



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT: PRELIMINARY

Plot H4 Heywood Distribution Park

Non-Residential development

For: **BLACK CAT BUILDING CONSULTANCY**

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: **08/07/24**

design**for**security

Ref: **2021/0187/CIS/03**

PLOT H4 HEYWOOD DISTRIBUTION PARK

2021/0187/CIS/03

The 'Crime Impact Statement: Preliminary' Explained

The 'Crime Impact Statement: Preliminary' has been created to accompany outline planning applications where layout is not considered (i.e. the proposal is only at the 'red line' stage). This part of the process will provide your design team with the contextual crime information, and site-specific design considerations needed to develop the layout and appearance of the proposal.

Reserved Matters Applications

Reserved matters applications, where layout is to be considered, will require a full Crime Impact Statement, which will appraise the design and layout of the developed proposals. Please contact us when work commences on the layout of the scheme for us to develop your preliminary report into a full Crime Impact Statement.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

I have no objection in principle to the development of this site for industrial and associated office uses. However, the considerations and general recommendations within Section 3.2 of this report should be addressed when the design team develop more detailed proposals.

A full CIS report should be prepared when the design of the scheme or phases of the scheme have progressed and an assessment of the details and specifications can be made. This is most productive well in advance of any full/reserved matters planning applications, so that any subsequent alterations do not cause delay to the submission.

Please get in touch with Design for Security if you have any queries regarding the contents of this document, or the security standards referred to therein.

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Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The proposed development site is an urban fringe location, spread over a large area of land to the southwest of Heywood, consisting largely of pasture and open fields over a former landfill site.

Adjacent areas are established residential zones, farmland and the major industrial / distribution depots around Pilsworth and Hareshill Industrial estates.

Hareshill Road currently contains width restrictors to discourage use by HGVs. Footways alongside the roads are relatively narrow and not particularly well used by pedestrians.

The site is crossed by a network of roads that link into the adjacent residential and industrial areas. Fly tipping is evident in some less-monitored sections on the outer perimeter of the site.

There is very little on-street car parking provision in the vicinity of the site, and overt measures have been installed to prevent misuse of roadside verges.

The main site currently benefits from entry control via a staffed barrier and gatehouse. The proposed areas for development are currently concrete service area and grass and treelined areas within the Heywood Distribution Industrial Park.

Generally the overall park is in a well maintained state.



1 – Existing vehicle entrance point.



2 – View Est of the vehicle entrance.




3 – Existing entrance point.




4 – Existing service area & boundary fencing.



7 – Existing boundary conditions, view East.



6 – Environmental features within existing landscaping.



5 – Existing site, view South West.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The following information has been produced to give an insight into the types and volume of, crime experienced across Greater Manchester and Rochdale. Particular attention is paid to the area surrounding 2021/0187/CIS/03 and to crimes which research shows can be affected by the built environment. All data is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2023 and 31st April 2024.

2.1 Crime Overview

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	<5	12	32	5	<5	<5	<5	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 The rate of crime in the local area over the past 12 months has been low for the Rochdale division, with less serious woundings having been most commonly reported. The majority of offences have taken place in the residential neighbourhoods around Sutherland Road to the north of the proposed site. Assaults have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates as well as cases of domestic violence.

2.2 Common Local/Use Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Offenders scaling buildings to gain unauthorised access to/through roof areas.

Possible Solution – Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas are not accessible, for example with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any ‘accessible’ skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself should be robust enough to withstand penetration.

- 2.2.2 Use of implements or power tools to force open or cut through shutters.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see appendix 2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

- 2.2.3 Use of implements such as crowbars to open doors, particularly fire doors, and gain entry to the premises.

Possible Solution - Although the location of doors should be considered (ideally placed where they can be readily observed, so that potential criminals would be more easily detected), it is inevitable that some will be located where they will benefit from lower levels of natural surveillance. All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- 2.2.4 Smashing through walls using implements such as sledgehammers to break through walls.

Possible Solution – There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (behind or within any cladding to the building at ground floor level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable

to attack (see Section 4.3). Boundary treatments, lockable gates, vehicle barriers or bollards should be incorporated to prevent unauthorised vehicles from getting close to the building out-of-hours.

- 2.2.5 Offenders posing as legitimate customers before gaining access to unauthorised 'staff-only' areas to commit theft.

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to the building/site are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.


2.3 Risk Factors - Industrial & Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Controlled access (staff/user only)
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Robbery
- Employee theft
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Industrial Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Rochdale industrial premises remains relatively consistent – peaking slightly on Thursday. The risk of burglary rises in the afternoon, peaking late at night and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target industrial premises at these times when it is dark, industrial areas are typically quiet, units are often closed or operate with fewer staff and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** When targeting Rochdale industrial premises, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Offenders have damaged or forced shutters upwards to gain unauthorised access or to gain access to doors and windows behind them.
- In a number of cases, the point of entry was 'unknown'. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors or employees before gaining access to back-of-house/staff areas and stealing property unnoticed.
- Doors have been forced open using tools/implements or when they have been left insecure by members of staff.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

2.5 Theft (Industrial Premises): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The greatest risk of theft at Rochdale industrial premises is experienced during the working week (i.e. Monday to Friday). During the day, the risk peaks during the late afternoon and into the evening. There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property from within buildings (e.g. cash, mobile phones, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from warehouses or service/storage yards.

2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.





2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at office premises in Rochdale is consistently high throughout the week, with the exception of Thursday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night/into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** When targeting Rochdale offices, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries against Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors/windows behind them.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- A number of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' or 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.6.3 Theft (Offices): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.6.4 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Rochdale offices is greatest on Wednesday/Thursday and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours/staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking late morning and mid-afternoon. During these times, many office workers will take breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out. Purses/wallets, cash, mobile phones and other items of technology (such as laptops) were the most frequently stolen items.

2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The information below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Wednesday and in the afternoon (13:00-14:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings at this time during the working week when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Design Considerations

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The application seeks outline approval for the development of flexible employment space comprising warehousing, ancillary office, associated parking, pedestrian and vehicular access arrangements, landscaping, and associated infrastructure, at Heywood Distribution Park, Heywood. The site has a total area of 26.40 acres (10.69 Ha). The development will fall within the following use classes: E(g)(iii) industrial processes / B2 general industrial / B8 storage and distribution and is for a maximum floor area of 52,000m² GIA.

3.2 Recommendations

- 3.2.1 The following issues are highlighted at this stage and should be addressed in the detailed design of each phase of the scheme:

Industrial/Offices

- 3.2.2 Each individual industrial/office unit or small clusters of units, should be enclosed to allow them to be individually secured both during operational hours if required and at night/when not in use. Partially hidden and potentially accessible side/rear elevations of the buildings should be enclosed within secure perimeter fence lines to prevent access to where hidden doors and windows could be attacked unseen – particularly where adjacent to open space, where offenders could access boundaries that benefit from little/no overlooking or natural surveillance and operate for a considerable time without fear of detection.
- 3.2.3 The boundary treatments themselves should be correctly installed and resistant to damage, scaling and penetration where adjacent to publicly accessible space. They should also be positioned on hard standing ground or, where this is not possible, ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary. Care should be taken to ensure ground level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing over boundaries or leave space underneath fencing that could leave the perimeter vulnerable to penetration.
- 3.2.4 Service yards/loading bays should also be enclosed within dedicated secure compounds and should only be accessible to staff. The perimeter fencing to service yards (where exposed) should be protected on the inner side from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary. The position of ancillary structures, parked trailers and any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
- Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
 - Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.
 - Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
 - Their potential to obscure damage to fence lines.
 - Any proposed lighting/CCTV columns, street furniture, tree/shrub planting etc. within or external to the site perimeter also be considered in relation to the above issues.
- 3.2.5 Ideally, all parking areas serving the buildings should be enclosed within the secure fence lines described above, with a single, formalised entrance point – allowing surveillance, activity and security to be focussed on this location. A robust access control strategy should be adopted for the operation of vehicular and pedestrian gates at the entrance to each site, in order to prevent unauthorised access, particularly outside of normal working hours (e.g. 6pm-7am). If the car parks are not incorporated into the secure perimeter of the sites, they should at least be enclosed with low-level railings or knee-rails (along with dense, low-level planting) and lockable vehicle barriers to prevent unauthorised vehicles getting close to the buildings out-of-hours. All parking areas should be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied rooms within the units. The quantity of parking must be sufficient to meet anticipated demand, ensuring that staff/visitor vehicles are not parked in remote/publicly accessible areas or on-street – where they would be vulnerable to attack unseen. Parking bays must be well lit and demarcated, to clearly indicate where parking is permitted/not permitted. Adequate provision for cycle parking should also be made within the secured perimeters of the units.

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- 3.2.6 All entrances/lobbies should be well lit and face onto the access roads/parking areas in the front of the buildings. Active frontages, including windows to routinely occupied rooms overlooking parking and communal areas, are encouraged. Locating car parking spaces and other vulnerable uses in isolated places should be avoided.
 - 3.2.7 Effective surveillance and maximising visibility are central to a safe and secure design. Building lines should be kept as simple as possible. Recesses, canopies and sheltered areas can create hiding places where buildings could be attacked unseen or can create hiding places and congregation points which are a focal point for crime and anti-social behaviour, possibly leading to littering, graffiti, vandalism and arson.
 - 3.2.8 The main entrances to the buildings should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system, linked to each individual office/industrial unit, so that in the absence of staffed reception, staff can vet callers to the building before allowing them access. If any floors within the office buildings are to be let separately to different tenants, there should be robust access to prevent unauthorised access between floors as well as into the building.
 - 3.2.9 Security-certified physical protection measures should be incorporated into the construction of the buildings (including doors, windows, shutters, glazing, the building fabric itself etc.), in order to make it harder for offenders to commit crimes and raising the risk of detection. High value items should be kept in secured areas and access to obvious internal risk areas (such as stock rooms or management offices etc.) should be restricted by lockable doors/access controls.
 - 3.2.10 A successful lighting scheme deters and reveals potential intruders and reduces the fear of crime. Lighting levels should be good, but not oppressive, evenly distributed and avoid light spillage. The location of lighting columns and any CCTV cameras should take account of obstructions to vision, such as vegetation and parking arrangements/storage of large vehicles. Lighting should be provided to all roads, footpaths, parking/servicing areas and building entrances.
 - 3.2.11 Any landscaping features (hard or soft) should not impede natural surveillance off/from the buildings or obstruct the coverage of any lighting/CCTV coverage. The robust management of the any landscaped/communal areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst leaving potential criminals feeling more vulnerable to detection and making crime less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. A well-cared for site will help to generate respect, discourage abuse and improve the informal policing provided by people going about their everyday business.
 - 3.2.12 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

Phasing

- 3.2.13 The phasing of building works and bringing into use parts of the site while others are undeveloped or under construction can significantly affect security. Uncompleted access roads/footpaths should be secured until such time as they are completed and surveillance opportunities are maximised from occupied buildings or dwellings. Care should also be taken to ensure that any hoardings erected around development sites do not create secluded passageways and blind spots, or become targets for criminal damage. It is recommended that while construction work progresses and occupancy levels of completed properties are low, an on-site security presence is maintained.

4 Useful References

4.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. The latest SBD guidance relating to new residential developments can be found at <http://www.securedbydesign.com/industry-advice-and-guides/>.

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
13/06/24	Blackcat Building Consultancy	Prelim CIS instructed
14/06/24	Blackcat Building Consultancy	Prelim CIS confirmed
14/06/24	Blackcat Building Consultancy	Drawings issued
14/06/24	GMP	Invoice issued
14/06/24	Client	Invoice paid
04/07/24	DfS	Site visit
08/07/24	DfS	Prelim CIS completed
08/07/24	DfS	Prelim CIS Issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
23103-UMC-XXXX-SI-DR-A-0507-P.01	Site Location Plan - Plot H4		
23103-UMC-ZZZZ-SI-DR-A-0648- P.05	Parameters Plan		
23103-UMC-ZZZZ-SI-DR-A-0651-P.01	Illustrative Site Plan - Plot H4 - 2 Unit		
23103-UMC-ZZZZ-SI-DR-A-0652-P.02	Illustrative Site Plan - Plot H4 - 1 Unit		
23103-UMC-ZZZZ-SI-DR-A-0656-P.02	Illustrative Site Plan - Plot H4 - 1 Unit - Option 2		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS 202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk