



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

FORMER TACK LEA WORKS, BURY & ROCHDALE OLD ROAD,
HEYWOOD, ROCHDALE

RESIDENTIAL (27 no. HOUSES & 6 no. APARTMENTS)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Hall & Co.

VERSION A: 25/08/2022

REFERENCE: 2009/0402/CIS/05

Former Tack Lea Works, Bury & Rochdale Old Road, Heywood, Rochdale

URN: 2009/0402/CIS/05

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Replacement of the patio doors to the ground floor apartments with windows protected by low-level defensible space (which would be less vulnerable to being left insecure, being forced open or being damaged) or securely enclosure them within private terraces if they are to be retained.
- Defensive planting beds are recommended along the rear elevation of the apartment to funnel any pedestrian movement away from the ground floor windows as much as possible.
- General boundary treatments, including secure enclosure of private gardens (with particularly consideration given to protecting exposed boundaries abutting publicly accessible open space and ensuring any level changes/retaining structures/nearby trees do not form climbing aids), gating of any communal side/rear access alleyways at their outermost point, definition/segregation of front gardens/driveways and enclosure/definition of communal parking areas.
- The driveway for the property immediately adjacent to the woodland walk entrance should be located immediately adjacent to and within the curtilage of the dwelling itself, entirely separate from the pedestrian route, with additional protection/definition to protect the parked vehicles from damage/attack.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site is located on the north side of Bury and Rochdale Old Road. The eastern portion of the site was formerly occupied by derelict commercial/industrial buildings, which have been demolished and cleared – leaving areas of hard standing and scrub vegetation. The site slopes upwards to the north and the original buildings cut into the hillside. There are a number of existing mill ponds to the north and the western portion of the site is formed by woodland surrounding a brook (which continues to the north-west of the site).


There is open farmland and wooded areas to the north and west of the site.

When open land or routes existing to the rear of sites and dwellings, they can often leave them vulnerable to unauthorised access (particularly when they benefit from little/no natural surveillance) – as they can provide easy access/escape routes for offenders to utilise unseen. Routes to the rear of dwellings can also experience nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and can leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly after dark.

The existing site is screened from the road by a heavily vegetated bank, with the site only visible through the vehicular entrance to the site (to the south-east).

There is also densely vegetated open land on the opposite side of Bury and Rochdale Old Road from the site, meaning it benefits from limited levels of natural surveillance and overlooking.

A small terrace of residential properties adjoins the site to the east, beyond which is a narrow access track leading to Lower Tack Lea Farm to the north of the site.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2021 to 30th June 2022.





2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	<5	<5	8	<5	<5	<5	<5	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is low and the local rate of crime (i.e. recorded crimes per 1,000 dwellings) is 35% below the average rate of crime for the Rochdale division. However, the study area does include large areas of open space that are not densely populated and typically attract fewer crime and disorder incidents. The most prevalent type of crime has been less serious wounding, including assaults, harassment and public order offences which have mostly occurred around/off residential streets to the south-west of the site.
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will focus on residential burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



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- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **42% higher** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **44% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **48% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **82% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **79% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **60% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **66% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **62% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **54% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **33% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **26% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **10% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.

- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** There have been relatively few recorded domestic burglary crimes in the local area in the last 12 months. However, there are also a limited number of residential properties within the study area, which results in an elevated rate of domestic burglary in the area (see above). When analysing these that have occurred, the risk peaks on Tuesday and over the weekend. During the day, the risk peaks late at night - when it is dark and streets typically have lower levels of footfall, activity and natural surveillance than during the day, meaning offenders often perceive a lower risk of being witnessed or detected.
- 2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:
- Windows have been forced open/smashed to gain entry.
 - Offenders have entered private gardens to gain access to sheds/outbuildings.

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** Again, over the previous 12 months, there have also been relatively few incidents of vehicle crime within the research area. Of those that have occurred, offenders have targeted vehicles in the evening – when they perceive a lower risk of being witnessed or identified.
- 2.4.2 Vehicles parked within open, communal areas or on streets, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked on the driveways of individual properties or within secure garages.

2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:
- Domestic burglary
 - Bogus callers and distraction burglary
 - Criminal damage to property and vehicles
 - Anti-social behaviour
 - Theft of/from parked vehicles
 - Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
 - Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
 - Neighbour disputes
 - Poor maintenance of access control systems
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Windows have been forced open/smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution - All windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.3), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible windows should also be fitted with key-operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.4).

Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' can a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties (see Section 4.6). Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

- Offenders have entered private gardens to gain access to sheds/outbuildings.

Possible Solution - All private spaces to the sides/rears of the dwellings should be robustly enclosed (see Section 4.6), particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of the buildings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.7).

Any sheds should be of robust construction (i.e. minimum 38x50mm planed timber frame; floor and roof constructed from minimum 11mm boards; and minimum 11x125mm tongue & grooved board walls and door), with coach-bolted hinges, two hasp and staples to meet 'Sold Secure' Silver and two padlocks to meet 'Solid Secure' Silver or LPS 1654 SR1. Communal cycle and bin stores should be securely enclosed to prevent damage, theft or mis-use.

- Vehicles have been targeted, particularly when parked on the street.

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving apartment blocks or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a 3 storey block of 6 no. 2 bed apartments and 27 no. 2/3 storey, 3/4/5 bed detached, semi-detached and mews cottages, with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The scheme will be accessed off Bury & Rochdale Old Road to the south-east, with a central access road serving all of the proposed dwellings. The apartment block will sit to the north of the site entrance, with a small communal car park serving it on the opposite side of the access road (also including 4 no. visitor spaces). The 10 no. semi-detached/mews mill houses to the rear of the apartment block will be served by a communal car park in front of the houses, which will also include a small communal garden area. The remainder of the cottages will each be served by 2 no. in-curtilage parking spaces in front/to the side of them.
- 3.1.3 A footpath link is proposed at the end of the access road to serve a woodland walk, outside dining area and play area within the existing densely vegetated western portion of the site.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring a currently vacant site into use and provide additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The proposed apartment block and many of the houses will front onto the proposed access road, resulting in good levels of surveillance of and from dwellings/parked vehicles and the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.3 The design of the dwellings has been kept simple, with no front doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).
- 3.2.4 The houses will have habitable room windows to their front elevations (at ground floor level), maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.
- 3.2.5 The houses will be served by in-curtilage off-road parking spaces or communal parking areas directly in front of them, allowing residents to secure/overlook their own vehicles and limiting opportunities to criminals.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Apartments

- 3.3.1 The main entrance to the apartment block should be that which fronts directly onto the access road, where surveillance opportunities are maximised over the entrance and any visitors coming to and from it. The main entrance itself should be formed by a security-certified, single-leaf doorset which is easier to secure with an electrically operated multi-point lock, capable of being operated via a robust electronic access control system (see Section 4.1). In addition to a robust access control system for visitors, there should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that ensures access to all floors of the building is not required (again, see Section 4.1 for more information). If there is a communal rear entrance to the building, it should be for the use of residents only.

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- 3.3.2 The ground floor apartments are proposed to have patio doors along the side/gable end elevations of the building. If such patio doors are publicly accessible, they can be vulnerable to unauthorised access - leaving the doors themselves vulnerable to damage, being forced open or being left insecure. If attacked or left insecure, they could be used by offenders to gain unauthorised access to both the apartments themselves, as well as the whole building (by circumnavigating the access-controlled communal entrance). Ideally, any such patio doors should be removed from the scheme and replaced with security-certified windows fitted with opening restrictors (see Section 4.3), which would be less vulnerable to forced unauthorised access, damage or being left insecure. If they must be provided, the doors themselves must be security-certified (see Section 4.1), incorporate laminated glazing (see Section 4.4) and enclosed within private terrace areas securely enclosed by railings or a balustrade to a minimum height of 1800mm. However, if the patio doors are replaced with windows, they should be protected by some defensible space defined by low-level railings, picket fencing or hedging (see Section 4.6 for more information), as should the frontage of the building.
- 3.3.3 The ground floor windows along the rear elevation of the building will directly abut the car park serving the dwellings behind it and will not be capable of being protected by clearly defined/enclosed defensible space (as the windows to the other elevations should be). It is highly recommended that at least some narrow defensive planting beds (including low-level, densely branched shrubs) are provided along the rear elevation of the building to funnel any pedestrian movement away from the windows as much as possible.
- 3.3.4 The communal car parks to either side of the access road (as well as the communal garden area) should be enclosed with low-level railings and planting to define them as in ownership/control of the residents and to deter pedestrian through-access around/between parked vehicles (where damage can easily occur – both accidentally and maliciously). There should be symbolic barriers at the entrances (e.g. brick pillars, change of road surface texture/colour etc.) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents, psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a purpose from entering. Any cycle or bin stores within the car parks should also be securely enclosed to prevent theft or mis-use (see Section 4.6).

Houses

- 3.3.5 The boundary treatments to the houses are vitally important to secure them, any parked vehicles and prevent unauthorised access to private spaces. The sides (including gables up to or as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the dwellings should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access, particularly robustly where adjacent to publicly accessible space (see below). Care should be taken to ensure ground level changes or adjacent trees do not inadvertently facilitate scaling boundaries or leave large gaps underneath the fencing panels/gates. The front elevations of dwellings should be protected by some defensible space (defined/segregated by low-level railings, picket fencing and/or dense hedging), creating garden areas/driveways that are clearly defined as separate from the street and each other, in ownership/control of the residents themselves (see Section 4.6 for more information).
- 3.3.6 Many of the proposed houses will back onto publicly accessible open space - leaving them exposed to unseen, unauthorised rear access. As well as robust boundary definitions, it is also highly recommended that any exposed side/rear boundaries of the dwellings are protected by belts of mature defensive planting (i.e. densely branched, thorny shrubs) to deter and discourage damage and scaling. The location of boundaries should be amended where possible to allow for these requirements.
- 3.3.7 Any rear access alleyways running to the side/between houses should be gated at their outermost point (i.e. at the front building line of the properties) to ensure that anyone attempting to gain unauthorised access can be clearly seen from the street (see Section 4.6 for more information).
- 3.3.8 The property/parked vehicles immediately adjacent to the proposed pedestrian link to the open land to the west of the scheme, which could provide easy access/escape route for criminals to utilise, could be potentially vulnerable to unauthorised access, anti-social behaviour and damage. It is highly recommended that the 2 no. parking spaces serving the 4 bed semi-detached cottage immediately adjacent to the woodland walk entrance are located immediately adjacent to and within the curtilage of the dwelling, entirely separated from the pedestrian footpath by dense, low-level defensive planting. It is also highly recommended that low-level railings and vehicular gates are incorporated to give some further protection and definition to its semi-private front garden/driveway (see Section 4.6).

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- 3.3.9 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls (Apartments)

- ☐ The main communal entrance doorset (fronting towards the access road) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. It should be single-leaf, self-closing and controlled by means of an audio or video entry phone system so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ Where possible, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. Where this is not practical, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries within a postal lobby without providing access to all floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ Any rear communal entrance door should also be security-certified to one of the above standards, self-closing and operated by resident key-fob only (on access and egress).
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ Any ground floor patio doors to individual apartments must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 and should include laminated glazing (see below).

4.2 Doors (Houses)

- ☐ Front and rear doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. Any rear french/double doors, sliding doors or bi-folding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key. Full instructions should be provided to residents to ensure that they understand that the key must be used to fully lock/secure the door.
- ☐ Front doors should also have either fixed sidelights or door viewers. Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential. Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ All ground floor and potentially accessible first floor windows (i.e. above any single-storey elements) should be certificated to BS PAS 24. Any ground floor/accessible curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ All ground floor and potentially accessible first floor opening lights must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ All ground floor and potentially accessible first floor glazing (i.e. above any single-storey elements) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarms

- ☐ Each house and apartment should ideally have an intruder alarm to comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems; or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.

Alarms should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows.

- ☐ If intruder alarms are not to be provided, there should at least be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur installed to each house and apartment, to allow future residents to connect an alarm if required.

4.6 Boundaries

Apartments

- ☐ If the patio doors to the ground floor apartments are to be retained, they should be enclosed within private terraces by railings or balustrades to a minimum height of 1800mm. If they are replaced with windows (fitted with opening restrictors), they should be protected by some defensible space defined as described below.
- ☐ The front and side elevations of the apartment block should be enclosed by low-level railings, timber picket fencing and/or dense hedging erected to/maintained to an approximate height of 1200mm. Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher. The rear windows to the block should be protected by some defensible planting beds, including low-level, densely branched shrubs.
- ☐ Any external communal cycle store should be enclosed with 1800-2100mm high walls or railings with a self-closing, 'slam to lock' steel-framed gate (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, fob operated from both sides). It should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/. Any external communal bin store serving apartment buildings should be similarly enclosed with 1800-2100mm high walls, railings or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and self-closing, 'slam to lock' gates. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place while retaining a secure development.
- ☐ All gates should have no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, lighting columns etc. Exposed hinges and large apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The hinges should also not provide footholds and the gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ All communal parking areas serving apartment block and houses (as well as the communal garden area) should be enclosed with low-level railings (to an approximate height of 1200mm) to define them as in ownership/control of residents and entirely separate from any immediately adjacent areas of open space or pedestrian footpaths. There should be a symbolic barrier at the entrance to the car parks (for example, formed by brick pillars and/or a change of road surface texture/colour etc.) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents, psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate reason from entering.



Houses

- ☐ The sides (including gables up to/as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the houses should generally be enclosed with 2100mm high walls or robust close-boarded timber fencing (with the top 300mm consisting of robust integral trellis if required). Boundaries to private space that are adjacent to publicly accessible open space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base. Any side pedestrian gates to the private spaces of houses should also be 2100mm high and should be fitted with either a pad-lockable bolt (to the mid-point of the internal face) or a key operable deadlock. Sub-divisional rear boundaries should be 1500-1800mm high.
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure level changes do not inadvertently aid scaling boundaries or leave large gaps underneath fencing panels. Any retaining structures should not have features that may aid climbing (such as sloping, terracing or footholds etc.) and any boundaries formed by a combination of retaining walls and fencing should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. It is highly recommended that any boundaries to private space that are exposed to publicly accessible open land or pedestrian footpaths are protected by some low-level defensive planting (i.e. densely branched, thorny shrubs) on their public side to deter damage, penetration and scaling.
- ☐ Any communal side/rear access alleyways within the site should be gated at their outermost point to prevent unauthorised access to where the dwellings could be attacked unseen. The gates themselves should be 2100mm high, self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut.
- ☐ The front gardens/driveways of houses should be protected by some defensible space, demarcated and segregated by low-level railings, timber picket fencing or dense hedging erected to/maintained to an approximate height of 1200mm. Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher. The front garden/driveway of the 4 bed semi-detached cottage immediately adjacent to the woodland walk entrance should be defined by low-level railings and should include low-level vehicular gates, in order to give some further protection and definition.
- ☐ Any external communal bin stores serving the houses should be enclosed with 1800-2100mm high walls, railings or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and self-closing, 'slam to lock' gates. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place while retaining a secure development.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to the access road should be to adoptable standards (to comply with BS 5489). Lighting to communal parking areas should display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear doors of all houses and the apartment block, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations, such as around building entrances/frontages and parking areas, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments or up to high level windows. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

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- ☐ Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme (particularly close to properties/parked vehicles) should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people, dwellings and vehicles (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
 - ☐ Hard or soft landscaping features (such as bollards, large boulders or trees) should be incorporated to prevent unauthorised vehicular access to the woodland walk/open space to the west of the scheme. The proposed woodland walk pedestrian routes should be as wide and as straight as possible, with any vegetation on either side maintained, in order to maximise views off and along them, encourage legitimate use and eliminate hiding places that could be exploited by offenders. Consideration should also be given to the deterring unauthorised motorcycle access without impeding wheelchair or pram use.
 - ☐ The proposed play area should ideally be enclosed and well-overlooked from nearby residential properties. There should be clear signage to any proposed play areas stating the age range of children who are allowed to use the play equipment. However, the equipment to be installed should be robust enough to withstand abuse by older children. The design of any furniture to the outside dining space should also be designed to withstand and discourage potential mistreatment and damage. Where there are numerous benches in isolated locations or within very close proximity of dwellings, they can often attract and foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour problems.
 - ☐ The robust management of landscaped areas, footpaths and play areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. If signs of disorder (such as criminal damage, graffiti, littering etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse.

4.9 Other

- ☐ There should be no features of the buildings (such as projecting brickwork/cladding features, projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, trees, handrails, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows/terraces or over boundaries to private space.
- ☐ Ideally, any meter cupboards should be capable of being read remotely or should be located to the fronts of dwellings only and not in the private areas, in order to deter bogus callers.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (such as access controls, boundaries, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as gable walls, boundaries to private space or parking bays).

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
10 th May 2022	Asteer Planning	Receipt of CIS instruction form & site plan
12 th May 2022	Asteer Planning	Quote email issued & request for additional info
14 th July 2022	Asteer Planning	Number of dwellings amended. Confirmation of
22 nd July 2022	Asteer Planning	Invoice revised to reflect amended scheme. Email correspondence re: plans required
2 nd August 2022	Asteer Planning	Receipt of updated site plan & housetype plans/elevations
25 th August 2022	Asteer Planning	Email sent to Agent re: report completion & payment
26 th August 2022	Asteer Planning	Email correspondence re: invoice
13 th September 2022	Asteer Planning & Hall & Co	Email correspondence re: payment
13 th September 2022	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A645_P_001	Location Plan	Feb 2022	-
A645_SK_10D	Proposed Site Plan (SUPERSEDED)	May 2021	-
A645_SK_10J	Proposed Site Plan (SUPERSEDED)	May 2021	-
A645_SK_10K	Proposed Site Plan	May 2021	-
A645_SK_200A	Proposed House Type – 4 Bed Cottage	Mar 2022	-
A645_SK_201A	Proposed House Type – 3 Bed Cottage	Mar 2022	-
A645_SK_203A	Proposed House Type – 4 Bed Semi-Detached Cottage	Mar 2022	-
A645_SK_205A	Proposed House Type – 3 Bed Mill House	Mar 2022	-
A645_SK_206A	Proposed House Type – 2 Bed Apartments	Mar 2022	-
A645_SK_208	Proposed House Type – 5 Bed Detached Cottage	Mar 2022	-
A645_SK_209	Proposed House Type – 4 Bed Semi-Detached Mill House	Mar 2022	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk