



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Oakenrod Primary School, Bury Road

52 Houses

For: **Hallmark**

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: **22/04/22**

design**for**security

Ref: **2022/0092/CIS/01**

Oakenrod Primary School, Bury Road

2022/0092/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported / security additions advised

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found acceptable and if submitted to the local planning department in its current form we will support the application.

The redevelopment of the site for the use as a school is welcomed. The proposed building is well located and presents no significant issues from a crime prevention perspective. To improve the overall security of the building and wider site, a number of recommendations are included, as follows:

- Boundary treatment to the side and rear of properties
- Effective street lighting
- Designated boundary treatment to public footpath
- Garden sheds
- External lighting
- Continuous pavement for pedestrians

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will recommend that, should the Rochdale Planning be minded to approve the application, a condition be included to require the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation, which should be easily achievable.

David Maher *Dip Arch*
Consultant

e: david.maher@gmp.police.uk

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located off the busy Bury Road, B6222. To the rear (South East), of the site is the River Roch. The two areas are separated by dense woodland to the rear of the proposed school and green open space.

The surrounding area is a popular residential location (social & private). The adjacent main roads contain small retail and commercial uses.

The site is served by public transport. A bus stops on both Bury Road.


The site is approx. 800m south west of from the town centre of Rochdale.

The existing has been cleared for some time.

Across the River Roch (South East of the site), are a collection of sites containing a number of industrial uses. A footbridge crosses the River Roch which can be accessed from Bury Road linking to Bridgefield Street to the south east of the proposed site.

The existing buildings across the River Roch have been victim of anti-social behaviour and broken into on a number of occasions.

There was evidence of fly-tipping on the site next to the car park.



7 – Footpath opposite the site off Bury Road.



6 – Evidence of fly-tipping on site.



5 – View west along Bury Road B6222.




1 – Existing site.



2 – Existing surface grade car park on site.



3 – Footbridge over the River Roch.



4 – View south west from footbridge.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2021 to 28th February 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
9	6	26	98	20	<5	<5	18	5	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the local area is above the average rate for Rochdale, with an exception to domestic burglary, which is 17% below the rate of burglary for Rochdale. Less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded offences taking place in the local area.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, with hotspots occurring to the north of the site, around Holmes Street and the junction of College Road and Bury Road and to the south of the proposed site, around Sparth Bottoms Road. Verbal and physical assaults and harassment have been the highest recorded less serious woundings recorded in the local area, often taking place during a domestic dispute and incidents between known associates.
- 2.1.3 Theft offences have taken place throughout the local area, particularly to the east where two supermarkets are located. Offenders have targeted insecure bags, which have been hung on a trolley. Offences have also occurred within dwellings whereby known offenders have removed bankcards and mobile phones. Offenders have also targeted fuelling station, filling vehicle and making off without payment.
- 2.1.4 Theft from a vehicle and criminal damage to a vehicle have been the highest recorded vehicle offences taking place in the local area. Offences have mostly taken place to the north of the site, around Holmes Street. Offenders have smashed glazing in order to cause damage and gain access to the vehicle. Offenders have also used objects in order to scratch and damage the bodywork of the vehicles, this type of damage has mostly occurred in supermarket car parks. Offenders have used devices in order to override the locking mechanism, gain access to the vehicle, and remove items from within – mostly tools. Offenders have also removed vehicle registration plates.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Windows have either been prised open by offenders or the glazing in them has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any accessible residential windows at street level should be protected by some defensible space, to define them as entirely separate from the street and protect them from unauthorised access, as well as damage, nuisance and anti-social behaviour.

- 2.2.2 Doors (all kinds) were forced open using implements.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to BS PAS 24 security standard. PAS 24-rated doors are very difficult to force open. All ground floor or otherwise accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- 2.2.3 Offenders have targeted doors when they have been left insecure

Possible Solution - All individual cluster flats/apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance door-set (see appendix 2), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

2.2.4 Vehicles were targeted for theft and criminal damage when parked on the street.

Possible Solution - The layout of the development should be designed to accommodate the likely demand for car parking space in order to cater for residents and their visitors. Formal parking spaces for residents should be located within the defined boundary of the site, with entry restricted to residents. Any other parking spaces should be located where it can be easily overlooked from windows of routinely occupied rooms in adjacent premises. Any arrangement for off-site car parking should utilise sites approved under the 'Park Mark' safer parking scheme.

2.2.5 Entering rear gardens and approaching secure garden sheds, using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

Possible Solution - Any garden sheds must be securely fixed to a concrete foundation and the shed door fitted with a certificated 'Sold Secure' Silver Standard padlock, hasp and staple (coach bolted through the shed structure). The shed door should be at least 44mm thick so that the door can be locked into the doorframe using either a mortise deadlock or mortise sash lock certificated to BS 3621: 2007 (see section 4.8).





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Rochdale and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **17% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **19% lower** than Greater Manchester and **16% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **117% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **136% higher** than Greater Manchester and **152% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **15% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **41% higher** than Greater Manchester and **109% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **7% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **39% higher** than Greater Manchester and **143% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Wednesday and Thursday during the afternoon (2pm – 4pm) and the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target properties in the afternoon, as residents are likely to be away from the property, attending work. Offenders also target properties during the early hours of the morning as it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.
- 2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
 - Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
 - Smashed glazing in rear windows and doors.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Wednesday and Sunday during various points of the day (early hours of the morning – 1:30am – 4am, afternoon 2pm – 4pm and late evening 10pm – 11:59pm). Offenders often target vehicles during these times as they are often left unattended for long periods of time, out of sight of the owner, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development seeks to construct a new build residential development within the site boundary and construct 52No. houses.
- 3.1.2 A new access road off Melrose Street & Dove Street will be formed on the Western side of the site coupled with a new road access on the Eastern side near Oakenrod Bridge for the residents and servicing. Car parking spaces will be located towards the front, side and rear of the houses.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring a long since cleared site into residential use and provide additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The design of the dwellings appears to have been kept simple, with no deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).
- 3.2.3 The houses should have habitable room windows to their front elevations, maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.
- 3.2.4 The houses will be served by off-road parking spaces, allowing residents to secure/overlook their own vehicles and limiting opportunities to criminals.
- 3.2.5 The development will help to continue to repopulate this part of Rochdale; and add to the general activity throughout the day and at weekends.
- 3.2.6 The mix and size of properties will offer a broader range of individuals and families the opportunity to live within the town centre fringes of Rochdale. A diverse resident population brings with it a likelihood of a level of activity around the development throughout the day. Developments with greater social cohesion, and active management, tend to be less prone to the effects of crime and disorder.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the buildings and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The boundary treatments to the houses are vitally important to secure them; any parked vehicles will prevent unauthorised access to private spaces. The sides (including gables up to or as close as possible to the front building line), and rear of the houses should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.6).
- 3.3.2 Consideration must be given to boundary treatments adjacent to the existing and proposed footpaths. Currently there is evidence of litter & waste has been thrown over the boundary adjacent to the footpath. Continuation of waste being dumped at these locations will create issues for new residents potentially leading to conflicts.
- 3.3.3 Boundary treatment and access needs to be considered for the control of pedestrian movement along the existing footpath on the eastern boundary. No access from the adjacent pedestrian footpath should be created to the front of the properties abutting this boundary.
- 3.3.4 The creation of a shared surface/'home-zone' design for the street, rather than a standard engineering solution will emphasise 'territoriality', promote 'ownership' of the 'street' amongst residents, and encourage play/socialising in the street – all of which adds to the overall supervision of the public spaces and deters crime. The use of ornate blockwork or a coloured/textured tarmac is recommended.

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- 3.3.5 Height of rear boundary fencing adjoining public space / footpaths. These boundaries should be 2.1m high – the top 300mm can be formed of trellis to improve natural surveillance (see section 4.5).
 - 3.3.6 Bin storage – space should be identified within the enclosed rear gardens to accommodate waste bins, avoiding the need for free-standing bin stores in front of the houses where they could provide potential hiding places and targets for criminal damage.
 - 3.3.7 Definition of front gardens and of frontage. Front and side garden boundaries should be well-defined to indicate ownership, using low walls, railings, planting and / or surface materials, and discourage intruders from approaching the dwellings and parked vehicles, or taking short cuts.
 - 3.3.8 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation and parking arrangements for larger vehicles.
 - 3.3.9 Communal facilities and amenity space. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
 - 3.3.10 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ French/double doors or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Window frames

- ☐ Ground floor window frames must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24 or BS 7950, be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within both external doors and all ground floor windows to each house must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356.

4.1 Intruder alarms

- ☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each house (but not essential for Secured by Design accreditation). If fitted, alarms should comply with BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems or BS 6799 for wireless systems, and be linked to contacts on all external doors of each property with PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms that have windows. Alternatively, a fuse spur should be available for residents to fit their own alarm system.

4.2 Boundaries

- ☐ Sub-divisional boundaries should include a privacy screen of 1800mm perpendicular to the house, but this may reduce to 1500mm for the remainder of this boundary, part of which may be trellis.
- ☐ Pedestrian gates into rear gardens should be 2100mm - 1800mm high and fitted with a key operated lock, which can be opened from either side of the gate. Ideally, the gates should be self-closing and self-locking.

4.3 Landscaping

- ☐ Trees and shrubs in the front gardens should be maintained such that natural surveillance is not compromised across the development. Shrubs should be not higher than 1200mm and the crowns of trees should be kept 2000mm or higher.

4.4 Lighting

- ☐ External, dusk-to-dawn lighting should be provided to the front and rear doors. Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition.

4.5 Garden Sheds

- ☐ If garden sheds are provided, they should be fitted with Sold Secure™ hasp and staple, Sold Secure™ padlock and have a Sold Secure™ ground anchor fitted, to allow residents to secure valuable equipment and/or bicycles.

4.6 Meter Cupboards

- ☐ If smart meters are not installed, meters should be located in ground level boxes to the front of each property.

4.7 Downpipes

- ☐ Downpipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the brickwork to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address maintenance of the un-adopted access-way and the amenity areas.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular movements into and out of the site.
- ☐ The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority approved.

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications

and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
22/02/22	Nicol Thomas	CIS instruction received
14/03/22	Nicol Thomas	Fee agreed
23/03/22	DfS	Invoice issued
21/04/22	DfS	Site visit
22/04/22	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
M4832-A100	Site Layout	11/10/21	0

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk