



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

NORMAN ROAD, ROCHDALE
7 no. INDUSTRIAL UNITS (1,927sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

FOR: 1618 Architects
VERSION A: 21/09/2022
REFERENCE: 2022/0372/CIS/01

Norman Road, Rochdale

URN: 2022/0372/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Security additions/improvements recommended

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Given the relatively remote/isolated nature of the site and the surrounding routes/open space that could be exploited by offenders unseen/undetected, the robust and secure enclosure of the whole site is considered essential - including vehicular gates to the site access/egress points on Norman Road and Corporation Road (ideally operated automatically on a 24/7 basis or at least outside of normal working hours if staff access is required) and secondary fencelines to prevent unauthorised access to the narrow routes and hidden side/rear elevations of the units during operational hours.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site is located on the west side of Norman Road, to the south-west of Rochdale town centre.



It is currently occupied by an MOT centre and a scrap yard, enclosed with a variety of boundary treatments, including Palisade fencing/gates, mesh panels, barbed wire and the facades of steel containers.

The site is surrounded by similar industrial uses. There are scrap yards to the north and west of the site (accessed off Corporation Road), as well as a large commercial/engineering unit on the opposite side of Norman Road. Norman Road is secured with a vehicle arm barriers in front of the site, but this was held open at the time the site visit was carried out. This section of Norman Road and Corporation Road to the west benefit from little/no active frontages along them or direct overlooking. They also benefit from limited levels of footfall, activity and passive surveillance – particularly at night when the commercial/industrial sites are likely to be closed. This could leave remote/isolated sites and buildings vulnerable to attack or unauthorised access undetected.

There are some terraced residential properties to the north-east, fronting onto Sparth Bottoms Road, but they are some distance away and do not directly overlook the site itself.

The southern and western boundaries of the site abut landscaped/wooded areas and footpaths linking onto Norman Road, Corporation Road and Mandale Park to the south and south-east.

Such open land/routes adjacent to (and particularly to the rear of) buildings and sites can often lead to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and secluded routes can leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly after dark. Adjacent properties can also often be vulnerable to unauthorised access, as they can provide easy access/escape routes that benefit from little/no natural surveillance.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st August 2021 to 31st July 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
8	<5	18	139	22	<5	<5	9	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the local area is lower than average for the Rochdale division. However, the study area surrounding the site does include some large areas of undeveloped/open land and industrial sites, which typically lower the density of development and attract fewer crime and disorder incidents. The most prevalent types of recorded crime in the area are less serious wounding, theft and criminal damage.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have particularly occurred to the north-east (around/off Norman Road), east (around/off Castle Avenue/Sparth Bottoms Road), south (around/off Holborn Street) and north (around/off Bury Road) of the site. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings taking place in the area, with the majority of offences taking place during domestic disputes or incidents between known associates (including at school). Thefts in the local area have mostly occurred around residential estates to the north and east, with offences often taken place within dwellings. Offenders (often known to the victim) have removed personal items belonging to homeowners (including cash, mobile phones and jewellery) or have stolen parcels left outside of properties. Offences of criminal damage have mostly occurred to the east of the site, with offenders damaging fixtures within buildings, causing damage to laptops/mobile phones and damaging fencing panels/walls with graffiti.
- 2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to proposed industrial units, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Rochdale Industrial Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Rochdale industrial premises remains relatively consistent – peaking slightly on Thursday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary rises in the afternoon, peaking late at night and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target industrial premises at these times when it is dark, industrial areas are typically quiet, units are often closed or operate with fewer staff and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

Rochdale Industrial Burglary – Point of Entry




2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** When targeting Rochdale industrial premises, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Offenders have damaged or forced shutters upwards to gain unauthorised access or to gain access to doors and windows behind them.
- In a number of cases, the point of entry was 'unknown'. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors or employees before gaining access to back-of-house/staff areas and stealing property unnoticed.
- Doors have been forced open using tools/implements or when they have been left insecure by members of staff.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.


2.3 Theft (Rochdale Industrial Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.

Rochdale Industrial Theft – Day Range





Rochdale Industrial Theft – Time Range



2.3.1 **Day & Time Range:** The greatest risk of theft at Rochdale industrial premises is experienced during the working week (i.e. Monday to Friday). During the day, the risk peaks during the late afternoon and into the evening. There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property from within buildings (e.g. cash, mobile phones, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from warehouses or service/storage yards.

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Wednesday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk fluctuates – peaking during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target vehicles at these times when vehicles are likely to be left unattended and out-of-sight of their owner for long periods of time, when it is dark and streets are typically quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.
- 2.4.3 Vehicles parked within open communal areas or on the street, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within secure garages/parking facilities.

2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:
- Burglary
 - Robbery to business
 - Theft of personal belongings at work
 - Criminal damage to property and vehicles
 - Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
 - Arson
 - Cycle theft
 - Employee theft
 - Theft of/from parked vehicles
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Rochdale industrial premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Offenders have damaged or forced shutters upwards to gain unauthorised access or to gain access to doors and windows behind them.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Sections 4.1/4.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

- In a number of cases, the point of entry was 'unknown'. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors or employees before gaining access to back-of-house/staff areas and stealing property unnoticed.

Possible Solution – There should be a robust access control system in place to ensure that callers to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Sections 4.1). All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

- Doors have been forced open using tools/implements or when they have been left insecure by members of staff.

Possible Solution - Although the location of doors should be considered (ideally placed where they can be readily observed, so that potential criminals would be more easily detected), it is inevitable that some will be located where they will benefit from lower levels of natural surveillance. All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.6, 4.8 & 4.9) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- Theft of materials, tools or plant equipment from warehouses/service yards

Possible Solution - The integrity of the boundary treatments should be evaluated and regularly checked for defects. Inappropriately parked vehicles/trailers and other externally stored items can obscure the spread of lighting and CCTV coverage, creating potential areas of intense shadowing and blind spots. It is recommended that this is considered in the external arrangement, and 'no store/park' areas specifically identified to avoid inadvertently blocking surveillance. Storage/parking areas close to boundaries should also be avoided as they may mask any damage to perimeter fencing.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development


- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect 7 no. industrial units with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 Separate vehicular access and egress points off Norman Road (allowing for HGV turning) will serve Units 1 to 6. Unit 7 will be served by a single, dedicated vehicular access/egress point off Corporation Road. The units will be served by a total of 39 no. vehicle parking spaces location along the front/side elevations of the units and communal bin/cycle stores.
- 3.1.3 Each of the units will feature ground floor pedestrian entrance doors, a large warehouse space (with an external loading bay door and an office, staff room and W/C) and additional space at mezzanine level.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will provide additional activity and natural surveillance/overlooking to the area when the units are operational.
- 3.2.2 The perimeter of the site will be capable of being defined by new security fencing to deter unauthorised access from all directions other than off Norman Road and Corporation Road.
- 3.2.3 The footprint of the buildings is simple, with no recesses that could provide cover for covert criminal activity and external façades that should provide little opportunity to scale the structures.
- 3.2.4 The proposed car parking areas are to be located directly in front of the units and will be overlooked, to some degree, from within the buildings themselves.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design/construction of the scheme.

Security measures carefully incorporated into the design/specification of the development can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.



Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

The site is somewhat remote/isolated, where it will benefit from limited levels of activity, footfall/passing vehicular traffic, passive surveillance and direct overlooking - particularly at night. It is surrounded by open space/footpaths to the south and west that could be utilised by offenders to gain access to the site, attack the units and escape without being seen/undetected. As a result, the units could be particularly vulnerable out-of-hours. The whole site, including all of the units and parking/servicing areas, should be enclosed within a 2400-3000mm high robust and secure perimeter fenceline (see illustration opposite and Section 4.6 for more details). The perimeter fencing should be formed by rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing securely fixed to posts with anti-tamper fixings. Care should be taken to ensure that ground level changes do not inadvertently aid climbing or leave gaps underneath fencing panels/gates big enough for someone to crawl through. Any immediately adjacent tree branches along the southern and western perimeter fencing should also be pruned or removed where necessary to ensure they do not form a

climbing aid over the secure boundaries. Secondary fencelines (which could be lower) should be incorporated to prevent unauthorised access to the narrow routes and hidden side/rear elevations of the units at all times of the day and night. The communal cycle and bin stores should also be securely defined/enclosed.

- 3.3.2 The access/egress points to the site (off Norman Road and Corporation Road) must be secured with a 2400-3000mm high vehicle gates to prevent unauthorised access to the site and mis-use of the parking/service areas (see above for illustration and Sections 4.5/4.6 for more information). Given the site will include numerous units and multiple users (and could therefore provide the opportunity for offenders to gain access to the site anonymously, without being challenged), consideration should be given to the gates being automatically operated at all times, in order to prevent unauthorised access during operational hours as well as at night/when closed. Any such gates should be operated on access and egress by staff key fob/proximity reader or via a video access control system linked to each unit – ensuring that visitors are vetted before being allowed access. If the gates must be left open during operational hours, they should at least be secured and operated via access controls if staff access is required outside of normal working hours (e.g. 6pm-7am). Manual gates securing such a large site with multiple users are unlikely to be utilised effectively.
- 3.3.3 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

In addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3, the following checklist forms the physical security requirements for the scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Access through the main entrance of each unit should be capable of being controlled remotely by staff, to ensure any visitors are vetted or are greeted/escorted before being allowed access into the unit (see Section 4.5 for more information). The doors themselves should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system (see Section 4.5 for more information).
- ☐ Any sectional loading bay doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ Internal doors/frames to any offices, individual rooms or back-of-house plant/service/stores etc. within the units should be robust/solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and capable of being secured when unoccupied. Staff should be able to store their belongings in a secure area while at work.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ Any opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Ground floor/potentially accessible windows should be secured out-of-hours with shutters certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, externally mounted shutters should have shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building, where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor/potentially accessible glazing should incorporate an inner pane with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining outer pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh or expamet mesh) behind any areas of cladding to the buildings, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack. Internal walls between the units themselves should be similarly robust to prevent unauthorised access from one unit into another.
- ☐ There should be no features of the buildings (such as projecting window cills or window reveals, projecting cladding features or exposed rainwater downpipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as immediately adjacent boundaries or handrails, lighting columns/street furniture, canopies below the eaves of the building, trees etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to high level windows or onto roof areas. Any louvres should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows. Security-certified louvered doorsets are available if required to plant/servicing areas (see www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search for SBD-compliant products).

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to each unit, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Access Controls

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by staff swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads (as codes can be easily observed/shared and are rarely changed). The following doors/gates should operate on access control:
 - The vehicular gates at the access/egress point to the site (on Norman Road and Corporation Road) - controlled on access and egress via staff key-fob/proximity reader or via an audio/visual access-control system linked to each unit. The gates should ideally be secured and operate via the access-control system on a 24/7 basis, but at least outside of normal working hours if staff access is required (e.g. 6pm-7am).
 - The main entrance doors to each unit (particularly if there is no staffed reception desk during operational hours) - controlled by staff card/fob and controlled remotely via audio/video access controls linked to a staffed office.
 - Any internal doors providing access to obvious high risk areas (e.g. server rooms, storage areas, staff changing facilities/lockers etc.)
- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the site/units should be fully auditable (i.e. allowing the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work and keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ The site perimeter should be defined by 2400-3000mm high rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing (ideally 358 gauge, with small apertures to deter scaling and cutting) with anti-tamper fixings to secure the panels to posts (please see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers) and gates. Sliding vehicular gates are preferred to the site access/egress points, but if double gates are used they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open.
- ☐ The routes to the sides and rears of the units should be secured with secondary fencelines and gates (2100mm high) to prevent unauthorised access to the rear of the units during operational hours - see Section 3.3 for illustration. If panic mechanisms are required on the inner face of any pedestrian gates for escape purposes, they should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the fencelines/gates.
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard/soft landscaping features (such as the sub-station structure, lighting columns, street furniture etc.) immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible. The site boundary treatment should also be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.



- ☐ The proposed bin stores should be enclosed with 2100mm high walls, railings or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and self-closing, 'slam-to-lock' gates (e.g. with an automatic deadlocking mortice latch that cannot be left insecure). A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place while retaining a secure development.
- ☐ It is highly recommended that condition of the fencing along the perimeter of the site is regularly inspected for signs of damage/attack and is repaired immediately if any incidents are experienced. Where exposed, the perimeter fencing to the service yards should be protected on the inner side from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails, to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary.

4.7 Parking Areas

- ☐ Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ The surface of the parking and servicing areas should be even concrete, tarmac or similar. The integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions and servicing areas clearly signed.
- ☐ Any proposed cycle stores should be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied rooms. They should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow staff to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all access/egress points and parking/service areas within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED, metal halide or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.9 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *Acceptable Standard* that will allow for *Identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are **Overview** and **Recognition**, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [the vehicular site access/egress points off Norman Road and Corporation Road, all external facades of the buildings, all service/parking areas and the entrance lobbies of each of the units.](#)

4.10 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around site/building entrances and parking/servicing areas, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow unimpeded surveillance and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots. These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.11 Other

- ☐ The position of ancillary structures, parked trailers or any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
 - Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
 - Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.
 - Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
 - Their potential to obscure damage to fencelines.
- Any proposed lighting columns, street furniture, tree/shrub planting etc. within or external to the site perimeter should also be reviewed in relation to the above issues.
- ☐ Any lockers within staff changing facilities must be robust/secure and all staff should be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended in changing areas.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing the units, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 5.1.2 All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.
- 5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site/units, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
27 th July 2022	1618 Architects	Receipt of CIS instruction form
28 th July 2022	1618 Architects	Quote issued & request for additional information
11 th August 2022	1618 Architects	Confirmation of instruction & fee. Receipt of drawing package
9 th September 2022	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
12 th September 2022	1618 Architects	Email correspondence re: timescales

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
PREAPP/00053/22	Pre-Application information from Rochdale Council	13/06/22	-
-	Design & Access Statement	Mar 2022	-
EX-01	Existing Site Location	08/02/22	-
P-01	Site Plan	08/02/22	A
P-02	Elevation A	08/02/22	-
P-03	Elevations	08/02/22	-
P-04	Section A-A	08/02/22	-
P-05	3D Visuals	08/02/22	-
P-06	3D Visuals	08/02/22	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk