



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT: PRELIMINARY

LAND TO NORTH & EAST OF STAKEHILL INDUSTRIAL ESTATE,
MIDDLETON

OUTLINE SCHEME FOR 350 no. RESIDENTIAL DWELLINGS (USE CLASS C3)
& UP TO 250,000sqft. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT (USE CLASS B2/B8)

Greater Manchester Police FOR: Trustees of the JP Milne (Deceased) Will Trust

designforsecurity

VERSION A: 09/01/2025

REFERENCE: 2018/0516/CIS/02

Land to North and East of Stakehill Industrial Estate, Middleton

URN: 2018/0516/CIS/02

The 'Crime Impact Statement: Preliminary' Explained

The 'Crime Impact Statement: Preliminary' has been created to accompany outline planning applications where layout is not considered (i.e. the proposal is only at the 'red line' stage). This part of the process will provide your design team with the contextual crime information, and site-specific design considerations needed to develop the layout and appearance of the proposal.

Reserved Matters Applications

Reserved matters applications, where layout is to be considered, will require a full Crime Impact Statement, which will appraise the design and layout of the developed proposals. Please contact us when work commences on the layout of the scheme for us to develop your preliminary report into a full Crime Impact Statement.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

We have no objection in principle to the development of this site for residential and industrial uses. However, the considerations and general recommendations within Section 3.2 of this report should be addressed when the design team develop more detailed proposals.

A full CIS report should be prepared when the design of the scheme or phases of the scheme have progressed and an assessment of the details and specifications can be made. This is most productive well in advance of any full/reserved matters planning applications, so that any subsequent alterations do not cause delay to the submission.

Please get in touch with Design for Security if you have any queries regarding the contents of this document, or the security standards referred to therein.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site is formed by a large portion of land bounded by the A627(M) to the east, the A627(M) Slattocks Link to the north and Bentley Avenue/Stakehill Lane/Hough Lane to the south, in the Middleton area of Rochdale.

The majority of the site is formed by undulating grassland, with mature trees and vegetation to the perimeter.

There is a row of semi-detached residential properties fronting onto Bentley Avenue to the south-west and a variety of residential properties and farms fronting onto Stakehill Lane and Hough Lane along the southern boundary, which back onto the open land forming the majority of the site. There is also a plant nursery and a number of fishing lakes accessed off Stakehill Lane.


Open land/routes adjacent to (and particularly to the rear of) sites, buildings and dwellings can lead to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and secluded routes can leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly after dark. Adjacent properties can also often be vulnerable to unauthorised access, as they can provide easy access/escape routes that benefit from little/no natural surveillance or direct overlooking.

Stakehill Lane itself narrows and passes through the site (serving a row of cottages) to the north and then crossing a bridge over the A627(M) Slattocks Lane, linking onto Thornham Lane.

Stakehill Lane also narrows to an unsurfaced route to the south-east, beyond the junction with Finlan Road (which is bollarded to prevent through vehicular access). Hough Lane is also a narrow, unsurfaced route passing through an underpass underneath the A627(M) and linking to Oozewood Road/Cinder Hill Road. The underpass has been heavily graffitied and there is evidence of street drinking.

These routes benefit from limited levels of footfall, activity, overlooking and natural surveillance.

To the south of the site is Stakehill Industrial & Distribution Park, including a number of units on the southern and south-western side of Stakehill Lane itself. Such estates are often busy during the day, but benefit from limited levels of activity and surveillance opportunities at night/at the weekend.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime Overview

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2023 and 30th November 2024.

Recorded Crime within 1000m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	<5	<5	22	8	<5	<5	5	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 Over the last 12 months, the general volume of recorded crime in the local area has been low – with less serious woundings being the most prevalent. The surrounding area includes large areas of open land and a large industrial and distribution estate and is sparsely populated – reducing the likelihood of criminal and anti-social activity. Any crime that does occur tends to be located around Slattocks roundabout to the west and along/around the main arterial route of Rochdale Road, where the majority of development in the area is concentrated. Assaults and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place.
- 2.1.2 As this Preliminary Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed outline residential and industrial/office scheme, the more detailed analysis below will look at local domestic burglary, local vehicle crime and use-specific burglary and theft.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Residential)

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.

- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **equal to** the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **1% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **4% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings in the local area is **39% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **28% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **38% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage in the local area is **53% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **47% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **35% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime in the local area is **25% higher** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **40% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **70% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site between 1st December 2023 and 30th November 2024.

- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** There have been relatively few incidents of domestic burglary within the study area. Those that have occurred have taken place Monday to Wednesday and during the evening/early hours of the morning – when it is dark, streets tend to be quieter and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.
- 2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** Offenders have forced doors open using implements/bodily pressure, smashed glazing or have targeted/exploited insecure doors/windows to gain entry.

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site between 1st December 2023 and 30th November 2024.

- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** Again, there have been relatively few incidents of vehicle crime within the study area. Recorded incidents have primarily taken place on Tuesday and Sunday and late-morning/early afternoon – when parked vehicles are likely to be left unattended for long periods of time (e.g. while owners are at work), creating perceived low risk opportunities for offenders to exploit.

2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (Rochdale Industrial Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.

- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Rochdale industrial premises remains relatively consistent – peaking slightly on Thursday.
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary rises in the afternoon, peaking late at night and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target industrial premises at these times when it is dark, industrial areas are typically quiet, units are often closed or operate with fewer staff and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.
- 2.5.3 **Point of Entry:** When targeting Rochdale industrial premises, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:
- Offenders have damaged or forced shutters upwards to gain unauthorised access or to gain access to doors and windows behind them.
 - In a number of cases, the point of entry was ‘unknown’. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors or employees before gaining access to back-of-house/staff areas and stealing property unnoticed.
 - Doors have been forced open using tools/implements or when they have been left insecure by members of staff.
 - Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

2.6 Theft (Rochdale Industrial Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.

- 2.6.1 **Day & Time Range:** The greatest risk of theft at Rochdale industrial premises is experienced during the working week (i.e. Monday to Friday). During the day, the risk peaks during the late afternoon and into the evening. There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property from within buildings (e.g. cash, mobile phones, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from warehouses or service/storage yards.

2.7 Non-Domestic Burglary (Rochdale Office Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.

- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at office premises in Rochdale is consistently high throughout the week, with the exception of Thursday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night/into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.7.2 **Point of Entry:** When targeting Rochdale offices, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries against Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors/windows behind them.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- A number of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' or 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.8 Theft (Rochdale Office Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.

2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Rochdale offices is greatest on Wednesday/Thursday and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours/staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking late morning and mid-afternoon. During these times, many office workers will take breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out. Purses/wallets, cash, mobile phones and other items of technology (such as laptops) were the most frequently stolen items.

2.9 General Risk Factors

2.9.1 **Residential:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.9.2 **Industrial/Office Premises:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft

- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.10 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.10.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting local residential dwellings and Rochdale industrial/office premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Local Residential:** Offenders have forced doors open using implements/bodily pressure or have targeted/exploited insecure doors/windows to gain entry.

Possible Solution: All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (such as BS PAS 24), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

The locks to the front doors of houses should be fitted with split-spindles, essentially meaning they are key only entry and are secure from the exterior of the dwelling when shut. This will ensure that they cannot be left open and accessible. All ground floor/accessible windows should also be fitted with key operated locks and opening restrictors.

A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to any apartment blocks before allowing them access to the building. The main communal entrances should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (to BS PAS 24), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' can a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties. Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour. All private spaces to the sides/rears of the dwellings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of the buildings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime.

- **Local Residential:** Offenders have smashed glazing within doors and windows to gain entry.

All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well-away from locking points.

- **Local Vehicle Crime:** Vehicles have primarily been targeted when parked on the street or within publicly accessible communal parking areas

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving apartment buildings or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

- **Rochdale Industrial & Office Premises:** Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure or tools

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR 2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doorsets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks and the fittings. They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can

also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- **Rochdale Industrial & Office Premises:** Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed and windows themselves have been forced open to gain unauthorised access

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points. The windows themselves should also be certified to recognised security standards where possible (to BS PAS 24). It may be necessary for more vulnerable windows to be fitted with security-certified shutters, grilles or perforated panels (to LPS 1175 SR 1/2), in order to provide some additional protection.

- **Rochdale Industrial & Office Premises:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers before gaining access to unauthorised staff-only areas to commit theft

Possible Solution – There should be a robust access control system in place to ensure that callers to the buildings are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into the buildings. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

- **Rochdale Industrial Premises:** Shutters have been forced upwards to gain access to doors/windows behind them

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (to LPS 1175 SR 2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

- **Rochdale Industrial Premises:** Theft of externally stored materials, tools and plant equipment

Possible Solution - The integrity of the boundary treatments should be evaluated and regularly checked for defects. Inappropriately parked vehicles/trailers and other externally stored items can obscure the spread of lighting and CCTV coverage, creating potential areas of intense shadowing and blind spots. It is recommended that this is considered in the external arrangement, and 'no store/park' areas specifically identified to avoid inadvertently blocking surveillance. Storage/parking areas close to boundaries should also be avoided as they may mask any damage to perimeter fencing.

3 Design Considerations

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is for an outline scheme comprising of up to 350 residential dwellings (Use Class C3) and industrial development of up to 250,000sqft. (Use Class B2/B8) with associated access, landscaping, open space and infrastructure. Planning permission is only being sought for access at this stage, with layout, scale, appearance and landscaping reserved for a later stage.
- 3.1.2 An indicative masterplan for the area has been prepared, with the residential portion of the scheme to the west (accessed off Bentley Avenue and Stakehill Lane) and the industrial portion to the south-east of the site (accessed off Stakehill Lane/Finlan Road) – separated by the existing fishing ponds. The proposed dwellings will front onto a network of access roads and private drives, with a number of areas of public open space (including attenuation ponds and easements) and LEAP play areas. The dwellings will be served by in-curtilage parking driveways and communal parking areas to their front or rear. The industrial portion of the site will comprise of 4 no. industrial units of varying sizes, with their own dedicated parking areas and service yards accessed off Stakehill Lane.

3.2 Recommendations

- 3.2.1 The following issues are highlighted at this stage and should be addressed in the detailed design of each phase of the scheme:

Residential Dwellings

- 3.2.2 The proposed dwellings should front onto access road/private drives and towards any public rights of way, in order to create 'active frontages' and maximize surveillance over visitors and external spaces, play areas etc. Effective surveillance and maximising visibility are central to a safe and secure design. Buildings should be orientated to maximise natural and formal surveillance opportunities, particularly of building frontages and entrances, and building lines should be kept as simple as possible to avoid recesses where partially hidden doors and windows can be vulnerable to attack unseen. Public rights of way running directly to the side and rear of dwellings (e.g. as shown to the rear of Plot R1), where they would benefit from little/no overlooking or natural surveillance and may leave the dwellings themselves vulnerable to unauthorised rear access unseen, should be avoided. It is preferable for dwellings to be generally arranged in perimeter blocks, with groups of houses fronting onto/accessed from surrounding streets/public rights of way, with private garden spaces backing onto each other, leaving them publicly inaccessible.
- 3.2.3 The dwellings on the edges of such large schemes are often more remote and isolated than those within the heart of the development, where they will not benefit from as much natural surveillance and overlooking. They are also more exposed to the surrounding open space and footpath links and this perhaps leaves them more vulnerable unseen unauthorised access. The definition to the edges of the development must be carefully considered - deterring casual/uncontrolled and unseen access and limiting legitimate access to formalised links described below (see 'Open Space' Section). Wherever possible, dwellings should also front towards areas of adjacent open space and any pedestrian/cycle links to pedestrian routes, allowing them to provide natural surveillance/overlooking to the public realm while protecting them from unauthorised rear access.
- 3.2.4 The proposed dwellings should all have habitable room windows to their front elevations (at ground floor level) and their design should be kept simple, with no front doors to houses hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack unseen). The main communal entrances to any apartment blocks must also be located in a prominent position, to ensure that surveillance opportunities over the entrance itself and any residents/visitors coming to/from it are maximised. Communal entrances should be single-leaf, self-closing and fitted with secure video access controls so that residents can vet callers to apartment buildings before allowing them access. In addition to a robust access control system for visitors, there should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that ensures access to all floors of apartment building is not required. Any ground floor/accessible balcony or terrace doors to publicly accessible frontages of any apartment buildings should be avoided, as they can be vulnerable to being left insecure by the residents, to damage and to being forced open and could be used by offenders to gain unauthorised access to both the apartments themselves, as well as the whole building (by circumnavigating the access-controlled main entrance).

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- 3.2.5 The boundary treatments to the houses and any apartment blocks are vitally important to secure them, any parked vehicles and prevent unauthorised access to private spaces. The sides (including gables up to or as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the houses and apartments should be defined as private space and adequately secured (with 2100mm high boundaries/gates) to prevent unauthorised access, particularly robustly where adjacent to publicly accessible space/routes. The front elevations of houses and any apartment blocks should be protected by some defensible space (defined by low-level railings and planting), creating front garden areas/driveways that are clearly defined as separate from the adjacent public highways and each other, in ownership/control of the residents themselves. Encouraging residents/legitimate users to feel a sense of ownership and responsibility for their surroundings can make an important contribution to community safety and crime prevention. Uncertainty of ownership can reduce responsibility and increase the likelihood of crime and anti-social behaviour going unchallenged.
- 3.2.6 Some of the side/rear boundaries of the proposed dwellings may unavoidably be exposed to publicly accessible space/woodland areas and, as such, may be vulnerable to rear access burglaries. As well as particularly robust boundary definitions, it is also highly recommended that belts of mature defensive planting is used on the public side of these rear boundaries, to discourage loitering/gathering, damage and unauthorised access. The location of boundaries should be amended where possible to allow for this requirement. Care should be taken to ensure that any existing or proposed ground level changes or trees do not inadvertently create climbing aids over boundaries to private space. Any shared/communal side and rear access alleyways serving the dwellings should be gated at their outermost point, to prevent unauthorised access to where the dwellings could be attacked unseen.
- 3.2.7 It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Any driveways/garages provided to the rear of individual properties (e.g. on corner plots), where vehicles would be hidden from view from the residents themselves, should ideally be incorporated into the rear gardens of the dwellings behind high fencing/vehicular gates. If any communal parking areas are to serve groups of houses or any apartment blocks, they should ideally be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve and be clearly separated from any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any rear communal parking courts serving houses/apartments, they should be securely enclosed and fitted with automatic gates to prevent unauthorised access to where buildings and vehicles could be attacked unseen. Any such rear parking courts should not include any visitor parking spaces and should be resident-only spaces.
- 3.2.8 Physical protection measures should be incorporated into the construction of the dwellings (including Secured by Design compliant doors, windows, glazing etc.) in order to make it harder for an offender to commit a crime and raising the risk of detection (see Section 4.1 for more information).
- 3.2.9 A successful lighting scheme deters and reveals potential intruders and reduces the fear of crime. Lighting levels should be good, but not oppressive and evenly distributed. Lighting should be provided to all roads/footpaths, parking areas and to the front/rear of all dwellings.
- 3.2.10 Any proposed landscaping features (hard or soft) within the public realm, in front of buildings or around parking areas should not impede natural surveillance of/from the buildings/spaces or create climbing aids over any boundaries or up to any upper floor windows/balconies. Future soft landscaping growth and maintenance must be taken into account at the design stage.

Open Space/Play Areas

- 3.2.11 Careful consideration should be given to the need for multiple pedestrian/cycle links to any adjacent areas of existing/proposed open space and any existing surrounding routes, which can provide easy access/escape routes for criminals to utilise and can leave adjacent dwellings and parked vehicles vulnerable to attack. The number of such routes should be reduced in number to the minimum practicable - creating formalised, well-overlooked access points set well-away from any immediately adjacent properties or parking spaces. Limiting the number of connections can concentrate legitimate activity and make a development less likely to attract crime (leaving criminals feeling more vulnerable to detection) without compromising permeability. Routes should be as wide and as straight as possible, with any vegetation on either side maintained, in order to maximise views off and along them, encourage legitimate use and illuminate hiding places that could be exploited by offenders.
- 3.2.12 Consideration should also be given to preventing unauthorised vehicular access to pedestrian-only routes and to areas of communal landscaping, as well as to deterring motorcycles.

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- 3.2.13 The indicative masterplan proposes a number of areas of POS and LEAP play areas. The robust management of such spaces is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. These areas must be well-overlooked by dwellings and well-maintained, to increase the likelihood of them being legitimately used.
- 3.2.14 The layout of any new communal areas of landscaping should be free of obstacles to vision where possible, allowing people to see and be seen in the areas. Any seating areas should be positioned away from the principle circulation routes and dwellings, so that any gathering groups are less likely to cause nuisance to or intimidate passers-by and residents. The design of street furniture, such as any steps, raised planters or benches, should be designed to withstand and discourage potential mistreatment.
- 3.2.15 Any play areas should be enclosed and well-overlooked from nearby residential properties. There should be clear signage to any proposed play areas stating the age range of children who are allowed to use the play equipment. However, the equipment to be installed should be robust enough to withstand abuse by older children.
- 3.2.16 Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme (particularly close to properties/parked vehicles) should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people, dwellings and vehicles (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- 3.2.17 Trees and planting should be avoided that may aid climbing over any boundary treatments or up to upper floor windows. The security of fences and properties can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

Industrial Units

- 3.2.18 Each individual industrial/office unit should be enclosed to allow them to be individually secured both during operational hours if required and at night/when not in use. Partially hidden and potentially accessible side/rear elevations of the buildings should be enclosed within secure perimeter fencelines to prevent access to where hidden doors and windows could be attacked unseen – particularly where adjacent to open space, where offenders could access boundaries that benefit from little/no overlooking or natural surveillance and operate for a considerable time without fear of detection. The boundary treatments themselves should be correctly installed and resistant to damage, scaling and penetration where adjacent to publicly accessible space. They should also be positioned on hard standing ground or, where this is not possible, ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary. Care should be taken to ensure ground level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing over boundaries or leave space underneath fencing that could leave the perimeter vulnerable to penetration.
- 3.2.19 Service yards/loading bays should also be enclosed within dedicated secure compounds and should only be accessible to staff. The perimeter fencing to service yards (where exposed) should be protected on the inner side from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary. The position of ancillary structures, parked trailers and any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
- Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
 - Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.
 - Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
 - Their potential to obscure damage to fencelines.

Any proposed lighting/CCTV columns, street furniture, tree/shrub planting etc. within or external to the site perimeter also be considered in relation to the above issues.

- 3.2.20 Ideally, all parking areas serving the buildings should be enclosed within the secure fencelines described above, with a single, formalised entrance point – allowing surveillance, activity and security to be focussed on this location. A robust access control strategy should be adopted for the operation of vehicular and pedestrian gates at the entrance to each site, in order to prevent unauthorised access, particularly outside of normal working hours (e.g. 6pm-7am). If the car parks are not incorporated into the secure perimeter of the sites, they should at least be enclosed with low-level railings or knee-rails

(along with dense, low-level planting) and lockable vehicle barriers to prevent unauthorised vehicles getting close to the buildings out-of-hours. All parking areas should be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied rooms within the units. The quantity of parking must be sufficient to meet anticipated demand, ensuring that staff/visitor vehicles are not parked in remote/publicly accessible areas or on-street – where they would be vulnerable to attack unseen. Parking bays must be well lit and demarcated, to clearly indicate where parking is permitted/not permitted. Adequate provision for cycle parking should also be made within the secured perimeters of the units.

- 3.2.21 The existing underpass underneath the A627(M) to the east benefits from little/no overlooking and natural surveillance and could therefore provide easy access/escape routes for offenders to utilise unseen - leaving nearby parked vehicles, buildings and compounds vulnerable to attack. There are currently signs of disorder within the underpass, indicating that it is fostering loitering/gathering and anti-social behaviour. The restriction of access to this route through the site should be carefully considered, as should the secure enclosure of any immediately adjacent units, parking areas and service yards.
- 3.2.22 All entrances/lobbies should be well lit and face onto the access roads/parking areas in the front of the buildings. Active frontages, including windows to routinely occupied rooms overlooking parking and communal areas, are encouraged. Locating car parking spaces and other vulnerable uses in isolated places should be avoided.
- 3.2.23 Effective surveillance and maximising visibility are central to a safe and secure design. Building lines should be kept as simple as possible. Recesses, canopies and sheltered areas can create hiding places where buildings could be attacked unseen or can create hiding places and congregation points which are a focal point for crime and anti-social behaviour, possibly leading to littering, graffiti, vandalism and arson.
- 3.2.24 The main entrances to the buildings should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system, linked to each individual office/industrial unit, so that in the absence of staffed reception, staff can vet callers to the building before allowing them access. If any floors within the office buildings are to be let separately to different tenants, there should be robust access to prevent unauthorised access between floors as well as into the building.
- 3.2.25 Security-certified physical protection measures should be incorporated into the construction of the buildings (including doors, windows, shutters, glazing, the building fabric itself etc.), in order to make it harder for offenders to commit crimes and raising the risk of detection. High value items should be kept in secured areas and access to obvious internal risk areas (such as stock rooms or management offices etc.) should be restricted by lockable doors/access controls.
- 3.2.26 A successful lighting scheme deters and reveals potential intruders and reduces the fear of crime. Lighting levels should be good, but not oppressive, evenly distributed and avoid light spillage. The location of lighting columns and any CCTV cameras should take account of obstructions to vision, such as vegetation and parking arrangements/storage of large vehicles. Lighting should be provided to all roads, footpaths, parking/servicing areas and building entrances.
- 3.2.27 Any landscaping features (hard or soft) should not impede natural surveillance off/from the buildings or obstruct the coverage of any lighting/CCTV coverage. The robust management of the any landscaped/communal areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst leaving potential criminals feeling more vulnerable to detection and making crime less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. A well-cared for site will help to generate respect, discourage abuse and improve the informal policing provided by people going about their everyday business.

Phasing

- 3.2.28 The phasing of building works and bringing into use parts of the site while others are undeveloped or under construction can significantly affect security. Uncompleted access roads/footpaths should be secured until such time as they are completed and surveillance opportunities are maximised from occupied buildings or dwellings. Care should also be taken to ensure that any hoardings erected around development sites do not create secluded passageways and blind spots, or become targets for criminal damage. It is recommended that while construction work progresses and occupancy levels of completed properties are low, an on-site security presence is maintained.

4 Useful References

4.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. The latest SBD guidance relating to new residential developments can be found at <http://www.securedbydesign.com/industry-advice-and-guides/>.

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
9 th December 2024	WSP	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
10 th December 2024	WSP	Quote issued
11 th December 2024	WSP	Confirmation of instruction & fee
23 rd December 2024	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
B10455-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0013	Indicative Masterplan	27/11/24	P7
B10455-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0018	Illustrative Masterplan	03/12/24	P2

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS 202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk