



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

A development of 73 dwellings
AT Silver Hill Farm, Broad Lane, Rochdale
FOR: David Wilson Homes North- West

VERSION A: 12.08.22

2022/0123/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

We consider a residential scheme appropriate and are happy to support the proposals.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development including: an appropriate number and mix of houses; a cul-de-sac layout; a suitable amount of defensible space around each property; parking is included within a garage or within the curtilage of most houses; with appropriate fencing or other measures, there will be a clear distinction between public, semi-private and private space; and, greenspace has been included on the site which all residents can enjoy.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in section 3.3. The recommendations are summarised as follows:

- introduce environmental enhancements to the streetscape at appropriate spaces within the development;
- include measures to prevent the development of informal pathways and vehicles parking on the greenspaces;
- clearly define ownership and management and maintenance of peripheral greenspaces;
- install appropriately secure fencing and gates to define and secure front and rear boundaries to the houses;
- include provision for secure cycle parking within the garage or rear garden of each house; and,
- specify Secured by Design standard doors, windows, glazing and door hardware.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Rochdale Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.

Adrian Murphy MRTPI

Consultant

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1 The Site and Surroundings

The development site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The site, edged in red on the plan, is located east of the junction of Broad Lane and Lower Lane, on the southern fringe of Rochdale. Broad Lane defines the western boundary of the site. It is a lightly trafficked, progressively narrowing, residential, cul-de-sac. It is lined with a mix of traditional and modern houses; there is a pub, The Spring Inn, at its western end, close to the junction with New Broad Lane. Lower Lane defines the north-western boundary. It is a very narrow cul-de-sac, with a handful of dwellings facing the lane and the rear garden boundaries of several others abutting the lane. All of the dwellings are on the western side of the lane, the opposite side to the site. The road is well surfaced but lacks footpaths. A detached bungalow, that is accessed off Broad Lane, and its elongated, rear garden define the site's southern boundary. Verdant Way, a cul-de-sac lined with modern detached houses lies further to the south. The car park to a very large distribution warehouse, located within the Kingsway Business Park, is situated to the east of the site. Access to the centre is gained from within the Business Park off. The yet to be developed Plot J2 of the Business Park is located to the north-east of the site, however planning permission to develop the site for the storage of operational vehicles.


The junction of Broad Lane and Lower Lane adjacent to the western edge of the site



Vacant farm buildings at the northern tip of the site at lower lane



A view along Broad Lane with the western boundary of the site on the right



A view across the site from north-east to south-west



The eastern edge of the site including a line of conifers which serve to screen the distribution centre car park



The access and car park of the distribution centre and its proximity to the site's eastern boundary on the right



The development site itself comprises a roughly 2-hectare, pentagonal parcel of undeveloped land. Known as Plot W on the Kingsway Business Park, the site comprises areas of rough grassland with clusters of semi-mature trees and shrubs, and mature trees and hedges around much of the perimeter. At the northern tip of the site there is a cluster of former agricultural buildings, including a stone-built farmhouse. Access to the farm buildings is gained from Lower Lane, though a tall steel mesh gate prevents access. Infrastructure laid out in advance of the development of the business park has provided an access to the site from the north-east, close to the entrance to the ASDA distribution centre. Hedges, post and wire fencing and stone walls define much of the boundary of the site although the north-east boundary is currently. The site has the benefit of outline planning consent for a range of industrial and warehouse uses.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2021 to 31st May 2022.

Domestic burglary	Non-domestic burglary	Criminal damage	Crimes involving the use or threat of violence	Theft, including shoplifting	Robbery	Serious wounding	Theft from motor vehicle	Theft of motor vehicle	Bicycle theft
22	<5	15	53	7	<5	<5	7	6	<5

2.1.1 There were 121 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is very much lower than the average rate for crime within a neighbourhood across the Rochdale Division. However, much of the land within this neighbourhood is undeveloped or in the early stages of redevelopment, which significantly affects the number, type, and distribution of crimes.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded were:

- crimes involving the use, or threat, of violence - 50%
- domestic burglary - 18%
- criminal damage – 12%
- vehicle-related crime - 12%
- theft - 7%



2.1.3 The most common place for a crime to be committed was in, or in the grounds of Birch Services followed by on the street and thirdly, in a dwelling.

2.1.4 The streets experiencing the greatest volume of crime (10 offences or more) were:

- Broad Lane - 15 offences
- Ginnell Farm Avenue - 13 offences
- Turf Hill Road - 22 offences
- Buxton Crescent – 10 offences.


Domestic burglary committed within 500m of the site

2.1.5 There were 22 burglaries in the neighbourhood in the period analysed, 4 of which involved properties on Broad Lane and 3 took place at properties on Ginnell Farm Road. These two streets were the most burglarised.



2.1.6 The most common days for burglary to occur were Thursday and Sunday, with offences mostly committed at night.


Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry




- 2.1.7 Offenders attempted to force entry through doors in two thirds of all cases of burglary, although on several occasions the offender failed to gain entry because they were either disturbed or the door was sufficiently robust to withstand the force applied. As well as using bodily force against the door to gain entry, offenders smashed glazed panels in doors and used a blowtorch, or similar, to melt the area around a lock. On three occasions the offender entered via an unlocked door. Sheds in the rear gardens of three different properties were targeted.

Vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range




- 2.1.8 The risk of vehicle crime is moderate but is greatest on a Thursday and Sunday. Offences took place sporadically through the day.

2.2 Crime rate comparison


Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Rochdale, Greater Manchester, and England & Wales

England & Wales data relates to the period January – December 2021.



Domestic Burglary



Wounding



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **119% higher** than the rate for Rochdale, **122% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **128% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of wounding crimes per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **65% lower** than the rate for Rochdale, **59% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **21% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.



- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **29% lower** than the rate for Rochdale, **20% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **3% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **13% lower** than the rate for Rochdale, **3% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **18% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary and theft in Rochdale and measures to reduce risk

2.3.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors, including patio doors, should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates, so that rear doors and windows are only accessible to residents;
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping, or damage to fencing.
- defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the street, i.e., a small front garden, ideally enclosed with a 1000-1200mm fence or hedge; and,
- all external doors should be illuminated by dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests a property is occupied, and the light will also highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed.

2.3.2 Doors and windows have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in/climb-in' burglaries:

- front doors to houses should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- windows should be certified to the PAS 24 standard, and be fitted with key operated locks and tamper proof, opening restrictors; and,

- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors.

2.3.3 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and windows on the ground floor of the houses and garages; and,
- access to rear gardens should be restricted using high fences and locking gates.

2.3.4 Breaking into garden sheds and garages using force to gain entry.

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing entry into garages and garden sheds:

- single garage doors should be security certified to LPS 1175 or fitted with a ground anchored T-bar fitted with a Sold Secure padlock;
- double doors should be fitted with two Sold Secure hasp and staples, which are coach-bolted through the door and secured with a Sold Secure™ padlocks, and top and bottom bolts should be fitted to the 'slave' door; and,
- shed doors should be fitted with a Sold Secure hasp and staple, which is coach-bolted through the frame, and secured with a Sold Secure padlock.

2.3.5 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol or visit during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged so as to prevent forced access onto the site; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with tracking devices.

2.4 Environmental features the site that can influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- given the nature of the non-through roads on two sides of the site, traffic in the locality tends to be locally. Offenders are unlikely to be aware of the site or any criminal opportunities associated within it;
- nearby houses overlook the boundaries of the site;
- the site's shared boundaries with the neighbouring distribution centre and detached bungalow on Broad Lane houses are considered appropriately secure;
- natural hedges around the periphery of the site deter access;

- the high steel mesh gates make it difficult to approach the cluster of agricultural buildings;
- the agricultural buildings have been secured with timber boards, steel sheet, and blockwork;
- there is currently little on the site that would attract criminals.
- the school grounds are already enclosed with a very high security fence making the creation of informal footpaths between the school grounds and the development site unlikely.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood with higher-than-average rate of burglary;
- the development will be visible to increasing volume of traffic on the Business Park;
- well-trafficked routes can act as a conduit for criminals facilitating access between the development site and the more densely populated area to the north and west, where domestic crime is more prevalent; and,
- during the construction phase of a development, the presence of the site compound can be an attraction for offenders, who may also target property in the vicinity of the compound.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development has two elements, firstly, a development of 4, detached, residential properties at Silver Hill Farm and, secondly, the construction of the 69 family houses.

3.1.2 The redundant farmhouse and barn will be converted to 5-bedroom houses. The farm buildings opposite will be demolished, and 4-bedroom house and a 4-bedroom bungalow built on the site. Access to this small cluster of properties will continue to be gained from Lower Lane. Each property will have in-curtilage parking for two cars and front and rear garden. Gardens will be enclosed with 1500mm high walls with 400mm bow-top fencing on top or 1600mm high, powder-coated, railings. The semi-private realm in front of the cluster will be distinctive and a good quality finish. A 1600mm high railing will prevent pedestrian movement to and from Silver Hill and the adjacent, new housing.

3.1.3 The remainder of the site will accommodate a series of 69no., three- and four-bedroom houses with accommodation set out over two or three storeys. Houses will be arranged in perimeter blocks along two culs-de-sac and a series of accessways. There will be detached and semi-detached houses as well as short terraces of three or four. All houses will have a rear garden and a more modest front garden which, in several cases, will be dominated by driveways that can accommodate at least one car but more usually two. Seven of the houses will have a garage. Access into this part of the development site will be gained from Broad Lane, close to the south-western corner of the site.

3.1.4 Public amenity space is concentrated at the western edge of the site, south of Silver Hill Farm

3.1.5 There plans do not indicate the form of the boundary enclosure at the front or rear of the houses.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals

3.2.1 A residential development seems to be an appropriate use for the site given the surrounding land uses to the west and south.

3.2.2 The site is located in a neighbourhood with a low volume of crime although the rate of burglary is of concern.

3.2.3 Developments built around short culs-de-sac tend to attract less crime than those located on 'through' roads that have a greater volume of traffic, including pedestrian traffic, where offenders tend to be less conspicuous.

3.2.4 The development includes a range of types and sizes of housing, which will help to diversify the resident population. A broader age range of residents can help to retain a presence throughout the day, e.g., families with young children and older, retirees.

3.2.5 There are sufficient numbers of houses within the development such that it is likely that some residents may be at home through the day. The presence of residents or even just visible signs of people present,

for example, cars on driveways, lights on in houses, external lighting on at entrance doors will help to deter offenders.

- 3.2.6 Houses are largely arranged in perimeter blocks, with defensible to the front and rear of each dwelling. Such an arrangement will also maintain the security of most of the rear garden boundaries to properties to the east and west.
- 3.2.7 The houses are orientated in such a way that promotes activity in appropriate places and passive supervision of the approach to Silver Hill, the culs-de-sac, the access-ways and across the 'streets' to neighbouring houses; front doors and principal room windows facing the 'street', and parking is generally at the front or side of each house.
- 3.2.8 Rear garden boundaries of the proposed houses at Silver Hill will be secured with fencing and gates.
- 3.2.9 The garage and driveway parking spaces for each house will reduce the risk of vehicles being targeted by offenders.
- 3.2.10 Retention of the hedge along the Broad Lane and Lower Lane boundaries, the provision of greenspace at the western side of the site, and landscaping of front gardens of the houses will help secure the northern boundaries, soften the appearance of the development, and maintain wildlife habitats.
- 3.2.11 Houses on Plots 12-15 will overlook the public amenity space
- 3.2.12 The proposed landscape buffer and acoustic fencing will screen the effects of the existing, and future, neighbouring business premises.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the scheme

Hedges and greenspace

- 3.3.1 Wherever feasible, mature hedges on the periphery of the site should be retained, but managed
- 3.3.2 A clear pathway separate from any of the accessways should be installed to guide users of the public amenity space from the adjacent cul-de-sac in front of plot 12.
- 3.3.3 To prevent vehicles overrunning the amenity space, the access-way serving plots 12-15 should also be defined with a 1000mm high railing. Similarly, a 1000mm high railing should define the outer edge of the accessway serving plots 1-5.
- 3.3.4 A greenspace management plan should be produced, which includes clear definition of ownership and responsibility for all greenspace within the development as well as a maintenance schedule.

Streetscape

- 3.3.5 In order to emphasise ownership, and encourage maintenance of, and play/socialising in, the street, the application of a high-quality surfacing of the culs-de-sac and access-ways is recommended. The creation of a shared surface/'Home-zone' design for the 'street', rather than a standard engineering solution will emphasise 'territoriality', promote 'ownership' of the 'street' amongst residents, and encourage play/socialising – all of which adds to the overall supervision of the public space and deters crime. We encourage the inclusion of such measures as: a rumble strip or raised plateaux; use of ornate blockwork or a non-standard, coloured/textured tarmac; and, distinctive signs, identifying the name of the development and the numbers of the houses served by each of the access-ways; and, distinctive lighting. Such measures suggest that a threshold has been crossed into a space that is more private, where one's actions may be under greater scrutiny.

Front garden boundaries to houses

- 3.3.6 Along front gardens adjoining the cul-de-sac should be defined with 1000mm high hedges, railings, or dwarf walls with railing infill.
- 3.3.7 Ownership/management responsibility between plots should be clearly defined with a low railing or hedge.
- 3.3.8 In order to differentiate parking bays where they adjoin those of the neighbouring house, railings or stone setts should be used to form a dividing line.

Rear garden fencing and gates

- 3.3.9 To allow drivers using the parking bays access to the rear of plots and cyclists to come and go, garden entry gates should be fitted with a lock that allows entry and exit with the use of a key.

-
- 3.3.10 Gates securing access to rear gardens should be as close to the front building line as is feasible.
 - 3.3.11 Rear gardens should be secured with 1800mm high walls or fences.
 - 3.3.12 Fencing between neighbouring houses should include an 1800mm high, close-boarded fencing panel (acting as a privacy screen, generally erected perpendicular to the back of the house before it may be lowered to 1200mm or 1500mm of close-boarded fencing with 600mm or 300mm sections of trellis to create a secure boundary whilst also allowing neighbours to interact.

Cycle parking

- 3.3.13 Include a ground or wall anchor in each garage to which bicycles may be secured or provide an appropriately, secure, cycle shelter (ideally a Secured by Design accredited store) within the rear garden of each property.

House security

- ☐ Secured by Design standard, doors, window frames and glazing should be installed within each house and bungalow.
- ☐ Garage doors should also carry a security rating.
- ☐ An intruder alarm is advised.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Front doors and back doors, including hinged sliding, or multi-folding doors, must all be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS 202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Front doors should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key when closed.
- ☐ Front doors should have fixed sidelights or a door viewer, as well as an opening limiter fitted, so that residents can identify visitors prior to opening the door fully.
- ☐ Chain or similar opening limiters should be fitted to the front doors.
- ☐ Letter plates should meet the Door Hardware Federation's Technical Standard 008 (TS 008), be fitted with deflector plate, and be located a minimum of 400mm away from the internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Each house/bungalow should be clearly numbered with the number visible from the 'street'.
- ☐ Garage vehicle doors must all be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR1/2.

4.2 Window frames

- ☐ Ground floor windows of dwellings must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within, and surrounding, all external doors and all ground floor windows of the houses must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356.

4.4 Intruder alarm

- ☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each property. Alarms should be linked to contacts on all external doors, with PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms that have windows. In the absence of an alarm a 13amp fuse spur should be provided to allow future residents to fit their own alarm.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as hedges, walls, or railings to a height of around 1000mm.
- ☐ Sub-divisional boundaries to the front of houses should be defined with railings, fencing or hedges.
- ☐ 1800mm high, timber gates should be installed to secure the access to rear gardens. These gates should be fitted as close to the front building line as is feasible.
- ☐ To allow motorists and cyclists to come and go, garden entry gates should be fitted with a lock that allows entry and exit with the use of a key. Security will be enhanced if the gates are self-closing and lock upon closure.
- ☐ Rear gardens should be secured with 1800mm high walls or fences.
- ☐ Fencing between neighbouring houses should include an 1800mm high, privacy panel and 1200mm or 1500mm of close-boarded fencing with 600mm or 300mm sections of trellis.

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In order to facilitate natural surveillance across the development, any shrub planting within front gardens, should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External, dusk-to-dawn lighting must be provided to all front, rear, and garage doors of all properties and to the parking bays at the sides of plots 53 and 54.
- ☐ Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light.

4.8 Meter cupboards

- ☐ Unless smart meters are installed, meters should be located in ground level boxes to the front of each property, not with the secure area at the side or rear of the properties.

4.9 Downpipes

- ☐ Wherever possible, downpipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the brickwork to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address maintenance of the amenity areas and any unadopted access-ways.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.
- ☐ The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved.

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout, and construction stages of homes and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for

Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
09.03.22	Thomas Lord, Turley	Statement requested
15.06.22		Site visited
15.08.22	Thomas Lord, Turley	Statement issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following:

Drawing No.	Title	Date	Rev
CD-10	Consultation Layout	17/01/22	
SK19	Proposed Site Layout	17/01/22	

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		12.08.22



Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
CD-10	Consultation Layout	17/01/22	
SK19	Proposed Site Layout	17/01/22	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

D CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		

E Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF: TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock, and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding, or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel, and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/Polyvinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors, and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections, and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk