

Crime Impact Statement and BREEAM HEA 06 Security Needs Assessment

Construction of a single commercial unit with ancillary office accommodation, spine
road, parking, landscaping and other associated works

at

Plot 3 - South Heywood Commercial Area

Pilsworth Road

Heywood OL10 2TB

On behalf of:

Russells South Heywood (Commercial) Limited

Produced by

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03 December 2024 [V5]

Ref: JN 1323

*Preventing
crime in is an
art not a
science*

*Crime prevention
is the
anticipation,
recognition and
appraisal of a
crime risk and
the initiation of
action to remove
or reduce it*



Revisions

Revision Ref	Issue Date	Revision Details
V1	06 Oct 2022	Initial Report Issued
V2	13 Oct 2022	Amendment to requirements - general
V3	12 Nov 2022	Amendment to page 15 of visual audit
V4	15 Feb 2023	Addition of layout details and recommendations
V5	03 Dec 2024	Amendment to planning requirements page 5, update to page 20 and updated plans; pages 24 to 28

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1.0

Introduction

Planning Requirements

Crime Impact Statement (CIS)

The CIS will take account of the specific layout issues affecting Plot 3 relating to how crime and disorder may be committed.

To reflect planning requirements, the CIS part of this report takes account of, and builds upon the findings and recommendations made by Greater Manchester Police Design for Security Unit on 31st August 2017 in support of outline planning application number 16/01399/HYBR and subsequent planning condition number 35 which states:

The submission of any reserved matters application, where layout is to be considered, should be accompanied by a full Crime Impact Statement, which appraises the design and layout of the developed proposals for each phase or part phase. Each full Crime Impact Statement shall incorporate the recommendations contained within section 3.3 and section 4 of the appendices, of the submitted Crime Impact Statement dated (31/08/2017).

It is accepted that there may be some overlap between the CIS and SNA elements of the report to aid the clarification of issues and concerns.



Crime Impact Statement (CIS)

This CIS has been prepared to support planning condition 19 (below) of planning application 22/01569/OUT and subsequent Reserved Matters application for Land on Plot 3 of the South Heywood Masterplan

'PC 19 - The submission of the reserved matters application shall include a full Crime Impact Statement, which appraises the design and layout of the developed proposals should be submitted. The development shall thereafter be constructed in accordance with the approved details'

The Crime Impact Statement also supports planning condition 21 (BREEAM) of planning application 22/01569/OUT and builds on the requirements of the CIS relating to planning condition 35 (Crime Impact Statement) of planning application 16/01399/HYBR

BREEAM HEA 06 Requirements

BREEAM HEA 06 Security Needs Assessment (SNA)

This part of the report relates to the building of a new 32,518m² commercial unit at Plot 3, South Heywood including designated external areas.

The SNA is a project and site-specific assessment of security needs and includes the following scope:

1. A visual audit of the site and surroundings, identifying environmental cues and features pertinent to the security of the proposed refurbishment:
2. Formal consultation with relevant stakeholders including crime risk analysis
3. Identification of risks specific to the use of the facility
4. Identification of risks specific to the user groups of the building
5. Identification of any detrimental effects the refurbishment that may have on the existing community

Security recommendations will be based on the issues identified in the SNA and will include physical security measures and solutions.

BREEAM HEA 06 Overview & Consultation

This approach requires the completion and submission of an SNA by the SQSS to the applicant who then submits the SNA to the BREEAM Assessor who has overall responsibility for determining whether full or partial compliance has been achieved and in turn grants the award.

It is not the responsibility of the SQSS to grant the point(s) but may be asked for a professional assessment regarding the level of compliance to help inform the BREEAM Assessors decision.

Formal consultation commenced in September 2022 between Russell LDP and David Lancaster SQSS to discuss the crime prevention design implications and agree the initial steps in moving forward.

Introduction

This report takes account of the current and prevailing threats, vulnerabilities, and crime risks specific to the development of Plot 3.

It provides a mix of proportionate and cost-effective measures and recommendations that if implemented fully will help to deny, deter, detect, delay, and detain potential offenders, reducing the risk of victimisation to the operation, its staff, and customers.

The Security Needs Assessment (SNA) supports HEA 06 of BREEAM UK New Construction and contains recommendations in support of claiming the single credit of the scheme, supporting RIBA stages 2 through to 6.

In doing so the SNA seeks to provide a balanced approach that takes account of commercial interests, aesthetic design, and security, promoting British, European and BRE LPCB security standards to help create a safer and more sustainable environment.

As a reflection of the offender '*modus operandi*' in the UK, British Standards are generally recommended in preference to European Standards. Should the applicant or their client choose European standards instead of British Standards then they must accept that a reduction in protection may result.

Any external design recommendations contained may also support compliance with HEA 07 Safe and Healthy Surroundings.

In adopting the SNA, the applicant agrees to implement the recommendations fully and take account of any changes or additions to design and specifications agreed with the SQSS as the development progresses. It should be considered as a fluid document that provides the basis for further discussion that can be reviewed and amended with the agreement of all parties.


As an independent consultancy we have no connection or affiliation with any manufacturer or supplier of products and maintain our integrity through the promotion of approved and tested security standards.

However, we are aware that in adopting this approach we leave you our client somewhat vulnerable due to the plethora of products claiming to achieve what is need to reduce the likelihood of victimisation.

To support your decision making this SNA may identify companies and solutions that we feel confident in recommending to help aid your choice.

Understanding the 'modus operandi' of opportunist offenders

In general terms, a security risk occurs when a particularly motivated offender has the capability and opportunity to commit crime against a target that has value to the offender and where there is a lack of a real or perceived capable guardian.



a 'suitable target' can be a person, place or thing

a 'likely offender' is anyone who is motivated, capable and intent on offending

a 'capable guardian' is anything or anyone who has a responsibility to protect the target

Designing out crime, designing in safety

One of the key elements of designing out crime is in reducing opportunity and increasing surveillance potential within the built environment through designing in 'defensive space' that promotes 'territoriality' and encourages 'ownership'.

This can be achieved through making 'targets' more difficult to attack and by making 'targets' more difficult to damage or move.

Understanding the relationship between individual buildings and the wider public or urban realm is important if targets are to be better protected.

In designing out crime there are two distinct but inter-related outcomes that a balance of effective physical security and environmental design can achieve.

Crime prevention – Reducing the opportunity for crime to take place through the provision of effective security and design measures balanced against risk.

Criminality prevention - Creating an environment where crime and anti-social behaviour are not tolerated and are less likely to occur.

Through design these outcomes collectively impact on the incidence and prevalence of crime and anti-social behaviour resulting in a reduction in the fear of crime and helping to create a more sustainable ⁽¹⁾ development

- (1) Sustainability is broadly defined as meeting the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

Source: World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) Our Common Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. Page 43)

What Makes a Safe Place?


Safety and security are essential to a successful and sustainable places. Not only do such places need to be well-designed and attractive environments to work in, they also need to be places where freedom from crime, and from the fear of crime, improves the quality of the facility.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) considers three overlapping strategies; territorial reinforcement, natural access controls and natural surveillance to help create a safer environment by reducing the propensity of the physical environment to support criminal behaviour. The main thrust of this approach is that the physical environment can be manipulated to produce behavioural effects that will reduce the incidence and fear of crime within the built environment, thereby improving the quality of the workplace and to encourage 'ownership'.

Territorial reinforcement: argues that physical design can encourage users of a property develop a sense of ownership over it. Territoriality is divided into two steps: Pre-occupancy, which is implemented at the design stage and is supported by delineating defensible space (physical limits designed within the layout) and design durability (built in ease of maintenance and durability).

Natural access controls: incorporate design characteristics to control the movement of people within the facility.

Natural surveillance: is facilitated by the design characteristics that enhance visibility and allow easier observation by the routine users of the facility.



What Makes a Safe and Sustainable Place? – The Seven Attributes

While CPTED concentrates on design, the seven attributes of safer places below provide a benchmark in determining what needs to be done to create a safer place.

Access and movement: places with well defined routes, spaces and entrances that provide for convenient movement without compromising security: incorporate design characteristics; controlling the movement of people and vehicles.

Structure: are places that are structured so that different uses do not cause conflict.

Surveillance: places where all publicly accessible spaces are overlooked.

Ownership: places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community.

Physical protection: places that include necessary, well-designed security features

Activity: places where the level of human activity is appropriate to the location and creates a reduced risk of crime and a sense of safety at all times

Management and maintenance: places that are designed with management and maintenance in mind, to discourage crime in the present and the future

How the Seven Attributes relate to this development based upon the information available at the time of writing the assessment

Access and movement has been clearly thought out with security in mind and well controlled movement of people and vehicles within clearly defined spaces.

The layout and how activities relate to each other has been considered

The layout/orientation of the unit(s) supports natural surveillance.

The clear delineation between public and private space supports ownership and will help to develop territoriality.

Physical security and security systems are specified within the SNA.

Natural surveillance combined with defensible spaces, territoriality and ownership will support activity as the units become operational.

The layout supports ease of maintenance with clearly defined spaces with specific uses which should make management easier.

2.0

Visual Audit

Visual Audit

Plot 3 is located to the left of Unit 1 and south of Heywood Distribution Park with access provided off Pilsworth Road.

The development being located near to Junction 3 of the M66 motorway is also in close proximity to the M62 motorway which provides easy access and an escape route for potential offenders who travel in from Bury and beyond. with both routes connecting to the M60 orbital motorway.


More locally based offenders will benefit from the ease of access and egress along Hareshill Road via Pilsworth Road and along Moss Hall Road.

The map right shows the location of Plot 3 and its proximity to existing commercial developments.



Visual Audit



The map right shows the location of Plot 3 which is identified as the 3rd commercial building unit as shown on the wider area plan.



Visual Audit

The plans below show how the public right of way pedestrian route traverses through the development connecting to other areas of the wider development.

There is an existing public right of way with access off Pilsworth Road that runs between Plots 1 and 3 which could serve to legitimise the presence of offenders who may be carrying out reconnaissance of both units with a view to future offending. The proposed public seating and a picnic area further exacerbates this risk.



Visual Audit

Currently, the perimeter is mostly defined by temporary Heras fencing, rural style fencing, rough grasses areas and bushes that reflects its agricultural past and the topography i.e. the arrangement of natural physical features in this case steep hills uneven ground with varying heights of land above the local area that reflect the rural nature of the site.



Visual Audit

It is clear from the perimeter treatment of the two adjacent commercial estates that secure perimeter fencing and signage for each unit will be necessary.

To provided anything less for each unit would leave the development more vulnerable than it needs to be.



3.0

Crime Risk

Crime Risk Assessment

When assessing risk, it is important to take account of a range of factors that individually or collectively impact on crime so that a more representative and justifiable outcome is achieved.

For the purposes of this report, data and information has been sourced from the following:

- Environmental scanning of other similar facilities
- Open-source information
- Police recorded crime data for the local policing area

Police recorded crime data at best can only provide an indication of what might happen in the future but cannot on its own be relied upon because there is no linear relationship between the reporting of offences, police recording and offender modus operandi.

This means that when assessing the likelihood of future victimisation, the only reasonable conclusion is that levels will most likely remain stable unless something changes to affect the incidence of crime, up or down.

When considering the built environment from a crime perspective there are many factors that can influence victimisation which need to be taken account of.

Assessing the likelihood of future victimisation using historic crime data alone often results in 'crystal ball gazing' leading to the recommendation of physical security solutions that are unjustifiable.

That said the interventions recommended do need to be robust enough to protect against a realistic increase in victimisation.

Local Crime Context

Crime Impact Analysis – The development is located within the Hopwood Hall policing area of Greater Manchester.

The crime profile for the area remains very much the same as identified in the previous CIS although there is the potential for crime levels to increase due to the ongoing development of residential estates in the area.

Typical security risk factors for the area are:

- Theft
- ASB
- Vehicle crime
- Criminal Damage
- Arson

Despite many commercial businesses operating on a 24/7 basis, various crime types and anti-social behaviour are committed on a regular basis, including harm to staff and other service users.

Commercial developments will attract both repeat victimisation by location and repeat offending by individuals and organised gangs if effective physical and operational measures are not adopted and implemented.

'earlier this year attempts were been made to access the site to commit theft'

While the range of crime types (security risk factors – left) are not exhaustive, they are presented to illustrate the extent of risk to staff, service users and the development itself.

It is sensible when considering the crime prevention design and operational based threats to take account of a wide range of crime categories so that a safer and more sustainable outcome is achieved that meets the needs of users now and those that follow into the future.

Offender - Modus Operandi

- ✓ Theft of diesel fuel where offenders target vulnerable vehicles subject to lack of formal or informal surveillance
- ✓ Forced entry of doors, windows and shutters brought about by ineffective security and poor quality products being fitted.
- ✓ Robbery where individuals are attacked for their personal possessions



Local Crime Context

Crime Impact Analysis –

The area still suffers a higher level of crime when compared with surrounding areas which supports the requirement to design out crime in the built environment.

These crime charts (courtesy of Greater Manchester Police) illustrate the increased risk to the area which could potentially worsen as the development is built and occupied.

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 1km of the site.




Crime Data Caveat –


Due to the inability of Greater Manchester Police to provide up to date crime data into the national police database, up to date crime data is not available. Therefore, the SNA can only include historical crime data that reflects the most likely situation for the locality and type of development.

The rates below relates to crime committed within 1km of the site.


Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (2Km), Rochdale, and Greater Manchester




Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (2Km), Rochdale, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (2Km), Rochdale, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (2Km), Rochdale, and Greater Manchester



The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **50% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, and **% higher** than Greater Manchester.

The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, and **% higher** than Greater Manchester.

The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **24% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, and **10% lower** than Greater Manchester.

The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **23% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, and **26% higher** than Greater Manchester.

Local Crime Context

The map (right) illustrates the potential for crime and anti-social behaviour to increase due to the increasing number of commercial units (orange blocks) and residential areas (yellow blocks) located adjacent to existing commercial and residential estates.




Local Crime Context

The new link road (blue) provides an essential route in and out for commercial operations but also provides an additional route for offenders.

Early in 2022 offenders who are believed to reside in a residential estate to the north-east of the site used this route while still under construction to try and gain access in an attempt to commit theft but were thwarted by security staff.

Updated plan Rev Z inserted



4.0

Security

Recommendations

Warehouse Plot 3 – Perimeter and Landscaping


Located along the north aspect of the development, plot 3 is accessed off a new spine road running off Pilsworth Road.

Overall, the plot will benefit from limited natural surveillance potential from Plot 1 and the commercial site to the North.

It is recommended that the perimeter treatments adopted for plot 1 are carried over to plot 3 as this provides a graded level of privacy and security where the most vulnerable areas around the loading bay areas are protected behind full height security fencing, with the less vulnerable areas being protected and identified by less secure boundaries and landscaping.

The use of paladin style fencing is the preferred option for the secure areas over palisade fencing which can be overcome easily without detection.

Weld mesh is more difficult to breach than palisade which. Please see next page for an explanation.



- The careful selection of trees, bushes and plants is critical to avoid impeding natural surveillance and to avoid unnecessarily high maintenance costs.
- Defensive planting can also be utilised to control movement and deter offenders.
- Planting bushes that grow to a maximum height of 1m reduces the amount of trimming needed and selecting trees with narrow canopies where the underside of their canopies are at least 2m above ground level all helps support effective natural surveillance and helps to maintain the efficiency of lighting and CCTV.

Warehouse Plot 3- Perimeter

Palisade fencing is not secure. Weldmesh/Paladin fencing offers greater anti-climb and penetration protection and can be aesthetically more pleasing. (The following information is provided courtesy of CLD Fencing Systems)

There are two types of palisade fencing:

D-Pale Palisade can be breached using a hammer in under 12 seconds with the method of entry being hidden.

W-Pale Palisade can be broken into with a hacksaw in under 10 seconds but would show where the pale was cut.



Palisade Fencing

Aesthetics

- Strong look of Steel and Security Topping with Tri-Tip Palisade
- Can appear dated in appearance
- Visibility can be reduced and restricted to certain angles
- Available in a wide range of RAL Colours

Standard Security

- Tri-tip Palisade has inbuilt Security Topping to prevent scaling
- D Pale Palisade is normally broken into with a hammer in under 12 seconds and can be hidden
- W Pale Palisade is normally broken into with a hacksaw in under 10 seconds but would show where the pale was cut
- External Fixings can be attacked with chisle and hammer to shear off

True Costs

- Can require intensive maintenance due to ease of attack and hiding where it has been attacked
- Normally has a longer installation time compared to Mesh Fencing
- Individual Pales can be replaced when damaged
- Starts from around £27 per LNM for 2.4m Fencing

Mesh Fencing

Aesthetics


- 3 Difference types: Profiled, Double Wire and 358 Mesh Styles
- Modern and Contemporary Appearance
- Clear View through for Line of Sight and CCTV
- Available in a vast range of RAL Colours

Standard Security

- 358 Mesh Panels offer Anti-Climb Fencing
- Profiled Mesh Panels have 30mm Projections to prevent scaling
- Double Wire Mesh Panels have 30mm Projections to prevent scaling and double horizontal wires up to 8mm each to prevent cutting
- Most Systems come as standard with security fixings

True Costs

- Minimal maintenance required
- Normally has a shorter installation time compared to Palisade Fencing
- Individual Panles can be replaced when damaged
- Starts from around £16 per LNM for [2.4m Profiled Fencing](#)
- Starts from around £29 per LNM for [2.4m Double Wire Fencing](#)
- Starts from around £44 per LNM for [2.4m 358 Mesh Fencing](#)



Layout – Access - Surveillance

The proposed site plan for Plot 3 shows its relationship to Heywood Distribution Park and Unit 1 which is located off to the right of the ward boundary.

The unit is accessed via a single shared point of pedestrian and vehicular access off Pilsworth Road.


The spine road provides two separate points of access and egress to the unit.

The first for staff, visitors leads to a dedicated parking area.

The second provides commercial vehicle access the loading bay areas through a secure perimeter with barrier controls and gatehouse leading to a new spine road that runs down the west side of the unit.

The layout and access provisions are both acceptable in terms of crime prevention environmental design and will potentially be well surveyed from Pilsworth Road and from adjacent units as the wider site develops.


Heywood Distribution Park



Unit 1

Layout and Access

The unit comprises of a large warehouse with supporting offices located on the ground, first and second floors within the fabric of the building (see below) which provide natural surveillance potential over the staff, visitor parking area.



To support the dock leveller operation, two 'hubs' are provided on the north and south sides of the building, each having offices on the ground and first floors.

These 'hub' offices will provide additional natural surveillance potential over the two dock leveller locations and commercial parking areas.

Staff and Visitor Parking


The number, type and location of the parking bays is acceptable with the layout supporting two separate one-way routes for vehicles which will provide a safer parking experience for drivers and pedestrians.

Signage and some road markings would be required.

Two Way Travel 

One Way Travel 

The location of cycle and motorcycle parking being close to the main entrance to the warehouse is acceptable.



78,146 bicycles were recorded stolen in England and Wales in the year ending June 2022. (source ONS Oct 2022). it therefore makes sense to provide robust and secure cycle parking.

It is recommended that a robust covered shelter is provided with fixings that enable the securing of both wheels and the frame.



Stratford Cycle Shelter with Ends Galvanised Steel Frame



The Stratford shelter is a free-standing, single sided cycle shelter designed for on site assembly, constructed from galvanised mild steel. The roof is 4mm UV stabilised PETG clear sheet.

The Stratford shelter provides a core element of a compliant cycle parking solution.

Extension bays can be added to achieve the desired shelter length.

Sheffield Cycle Stands shown and Gates are available as additional options.

Part Number	Description	Weight (kg)
138 203 930	2m Main Bay with Ends - Bolt Down	222kg
138 203 935	3m Main Bay with Ends - Bolt Down	272kg
138 203 940	4m Main Bay with Ends - Bolt Down	322kg
138 203 950	5m Main Bay with Ends - Bolt Down	374kg

The Velopa Stratford Cycle Shelter (above) is a typical example that can hold up to 24 bicycles. www.autopa.co.uk

For motorcycle parking it is recommended that fixings are provided to prevent theft. The images below shows some potential solutions.



MOTORCYCLE LOCKING LOOP BOLT DOWN



MOTORCYCLE LOCKING LOOP CAST IN



MOTORCYCLE SECURITY BARRIER

External Lighting

Where appropriate the following recommendations should be taken account of

- Environmentally friendly, good quality LED lighting that covers the whole of the building and surrounding areas including entrances and exits should be specified that is capable of providing a uniform level of lighting with no '*dark places*' and compliant with any local '*dark sky*' policies and light pollution limitations.
- Where appropriate the lighting scheme should comply with BS 5489-1:2013 and BREEAM Hea 01 Visual Comfort.
- Luminaires should be vandal resistant and mounted a minimum of 2.5 metres above the ground and located where trees and other obstacles do not obstruct or reduce their effectiveness and be column or wall mounted.
- The use of bollard style lighting can be used for way finding or as a supplementary lighting provision but should not be relied on alone as it does not provide for facial recognition of people walking towards you.
- To reduce the effect of blue light on humans and ecology receptors, LED light sources with a colour temperature of less than 4000 Kelvin is recommended.
- The use of PIR activated lighting is not recommended as it can reduce the effectiveness of human night vision upon activation.
- Using dusk to dawn sensor activation with variable controlled lighting levels to reduce energy consumption is the recommended solution: dependent upon operational requirements.
- It is essential to adopt effective maintenance practices for lighting systems that includes the pruning of trees and bushes if provided.

External Lighting

All external areas (including any parking area provided) and external doorsets should be illuminated using LED lighting to maximise on efficiency.

Luminaires should be mounted sufficiently high so that facial recognition is provided. The use of low level bollard style lighting alone is not recommended as it does not provide for facial recognition, but can be used for wayfinding purposes.

External lighting should be switched using dusk to dawn sensors.



Door and Glazing Standards Information

External Doorsets

The most vulnerable parts of the building where offenders will seek access are through external doors, windows, rooflights and the shell of the building which all need to be adequately protected using security rated products and access control systems.

The following standards provide protection against the current modus operandi of offenders in the UK. There are however other European standards that may be considered which may or may not meet the same standards and only provide limited protection.

- PAS 24:2016
- LPS 1175
- STS 201 Issue 7:2015
- STS 202: Issue 7, BR2
- BS EN 1627, BS EN 1628 & BS EN 1630

It is expected that all doorset products are fit for purpose and therefore certification to the following material specific standards is also required:

- BS 6510:2010 (Steel)
- BS 7412:2007 (PVCu)
- BS 644:2012 (Timber)
- BS 8529:2017 (Composite)
- BS 4873:2016 (Aluminium)
- BS 6375 parts 1 and 2 (performance) BS 6375-3:2009+A1:2013 (basic security)

Where there is a requirement for doorsets to be both fire and security rated and to minimise the likelihood of them being provided in two differing configurations, the manufacturer or fabricator supplying the product should provide independent third-party dual certification from a single UKAS accredited certification body.

Windows, Glazing and Rooflights

All ground floor windows, and any other easily accessible windows should be robust, tested and certificated to either:

- PAS 24:2016
 - STS 204 Issue 6:2016
 - LPS 1175 Issue 7 SR1
 - STS 202 Issue 7:2016 BR1
- Where appropriate, glazing should include a single pane of laminate glazing tested and certificated to BS EN 356 Class P1A minimum.

Glazed curtain walling systems if installed.

- Curtain walling systems should be installed in accordance with manufacturer instructions. Any doors that form part of the curtain walling system should also meet the same requirement as other doors above.
- The following four types of curtain walling systems are recommended
 - Large glazed units connected using a 'spider clamp' system
 - Glazed units directly retained within a framing system
 - Framed windows installed within a separate framing system
 - Framed windows connected to other framed windows creating a 'wall'.
- Ideally these systems should be tested and certificated to one of the following:
 - PAS 24:2016
 - STS 204 Issue 6:2016
 - LPS 1175 Issue 7 SR1
 - STS 202 Issue 7:2026 BR1

If roof lights are to be installed then access to the roof from the stairwells should be controlled with all accessible rooflights compliant to LPS 1175 SR1.

Assessment and the award of credits

In achieving a safe and secure development it is accepted that there may be client led design standards and specifications that are designed to deliver against specific operational requirements and further discussions may need to be carried out between the applicant and the SQSS to agree the way forward.

While the SNA is designed to be 'fluid and adapt' to changing requirements as the development proceeds it is the applicant's responsibility to comply with the requirements and recommendations contained within the SNA and with any deviations being agreed with the SQSS.

It is the BREEAM Assessor who is responsible to determine the extent of compliance and decide whether, or not to grant the credit(s). Any dispute arising from changes to the specifications contained within this SNA that cannot be resolved must be considered by the BREEAM Assessor who awards the credits.

The SQSS will provide support to the applicant throughout the build phase in agreeing any changes to the specifications and provide advice to the BREEAM Assessor if required in support of their decision.

The applicant also needs to be aware that compliance with the requirements of the SNA does not guarantee a crime free development and does not create any liability to the author of the SNA, the client over and above any general contractual and legal obligations.

Preventing crime in is an art not a science

Crime prevention is the anticipation, recognition and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of action to remove or reduce it

