



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

29-41 Maclure Road, Rochdale
38 No. Apartments & 4 No. Ground Floor
Commercial Units

FOR: LEACH RHODES WALKER

VERSION A: 18th December 2023

REFERENCE: 2006/1349/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

29-41 Maclure Road

2006/1349/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design changes not required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed residential/mixed-use development is suitable for this area, which has a number of similar developments proposed in the local area. Further consideration should be given to the following points:

- The main entrance to the apartment, and access into the bicycle/bin stores are recessed, which can generate criminal and antisocial behaviour. It is recommended that these entrances are recessed from view or mitigating security measures should be introduced.
- The entrance to the rear of the building is concealed from view and it is recommended that this is addressed.
- Access control into, and throughout, the building should be carefully considered.
- The development should be built to Secured by Design standards to ensure a high level of security is achieved.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development and it is highly recommended that these are considered for the proposed units and the wider outline proposals.



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
1 Visual Audit

The proposed development can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the town centre area of Rochdale.

The site is a corner plot and the site boundaries are defined by Fire Station Yard to the North, to the East by Al Wasilah Learning Academy, to the South by Station Road, and to the West by Maclure Road.

The site is currently developed with two no. buildings occupying the site. There is an older three storey building positioned adjacent Fire Station Yard and a newer single storey building on the junction of Maclure Road and Station Road.

Rochdale Railway Metrolink Station is located opposite the site on Maclure Road. To the North of the site is the Rochdale Fire Museum.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2022 to 30th November 2023.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
14	15	60	334	32	20	9	35	59	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months has been high for the Rochdale division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and vehicle crime having been the most reported offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town, or city centres where there is often a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues. Whilst the offences have occurred throughout the local area, there has been a few hotspots of offences at locations near to and along Drake Street to the north of the proposed site, as well as at the junction of Milkstone Road with Tweedale Street to the west.
- 2.1.2 Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most common less serious woundings taking place. These offences have been occurring throughout the local area, especially at the hotspot of offences mentioned above. They have mainly involved disputes between known associates and disputes between neighbours, as well as cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage to vehicles has accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences taking place in the local area. Offenders have in most targeted vehicles by using bodily pressure or implements in order to smash the glazing in windows and damage the bodywork of cars. There have also been cases of damage being done to properties with objects being used to damage the front windows and doors of dwellings.
- 2.1.4 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most common vehicle crime offence taking place, whereby offenders have smashed the glazing in windows before removing items from within. Offenders have targeted vehicles parked in the streets and car parks to the west of the proposed site, as well as at a hotspot of offences occurring around Woodward Place to the east. As the location is within close proximity to the city centre vehicles are usually left unsupervised for long periods of time, creating many low-risk opportunities for offenders.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- **Residential:** Doors have been forced open using bodily pressure and tools

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the apartment block before allowing them access to the building. The main communal entrance/s should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access.

- **Residential:** Offenders have targeted doors when they have been left insecure

Possible Solution - All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance door set (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

- **Commercial:** Doors have been forced open and glazed panels within them have been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

- **Commercial:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers/service users to gain access to unauthorised and staff-only areas and theft of service user/staff property

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place (see Sections 5.1 & 6) to ensure that public access is not possible to staff-only areas. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.

2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems





2.4 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer/staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.5 Crime Rate Comparison




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2017.



- 2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **39% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **38% lower** than Greater Manchester and **36% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **26% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **48% higher** than Greater Manchester and **182% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **24% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **40% higher** than Greater Manchester and **70% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **183% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **215% higher** than Greater Manchester and **283% higher** than England & Wales.

2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.




2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on Tuesday in the early hours of the morning (02:00-03:00). Offenders tend to target properties at this time when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as "unknown" it is likely that offenders have exploited insecure windows/doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements.

2.7 Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



2.7.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at Rochdale retail premises remains consistently high, with a slight peak on Monday and Wednesday. During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning when it is dark, the majority of such premises are closed/unoccupied, streets are quiet, and offenders perceive a lower risk of being witnessed.

2.7.2 Point of Entry: When offenders have targeted Rochdale retail premises, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Shutters have been forced open with tools/implements, bodily pressure and vehicles to gain access or to target doors/windows behind them.
- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using implements and bodily pressure.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Where entry points were 'legitimate' or 'unknown', offenders are likely to have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have penetrated through walls and roofs using tools to gain access to premises.

2.8 Theft Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against retail, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Rochdale retail premises peaks on Thursday. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or personal property stolen from customers (e.g. purses/wallets, mobile phones etc.). Theft of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.

2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.9.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Tuesday in the afternoon (14:00-15:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles in the afternoon during the working week when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time whilst they are at work, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Proposed full planning application for a 6 storey mixed-use development comprising of 4no. ground floor commercial units with a gross external area of 386sqm and 38no. of 1 and 2 bed residential apartment units over 5 floors with associated ancillary space.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.


- 3.2.1 The site is located on the busy junction of Maclure Road and Station Road where it will be subject to high levels of surveillance by passing vehicles and pedestrians.
- 3.2.2 The main entrance to the commercial units and the apartments is taken from the front elevation where they can easily be seen from the public highway.
- 3.2.3 There will be a bicycle store with the building allowing residents to secure their vehicles bicycles within the building.
- 3.2.4 The proposed mix of uses will generate activity during different times of the day which will deter criminals and those antisocially minded.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Apartments

- 3.3.1 The main entrance into the apartment building, bin store, and cycle store, are recessed which can be problematic in town centre areas. Buildings with similar recessed buildings often experience misuse of these spaces, with loitering, drink/drug consumption, vagrancy, and public urination. If the recess must be retained, then it should be illuminated to a very high standard and covered by CCTV.



- 3.3.2 The rear entrance to the building is recessed and potentially concealed from view, depending on approach. It is highly recommended that the building line is altered (see above) so that it cannot be misused by criminals or antisocial individuals.
- 3.3.3 The proposed bicycle stores should be restricted to residents with an access controlled door, certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24). There should be a vision panel in the door to allow those using the facility to view any threats before entering/exiting. Access from the cycle store, into the building, should operate on an access control system.
- 3.3.4 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating with an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- 3.3.5 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- 3.3.6 There should be a second secure, access controlled, door set between the entrance lobby and the circulation areas of the buildings to prevent tailgating.
- 3.3.7 On a development of this size it is recommended that access to individual floors is restricted to residents of that floor by the access control system.

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- 3.3.8 The rear blank façade of the building should be treated with an anti-graffiti coating to a height of 2000mm so that any graffiti can easily be removed.

Commercial Units

- 3.3.9 The back-of-house areas of the commercial units should be self-contained with no shared access, which could compromise the security of these units.
- 3.3.10 The proposed commercial units should have the infrastructure for the easily installation of an alarm, CCTV system, and access control, to allow a future tenant to install these during the fitout of these units.
- 3.3.11 The opening hours of the units should be in keeping with similar users as the local area and reflect the residential nature of the building on the upper floors.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

- Communal entrances
- Communal areas
- Individual floor levels
- Cycle store

4.6 Bicycle Parking

- ☐ Doors into internal cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners).
- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Doors within the parking area should be illuminated with a dedicated lighting source.
- ☐ Elevations of the building should be illuminated.

5 Physical Security (Commercial Units)

5.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main sliding entrance doors should be capable of being controlled by reception staff if required (e.g. at night) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby.
- ☐ Sliding/revolving doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All doors/frames to staff areas/stores/offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

5.2 Windows, Building Fabric & Shutters

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

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- ☐ Any shutters must be tested and certified to STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

5.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.4 Alarms

- ☐ The commercial units should have intruder alarms installed or the infrastructure for tenants to easily install an alarm.

5.5 CCTV

- ☐ The retail units should be monitored with a comprehensive CCTV system, or the infrastructure for one to be installed by the end user should be provided.

5.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
- External doors
 - Staff areas

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 6.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.
- 6.1.3 A comprehensive security regime for the individual commercial units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable, and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing the building, including staff arrival and departure.
 - Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
 - Details of staff security training.
 - Location and management of any smoking areas.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
01/12/2024	David Luong	CIS application received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
8337-LRW-ZZ-00-DR-A-00-192_P01	Proposed Site Plan - Option 7 (Colour)		
8337-LRW-ZZ-00-DR-A-00-195_P01	Proposed Ground Floor Plan - Option 7 (Colour)		
8337-LRW-ZZ-01-DR-A-00-196_P01	Proposed First Floor Plan - Option 7 (Colour)		
8337-LRW-ZZ-02-DR-A-00-197_P01	Proposed Second Floor Plan - Option 7		
8337-LRW-ZZ-05-DR-A-00-199_P01	Proposed Fifth Floor Plan - Option 7 (Colour)		
8337-LRW-ZZ-RF-DR-A-00-600_P01	Proposed Roof Plan - Option 7 (Colour)		
8337-LRW-ZZ-RF-DR-A-00-600_P01	Proposed Roof Plan - Option 7 (Colour)		
8337-LRW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-00-198_P01	Proposed Third - Fourth Floor Plan - Option 7		
8337-LRW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-00-198_P01	Proposed Third - Fourth Floor Plan - Option 7 (Colour)		
8337-LRW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-00-207_P01	Proposed Elevation 2 (Colour)		
8337-LRW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-00-208_P01	Proposed Elevation 3 (Colour)		
8337-LRW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-00-208_P01	Proposed Elevation 3 (Colour)		
8337-LRW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-00-604_P01	Site Location Plan		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		