



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

104A – 104B, Durham Street, Rochdale

Change of Use to Apartments

For: **Odyssey Fashion**

Version A: **10/12/24**

Ref: **2024/0291/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

104A – 104B, Durham Street, Rochdale

2024/0291/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor Design Changes Advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found acceptable in principle, but further consideration of certain aspects is recommended as stated in section 3.3 of this report, to gain our full support for this development at planning stage.

Design for Security's support for the scheme is dependent on the following:

- Installing fencing and gate to secure the rear access of the site.
- Installing security rated entrance and escape doors
- Use of access controls to regulate movements into premises.
- Installing appropriate lighting to main entrance(s)

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The proposed site is located on Durham St, near to the A671, Oldham Road, approx. 1km south from Rochdale town centre and 350m from Rochdale train station.

The neighbourhood in which the site is located comprises a mix of commercial, industrial and residential properties, typical of an edge of centre location. Lincoln Close Business Park lies immediately north of the site.

A short walk from the proposed development site; on the A671 road are bus stops heading in both directions.


Predominate uses within the area of the site are retail and light industrial. To the immediate vicinity of the site, the area is dominated by a number of residential streets, a mix of terrace and semi-detached homes.

The boundary to the rear abuts a religious building on Derby St & Hereford St.

The site is bounded by terrace houses to the east and the religious building to the south. A small alleyway off Derby St provides a secondary means of access to the rear of the site.

On-street car parking is prevalent within the area.


Alleyways in the area are gated. The majority of alleyways contain large amounts of waste and/or fly-tipping.




1 – View of site from Durham St.



2 – View west along Durham St.




3 – View south along Hereford St.




7 – Existing doorway entrance into the existing building on site.



6 – Residential & religious buildings on Durham St.



5 – View north along Derby St to the alleyway gates.



4 – Rear alleyway access to the site.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2023 to 30th September 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
12	34	42	268	25	15	6	36	32	5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months is average for the Rochdale division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft having been most commonly reported. These offences have occurred all throughout the local area surrounding the site.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have occurred in the residential neighbourhoods surrounding the site, where assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place. The majority of these incidents have involved disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 In cases of criminal damage, offenders have targeted vehicles by using objects to smash the glazing in windows and dent the bodywork of cars. Offenders have also used objects in order to cause damage to the front windows and external doors of dwellings.
- 2.1.4 Theft of and from motor vehicles have been the most common vehicle crime offences taking place. Offenders have targeted vehicles parked on residential streets by using implements to bypass locks and smash the glazing before either removing items from within or stealing whole vehicle. There have also been many cases of number plates being removed from cars.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry.

Possible Solution - All external doors and accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Entrance doors should be positioned where they can be easily seen from neighbouring properties and passers-by. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.
- 2.2.2 Breaking glazing in windows and doors (mostly ground floor windows) using implements.

Possible Solution - All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high and robust fencing with lockable gates so that rear windows are only accessible to residents. Secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible, as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.
- 2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - A robust access control system is required to prevent unauthorised entry to communal areas. Communal entrance doors and all individual apartments should be provided with a security-certified entrance door set (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Apartment entrance doors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. Any ground floor doors opening onto private or communal garden space must fall within a secure boundary line.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Non-crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Rochdale and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **50% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **49% lower** than Greater Manchester and **48% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **4% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **13% higher** than Greater Manchester and **115% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **17% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **7% lower** than Greater Manchester and **13% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **96% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **119% higher** than Greater Manchester and **165% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Monday in the morning (10:00-11:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings in the morning when it is dark and less footfall in the area. Offenders also target dwellings during the working week when they are left empty for long periods of time whilst the owners are at work, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point is recorded as "unknown", it is likely that the offender has exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Monday in the afternoon (15:00-16:00). Offenders often target vehicles at this time during the working week when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time whilst they are at work, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Conversion of a 3-storey commercial building to a 4-storey block of residential apartments within the curtilage of the former building.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 Redevelopment and population of the site should help to foster a sense of ownership and responsibility and improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 Many of the flats will have routinely occupied rooms overlooking the communal areas and adjacent public realm, which will help to increase natural surveillance in the public realm around the site and communal areas around the new block.
- 3.2.3 The residents' entrances to the building have scope to be laid out with a double door entry system, creating a lobby area and inner access-controlled doors to allow further entry to the inner hall and stair well. This helps to discourage tailgating into the blocks, which is the most common method of entry for intruders.
- 3.2.4 Arrangements for delivery of post should not allow or require postal delivery staff to have unrestricted access to internal areas of the residential block. Any mailboxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a "through-the-wall" arrangement allowing external delivery / internal collection.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can appear hostile and increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The communal entrance must be well lit, be fitted with security-certified doors and fitted with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a programmable fob. There should also be an audio-visual link to each apartment, so that residents can remotely allow *bona fide* visitors.
- 3.3.2 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the reception area only prior to providing access further into the building.
- 3.3.3 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns for the parking court should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation and parking arrangements for vehicles.
- 3.3.4 To minimise the risk of offender's tail-gating legitimate residents/visitors, the secondary doors into lobby entrance should also include access controls. Access controls will need to be used at the communal entrances to restrict entry into the development to residents and their authorised visitors.
- 3.3.5 Residential post - Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal staff to have access to internal areas of the residential area beyond the reception space. Mailboxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a 'through-the-wall' post box arrangement. Further design details of these ancillary spaces are to be developed.
- 3.3.6 Parking. There is no allocation on the site to accommodate vehicles for any residents and visitors. Any increased parking demand is likely to impact on adjacent properties and could create conflicts between residents and neighbours which can escalate into antisocial or criminal behaviour. Residents may be obliged to park in more remote locations where they and their vehicles will be at higher risk. In order to

avoid unauthorised vehicles parking within the site the report requires an access control gate is incorporated to the vehicle entry/egress point.

- 3.3.7 Cycle stores for residents are provided to the rear of the building. Entry to the stores must be restricted to genuine cyclists only, on application to the managers of the building. Racks within the enclosures should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com for details).
- 3.3.8 Bin storage – Following the refuse collection bins should be returned to the bin store avoiding the need for free-standing bin stores in front of the apartment building where they could provide potential hiding places and targets for criminal damage.
- 3.3.9 Communal facilities, amenity. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
- 3.3.10 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post boxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrance.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Any external french/double doors or sliding doors to easily accessible balconies or terraces should also be certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2 and should include laminated glazing (see below).
- ☐ The doors to the cycle store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 or be steel gates within steel frames. These doors/gates should both be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and be accessible by a programmable fob.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems

-
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ Secure boundaries should be formed around the car park and residential boundaries. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:
- LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
 - STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
 - Sold Secure Gold
- ☐ PAS 68: 2013

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Lighting in the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Lighting to undercroft parking areas should display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances](#), [foyer](#), [stairs](#), [lift lobbies](#), [landings](#), [cycle stores](#), [bin store entrances](#).

4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
 - Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

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- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
12/08/24	James Cambell Assoc. Ltd	CIS instructed
03/10/24	James Cambell Assoc. Ltd	CIS confirmed
03/10/24	GMP	Invoice issued
21/11/24	DfS	Site visit
10/12/24	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Site Location Plan	07/10/24	
	Pre-App Design Statement	07/10/24	
	24.3402.1 Existing Ground Floor Plan	07/10/24	
	24.3402.2 Existing First Floor Plan	07/10/24	
	24.3402.3 Existing Mezz Floor Plan	07/10/24	
	24.3402.4 Existing Section	07/10/24	
	24.3402.5 Existing Elevations	07/10/24	
	24.3402.SC2.1A Proposed Ground Floor Plan	07/10/24	
	24.3402.SC2.2A Proposed First Floor Plan	07/10/24	
	24.3402.SC2.3A Proposed Second Floor Plan	07/10/24	
	24.3402.SC2.5A Proposed Section	07/10/24	
	24.3402.SC2.7A Proposed Elevations	07/10/24	
	24.3402.SC2.8 Existing & Proposed Block Plans	07/10/24	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk