse. The service yard will be enclosed by a combination of a 5000mm high acoustic fence and green wall (to screen the noise from activities in the service yard from nearby housing) and a 2400mm paladin fence.
- 3.1.9 A 318-space car park will be constructed on land west of the service yard. Access into the car park is gained via an unsecured extension of the site circulation route. A 40-space cycle shelter will be erected at the south-east corner of the car park adjacent to the detached stairway that provides access to the main office the main office entrance.

The site

- 3.1.10 The existing perimeter fencing will be retained, as will the sub-stations and gas housing. The gas housing will be contained in a new, glass-reinforced plastic unit.
- 3.1.11 Where feasible existing trees around the periphery of the site will be retained and supplemented with additional trees. Where space is limited, 3000mm and 5000mm high, acoustic fencing and green walls will be used to dampen noise and screen the development from existing and proposed residential development. Attenuation ponds will be created at the northern and southern end of Unit 3 and adjacent to the site entrance at the south-eastern corner of the site.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal

- 3.2.1 The development will be located in a neighbourhood with a low level of crime.
- 3.2.2 The perimeter fencing provides a reasonably secure boundary to the site, reducing the risk of trespass, or of offenders targeting the premises.
- 3.2.3 The entrance off Manchester Road is the sole means of entering the site. It is easier to maintain a secure development when limiting the number of entrances to a site.
- 3.2.4 Given the height of the proposed buildings, breaking and entering via the roof is not going to be an issue.
- 3.2.5 Staff employed at the gatehouse at Unit 3 have a direct view over the service yard entrance gates.
- 3.2.6 The offices in each building will be orientated in such a way as to promote natural surveillance with windows allowing staff a view car parks, service yards and circulation routes and the site.
- 3.2.7 The concentration of loading docks and service entrances in each unit makes it easier for staff to supervise activity at the loading and service area.

-
- 3.2.8 Car parking is well-located, close to the office entrances and visible to staff present in the offices and in the service yards and in the gatehouse.
 - 3.2.9 Cycle parking provision has been included and cycle stores are conveniently located close to the office entrances where they can be readily supervised by passing staff and visitors, or staff in the gatehouse of Unit 3.
 - 3.2.10 The retention of trees and shrubs and addition of acoustic fencing and green walls around the periphery of the site will make a positive contribution to maintaining good visual and environmental standards on the business park.

3.3 Recommendations to enhance the security of the development

Controlling entry to the business park - perimeter fencing and vehicle barriers

- 3.3.1 Consider retaining the existing security lodge, relocating the proposed gatehouse to Unit 3 to the site entrance, or erecting a new, second gatehouse, with vehicle barriers, at the entrance to the site, off Manchester Road. We recommend that the security lodge/gatehouse is staffed 24/7.
- 3.3.2 The existing perimeter fencing, and vehicle entrance and pedestrian gates should be retained. That said, the existing vehicle and pedestrian entrance gates may not present an ideal gateway to the development so you should consider gates that offer a greater level of security and usability, and are visually more appropriate. In addition, the perimeter fence should be reviewed from time to time in order to ensure it continues to provide a secure boundary. Some sections of fencing that have been damaged tree growth. If not addressed the fencing may be breached and the overall security of the site compromised.

The buildings

- 3.3.3 Each unit should have brick or blockwork walls (or other robust material) up to a height of around 2000mm - it is not unusual for offenders to attempt to gain entry by prising open cladding panels, particularly on businesses storing high value, readily disposable, goods or equipment.
- 3.3.4 Security-rated external doors, roller shutters and window frames should be installed; laminate glass should be used in external all glazing.
- 3.3.5 Auditable access controls should be fitted at:
 - the external entrance doors to the offices, including the entrance door to the detached and enclosed stairway that allows access to the main office of Unit 3;
 - the doors connecting the offices to the reception areas;
 - the upper floors offices to the upper floor lobby (main office Unit 3);
 - external personnel doors into the warehouses;
 - internal doors connecting offices to the warehouse;
 - loading dock shutters;
 - drive-in doors.

An appropriately programmed fob should allow staff to pass through the respective doors and shutters.

- 3.3.6 Staff in the offices should be able to vet visitors at the respective entrance prior to allowing entry to the building via an audio-visual link, with a remote door lock release. This is particularly important when there may be only one or two staff present.
- 3.3.7 A strong room/management office should be created. It should contain a safe for cash and valuable documents, and the CCTV recording equipment (if images are recorded on-site). The door to this room should be certified to BS PAS 24 or be a 44mm solid core door with SBD certified electronic lock. In addition, it should have a door viewer fitted and be self-closing and self-locking. The walls to this office should be constructed using blockwork or a similarly robust material.
- 3.3.8 A smart management system should be used for the storage and management of keys, such as Traka™ or similar.
- 3.3.9 Lockers should be available in the warehouse and the offices to allow staff to securely store belongings.

Service yards

- 3.3.10 If required, a fuel management system, that allows only authorised users to dispense fuel to authorised vehicles, should be installed.
- 3.3.11 External storage should be avoided but if any materials are stored within the service yard, they should be placed within appropriately secure containers.
- 3.3.12 Plant, machinery, and vehicles should be fitted with tracking devices.
- 3.3.13 In order to reduce the risk of accidental damage caused by vehicles turning or reversing against the building or parked vehicles, I recommend the installation of Armco™ barriers and/or bollards in areas where such a risk may arise.
- 3.3.14 The position of any ancillary structures within the service yard should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
 - creating blind spots that might reduce the effectiveness of supervision of the site by staff;
 - creating areas that CCTV cameras cannot monitor; and,
 - reducing the efficiency and effectiveness of site lighting.

Car and cycle parking

- 3.3.15 Visitor parking spaces should be designated in the car park and cycle stores with visitors directed to them by appropriate signs.
- 3.3.16 The cycle parking store should be weather resistant and fitted with 'Sheffield' style cycle stands.

Monitored alarm and CCTV

- 3.3.17 A monitored intruder alarm should be installed in each unit.
- 3.3.18 A CCTV system should be installed at the site. It should include cameras capable of monitoring:
 - all elevations of all units;
 - all external doors, loading docks and drive-in shutters;
 - the lobby/reception area of the offices;
 - the service yards;
 - the car parking; and,
 - cycle parking.
- 3.3.19 The system should include a public address system, allowing CCTV/Alarm Receiving Centre/gatehouse staff to issue an audible warning to alert to intruders that they have been detected and a response generated.

Lighting

- 3.3.20 For pedestrian and vehicle safety, and to support the CCTV system, dusk-to dawn-lighting should be provided along the circulation routes, the car parking, cycle stores service yards, and all elevations of the units, particularly around the loading docks, pedestrian and vehicle entrance doors, and means of escape doors.

Signage

- 3.3.21 Clear signage should be used to indicate the name of each unit and company details.

Landscaping

- 3.3.22 To allow CCTV to monitor the circulation routes and for staff to maintain views around the edges of the site, peripheral shrub planting should be managed not higher than 1200mm and tree canopies should fall not lower than 2000mm.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ The external, office entrance doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The external office entrance doors must be capable of being operated via an electronic, access control system that forms part of the security rating of the door. An audio-visual unit should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) to an appropriate desk within the offices to allow vetting of visitors prior to allowing entry. Staff should be able to operate the locking mechanism of the entrance doors remotely from within their office. The doors should be self-closing and lock on closure.
- ☐ All other external, personnel and escape doors on the building should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ All external personnel doors should be self-closing and self-locking.

4.2 Window frames & shutters

- ☐ Where feasible, window frames should meet the PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standard.
- ☐ Any ground level opening windows be fitted with key operated locks, and fixed opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.
- ☐ Where feasible, loading dock shutters and drive-in shutters should be tested, and certified, to LPS 1175 SR2.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to all external doors, ground floor windows and ground level curtain walling should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass, that is, glass rated as P1A or P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Intruder alarm

- ☐ An intruder alarm should be fitted to each unit. Contacts should be fitted to all external doors and shutters, and PIR detectors fitted in all rooms with windows.
- ☐ The alarm system should be monitored and include a response facility.

4.5 Access control

- ☐ An auditable access control system should be operable by swipe card or fob, to restrict unauthorised access to:
 - the external doors to the offices
 - the reception/lobby to office entrance doors on each floor
 - the warehouse entrance doors
 - loading dock and drive-through shutters

4.6 Boundary fencing

- ☐ Any replacement sections of boundary fencing should match the height and design of the retained fencing.
- ☐ The fencing details for various areas of the site indicated on drawing number 21157-ASA-00-ZZ. ZZ-D-A-0003_(S3-P6), dated 02/08/22, 'Proposed Site Plan' is considered appropriate.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should illuminate all circulation routes, all elevations of each unit, the car parks, cycle stores and the service yards. Lighting levels should accord with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ The landscaping around the periphery of the site should be trimmed back and managed such that it does not offer intruders an aid to climb over the perimeter fencing and enter the site, and so that the circulation routes can be monitored effectively by CCTV.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ A good quality CCTV system should be installed.
- ☐ If stored on site, CCTV monitoring and recording equipment should be located in a secure room with access limited to appropriate staff. Alternatively, images may be monitored and stored off site by a suitable monitoring company.
- ☐ Cameras should be capable of monitoring: the site entrance; circulation routes; all elevations of each unit; the service yards; the entrance doors and service shutters; all escape doors; the cycle stores; and, areas of car parking.
- ☐ A public address system should be installed to complement the cameras so that camera and alarm monitoring staff can warn off intruders.

4.10 Car Park

- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly marked, and visitor spaces indicated.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be prepared, which addresses, *inter alia*, upkeep of CCTV and alarm systems, lighting, signage, access controls, and landscape maintenance.

6 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
08.06.22	Harry Spawton Gerald Eve	Report commissioned
14.07.22	Jodie Farnill, Gerald Eve	Additional plans
17.08.22	Jodie Farnill, Gerald Eve	Additional plans
10.08.22		Site visited
05.10.22	Harry Spawton & Jodie Farnill, Gerald Eve	Report issued
10.10.22	Jodie Farnill, Gerald Eve	Revised site plan issued
12.10.22	Jodie Farnill, Gerald Eve	Revised report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
21157-ASA-00-ZZ.ZZ-D-A-0003	Proposed Site Plan	02.08.22	P6
21157-ASA-00-EL.ZZ-D-A-SK01	Proposed Elevation Unit 1 and 2	20.05.22	P5
21157-ASA-00-EL.ZZ-D-A-SK02	Proposed Elevations Unit 3	20.05.22	P4

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations in this report

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		05.10.22
B	Minor realignment of the road south of unit 3 & changes to the gas supply housing	12.10.22

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- Resistance of glazing
- Performance of hardware
- Resistance to static loading
- Resistance to dynamic loading
- Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels

of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstdesign.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk