



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

WEST HILL HOUSE, 158-170 MANCHESTER ROAD, ROCHDALE
RESIDENTIAL (28 no. APARTMENTS)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Oaklodge Ltd.

VERSION A: 31/03/2025

REFERENCE: 2025/0073/CIS/01

West Hill House, 158-170 Manchester Road, Rochdale

URN: 2025/0073/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements/additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Secure enclosure/gating of sides and rear of the building (including the landscaped areas and car park), which if left open/publicly accessible could leave resident's vehicles and the hidden windows/doors of the building itself vulnerable to attack/unauthorised access unseen, as well as the hidden/sheltered undercroft areas vulnerable to fostering loitering/gathering/nuisance issues.
- The main entrance to the building should be that which fronts onto Manchester Road, where surveillance opportunities are maximised, with robust access controls for visitors and a secure system for the delivery of post/parcels.
- Replacement of potentially vulnerable ground floor patio doors along the Manchester Road frontage of the building with windows (protected by some defensible space), which would be less vulnerable to being left insecure, being forced open or being damaged. If not, they must be enclosed within secure private space.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies to the west of Manchester Road and to the south of Castle Avenue, to the west of Rochdale town centre.

The site is currently occupied by Cope Funeral Services, comprising of a large single storey building fronting towards Manchester Road, a hardstanding parking area to the north of the building (accessed off Castle Avenue) and an enclosed courtyard/garage colony to the south (accessed off Manchester Road). The street frontages of the site are defined by low stone walls and grassed banks, with low gates to the vehicular access points.


To the south of the site are some large residential properties, beyond which is Beech House Primary School. On the opposite side of Manchester Road are detached and terraced residential properties directly overlooking the site, as well as an office building at the junction of Manchester Road and Manchester Road (A58).

To the north of the site (on the opposite side of Castle Avenue) is the gable end of a terraced dwelling fronting onto Manchester Road and terraced houses fronting onto Castle Road. The gable end property has external bars and internal grilles to its ground floor windows and high walls, railings and gates enclosing its rear yard topped with anti-climb rota-spike – indicating that crime and disorder incidents have previously been experienced.

Terraced housing can be vulnerable to nuisance and anti-social behaviour as they often directly address the street, meaning doors and windows to their front elevations are not protected by any defensible space. Ground floor front/gable windows and doors can also be vulnerable to unauthorised access (particularly when left insecure by residents), as they can be easily accessed by passing pedestrians. Terraced streets are also usually served by networks of rear access alleyways. These can be utilised by criminals as easy access/escape routes to gain unauthorised access to the rear of adjacent dwellings unseen. Many of these routes across Greater Manchester have been fitted with high alleygates as a result.

To the west is a small estate (West Hill) of mews properties/low-rise flat blocks and a car park serving them (accessed off Castle Avenue) that isn't particularly well-overlooked by the properties it serves. Residential estates featuring pedestrian routes separated from vehicular movement (often to the rear of dwellings) and communal parking areas remote from the dwellings they serve can often attract nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal damage issues.

Beyond the estate to the east lies Mandale Park, crossed by a network of footpaths. Open land/routes adjacent to (and particularly to the rear of) buildings and dwellings can often lead to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and secluded routes can leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly after dark. Adjacent properties can also often be vulnerable to unauthorised access, as they can provide easy access/escape routes that benefit from little/no natural surveillance or direct overlooking.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2024 to 28th February 2025.





2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
16	5	50	204	11	<5	<5	25	16	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is relatively high, particularly the levels of less serious wounding (including assaults, public order offences and harassment, often involving domestic disputes and incidents between known associates). The majority of recorded crime within the study area is concentrated on the primarily residential streets to the east of Manchester Road (A58).
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will look at local residential burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries in the local area (i.e. recorded crime per 1,000 dwellings) is **28% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **27% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **25% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings in the local area is **22% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **8% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **75% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage in the local area is **7% higher** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **20% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **46% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime in the local area is **30% higher** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **45% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **76% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.




- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Saturday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk fluctuates and peaks during the early afternoon and the early hours of the morning. At night, when it is dark and streets tend to be quieter, offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected. During the day, when residents are more likely to be away from home (at work or otherwise), some offenders perceive a lower risk of being disturbed.

2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed
- Doors and windows have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the day, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks Tuesday to Friday and is generally lower over the weekend.

2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks in the afternoon and during the early hours of the morning – when offender perceive a lower risk of being identified. Vehicles parked within open communal areas or on-street are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within the curtilages of individual properties or within secure garages/parking facilities.

2.4.3 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most reported vehicle crime taking place, with offenders using implements to smash windows and remove items from within vehicles, as well using tools to remove vehicle parts and registration plates. Recorded criminal damage offences have also included damage to the windows and bodywork of vehicles.

2.5 General Risk Factors

2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting residential properties and vehicle are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed

Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow staff/residents to vet visitors to the building before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the building should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to ‘airlock’ lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

- Doors and windows have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (also see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents or staff. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. There should be no balconies/terraces that would be publicly accessible, with doors that could be left insecure.

All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Clearly defined defensible space between building frontages and the ‘street’ can provide a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties (see Section 4.5). Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

All private spaces to the sides/rears apartment blocks should be robustly enclosed (see Section 4.5), particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of the dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.6).

- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- Vehicles have been targeted primarily when parked on-street or within open car parks

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that staff/resident/visitor vehicles are secured and overlooked. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving the building should be located directly in front of it, clearly separated from the street or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured with automatic gates/shutters to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a 3 storey block of 12 no. 1 bed and 16 no. 2 bed residential apartments, with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The building will occupy the eastern portion of the site, along the Manchester Road frontage. To the west of the building will be a lawned garden area and part surface, part undercroft parking area (comprising of 19 no. spaces and a cycle store) accessed off Castle Avenue. The building will have entrances off both Manchester Road and the car park and will include 2 no. entrance lobbies, meter/plant rooms, a store and 8 no. apartments at ground level (with external patio doors along the front and rear elevations of the building), a staff office and 10 no. apartments at first floor level and a gym and a further 10 no. apartments at second floor level.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal


The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will provide additional activity overlooking and natural surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The building will present an active frontage to Manchester Road, enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the street.
- 3.2.3 The communal entrance to the building on Manchester Road will be well-overlooked from the street and the dwellings opposite, maximising surveillance over it and any visitors coming to/from the building.
- 3.2.4 Staff will be on-site to monitor access to the building and manage the scheme.
- 3.2.5 Parts of the communal parking areas serving the building will be capable of being overlooked from the upper floors of the building.
- 3.2.6 The majority of the proposed apartments will be provided well-above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively prevented. This also reduces the potential impacts of any noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design/construction of the scheme. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design/specification of the development can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 If the car park to the rear of the building were to remain open, it will leave the rear of the site publicly accessible and any parked vehicles/cycles, as well the hidden doors and windows of the building itself, vulnerable to attack unseen from the street. The undercroft parking areas in particular will not be capable of being directly overlooked by residents or staff – leaving any parked vehicles and cycles particularly vulnerable to attack unseen and the accessible sheltered/hidden spaces vulnerable to fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues. The sides and rear of the building (including the garden area, car park and bin/cycle stores) should therefore be enclosed and defined as private space (see illustration opposite & Section 4.5 for more information) and the vehicular entrance to the car park should be fitted with an automatic vehicular gate/s, to



prevent unauthorised access. The rear entrance to the building off the car park should be for the use of residents only and the main entrance for visitors should be that which fronts onto Manchester Road – where surveillance opportunities are maximised. More information relating to the design and operation of the vehicular gate/s can be found within Section 4.5.

- 3.3.2 The main communal entrance to the building (off Manchester Road) should be formed by a single-leaf, self-closing doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the security-certification, capable of being operated remotely via an access control system. In addition to a robust access control system for visitors, there should also be a secure system for the delivery of post/parcels that ensures access to all areas/floors of the building is not required (see Section 4.1 for more information).
- 3.3.3 Ideally, there should be no ground floor patio doors along the Manchester Road frontage of the building, which can often be vulnerable to damage, being forced open or being left insecure. If attacked or left insecure, they could be used by offenders to gain unauthorised access to both the apartments themselves, as well as the whole building (by circumnavigating the access-controlled communal entrance). Ideally, any such patio doors along the street frontage of the building should be removed from the scheme and replaced with security-certified windows fitted with opening restrictors (see Section 4.3), which would be less vulnerable to forced unauthorised access, damage or being left insecure. If they must be provided, the doors themselves must be security-certified (see Section 4.1), incorporate laminated glazing (see Section 4.3) and enclosed within private terrace areas securely enclosed by stone walls and railings/balustrades to an overall height of 1800mm. However, if the patio doors are replaced with windows, the street frontage could be defined by low-level walls and planting (see illustration above and Section 4.5 for more information). The remaining ground floor patio doors to the rear of the building should be secured within private space as described/illustrated above.
- 3.3.4 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted for use under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required to plant rooms or bin stores (e.g. www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search).
- ☐ The main communal entrance doorset fronting towards Manchester Road must also be security-certified to one of the above standards, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. It should be single-leaf, self-closing and controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that so that in the absence of a concierge, residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ There should be a secure system for the delivery of post without needing to provide access to all floors of the building. Ideally, postal deliveries should be made directly to postboxes within the main entrance lobby under the supervision of the concierge. If there is not to be a concierge present at all times within the entrance lobby, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries to postboxes within a secure postal lobby without providing access to other areas/floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). Consideration should also be given to be a secure system for depositing parcels within the secure postal lobby, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies. All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ The communal entrance doorset at the rear of the building (off the landscaped area/car park) should also be a security-certified, single-leaf, self-closing/locking doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, operated by staff or resident key-card only on access and egress.
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that apartment entrance doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended, but not generally essential. Any ground floor patio doors should also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Any internal doors/frames to meter/plant rooms or storage rooms should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by resident/staff key-fob. The doorset to the upper floor staff office and resident gym should also be similarly secured/operated to prevent non-staff/resident access.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All ground floor/easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards).
- ☐ All ground floor and any other easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be no other features of the buildings (such as projecting canopies/window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting brickwork/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows or balconies.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Each apartment should ideally have an intruder alarm to comply with BS EN 50131. Alarms should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows or patio doors.
- ☐ If intruder alarms are not to be provided, there should at least be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur installed to each apartment, to allow future residents to connect an alarm if required.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The sides and rear of the site (including all landscaped areas and parking areas) should be enclosed with walls and/or railings and gates to a minimum height of 2100mm (from external ground level). Care should be taken to ensure level changes do not inadvertently aid scaling boundaries or leave large gaps underneath railing panels or gates. Any retaining structures should not have features that may aid climbing (such as sloping, terracing or footholds etc.) and any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ☐ The vehicular access/egress point on Castle Avenue should be fitted with a 2100mm high vehicular gate/s (ideally a sliding gate), to prevent unauthorised access. The vehicular gate/s should be operated using a key fob/proximity reader system with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles or the building and escape. If double vehicular gates are used, they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open.
- ☐ Any pedestrian gates to side/rear parking areas should also be 2100mm high, self-closing/locking and operated by resident key-fob on access and egress. If a panic mechanism is required on the internal face of any pedestrian gates for emergency egress purposes, they should be fitted so that they cannot be reached/operated from the external face of the gate, with signage to deter mis-use.
- ☐ All gates should have no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, lighting columns etc. Exposed hinges and large apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The hinges should also not provide footholds and the gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard/soft landscaping features immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the perimeter fenceline. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible.
- ☐ If the external patio doors to the ground floor apartments along the Manchester Road frontage of the building are to be retained, they should be enclosed within private terraces by low walls and railings/balustrades above, to an overall height of 1800mm. Again, any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings/balustrades should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. If the patio doors are replaced with windows (fitted with opening restrictors), the frontage of the apartment block should be protected by some defensible space, defined by low-level walls (to an approximate height of 1200mm) and planting. The design or any low walls or railings should be carefully considered to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them – which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.



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- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
 - ☐ Any external communal cycle and bin stores should be enclosed and secured as described within Section 4.8.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all surface and undercroft parking areas within the site, in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around building entrances, frontages and parking areas, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Other

- ☐ Any external communal cycle store (partially hidden within the undercroft space) should be enclosed with 2100mm high railings and a self-closing, 'slam to lock' gate (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, fob operated from both sides). It should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ The external communal bin store serving the building should be similarly enclosed with 2100mm high walls, railings or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and self-closing, 'slam to lock' gates. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place while retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (access controls, gates/fencelines, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as gable walls, boundaries to private space or hidden corners/recesses).

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
27 th February 2025	Bluechip Architecture	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
28 th February 2025	Bluechip Architecture	Quote issued & request for additional info
28 th February 2025	Bluechip Architecture	Confirmation of instruction & fee. Receipt of D&A Statement. Boundary treatment plan to follow
24 th March 2025	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
24067 001	Existing Floor Plans & Elevations	Nov '24	-
24067 002	Existing Floor Plans & Elevations (Garage)	Nov '24	-
24067 200	Site Location Plan	Oct '24	-
24067 201	Proposed Floor Plans	Nov '24	-
24067 202	Proposed Floor Plans	Nov '24	-
24067 203	Proposed Floor Plans	Nov '24	-
24067 210	Proposed Elevations	Nov '24	-
24067 220	Proposed Site Plan	Oct '24	-
24067 230	Topographical Survey	Nov '24	-
24067 231	Site Sections	Nov '24	-
24067	Design & Access Statement	24/02/25	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk