



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land opposite to 1-35 Bentley Street,
Rochdale

2-3 storeys comprising of 23 apartments.

For: **KOPLAR GROUP LTD**

Version A: **21/11/24**

Ref: **2024/0317/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

Land opposite to 1-35 Bentley Street, Rochdale

2024/0317/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported - Minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings.
- Secure cycle store provision
- Ground floor external material protection against graffiti.
- Robust site wide management strategy for maintenance & litter free

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application subject to the design team suitably addressing the recommendations contained in the report (Sections 3.3, 4 & 5), and will seek the inclusion of a planning condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located on Bentley St, off the busy Whitworth Road (A671). The site is approx. 2km north of Rochdale town centre.

Bounded by Bentley St to the south the rear of houses to the west. The site appears to have been unused for some time.


Whitworth Road and the immediate area combines a mix of commercial/retail/leisure/residential uses, with residential the dominate use. In turn this provides high levels of activity throughout the day & evening.

To the west and south of the site are several well-established residential estates within the vicinity.

Adjacent to the site, in the southern corner is an existing car mechanics business with associated car parking for a small number of vehicles.

Bentley St contains a dedicate bus route with bus stops immediately adjacent to the site.


The topography of the site increased dramatically to the northeast.



1 – View towards the site.



2 – Existing terrace houses on Bentley St opposite the site.



3 – Herras fencing to site frontage.




7 – View southeast along Whitworth Rd (A671).



6 – Adjacent Tesco on Whitworth Rd (A671).



5 – rear boundaries to houses on Bradley Smithy Close.



4 – Car mechanic business neighbouring the site.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2023 to 31st October 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
19	<5	34	110	19	<5	<5	17	10	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months has been below average for the Rochdale division, with less serious wounding and criminal damage having been most commonly reported. These offences have been occurring throughout the residential neighbourhoods surrounding the site, particularly at locations along/close to Whitworth Road.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have taken place all throughout the local area. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 In cases of criminal damage offenders have used bodily pressure and objects to damage the external doors and windows to dwellings. Offenders have also targeted vehicles by smashing the glazing in the windows and denting/scratching the bodywork.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Entering apartment buildings by means of tailgating residents/ exploiting insecure doors and accessing communal areas (mostly corridors/ post and bike storage areas).

Residential: Possible Solution - All individual apartments should be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.), cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. A staffed 24/7 concierge desk will support the management and security of the entrance lobby.

- 2.2.2 **General:** Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key.

- 2.2.3 **General:** Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.4), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.4). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

- 2.2.4 **General:** Forcing open shutters using implements and tools in order to gain access to the doors and windows located beneath.

Possible Solution – (If proposed within the development), Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

- 2.2.5 **General:** Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

-
- 2.2.6 *Possible Solution – All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Ensure that rubbish and loose material is removed from the areas around the site. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.*





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Rochdale and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **16% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **15% lower** than Greater Manchester and **13% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **58% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **50% lower** than Greater Manchester and **5% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **29% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **20% lower** than Greater Manchester and **3% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **17% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **7% lower** than Greater Manchester and **13% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on Sunday in the evening (21:00-22:00). Offenders often target dwellings at this time when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point is recorded as "unknown", it is likely that the offender has exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Tuesday and Thursday in the early hours of the morning ((01:00-02:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposal seeks to develop land; which has been vacant for a period of time.
- 3.1.2 23 apartments across two 2/3 storey buildings.
- 3.1.3 The scheme incorporates a resident car park and residential garden space.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will generate additional legitimate activity into a neighbourhood which has been subject to fly-tipping and ASB. Redevelopment with apartments will support the repopulation of the site and should help to create a sense of ownership, responsibility and improve informal policing of the area (see also 3.3.1).
- 3.2.2 The building footprints at ground floor level is relatively free of recesses or projections that could provide cover for criminal or antisocial activity.
- 3.2.3 The apartments will have routinely occupied rooms overlooking the adjacent public areas, which will help to increase natural surveillance of accessible areas around the block.
- 3.2.4 The building provides ground floor activity in the form of residential entrances and reception space use and in-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent public realm.
- 3.2.5 The proposed building clearly defines the different uses of the building, and all entrances can be easily located and navigated.
- 3.2.6 The foyer/reception zone provides the opportunity for good levels of security at a central control point for the development.
- 3.2.7 The access-control strategy adopted for the development should be capable of confining movement into and through the building, thus allowing staff and visitors to only enter parts of the site to which they have legitimate reason to be present. Access permissions should be fully auditable and regularly reviewed.
- 3.2.8 Current drawings show an external cycle parking shelters for residents are contained within the site boundary. Entry into this space should be strictly limited via the access-controlled system under the building management system ensuring only genuine cyclists can gain access. Racks within the cycle stores should allow bikes to be locked by the frame and both wheels and should be obtained from a Secured by Design approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com).
- 3.2.9 The car parking has been well laid out, avoiding potential hiding spaces for intruders.
- 3.2.10 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Mailbox location. Arrangements for delivery of post should not need postal delivery staff to have access to internal corridors and stairwells of the residential block. Mailboxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a “through-the-wall” arrangement allowing external delivery / internal collection.
- 3.3.2 Residential post/parcel/grocery room. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal or grocery delivery staff to have access to internal areas of the residential block beyond the GF reception space. Postal workers should not be given unfettered access to the entire building as this could potentially leave apartments and residents vulnerable. (see Section 4.1 for more information).
- 3.3.3 External elevations generally. The cladding / facing materials should not provide external aids to climbing that could allow an intruder to gain access to the upper floor windows or balconies. The detailing of the façades and the relationship between the building and any other external landscape features / street furniture will need to be carefully planned to avoid introducing this kind of vulnerability.
- 3.3.4 Graffiti on surfaces. This kind of abuse is particularly prevalent in the vicinity of the site. It is important that external cladding materials at ground floor are sealed, protected and supports the removal of graffiti, a resistant coating applied to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings. The external space should not contain climbing aids that could allow an intruder to gain access to the upper floor balconies. The detailing of the façade and any proposed external landscape features will need to be considered to avoid introducing an access vulnerability point into the building.
- 3.3.5 Communal facility maintenance. The robust management of such features is essential as poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
- 3.3.6 It should not be possible for an intruder to progress beyond the entrance lobby and enter the residential area of the building. Visitors should require passage through further access-controlled doors to stairs and lifts.
- 3.3.7 The residential stair and lift cores in the block will require access control allowing only building staff and residents’ access beyond the reception space to upper floors, to create a secure lobby area.
- 3.3.8 It is essential that all the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post boxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrance.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ The doors to the cycle store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 or be steel gates within steel frames. These doors/gates should both be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and be accessible by a programmable fob allowing secure entry and exit.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems

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- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:
- All external doors where regular staff access is required.
 - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies.
 - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)
 - Cycle stores.

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the sports courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:
- LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
 - STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
 - Sold Secure Gold
 - PAS 68: 2013
- ☐ Boundary treatments to front gardens should be designed to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them, which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.
- ☐ The ground floor townhouses and apartments which front onto the public realm and the landscaped courtyard, must be protected by some defensible space, defined by dense low-level planting, creating front gardens areas in ownership/control of the residents themselves.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.

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- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
 - ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
03/09/24	Tang & Associates Ltd	CIS application submitted
28/10/24	Tang & Associates Ltd	Client confirmation
28/10/24	GMP	Invoice Issued
21/11/24	DfS	Site visit
22/11/24	DfS	CIS completed
22/11/24	DfS	CIS issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
9757 - 001b	Location Plan		
9757-010c	Existing site plan		
9757-102d	Proposed site plan		
9757-121g	Existing and proposed street scenes		
9757-122h	Existing and proposed site sections A+A		
9757-211d	G/F plans		
9757-212d	1/F plans		
9757-213d	2/F plans		
9757-214c	Roof plans		
9757-221d	Block A Bentley Street and west elevations		
9757-222c	Block A – rear and East elevations		
9757-223d	Block B elevations		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk