



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land West of Hollingworth Road
Development Of 330 Houses & Education
2300m2

For: **Bloor Homes Northwest**

Version A: **18/06/24**

Ref: **2022/0395/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security



Land West Of Hollingworth Road

2022/0395/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, however to improve the scheme from a crime prevention perspective please review in more detail the points outlined within Section 3.3 of this report namely:

- Secure cycle store provision
- Access control for apartment entrance lobbies
- The development should be built to Secured by Design standards

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition to achieve Secured by Design certification is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

David Maher *Dip Arch*
Consultant

e: david.maher@gmp.police.uk

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The development site is situated on land which has been grazing land for some time. The site is off Hollingworth Road in the Littleborough district of Rochdale.

The site is bounded by Hollingworth Rd to the east, the Rochdale canal along the northern boundary and what appear to be farmland to the south & west.

The land contains a mixture of self-seeded trees & foliage with significant level changes in the landscape.

The site has very good vehicle connections to Hollingworth and Littleborough.

The site is served by a bus routes, with bus stops located on Hollingworth Road a short walk from the proposed site entrance.





The tow path of the Rochdale canal is located on the opposite side of the canal from the development site.

The proposed site is approx. 0.6km south from Littleborough train station.

Hollingworth Lake is located 0.8km south west of the site.

The surrounding area of the site is predominately farmland & fells with pockets of residential sites to the west and closer to Littleborough.

The majority of properties within the area contain off-street parking however on-street car parking is well controlled within the area due to the popular attraction of Hollingworth Lake.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2022 to 31st December 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
8	<5	<5	30	<5	<5	<5	<5	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the local area is 34% below the average rate of crime for Rochdale Division; however the location of the proposed site should be taken into consideration. The analysed area consists of large spaces of undeveloped land and open water, where crime often doesn't occur or goes undetected due to the lack of footfall and opportunities. The majority of crime has occurred along Lake Bank located to the south of the proposed site where there are a number of licenced premises, restaurants and retail units. Violence and domestic burglary have been the highest recorded offences taking place, which is common in residential areas. The violence occurring has mostly involved public order offences and assaults, which have commonly taken place within the dwellings and around the licenced premises. The volumes of offences in the area are low.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.**

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1 & 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors into apartment blocks before allowing them access to the building (also see section 4.1). The main communal entrances should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access.

- 2.2.2 **Breaking of glazing in windows and doors using implements.**

Possible Solution - An appropriate glazing specification should be used to adequately secure the building. All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection. However, the layout of the building and position of windows should be designed to avoid vulnerabilities as much as possible. Any damage arising from vandalism should be repaired quickly in order to maintain a culture of care and respect, as a lack of maintenance can often attract further abuse.

- 2.2.3 **Forcing open secure shutters using implements and tools (mostly metal bars) in order to gain access to the windows and doors located below.**

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- 2.2.4 **Prising open of windows, including windows on balconies and on the ground floor, using implements most likely screwdrivers, crowbars or similar at residential properties.**

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.4), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.4). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well away from locking points.

2.2.5 Theft of insecure property belonging to staff, pupils and the school.

Possible Solution – To minimise the risk of offenders stealing personal property from the premises access control systems should be employed within the building to prevent unauthorised personnel from entering staff and storage rooms where sensitive information, IT or other expensive, portable equipment, or staff belongings may be stored; overt signage can also assist in deterring casual entry; and, include space for staff and students to store personal/valuable items securely e.g. small lockers or lockable drawers.

2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems




2.4 Risk Factors - Education

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property
- Unauthorised access to buildings and private spaces
- Antisocial behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Internal theft
- Theft of staff / pupil belongings
- Staff, pupil and parent safety
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (Rochdale Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against educational facilities, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.





2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at educational facilities in Rochdale peaks on Sunday – when many are likely to be closed. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon and into the late evening/early hours of the morning. The opportunities often rise in the afternoon, when large numbers of students are entering / leaving buildings, staff presence is likely to be lower and parents / carers enter school sites – providing anonymity to offenders. Offenders often target buildings at night when they are closed, it is dark, streets are typically quieter and they perceive a lower risk of being detected.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements, gaining access.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Offenders have climbed onto the roof of single-storey building elements and gained access through the roof itself or through high level roof-lights / windows.
- Where the point of entry is unknown / legitimate, this is likely to have been when offenders have gained access to insecure rooms / areas unnoticed, before targeting equipment (such as laptops, media / musical equipment, tools etc.).

2.6 Theft (Rochdale Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against educational facilities, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft at educational facilities in Rochdale peaks on Monday. During the day, the risk of theft peaks during the early hours of the morning and during the normal school / college day, with offences frequently taking place during breaks, when pupils and staff leave personal property in unlocked rooms, where they are accessible and vulnerable to theft. Mobile phones, cash, bags and coats are the most routinely stolen items. Out-of-hours, externally stored equipment/materials have been targeted.

2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Thursday, during the afternoon (12pm - 2pm) and evening (6pm – 8:30pm). Offenders often target vehicles during these peak times as they are left unattended, often out of the sight of the vehicle owner for long periods of time, reducing the risk of being caught.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposal incorporates a hybrid planning application consisting of; detailed application for housing, outline application for primary school.
- 3.1.2 The housing proposals provide 300 homes with associated amenity spaces and public realm spaces.
- 3.1.3 The Primary School and associated outdoor playing space (use Class F1a) will form part of an outline application, further details to be confirmed.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The mix and size of properties will offer a broader range of individuals and families the opportunity to live within the district of Hollingworth. A diverse resident population brings with it a likelihood of a level of activity around the development throughout the day, and a greater prospect of a more stable population as residents may be more likely to remain. Residents who remain for the long term are more likely to develop social ties with the area and with other long-term residents who then have more of a vested interest in the maintenance and security of the development. Developments with greater social cohesion, and active management, tend to be less prone to the effects of crime and disorder.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will positively add to the development and regeneration of Hollingworth.
- 3.2.3 The proposed masterplan will see the development of a long-standing farm land. The redevelopment of the site will remove a site which provides no street level activity.
- 3.2.4 The proposed building plots provide further ground floor activity in the form of residential uses and new public realm leading to dedicated resident entrance reception spaces. In-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent streets.
- 3.2.5 Resident amenity spaces provide opportunities for residents to meet and foster community relations within the development. Schemes which have good social communities are less likely to tolerate inappropriate behaviour and are more willing to challenge unfamiliar faces in the development.
- 3.2.6 Where ground floor amenity spaces have been located, consideration appears to have been taken using external facing materials; glazing, providing good levels of activity.
- 3.2.7 The urban design will provide a new road layout with each property having off-street parking in front of the house.
- 3.2.8 Each house will have garden space to the front and rear of the property.
- 3.2.9 Extensive landscaping of the public realm to the streetscape and green spaces will complement the proposed masterplan. A series of pedestrian routes will be implemented to encourage less reliance on vehicles.
- 3.2.10 The residential proposals incorporates a mix of dwelling house typologies.
- 3.2.11 There are clearly-defined, entirely separate entrances into each of the different uses proposed, which reduces the opportunities for confusion and conflict and reduces the opportunities to criminals. The residential blocks and amenity spaces each have single access/egress points in prominent locations off the public realm, which are capable of being robustly managed to control access.
- 3.2.12 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

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- 3.3.1 The entrance doors and windows of ground floor the houses must be protected by some clearly defined defensible space - creating areas entirely separate from the street, in ownership/control of the residents themselves that protect the accessible doors/windows from nuisance, anti-social behaviour and unauthorised access (see Section 4.6).
 - 3.3.2 The exposed gable ends of houses should be protected by a dense band of landscaping. Such gable walls are often used as targets in ball games, and whilst there may be no intent on disturbing the residents within the house it is not unknown for issues to arise as a result of ill-considered designs.
 - 3.3.3 Bin storage – space should be identified within the enclosed front or rear gardens to accommodate waste bins, avoiding the need for free-standing bin stores in front of the houses where they could provide potential hiding places and targets for criminal damage.
 - 3.3.4 Any communal rear access alleyways should also be gated at their outermost point, in order to prevent access to where dwellings can be vulnerable to unauthorised access unseen and ensure that any offenders attempting to gain access can be clearly seen from the street.
 - 3.3.5 Definition of front gardens. Definition of frontage. Front and side garden boundaries should be well-defined to indicate ownership, using low walls, railings, planting and / or surface materials, and discourage intruders from approaching the dwellings and parked vehicles, or taking short cuts.
 - 3.3.6 Street furniture and landscape features should be used to prevent unwanted parking or access onto pedestrian only surfaces. It should be very clear in which spaces, or on which streets, vehicle parking is authorised.
 - 3.3.7 Any play areas within the amenity spaces should be located at an appropriate distance from residential property (see “Planning and Design for Outdoor Sport and Play” published by Fields in Trust www.fieldsintrust.org).
 - 3.3.8 Communal facilities and amenity space. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
 - 3.3.9 Poor design, management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. Any landscape features (hard or soft) should not impede natural surveillance of/from the buildings or reduce the effectiveness of lighting or any CCTV system. The design of any hard landscaping features or street furniture, in particular any steps, ramps or benches, should be designed to withstand and discourage the potential for mistreatment and damage (e.g. from vandalism, rough sleeping etc.). Bollards or similar hard/soft landscaping features should also be incorporated to prevent unauthorised vehicles from accessing or parking on greenspace.

3.4 Points for Further Consideration

- 3.4.1 Graffiti on surfaces. Expanses of blank wall exposed to public areas should be formed of a graffiti-resistant surface or have a resistant coating applied to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings.
- 3.4.2 Vegetation Management. The proximity of bushes and trees to the fence line can undermine the security of the boundary by creating cover for an intruder or providing potential climbing aids. Overhanging branches and dense vegetation should be removed where it could be exploited in this way. Care must be taken to ensure the proposed landscaping to the perimeter of the site is maintained at an appropriate height (see Section 4.6), in order to prevent it impeding views to and from the site, and avoid the creation of hiding places that could be exploited by offenders.
- 3.4.3 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

3.5 Public Realm influence over crime patterns

- 3.5.1 Features of the physical environment can influence criminal patterns and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might

intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

3.5.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder on and around the site are as follows:

- The public realm will improve and street lighting and light spilling from buildings that are likely to be occupied well into the night area; will make the neighbourhood feel safer for pedestrians.

3.5.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the absence of regular street activity or passive surveillance for much of the day and night leaves the buildings and vehicles parked on the site, and pedestrians passing through the area, vulnerable to criminal and anti-social activity.
- Poor environments can also embolden offenders who may sense that a lack of care of the environment means that their actions are less likely to be challenged. Environmental decay can also deter investment in a neighbourhood.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ French/double doors or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - All external doors where regular staff access is required.
 - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
 - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)
 - Cycle stores

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ Boundary treatments to front gardens should be designed to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them, which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.

-
- ☐ The ground floor townhouses which front onto the public realm and the landscaped courtyard, must be protected by some defensible space, defined by dense low-level planting, creating front gardens areas in ownership/control of the residents themselves.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Any garden sheds must be securely fixed to a concrete foundation and the shed door fitted with a certificated 'Sold Secure' Silver Standard padlock, hasp and staple (coach bolted through the shed structure). The shed door should be at least 44mm thick so that the door can be locked into the doorframe using either a mortise deadlock or mortise sash lock certificated to BS 3621: 2007.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and metal pipework and wiring should not be visible.

5 Physical Security (Non-residential)

5.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Any sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All internal doors / frames to offices and stores should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a 5 lever mortise deadlock (to BS 3621 / EN 12209), so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.

5.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any shutters to protect ground floor openings must integrally-mounted and be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

5.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.4 Roof construction

- ☐ Lightweight roofing systems must be certified to a minimum of:
 - LPS 1175: issue 5 or above, SR1
 - STS 202: Issue 1 or above, BR1

5.5 Curtain Walling

- ☐ Secured by Design recognises four distinct types of glazed wall systems. These are:
 - Large glazed units connected by 'spider clamp' system.
 - Glazed units directly retained within a framing system (usually aluminium)
 - Framed windows installed within a separate framing system.
 - Framed windows connected to other framed windows to create a window wall.
- ☐ Glazed curtain walling must be installed using a secure glazing retention system. The method of retaining glass must include one or more of the following:
 - Security glazing tape
 - Dedicated security sealant or gasket

- A secure mechanical fixing system (Evidence will be required to prove the system is secure. This may be achieved by utilising the specific glazing retention test within PAS 24:2012 or by indicative test on the retention system to LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR1 or STS 202: Issue 3, BR1)

☐ Framed windows (3 and 4 above) used within the construction of a window wall must be certified to one of the following requirements:

- BS PAS 24:2016
- STS 204 Issue 3: 2012
- LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 Security Rating 1

5.6 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- Main entrance doors
- Internal doors off entrance lobby
- Doors separating internal zones within the buildings

5.7 Alarms

☐ The intruder alarm should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

☐ It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

5.8 Boundaries

☐ New secure boundary treatments should generally be 2400mm high and of welded wire mesh construction.

☐ There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the fence, to reduce the potential for crawling in to secure areas.

☐ The site boundary treatment should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary. Care should be taken to ensure that fence panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates.

☐ Secondary / internal fence lines may be lower, e.g. 1800 to 2100mm.

☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

☐ Gates should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:

- A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
- A key operable deadlock

☐ All vehicular and pedestrian gates should also be 2400mm high. There should be no centrally-located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be positioned away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of All boundary fencing should be reviewed to ensure that it provides a consistent level of security around the site.

☐ Fencing separating the site frontage from secure areas should be a minimum of 2.1m high.



5.9 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

5.10 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to vehicle circulation areas, service yards and car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

5.11 CCTV

- ☐ CCTV Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances & lobbies](#), [building perimeter](#), [cycle parking](#).

5.12 Other

- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire-resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors / televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the building. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.
- ☐ Signage and orientation. Routes leading to and from various facilities in and around the site should be obvious to site users and visitors. Disorientation can provide legitimacy for an offender to be present in a restricted area. Clear signage should be provided throughout the site which will help to direct people to where they need to go, and discourage entry to restricted areas.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to a protective coating applied to any areas that may be vulnerable to graffiti (such as large expanses of blank walls and inside toilets) - applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal (e.g. 'easy on' – see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).
- ☐ Car parking - Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The designer must ensure that this report is included within the BIM management model so that all parties are aware of the requirements for construction and management.
- 6.1.2 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 6.1.3 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.
 - Ensure that the site management is for which the building / site was designed able to cope with the remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
- 6.1.4 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications

and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
26/09/22	Client	Application received
25/01/23	Client	Client confirmation
26/01/23	GMP	Invoice issued
15/04/24	DfS	Site visit
18/06/24	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Site Location Plan		
	NW111-LS-002 (Site Landscaping)	22/02/24	
	NW111-LS-003 (Site Landscaping)	22/02/24	
	NW111-LS-004 (Site Landscaping)	22/02/24	
	NW111-LS-005 (Site Landscaping)	22/02/24	
	NW111-LS-006 (Site Landscaping)	22/02/24	
	NW111-LS-007 (Site Landscaping)	22/02/24	
	NW111-LS-008 (Site Landscaping)	22/02/24	
	NW111-LS-009 (Site Landscaping+Specification and Schedule)	22/02/24	
	Hollingworth Road, Littleborough_27092022		
	NW111-PD-1001B [Site Layout + East]		
	NW111-PD-1001B [Site Layout + West]		
	PROW's		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk