



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

UNICORN HOUSE, CHEETHAM STREET, MIDDLETON
CONVERSION TO 11 no. RESIDENTIAL APARTMENTS

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: SHR Property Management

VERSION A: 13/09/2024

REFERENCE: 2024/0305/CIS/01

Unicorn House, Cheetham Street, Middleton

URN: 2024/0305/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Security improvements/additions required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme will be considered acceptable if the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The access route to the rear of the building is narrow, partially unmade, unlit and benefits from limited levels of passive surveillance and direct overlooking. As such, offenders could exploit it to attack rear doors, windows and parked vehicles unseen. The north side and rear of the building should be securely enclosed and gated to prevent unauthorised access to all but residents.
- The 2 no. parking spaces along the southern gable of the building will not be capable of being located within the secure car park – leaving them vulnerable. These spaces should be capable of being well-overlooked from habitable room windows and should be well-lit, to protect the parked vehicles as much as possible.
- The potentially vulnerable ground floor residential windows to Apartments 1, 2 & 3 that cannot be protected by some defined defensible space should be non-opening and protected by balustrades, bars or planters to deter unauthorised access, criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.
- The recessed main communal entrance off Cheetham Street will be partially hidden from the street, where it could be attacked unseen. The entrance doorset should be flush with the front building line, with any steps provided internally within the entrance lobby, to remove any potentially vulnerable recess and maximise surveillance opportunities. It should also be fitted with robust access controls into the building for residents/visitors, including a secure system for the delivery of post/parcels.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Crime Rate Comparison	
	2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis	
	2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
	2.5 General Risk Factors	
	2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	9
	3.1 Proposed Development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Points for Further Consideration	
4	Physical Security	11
	4.1 Doors & Access Controls	
	4.2 Windows	
	4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	4.4 Alarms	
	4.5 Boundaries	
	4.6 Lighting	
	4.7 Landscaping	
	4.8 Other	
5	Management & Maintenance	14
6	Construction	14
7	Useful References	14
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact Register.....	15
B	Associated Documents.....	15
C	CIS Version History	15
D	Glossary	16

1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the west side of the short cul-de-sac route of Cheetham Street, in Middleton, south-west Rochdale.

It is currently occupied by a vacant 'L' shaped building and rear yard, last in use as a gym.


The front elevation of the building directly abuts the back edge of pavement along Cheetham Street, with ground floor windows and a recessed entrance doorway fronting directly onto the street. The blank (southern) gable of the building abuts a strip of hard standing within the demise of the site and the rear of the site includes a hard standing yard area partially enclosed with concrete panel/palisade fencing and littered with overgrown scrub vegetation and dumped materials. The facades of the building adjacent to the yard area are also blank except of door openings at ground and first floor level (served by an external stair).

Cheetham Street itself is a short cul-de-sac route fronted onto by just the site itself and a small single-storey garage to the north. On the opposite side of the route from the site is a vehicle turning space and a high brick wall to the adjacent industrial site (a manufacturer and distributor of cleaning products), along with steps to the pedestrian route along the A576/perimeter wall of the industrial site. At the end of the route to the south-east of the site are vehicular gates serving the industrial site. As a result, the route benefits from limited levels of activity, footfall, passive surveillance and direct overlooking.

Along the southern boundary of the site is a narrow, partially tarmacked, unlit rear access route serving the rear yard of the site and the terraced properties fronting onto Manchester Old Road (A576) – the majority of which appear to be in residential use. The route also serves a rear patients parking area serving a mid-terrace medical centre and pharmacy to the west.

Open land/routes adjacent to (and particularly to the rear of) buildings and dwellings can often lead to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and secluded routes can leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly after dark. Adjacent properties can also often be vulnerable to unauthorised access, as they can provide easy access/escape routes that benefit from little/no natural surveillance or direct overlooking.

In terms of the wider area, the site lies on the south-western edge of Middleton town centre, within walking distance of Aldi and Tesco supermarkets, Middleton Arndale shopping centre and Middleton bus interchange.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st August 2023 to 31st July 2024.



2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
13	12	55	262	52	14	<5	21	6	8



- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is high for the Rochdale division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft being the most commonly reported. These types of crimes are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to an increase of crime and disorder issues. The majority of offences have occurred to the north-east and east of the site, towards Middleton shopping centre.
- 2.1.2 The majority of less serious woundings have taken place around Middleton town centre. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most commonly reported types of less serious woundings, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates or customers in retail outlets and licensed premises, as well as cases of domestic violence. Criminal damage against commercial properties and vehicles have accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences. Offenders have used objects or implements to smash windows and damage the bodywork of cars, as well as external doors and windows of premises. Theft offences have also mostly occurred in and around Middleton shopping centre. Offenders have used pickpocketing techniques to remove items such as mobile phones, wallets and purses, as well as targeting insecure bags, coats and items left on tabletops and benches.
- 2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will look at local residential burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.






- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries in the local area (i.e. recorded crime per 1,000 dwellings) is **13% higher** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **14% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **17% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings in the local area is **92% higher** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **126% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **331% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.



- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage in the local area is **125% higher** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **153% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **208% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime in the local area is **68% higher** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **87% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **128% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks over the weekend.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning – when it is dark, streets tend to be quieter than during the day and offenders perceive a lower risk of being detected.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:
- Glazing has been smashed within doors and windows to gain entry.
 - Doors and windows have also been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been exploited when left insecure.

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area fluctuates – peaking slightly on Tuesday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning (when offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed/identified) and during the afternoon. Offenders know that vehicles belonging to commuters and shoppers are often left for long periods of time on streets or in car parks within/surrounding the town centre during the day – meaning they can target them without fear of being disturbed.
- 2.4.3 Vehicles parked within open, communal areas or on street, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked on the driveways of individual properties or within secure garages/parking facilities.

2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:
- Domestic burglary
 - Bogus callers and distraction burglary
 - Criminal damage to property and vehicles
 - Anti-social behaviour
 - Theft of/from parked vehicles
 - Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
 - Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
 - Neighbour disputes
 - Poor maintenance of access control systems
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting residential properties and vehicle are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Glazing has been smashed within doors and windows to gain entry.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should ideally be small and set well-away from locking points.

- Doors and windows have also been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been exploited when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the apartment block before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed. All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Clearly defined defensible space between building frontages and the 'street' can provide a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties (see Section 4.5). Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

All private spaces to the sides/rears apartment blocks should be robustly enclosed (see Section 4.5), particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of the dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.6).

- Vehicles have been targeted for theft of, theft from and criminal damage when parked on-street or within open car parks

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving apartments or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be enclosed and secured with automatic gates/shutters to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to change the use of the existing building to form 11 no. residential apartments, with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The main communal entrance to the building will be off Cheetham Street. A secondary communal entrance will be located to the rear of the building (off the proposed car park) via steps/ramp up to it. A small amenity/landscaped space, parking for 9 no. vehicles and a refuse storage area will be provided to the rear of the building. An additional 2 no. parking spaces will be provided along the southern elevation of the building. In addition to the 1 and 2 bed apartments, a library/office, a cycle store and a post room are proposed at ground level, with an additional landlords store at first floor level.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal


The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The building will have habitable room windows to its front and rear elevations, providing surveillance opportunities over the parked vehicles, any visitors to the block and towards the street/access route.
- 3.2.3 Many of the apartments will be provided above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively deterred. This also reduces the potential impacts of any excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.4 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The access route to the rear of the building (serving the rear car park) is narrow, partially unmade and unlit. It benefits from limited levels of passive surveillance and direct overlooking, which could leave hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles potentially vulnerable to attack unseen if the rear of the site is left open/accessible to all. The north side and rear of the building should be enclosed with 2100 high railings & gates to prevent unauthorised access to all but residents (see illustration opposite and Section 4.5 for more information). The vehicular entrance to the car park (off the rear access route to the south) should be fitted with an automatic vehicular gate/s operated by resident key fob/proximity reader with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the rear of the building or the parked vehicles unseen and escape. Any pedestrian gates to the area (off Cheetham Street or the rear access route) should be for the use of residents only and should be single-leaf, self-closing/locking and operated by resident key or fob (again, see Section 4.5 for more information).



3.3.2 The 2 no. parking spaces along the southern gable of the building (marked as 'Parking 01' & 'Parking 02' on the proposed site plan), will not be capable of being located within the secure car park describe above. As a result, these space hidden to the side of the building could leave the vehicle vulnerable to attack unseen. At the very least, lighting should be provided to the spaces (see Section 4.6) and windows to Apartments 2, 3, 8 & 9 should overlook them as much as possible (with additional protection to the windows themselves, as described below).

3.3.3 As proposed, the ground floor windows to the apartments along the Cheetham Street frontage and southern gable of the building (i.e. to Apartments 1, 2 & 3) will front directly onto the street/rear access road and will not be protected by enclosed by any defensible space – leaving them exposed and vulnerable to unauthorised access, damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour, as well as a lack of privacy for residents. Ideally, such windows should be protected by defensible space (defined by low railings and planting), in order to deter unauthorised access/nuisance/anti-social behaviour and funnel any pedestrian movement away from them. Clearly defined defensible space between such residential windows and the public realm provides a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and acts as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny if they enter or cross the space. Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage. However, it is noted that this is not achievable at this site. It is therefore highly recommended that at least the lower portion of the windows are protected by balustrades, ornate bars or planters (see opposite for some examples), to provide a visual deterrent and deter criminal damage and nuisance, as well as provide a degree of privacy for residents. When residents do not feel



is preferable for any such balustrades/bars/planters to be fixed within the window reveal where possible, with no gaps/steps that could inadvertently create climbing aids to upper floor windows. The windows themselves must also be security-certified and laminated glazing (see Sections 4.2 & 4.3) and should ideally be non-opening, or fitted with opening restrictors and key operated locks if they must open.

3.3.4 The main communal entrance to the building will be deeply recessed, accessed via steps up off the street. As a result, the entrance will be partially hidden from the street (where it could be attacked unseen) and located within a publicly accessible sheltered space that could foster loitering/gathering to the nuisance/intimidation of residents and legitimate visitors. It is highly recommended that the communal entrance to the building is brought forward to the front building line (see illustration above), with any steps provided internally within the entrance lobby, to remove any potentially vulnerable recess and maximise surveillance opportunities. The communal entrance itself should be formed by a single-leaf, self-closing doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the security-certification, to operate remotely via an access control system. There should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that does not require access to all floors of the building. Given the emerging trend of parcel thefts (particularly at apartment blocks), it is highly recommended there is a secure system for depositing parcels (see Section 4.1 for more information).

3.3.5 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main communal entrance doorset (off Cheetham Street) must be security-certified to one of the above standards, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. It should be single-leaf, self-closing and controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ There should be a secure system for the delivery of post without needing to provide access to all floors of the building. Ideally, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. If not, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries to postboxes within a secure postal lobby without providing access to the apartments/all floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). Consideration should also be given to a secure system for depositing parcels within the secure postal lobby, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies. All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ The communal entrance doorset to the rear of the building (off the car park), as well as the external doorset to the cycle store, must also be security-certified to one of the above standards, be self-closing/locking and controlled by means of resident key-fob only (i.e. no visitor access).
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. These doors should have either a door viewer or a fixed sidelight, containing laminated glazing.
- ☐ Internal doors/frames to the office, cycle store and any stores/meter rooms should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by resident/staff key-fob.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All ground floor and any potential accessible upper floor windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ The ground floor residential windows to Apartments 1, 2 & 3 (i.e. those that cannot be protected by defined defensible space along the street/rear access route) should be non-opening and protected by bars or balustrades as described within Section 3.3. All other ground floor opening lights should be key-lockable (escape requirements permitting) and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor and any potential accessible upper floor glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be no other features of the building (such as projecting canopies/window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting brickwork/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, handrails, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Each apartment should have an intruder alarm to comply with BS EN 50131 for wired or wireless systems. They should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The north side and rear of the building should be defined and enclosed as a private, resident-only space with walls and/or railings and lockable gates to a height of 2100mm from external ground level. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and there should be no immediately adjacent climbing aids. Any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
 - ☐ Any pedestrian gates to private space should also be 2100mm high, self-closing and self-locking, operated by staff/resident key or fob on access and egress. They should also be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, planters/street furniture, lighting columns etc. Mid-point horizontal elements, exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds (see illustration opposite).
- 
- ☐ The vehicular access/egress point to the rear parking area should be fitted with a 2100mm high automatic vehicular gate/s (ideally a sliding gate), to prevent unauthorised access. The vehicular gate/s should be operated using a key fob/proximity reader system with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles or the building and escape. It should have no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gate/s should be located away from any other climbing aids. If double gates are used, they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open. The access-controlled vehicular gate/s should be regularly maintained and immediately repaired/replaced if it fails, in order to continue preventing unauthorised access to the rear of the site.
 - ☐ The external refuse store serving the building should be similarly enclosed with 1800mm high walls, railings or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and self-closing, 'slam to lock' gates (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key or fob operated from both sides).

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around building entrances and parking areas, any low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and any tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

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- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
 - ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
 - ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Other

- ☐ The secure residential cycle store should include either secure lockers or stands that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (such as access-controls, fencelines/gates, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
20 th August 2024	SP Architects	Receipt of CIS instruction forms & plans
23 rd August 2024	SP Architects	Fee quote issued
27 th August 2024	Signature Estates NW Ltd	Confirmation of instruction/fee
2 nd September 2024	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
398(PL)001	Location Plan	09/08/24	Draft
398(PL)002	Site Plan – PROPOSED General Arrangement	09/08/24	Draft
398(PL)030	Ground Floor – PROPOSED General Arrangement	09/08/24	Draft
398(PL)031	First Floor – PROPOSED General Arrangement	09/08/24	Draft
398/DAS	Design & Access Statement	09/08/24	Draft

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk