



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

A development of 16 apartments
at 342 Heywood Old Road, Middleton

Gary Hyde Associates

VERSION A: 20.04.18

2018/0077/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

342 Heywood Old Road, Middleton

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

Residential development on the site seems appropriate. However, the lack of clear definition of the site boundaries and location of the cycle store raises some concerns, particularly as the crime rate in this neighbourhood is high.

The report includes a number of recommendations, set out in section 3.3, which relate to: boundary treatments; cycle store location; the inclusion of 'false' front doors on the front elevation; the recessed, main entrance door; and, the landscaping of the site.

We are happy to support the proposals, subject to the developer suitably addressing each of the recommendations. At the planning application stage, we may make further representations to Rochdale Planning to request the inclusion of conditions that will address any outstanding issues, as well as a condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.



Adrian Murphy MRTPI

Consultant

e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Modus Operandi used by offenders in committing burglary in this neighbourhood & measures to reduce vulnerabilities	
	2.3 Risk Factors	
	2.4 Crime Rate Comparison	
	2.5 Burglary: Risk Analysis	
	2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	8
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development	
4	Physical Security	11
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Window Frames	
	4.3 Glazing	
	4.4 Intruder Alarm	
	4.5 Boundaries	
	4.6 Landscaping	
	4.7 Lighting	
	4.8 CCTV	
	4.9 Cycle store	
	4.10 Meters	
	4.11 Rainwater pipes	
5	Management & Maintenance	13
6	Construction	13
7	Secured by Design (SBD)	13

Appendix

A	Contact register	14
B	Associated Documents.....	14
C	CIS Version History	14
D	Glossary	15

1 Visual Audit

The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. The site, edged in red on the plan, comprises the former Tapios Bar and Restaurant and associated car park. It is situated on the eastern side of Heywood Old Road about 2.5 kilometres north-west of Middleton town centre. Heywood Old Road is sparsely populated in the immediate vicinity of the site. A detached cottage with parking area lies immediately to the north of the site with a small grouping of houses opposite, on the western side of the road. The density of housing increases further south but is still low being largely ribbon development along Heywood Old Road. Locally, centres of population are found at the Langley estate, some 500 metres west of the site, and at Simister village, a kilometre to the south-west. The land west of Heywood Old Road falls within the Green Belt. There is a small area of parkland, part of Bowlees Park, adjoining the southern and eastern boundaries of the site. The parkland is tree-lined with the development site largely screened from view. A health and leisure club and its car park lie to the north-west; a steel palisade fence defines the boundary of the site with the club's car park. A vacant, fire-damaged, bar and restaurant with its car park, accessed from Heywood Old Road, currently stands on the development site. An attempt has been made to prevent vehicles accessing to the site with the erection of steel mesh fencing but those on foot can easily by-pass the fencing or approach from the adjacent park where the boundary wall is neither sufficiently high or complete to secure this southern boundary. The result of the ease of access has resulted in the building and site having been subject to vandalism and fly-tipping. The building, particularly at the rear is now something of an eye-sore and is likely to attract further abuses if not redeveloped or adequately secured.




The site entrance and former restaurant building viewed from Heywood Old Road



Looking south from Heywood Old Road with the site on the left



The fire damaged building, viewed from the rear of the site, with car park in the foreground



Tree-lined parkland & the stone wall defining the southern boundary of the site



The car park and buildings of the David Lloyd Health Club which adjoins to the rear of the site



N° 344 Heywood Old Road, a detached cottage with associated parking area, adjoin the site's northern boundary

In the past 12 months there have been 584 crimes recorded in the wider neighbourhood around the site. By Greater Manchester standards this figure is a little higher than the average for a suburban neighbourhood. The most common crimes, around 34% of those reported, involve the use or threat of violence and occur predominantly on the Langley Estate, a short distance to the east of the site. Vehicle crime, including theft of, theft from, or damage to vehicles is next most recorded type of crime and makes up 27% of the total. Crimes that occur in and around residential property, i.e., damage to, and theft, from cars; burglary; and, theft from gardens, garages, and garden sheds amount to nearly 150 incidents – around 24% of the total recorded crime. When looking at the environment surrounding the site, the types of offences committed in the neighbourhood, and the modus operandi used by offender in committing crimes that affect residential areas, the parts of the development most likely to be affected by any criminal or antisocial activity are: a) offenders seeking to break and enter through the communal entrance door or secluded doors and windows; b) offenders targeting vehicles or bicycles parked within the grounds of the development; c) criminal damage to boundary fencing on the southern (park) boundary.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2017 to 31st January 2018

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 1000m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
72	8	109	215	55	8	<5	66	40	<5

- 2.1.1 Over the last 12 months, the volume of recorded crime in the neighbourhood has been high. The however, a low density of development in the immediate area around the site where crime levels are low but there is a very significant volume of crime on the Langley estate to the east of the site and, less so, at Birch Services, Rhodes and Simister village. The most prevalent crimes in the area are less serious wounding, criminal damage and vehicle crime.

2.2 Modus Operandi used by offenders in committing burglary in this neighbourhood & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.2.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors and windows:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- communal entry doors should be visible from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on the more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- defensible space should be provided between the building and the street, i.e. a small front garden, ideally, enclosed with a 1000-1200mm high railing. A degree of separation between public and private space can act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are then less willing to cross from public to clearly defined private space. Such boundary definition can also reduce the risk of criminal damage to property;
- communal spaces to the side and rear of the building should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates, so that rear doors and windows are only accessible to residents; and,
- all external doors should be illuminated by dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests a property is occupied, and the light will also highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed.

2.2.2 Windows have been prised open by offenders

To minimise the risk of prising windows open:

- all ground floor windows should include key operated locks and opening restrictors; and,
- unauthorised access to the rear of the building should be deterred by the erection of robust boundaries, and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes to the rear. As a means to break and enter dwellings, offenders are more likely to target doors or windows on secluded side or rear elevations.

2.2.3 Doors and windows have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of walk/climb-in burglaries:

- the communal entry door should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- the communal entry door should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closure;
- bin store doors should be self-closing and self-locking;
- ground floor balconies should include balustrades to a height of around 1200-1300mm to prevent easy access to balcony doors; and,
- ground floor windows should be fitted with key operated locks as well as tamper proof opening restrictors.

2.3 Risk Factors



2.3.1 The security risks for this development are:

- Burglary
- Theft from gardens
- Cycle theft from communal cycle parking stores
- Criminal damage to dwellings
- Criminal damage to vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Theft of mail from postal boxes
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft of plant and machinery. and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison



Comparing crime rates in this neighbourhood to rates in Rochdale & in Greater Manchester.

The neighbourhood rates are calculated using crimes committed within a 500m radius of the site.



2.4.1 The rate of burglary per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **19% higher** than the Rochdale rate and **41% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate.

2.4.2 The rate of wounding crimes per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **100% higher** than the Rochdale rate and **115% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate.





2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **9% lower** than the Rochdale rate but **5% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate.


2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **60% higher** than the Rochdale rate and **65% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate.

2.5 Burglary: Risk Analysis

These figures relate to burglaries committed within a 1000m radius of the site.





2.5.1 **Day and Time Range:** There risk of burglary is consistently high all through the week, with the risk high throughout the day, rising from the late morning until late afternoon/early evening.



2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** Doors and windows have been targeted either when left open or unlocked by residents, or being forced open by offenders. On a several occasions, the glazing in both doors and windows has been smashed as a means to gain entry.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The figures relate to crimes committed within a 1000m radius of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day and Time Range:** There is a very high risk of vehicle related crime in this neighbourhood; the risk increases through the middle of the week decreasing at the weekend. The risk peaks during the hours of darkness, in the late evening and at night.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises the demolition of the bar and restaurant building and erection of a three storey building containing 16, two bedroom, apartments including 2 duplex apartments.
- 3.1.2 Six apartments will be accessed from the ground floor. The ground floor also includes the entrance lobby - with doors to the front and rear of the building, and a staircase to the upper floors. The entrances to the remaining four apartments will be located on the second floor. All apartment entrance doors are located within the building, although what appear to be 'front' doors are proposed for the two ground floor apartments located at the western end of the building facing Heywood Old Road. Pathways are included linking the doors to Heywood Old Road but the doors open directly into the living rooms of the respective apartments, so are assumed to be intended to elevate the visual importance of this elevation but used solely by residents to access their private gardens.
- 3.1.3 The main resident and visitor entrance will be somewhat recessed, being located on the southern elevation, facing the access road and parking bays. A second door, on the northern elevation, will provide access to the private amenity space at the rear of the building.
- 3.1.4 A total of 18 parking spaces are proposed, set out alongside access road.
- 3.1.5 Cycle parking is provided in a small store, located deep into the site at the eastern end of the access road.
- 3.1.6 Like the cycle store, the bin store is similarly located at the eastern end of the access road.
- 3.1.7 As well as the communal amenity space at the rear of the building, each of the ground floor apartments will have their own private garden; the apartments on the northern and southern elevation will be able to access the gardens via French doors.
- 3.1.8 There is no boundary treatment plan, whilst the site layout plan merely indicates the inclusion of hedges to define the site boundaries.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

- 3.2.1 A development of apartments seems appropriate for the site given the surrounding land uses.
- 3.2.2 The development will result in the removal of a building that is attracting anti-social behaviour and criminal acts, which if it continues or escalates is likely to affect neighbouring property.
- 3.2.3 There is sufficient 'critical mass', in terms of the numbers of, and size of, apartments within the development to suggest that it will be occupied for much of the day. The actual presence of residents, or even visible signs of people present, for example, lights on or cars parked in the car park, will help to deter offenders.

-
- 3.2.4 Half of the apartments are orientated with habitable room windows and/or Juliette balconies facing the car park and access road, which will facilitate residents' surveillance over this area. Those southern and western facing ground floor apartments, with private garden space, are more likely to use these spaces, thus further increasing the level of activity and surveillance over the semi-private and the public realm. The visibility of residents is more likely to deter offenders than is the possibility of being noticed from within an apartment without the offender actually observing the resident.
- 3.2.5 Locating the car parking in the semi-private space at the side of the building will provide a more secure place for vehicles than relying on the street to accommodate vehicles.
- 3.2.6 The layout plan indicates the inclusion of a high quality surface to the access road. High quality surfaces, which differentiate between public and private space, can help reinforce territoriality and deter offenders.
- 3.2.7 Defensible space separating the ground floor apartments from the 'street' and the passing public, and from the access road and passing residents and visitors is included.
- 3.2.8 Though not ideally located, the cycle store is positioned well within the site, some distance from the site entrance, where it is less likely to be noticed by passing offenders. However, it is not in a location where it can be easily supervised by residents and it could be located in a more secure place at the western side of the building.
- 3.2.9 A refuse store is provided in an appropriate location.
- 3.2.10 Amenity space is included within the development. As well as the health and well-being benefits afforded by outdoor space, the inclusion of communal amenity space can help residents to build connections with each other, which helps to build 'social capital'. Residents who know each other tend to look out for each other's interests, which can result help to deter crime. The proposed development and the landscaping of the grounds will help to raise the quality of the local environment. Well maintained environments tend to attract less crime and anti-social behaviour.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

Five of the recommendations set out below are highlighted on the annotated layout plan on page 10.

Define the front of the development and the private gardens on the southern elevation

- 3.3.1 Railings, around 1100mm high, should be erected along the Heywood Old Road boundary returning into the site to separate the private gardens of the ground floor apartments from the access road. A self-closing, pedestrian gate should be included to reinforce the privacy of the pathway leading to the main entrance door. Boundary fencing and gates help to define territory, deflect pedestrians seeking out short-cuts, and deter offenders.

Define the private gardens at the rear of the development with appropriately high fencing

- 3.3.2 To prevent non-residents accessing the secluded side and rear elevations of the building:
- an 1800mm high, close-boarded, timber fence should be erected close to the front elevation of the building and the northern boundary of the site;
 - an 1800mm high, close-boarded, timber fence should be erected along the northern boundary of the site, should the existing boundary be inadequate visually or for security purposes;
 - a section of 1800mm high railing, with a similarly styled gate, should be erected between the south-eastern corner of the building and the eastern boundary. The gate should allow residents access to the communal gardens and relocated cycle parking. The gate should be secured with a fob activated electronic lock; it should also be self-closing and lock upon closure.

Define the southern and western boundaries with appropriately high and robust fencing

- 3.3.3 To deter trespassers, the southern boundary, and the western boundary (where the existing fence does not provide adequate security or is visually inappropriate in a residential setting) should be defined with 1800mm high railings. A timber fence is not recommended on these boundaries because of the increased risk of damage, accidental or malicious, or graffiti, by users of the park.



Recessed entrance door

- 3.3.4 The communal entrance door set within a recessed area on the southern elevation of the building, where natural surveillance is limited, is not ideally located. However, the two ground floor apartments either side of the entrance do have lounge windows broadly overlooking the approach to the entrance door. If the entrance door is clearly sign-posted, well-illuminated, and the railings and the gate are installed, (as recommend in paragraph 3.3.1 above) I am happy to support this location.

High quality surfacing and landscaping to define the private nature of the development

- 3.3.5 In addition to the higher quality specification of the access road itself, a change of road surface should be used to mark the entrance to the development at the junction of the access road and Heywood Old Road. These measures together with a development name plate/sign, and gateway features, will help to promote ownership of the space at the front of the site. Residential developments that clearly display a sense of ownership through the use of higher quality hard and soft landscaping, and symbolic features such as signs and gateway features tend to discourage criminal and anti-social activity.

False front doors on the western elevation

- 3.3.6 To improve natural surveillance of the 'street' and to remove any ambiguity of the correct approach for visitors to these apartments, the proposed front doors on the western elevation facing Heywood Old Road should be replaced with doors that have a greater amount of glazing and look less like the principal entrance to the development or to these apartments.

Cycle storage

- 3.3.7 The location of the cycle store is not ideal, and because cycle theft is an increasingly common occurrence, the cycle store must be designed and located in the most secure location available. Poorly designed and poorly located stores tend to go unused because cyclists do have confidence in the ability of the store to secure their bicycles adequately.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ The communal entrance doors should be:
 - compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2;
 - include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system; and,
 - self-closing and lock automatically on closure.
- ☐ An audio-visual unit should be located at the communal entrance door on the southern elevation to allow visitors to communicate with residents.
- ☐ Residents should have a handset in their apartment to speak to and view visitors.
- ☐ Residents should be able to operate the communal entry door locking mechanism remotely from within their apartments to allow *bona fide* visitors entry.
- ☐ Individual apartment entrance doors, and any other ground floor doors, including single leaf, French or sliding doors that allow access to private garden space, must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Front entrance doors to the apartments should contain a door viewer and an opening limiter.
- ☐ Postal arrangements should be clarified – a through-the-wall system at the visitor entrance, with mail dropping into secure boxes, is preferred.

4.2 Window Frames

- ☐ Ground floor window frames should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24 and, escape requirements permitting, should be lockable with a key, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within all external doors and all ground floor windows should incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Intruder Alarm

- ☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each apartment. If fitted, alarms should comply with BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems or BS 6799 for wireless systems, and be linked to contacts on all external doors of each apartment, with PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms that have windows or balcony doors. Alternatively, a fuse spur should be available for residents to fit their own alarm system.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The front boundary of the site with Heywood Old Road should be defined by railings or wall/railings to a height of around 1100mm. The fence should return to define the private gardens of ground floor apartments on the southern side of the building and enclose the landscaped area adjacent to the site access road. A self-closing pedestrian gate should be installed to mark the transition from semi-public space of the access road to the semi-private space at the pathway leading to the main entrance door.
- ☐ The northern boundary of the site should be secured with 1800mm close-boarded, timber fencing.

-
- ☐ The southern and eastern boundaries should be secured with 1800mm high, powder coated, railings.
 - ☐ An 1100mm high, self-closing, gate should be installed at the pathway to the main entrance door
 - ☐ An 1800mm high gate should be installed at the pathway to the main entrance door to facilitate access to the private amenity space and cycle store at the western end of the building. This gate should be operated by residents' fob and be self-closing and lock upon closure. The release mechanism on the inner side of the gate should be suitably shrouded to avoid it being released from the outer side.

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ There should be a change of surface material of the access road at the entrance to the development to signify the private nature of the space beyond. Symbolic gate posts and a development name sign should also be installed to help to reinforce the private space beyond but also to inform and guide visitors to the entrance of the building.
- ☐ In order to facilitate natural surveillance across the development, shrub planting within the communal car park and within the grounds at the front of the building, should not exceed 1000mm in height. Tree and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground.
- ☐ Car park bays should be white-lined or defined by another suitable method.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the two communal entrances to the building, the access road, the cycle store, bin store, car parking bays, and all garden access doors of the ground floor apartments. Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV system may be considered for the development. If included, it will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
 - With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
 - Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
 - **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
 - **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are '[Overview](#)' and '[Recognition](#)', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

-
- ☐ The location of cameras should help to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations for cameras would be:
 1. externally – monitoring activity around the main entrance door and approach to it, the car park and cycle store; and,
 2. internally - within the ground floor front and rear entrance lobbies.

4.9 Cycle store

- ☐ The external door/gate cycle store door should be fitted with either a fob activated electronic lock. The door should include a self-closing hinge/door closer, which automatically locks the door upon closure. Securely anchored 'Sheffield' stands should be fitted within the cycle store.

4.10 Meters

- ☐ Meter cupboards should be located in an accessible place within the building.

4.11 Rainwater pipes

- ☐ Rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to lighting, signage, and access controls
 - Landscape maintenance

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access into and out of the site.
- ☐ The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority approved.

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of housing and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
01.02.18	Andrew Gent, Gary Hyde Associates	Request for Crime Impact Statement
05.02.18		Site visited
23.04.18	Andrew Gent, Gary Hyde Associates	Report Issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
4270/110	Proposed Plans	Oct '17	A
4270/120	Proposed Elevations	Oct '17	A
4270/001	Existing & Proposed Site Plan/Location	July '17	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk