



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Change of use of vacant retail premises (Class E) to 22 flats (C3 Use) with retail retained at ground/basement level, together with a roof extension and other associated elevational alterations

AT 44 Yorkshire Street, Rochdale

FOR: Cassel and Fletcher Ltd

VERSION A: 01.07.22

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

We welcome the continuing investment in Rochdale town centre and support redevelopment of this site for retail and residential purposes.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include: the development will result in the re-use of a vacant building; the building will be more animated with the (re)introduction of windows and shopfronts; there will be an appropriate number of apartments; and the development will focus activity at appropriate areas whilst also facilitating passive surveillance of the surrounding streets.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in sections 3.3 and 4. The principal recommendations relate to securing the building and individual apartments within it appropriately, as well as controlling access from the entrance lobby to the core of the building, providing secure cycle storage and a refuse store.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Rochdale Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.

Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*

Consultant

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

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1 The Site and Surroundings

The development site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The site, N^o 44-46 Yorkshire Street, edged in red on the plan, is located in the Rochdale town centre, and in the Rochdale Town Centre Conservation Area. In the immediate vicinity of the site, Yorkshire Street is pedestrianised and retail uses dominate the ground floor of many of the buildings on the street. Adjoining the site, number 42 Yorkshire Street is occupied by a beauty parlour, whilst there is an adult gaming centre at number 40. Exchange Shopping Centre is situated opposite N^o 44-46, on the north side of the street, and the Wheatsheaf Shopping Centre is located a short distance north-east of the site, also on Yorkshire Street. The Riverside Centre, a new shopping and leisure venue, is situated to the rear of the Wheatsheaf Centre which, along with the adjacent transport interchange and council offices has shifted the focus of the town centre away from Yorkshire Street. The Bank, a well-used, wide, partially stepped, passageway, immediately east of the site, connects Yorkshire Street with the much lower level, Baillie Street, to the south. The high, windowless, gable wall (with painted mural) of number 50 Yorkshire Street defines the eastern side of The Bank. Baillie Street is a pleasant, partially pedestrianised street; the Riverside Centre is at its eastern end. Licensed premises with outdoor seating face the rear elevation of N^o 44-46 across Baillie Street. Adjoining the of the western elevation N^o 44-46, Pack Horse Yard is a private, service route that is gated at both the Yorkshire Street and Baillie Street ends. A hair and beauty salon occupies the neighbouring premises west of the yard.



The development site itself comprises a substantial, flat-roofed, multi-storey, retail premises, with accommodation at ground floor and first floor at the Yorkshire Street end of the building and an additional basement and sub-basement at the Baillie Street end. N^o 44-46 is largely constructed of brick but with a stone upper façade to Yorkshire Street. Once occupied by Poundworld, the premises are now vacant. Roller shutters protect the Yorkshire Street shopfront, including the main entrance door, which sits beneath a first-floor overhang, supported by a single column, at the chamfered corner of the building. Level differences at the entrance have required steps to connect The Bank to the entrance door. There is a second entrance door on The Bank, which is also protected by a roller shutter. There are numerous windows on the elevation facing The Bank; all at ground floor level and most at first floor are protected with timber sheeting. On the rear elevation, there are two means of escape doors that open onto Baillie Street. On the Pack Horse Court facing elevation there is a service door, secured with a roller shutter, and an elevated means of escape door and external escape stair. Windows on this side of the building have been secured with steel bars or, like others, particularly on the rear elevation, have been bricked-up.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

Crime committed within a 500m radius of the site, recorded between 1st June 2021 & 31st May 2022. Data is accurate to +/- 8%, due to updates with our I.T systems

General crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Crime involving the use or threat of violence	Theft (including shoplifting)	Robbery	Drug offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
22	66	141	1137	598	50	35	43	11	7

2.1.1 There were 2110 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is around six times greater than the average rate across the Rochdale Division. but such a volume of crime is typical of neighbourhoods which are in town centres with a high number of crime attractors and crime generators including, shops, licenced premises, and transport hubs. The most common crimes recorded were:

- the use, or threat, of violence - 54%
- theft (including shoplifting) - 29%
- Criminal damage – 7%
- burglary - 4%
- vehicle crime, i.e., theft of, theft from and criminal damage to a vehicle - 3%.

2.1.2 Where the location of the crime was recorded, the streets experiencing the greatest volume of crime were:



- Yorkshire Street - 174 crimes
- The Esplanade – 128 crimes
- Rochdale Interchange – 100
- Whitworth Road – 95 crimes
- Riverside – 70 crimes
- Drake Street – 68 crimes

2.1.3 There were 17 offences committed on and around Baillie Street.

2.1.4 Crime on Yorkshire Street were dominated by shoplifting, acts of violence, criminal damage, and burglary of commercial premises. On Baillie Street, burglary and crimes involving the use or threat of violence were most common.


Domestic Burglary

2.1.5 There were 22 burglaries committed within the neighbourhood during the period analysed, most of which took place in the inner residential streets just north of St Mary's Way.



- 2.1.6 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary is greatest on a Wednesday and Sunday. The early evening is the most common time for offences to take place. Offenders have posed as residents of bona fide visitors, tailgating residents at communal entrance doors to gain entry.

Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry





Crime at retail premises in the town centre

Crime committed within the town centre beat from June 2018 – May 2019.



- 2.1.7 There were 545 crimes at retail premises in the two town centre Police beats during the period analysed. The most common crimes were shoplifting/theft (72% of the total), followed by the use or threat of violence (17%), burglary (6%) and criminal damage (2%).
- 2.1.8 The risk of theft at retail premises in Rochdale town centre rises through the day, peaking in the mid-late afternoon.
- 2.1.9 Incidents of burglary tend to occur in the middle of the night and are spread across the week. In terms of gaining entry to premises, the most common method is for an offender to force open shutters, followed by forcing a door or a window (or smashing the glass in a window). Walls and roofs have also been targeted by offenders.

2.2 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Rochdale, Greater Manchester & England and Wales

Site = crimes within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.2.1 The rate of burglary per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **6% lower** than the Rochdale rate, **5% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **2% lower** than the rate across England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of wounding crimes per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **267% higher** than the Rochdale rate, **331% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **722% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.



2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **185% higher** than the Rochdale rate, **221% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **291% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.

2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **45% higher** than the Rochdale rate, **61% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **96% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary and theft at residential and retail premises in Rochdale & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3.1 Communal entrance and apartment entrance doors were targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of offenders tailgating through communal doors or entering apartments through insecure doors:

- communal entry doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure;
- install a secondary set of secure doors (airlock/secure lobby), that are also self-closing and self-locking;
- install lifts that are operated by a fob or card access control system;
- install CCTV cameras in the entrance lobby;
- apartment doors should be self-closing with a thumb-turn lock on the inner side that meets fire regulations, with clear, yet discreet, permanent instructions on the door to inform the resident that the door is not secure until the lock is turned; and,
- employ a concierge to supervise the entrance lobby.

2.3.2 Doors have been forced open

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors and apartment entry doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- 'recess-free' entrances should be installed so that entrance doors are easily visible - offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- all external doors should be illuminated with dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests a property may be occupied and may deter offenders from targeting a premise. Lighting will also support CCTV systems and highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed; and,
- CCTV should be considered, to record activity within circulation spaces within the building and around exterior of the building.

2.3.3 Ground floor windows were prised open, or the glazing smashed to gain access

To minimise the risk of offenders prising open windows or breaking glass to gain entry:

- avoid installing opening windows at street level;

- install window locks and opening restrictors to any windows that are accessible from street level; and,
- install laminate glass on street level windows and doors.

2.3.4 Offenders have entered communal cycle stores and stolen bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders entering cycle stores:

- cycle stores should be secure rooms or stores;
- appropriate CCTV and PIR lighting should be installed within a store; and,
- doors or gates to cycle stores should be fitted with good quality locks (ideally a maglock or similar with a resistance force of around 4500N), be self-closing and lock automatically upon closure.

2.3.5 Doors, windows, shutters, and grilles on commercial properties have been forced open

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing entry:

- install LPS 1175 security-rated doors, window frames, shutters, or grilles on commercial units; and,
- avoid designing windows or doors on secluded, poorly supervised elevations or in deep recesses on the building.

2.3.6 Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff-only areas of commercial premises

To minimise the risk of offenders gaining access to staff-only areas:

- access control systems should be considered to secure sensitive areas of premises – e.g., stock rooms, staff rest rooms and offices;
- staff should be required to wear an appropriate form of clearly visible ID and/or a company uniform;
- doors separating public areas, from staff-only areas should be monitored by CCTV; and
- lockers should be provided for staff to secure their personal belongings whilst at work.

2.3.7 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with a tracking device.

2.4 Environmental features in the area that may influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?

- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the recent high level of investment and planned investment in the neighbourhood is likely to result in more pro-active management and maintenance of the private and public spaces;
- the town centre has a broad and complementary range of retail, commercial, cultural, civic and leisure uses, which attracts a diverse range of people;
- the new leisure uses in the vicinity of the site attract people into the town centre in the evening;
- efforts have been made to enhance the environmental quality The Bank, with planters, hanging baskets and a mural to enliven the otherwise dead gable wall of the adjoining building;
- Yorkshire Street and The Bank are pedestrian-friendly, such urban environments can encourage people to use the town centre, and feel safe in doing so;
- the northern, southern, and eastern edges of the site are visible to passing pedestrians, shoppers, and customers of the nearby licensed premises. Activity and passive surveillance generated by these groups of people can act as a deterrent to those intent on committing crime or anti-social activities;
- CCTV cameras monitor activity on the premises and streets adjacent to the site;
- No 44-46 is currently very secure, although the method securing the windows and doors is not always appropriate in a conservation area; and,
- Pack Horse Yard on the western side of the building is secured with high, lockable gates.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- there is a high level of crime in the town centre, indicating that offenders are active in the area - retail premises and the night-time economy are a particular focus for such activity;
- the security measures installed on the building are not
- the absence of any significant residential development in the town centre leaves premises isolated in the evening and at night when activities and informal surveillance relating to office and retail uses subside;
- there is regular footfall on Yorkshire Street and Baillie Street, some of the people passing the front of the site may be intent on criminal or anti-social activity; and,
- the permeability of this part of the town centre presents would-be offenders with an easy and convenient route to and from the site.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development involves a change of use of these vacant retail premises (Class E) to 22 flats (C3 Use) with retail retained at ground/basement level, together with a roof extension and other associated elevational alterations.
- 3.1.2 At the lower ground level, a new retail unit will be created with a shopfront facing Baillie Street. The retail use on the ground floor will be retained but subdivided into several smaller units with shopfront facing Yorkshire Street and The Bank. An additional floor will be added at second floor level; it will occupy a smaller footprint than the lower floors.
- 3.1.3 The proposed residential use will commence at the rear of the first floor, where three apartments will be located. The remaining apartments will be on the upper floors, twelve on the first floor and a further seven on a new, second floor extension. All apartments will have one bedroom, with all apartment entrance doors opening onto the circulation corridors of the respective floor of the building. The communal entrance will be located mid-way along The Bank, where a pair of doors allows entry into a

lobby with lift and stair core and an unmarked room, which is assumed to be a plant room, a refuse store, or a cycle store. A means of escape door will allow egress into Pack Horse Yard.

- 3.1.4 To allow light to penetrate the proposed apartments, new windows will be opened on the Yorkshire Street, Baillie Street and The Bank elevations. The ground floor apartment windows will overlook the steps on The Bank but be high enough above the steps not to cause any privacy or security issues. Windows at first floor level on The Bank elevation will project out over the passageway and have a dual aspect.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal

General

- 3.2.1 The re-use of the property is welcomed. Properties that remain vacant for some months are often targeted by thieves and vandals. The resulting visible signs of decay can attract further abuse, which is then likely to negatively affect neighbouring premises.
- 3.2.2 The proposed uses will bring activity and passive surveillance to Yorkshire Street, The Bank and Baillie Street during the day and evening.
- 3.2.3 The neighbouring shopping centre have 24/7 security presence and CCTV cameras monitor activity in and around these centres and Yorkshire Street. Whilst their security teams will not have authority over the proposed development, their presence may deter offenders.

Retail units

- 3.2.4 The proposed locations of the entrance door will particularly promote activity on The Bank and facilitate surveillance over the 'street'.
- 3.2.5 Small units tend to be less attractive to offenders, who prefer to mingle anonymously in larger, busy premises before carrying out acts of theft. Staff and customers tend to be more vigilant in more intimate premises.
- 3.2.6 Each unit will have a single entrance, which is easier to manage than stores with multiple entrances.
- 3.2.7 Public transport and taxi ranks are located close-by.

Residential

- 3.2.8 There will be twenty-two apartments in the property, which is considered sufficient to provide a reasonable prospect of a presence of residents throughout the day and particularly at night, who will provide activity and passive supervision within the development, which can help to deter offenders from targeting the property.
- 3.2.9 Residents of smaller developments are more likely to interact with their neighbours as they come and go, and the presence of strangers in the building, or at the entrance doors, is more likely to be questioned by residents. Such positive behaviours can deter offenders from attempting to enter the property.
- 3.2.10 Residents of smaller apartment schemes soon get to recognise other residents as they come and go from the development. Ill-considered, larger apartment schemes tend to be less intimate, and can lead to issues with 'tailgating' at entrances, with crime and anti-social behaviour issues as offenders exploit a lack of familiarity between residents.
- 3.2.11 Access controls can easily be deployed at the communal entrance door in order to restrict access to residents and authorised visitors.
- 3.2.12 The proposed communal entrance door will be located where it will be clearly visible to residents and visitors, and will promote activity on The Bank.
- 3.2.13 Apartment windows will facilitate surveillance over the surrounding streets.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

Retail units

- 3.3.1 Each unit should be fitted with security-certified, external doors.
- 3.3.2 The shopfronts should include laminate glazing.

3.3.3 Provision should be made for the inclusion of an intruder alarm and CCTV.

3.3.4 There must be a dedicated area for waste storage within the unit/building.

Control entry into the apartment building

3.3.5 The communal entrance doors at ground must be security-rated, self-closing and lock securely upon closure. It should be secured with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a residents' fob. A single door is a more secure option than a pair of doors. To reduce the risk of anti-social behaviour, the depth of the recess should be minimised. The recess/entrance door should be monitored by CCTV and brightly illuminated during the hours of darkness.

3.3.6 An audio-visual unit, with a link to each apartment should be fitted at the communal entrance door to enable residents to vet callers prior to releasing the lock and allowing access to *bona fide* visitors only.

3.3.7 In order to reduce the risk of visitors or intruders tailgating into the building without due supervision a secure lobby should be created. The door connecting the entrance lobby to the lift and stair core should be fitted with a fob-operated, electronic lock, and the door should be self-closing and lock upon closure. Similarly, a door fitted with the same locking and closing hardware, should be installed to secure the access to the three ground floor apartments.

3.3.8 Mail delivery should be a through-the-wall system if feasible, adjacent to the communal entrance door. Alternatively secure boxes should be fitted to the lobby wall.

3.3.9 The external means of escape doors at ground should also be security-rated.

Apartment security

3.3.10 Each apartment should be fitted with a security-rated entrance door, fitted with a door viewer and opening limiter.

Cycle store

3.3.11 A secure cycle store should be provided within the building accessed from the lobby. The door to the cycle store should be a robust and fitted with a fob-operated, electronic lock, and the door should be self-closing and lock upon closure.

Bin store

3.3.12 A bin store should be provided within the building. Any external doors to the store should be security-rated. Internal doors should be robust and fitted with a fob-operated, electronic lock, and the door should be self-closing and lock upon closure.

Intruder alarm and CCTV

3.3.13 Ideally, each apartment should be fitted with an intruder alarm.

3.3.14 The developer should consider installing a modest CCTV system, with cameras capable of monitoring the entrance doors, entrance lobby and mailboxes, cycle store and the means of escape door on the Pack Horse Yard elevation.

Streetscape

3.3.15 The quality of the environment along The Bank must be improved to reflect the introduction of the residential use. Residents coming home late at night should feel comfortable walking towards the communal entrance. Feature lighting and CCTV are considered appropriate as are additional planters and relocation of litter bins away from residential or retail entrances.

4 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security and to gain Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors and Access Controls

Retail units



The entrance doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.

Residential

- ☐ The residents' entrance door should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It must include an electronic lock capable of being operated via an access control system and be fitted with a door closer and a locking system that automatically secures the door upon closure. The outer handle should be fixed.
- ☐ An intercom, with two-way audio and one-way video, should be provided at the entrance door, linked to a handset in each apartment to allow residents to vet visitors prior to allowing entry via a remote door release.
- ☐ The means of escape door should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must also be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24 and be fitted with a door viewer and chain opening limiter. These doors must also be self-closing and, ideally, lock upon closure.
- ☐ Any external doors to the refuse store should be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The internal door to the refuse store should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It must include an electronic lock capable of being operated via an access control system and be fitted with a door closer and a locking system that automatically secures the door upon closure. 4
- ☐ Glazing within external doors (though glazing is not advised on the doors of the rear elevation) should include P4A rated laminate glass.
- ☐ Mail delivery should be a through-the-wall system if feasible, adjacent to one the communal entrance door. Alternatively secure boxes should be fitted to the lobby wall.
- ☐ The cycle store should be secured with a 44mm, solid-core door, fitted with a fob-operated electronic lock with a holding force of around 4500N.

4.2 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to all external doors and shopfronts should be P4A rated laminate.

4.3 Signage

- ☐ Signage to indicate the name of the development should be included at the communal entrance.

4.4 Intruder alarm

- ☐ An alarm should be fitted in each retail unit.
- ☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each apartment.

4.5 CCTV

- ☐ Each of the retail units should have CCTV cameras fitted.
- ☐ A CCTV system should be considered for the residential part of the development.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting should be provided to all external doors, to the cycle store and the refuse store.
- ☐ With the exception of the refuse and cycle stores, lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor. PIR should be used in the refuse and cycle stores.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up for the residential element of the building, to address issues such as cleaning of communal areas and maintenance of lighting, CCTV, and access controls.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure the site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.
- ☐ The contractor should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved, (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial buildings, and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
26.05.22	Lynsay Ewart, Paul Butler Associates,	Request for Crime Impact Statement
15.06.22		Site visited
01.07.06.22	Lynsay Ewart, Paul Butler Associates,	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
22017-FE-001	Location Plan	04/05/22	
22017-FE-002	Existing Block Plan	04/05/22	
22017-FE-050	Proposed Block Plan	04/05/22	
22017-FE-099	Ballie Street Proposed Floor Plan	06/04/22	A
22017-FE-100	Yorkshire Street Proposed Floor Plan	06/04/22	B
22017-FE-101	Proposed First Floor Plan	06/04/22	D
22017-FE-102	Proposed Second Floor Plan	06/04/22	B
22017-FE-200	Proposed Elevation	04/05/22	
22017-FE	Massing Model		
	Baillie Street View		

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		01.07.22

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock, and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding, or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel, and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/Polyvinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors, and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections, and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk