



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Corrosion Resistant Products LTD, Todmorden Road
Extensions to Existing Warehouse Buildings

FOR: CRP LTD

Greater Manchester Police

VERSION A: 2nd May 2025

designforsecurity

REFERENCE: 2025/0128/CIS/01

Corrosion Resistant Products LTD, Todmorden Road

2025/0128/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design changes not required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed extension to the existing industrial development is suitable for this area and includes a number of positive features (see section 3.2) There are a number of recommendations within section 3.3 of the report which would enhance the security of the development and it is highly recommended that these are considered.



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
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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Littleborough area of Rochdale.

The site is roughly rectangular and it is bound by Town House Brook to the North, to the East by the River Rach, to the South by G N G Foam Converters Ltd, and to the West by Todmorden Road.

The site is currently occupied by Corrosion Resistant Products, a leading manufacturer and stockist of high-quality Fluoropolymer PTFE/PFA-lined piping and equipment. There are a number of buildings on the site, including two temporary buildings which are to be removed as part of the application. There is also a car parking area and a service area, both accessed from Todmorden Road. The service area is well defined with a 2400mm black paladin fence and gates.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st May 2024 to 30th April 2025.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
9	<5	22	91	9	<5	<5	14	9	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months has been low, with less serious wounding having been the most recorded offence taking place. These offences have mostly occurred in the neighbourhoods to the south/west of the proposed site around Victoria Street. Assaults and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings, with the majority of these incidents involving disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as some cases of domestic violence.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements/ tools to gain access.

Possible Solution – A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.2) should be installed. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering or attack. Avoid locating openings in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed.

- 2.2.2 Opening secure doors using bodily force and implements/tools to gain entry to property.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1).

- 2.2.3 Open access to service yards has allowed offenders to enter freely before targeting restricted areas.

Possible Solution - Robust boundary treatments will deter access to the site for offenders. Gates at the entrance to service areas should be only opened to allow passage of vehicles, once the authenticity of the driver has been confirmed. The periphery of the building should be easy to monitor, with no recesses or protrusions that could provide cover for criminal activity. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines or CCTV coverage. Storage / parking areas close to boundaries should also be avoided as they may mask any damage to perimeter fencing.

- 2.2.4 Theft of staff property or unattended / insecure items of personal property.

Possible Solution - There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed further access to all areas.

- 2.2.5 Damaging fencing and gates using tools in order to access the industrial unit

Possible Solution – A robust boundary treatment should be used to define the site perimeter. The boundary treatment should be capable of withstanding opportunistic attacks with hand tools. Boundary treatments should be installed on hardstanding so that offenders cannot crawl under and of a height sufficient to deter climbing.

Gates should be of robust material and to the same height as surrounding boundaries. The gap between the gate and the ground should be minimised to reduce the potential of an offender crawling under. The design of the gate should not include any horizontal bars or exposed hinges that could assist climbing




2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of fuel, company stock, tools and IT equipment
- Theft of employee personal belongings
- Criminal damage the buildings and vehicles
- Arson
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Bicycle and motorcycle theft
- Theft of plant and machinery and criminal damage during the construction period
- Other theft from premises

2.4 Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Rochdale area.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Rochdale industrial premises remains relatively consistent – peaking slightly on Thursday. The risk of burglary rises in the afternoon, peaking late at night and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target industrial premises at these times when it is dark, industrial areas are typically quiet, units are often closed or operate with fewer staff and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** When targeting Rochdale industrial premises, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Offenders have damaged or forced shutters upwards to gain unauthorised access or to gain access to doors and windows behind them.
- In a number of cases, the point of entry was 'unknown'. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors or employees before gaining access to back-of-house/staff areas and stealing property unnoticed.
- Doors have been forced open using tools/implements or when they have been left insecure by members of staff.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

2.5 Theft Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Rochdale area.



2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The greatest risk of theft at Rochdale industrial premises is experienced during the working week (i.e. Monday to Friday). During the day, the risk peaks during the late afternoon and into the evening. There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property from within buildings (e.g. cash, mobile phones, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from warehouses or service/storage yards.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Tuesday in the evening (20:00-21:00). Offenders often target vehicles at this time when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development includes two no. extensions to the existing permanent buildings on site, removal of the existing temporary buildings, enhancements to the site perimeter, and repositioning of car parking area.


3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The footprints of the proposed extensions are relatively simple and do not contain any features that might conceal an offender from view (i.e. recesses or projecting features).
- 3.2.2 The proposals will see temporary, less secure buildings removed from site, improving the security of the site as a whole.
- 3.2.3 The secure fence line which defines the boundary of the site on Todmorden Road where the service yard is, will be extended across the site on Todmorden Road. This will provide a greater level of security to the site, particularly at night and at the weekends when the buildings are closed or have lower levels of staff.
- 3.2.4 On my site visit I was informed that secure cycle parking is being investigated to the rear of the site, providing a much better solution for cyclists who often store their bicycles within the building.
- 3.2.5 The proposals will provide additional internal storage space and will reduce the reliance on external storage, which can be vulnerable to theft.
- 3.2.6 The site is well overlooked by houses on Todmorden Road, which will provide the site with high levels of natural surveillance. Todmorden Road is a busy road for both vehicles and pedestrians, which will provide the site with high levels of passive surveillance.
- 3.2.7 The proposed building heights will make climbing on to the roof to gain entry difficult.
- 3.2.8 The proposals include a comprehensive CCTV system to be extended to the new extensions.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.



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- 3.3.1 The proposed escape doors could potentially be vulnerable, they are positioned within the secure boundary, but they are obscured from view from the public highway due to dense tree/vegetation, which could allow an offender to target them for an extended period of time if they gained access to the site. It is recommended that a gate is installed to restrict access to this area.
 - 3.3.2 Any existing security measures (such as CCTV/alarms/access control) should be extended to the proposed extensions, to ensure a high level of security across the buildings is maintained.
 - 3.3.3 External storage should be minimised to reduce the potential for opportunist thefts, particularly of any valuable materials such as metal. At present there are double gates which are manually locked with a padlock, which are typically left insecure during the day to manage deliveries. Consideration should be given to installing some form of vehicular restriction, such as an arm barrier, to deter potential criminals from casually entering the site from Todmorden Road.
 - 3.3.4 Any areas used for external storage should be covered by CCTV and be illuminated to a high standard, to deter offenders from targeting materials and to allow natural surveillance opportunities from those houses opposite.
 - 3.3.5 The cycle store will be repositioned to the rear of the manufacturing building extension and not well overlooked, this area is not secure because there is pedestrian access into the site from the main entrance, and potentially access from the brook to the North. It is recommended that cycle storage is provided within the secure area to the rear of the building, or within a secure shelter/compound.
 - 3.3.6 Secure boundary treatments should be a minimum of 2400mm high and of robust construction, to prevent climbing or using tools to damage it to gain entry. Secure boundaries should generally use a secure paladin 358 panel (or similar system) or be certified to LPS 1175 SR 2. There should be minimal ground clearance to prevent an offender from crawling underneath. Any gates should be of the same height and construction and should feature no climbing aids such as exposed midrails, hinges, or locking points.
 - 3.3.7 Shutters and sectional overhead doors have frequently been targeted by offenders to gain access into industrial units. For this reason it is essential that all shutters and sectional overhead doors are certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR 2).

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to RC2, LPS 1175 SR2 or STS202.

4.2 Windows, Curtain Walling, Cladding & Shutters

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Shutters must be tested and certified to STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

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- ☐ Solid block walls should be provided behind any lightweight cladding to a height of 2400mm to prevent attacks to the cladding to gain access to buildings.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover each building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.
- ☐ If an alarm isn't installed, then the infrastructure should be provided for one to be easily installed.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - External doors
 - Gates

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ The proposed site boundaries satisfy the requirements of Secured by Design.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
11 th April 2025	Jonathan Mitchinson	CIS application received
29 th April 2025	Jonathan Mitchinson	Site meeting

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
N1238 - PL[0]20	Existing site plan with CCTV layout (10.04.2025)		
N1238 - PL[0]20	Existing site plan with CCTV layout (10.04.2025)		
N1238 - PL-0-01	Location Plan		
N1238 - PL-0-02	Existing site plan		
N1238 - PL-0-06	Rev C Proposed site plan		
N1238 - PL-0-09	Proposed Section A-A - Manufacturing Unit Extension		
N1238 - PL-0-10	Proposed Elevations Sheet 1 - Manufacturing Unit Extension		
N1238 - PL-0-11	Proposed Elevations Sheet 2 - Manufacturing Unit Extension		
N1238 - PL-0-15	Proposed Elevations Sheet 1 - Storage Unit Extension		
N1238 - PL-0-16	Proposed Elevations Sheet 2 - Storage Unit Extension		
N1238 - PL-0-18	External works details		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		