

Northern Gateway (JPA1.1)

Outline Planning Application

Crime Impact Statement





CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land at Northern Gateway, Moss Hall Road

Outline application for employment development (up to 600,000 sqm), including logistics, warehousing, industrial and manufacturing uses, with a range of other supporting ancillary mixed uses (up to 5,000 sqm) and associated other works

FOR: Northern Gateway Development Vehicle LLP

Greater Manchester Police

VERSION B: 13th February 2025

REFERENCE: 2024/0326/CIS/01

designforsecurity

Land at Northern Gateway, Moss Hall Road

2024/0326/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overall the proposed development appears acceptable in relation to security. The local area has a number of similar developments which do not attract considerable amounts of criminal or antisocial behaviour. Whilst the layout is indicative at this stage, the eventual developers must consider the recommendations contained within this report when finalising the arrangement and detailed design, to reduce the potential for criminals and to ensure a high level of security.

In this respect I would encourage further dialogue with this consultancy throughout the design and construction process to ensure the resulting development is secure, in order to minimise the opportunities to commit crime and reduce the fear of crime in the area.



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
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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site straddles the boundaries of Bury & Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Councils, and it is known as the Northern Gateway. The site is well connected, in close proximity to the M66 and M62 motorways.

The site is loosely bound by Viridor Pilsworth Landfill and Heywood Industrial Estate to the North-West, to the Northeast the site is bound by agricultural land and Birch Industrial Estate, to the South-East the site is bound by the M62 and Birch motorway service station, to the South/South-West the site is bound by Whittle Brook. Moss Hall Road, the main route from the area to Middleton, dissects the site from North to South.

The site is made up of farm/agricultural land and there are relatively few buildings. The site is largely bound by similar land and the majority of development in the wider area is industrial/warehouse/storage facilities.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Introduction

- 2.1.1 All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2023 and 31st October 2024.
- 2.1.2 When looking at crimes at industrial developments (and similar premises such as warehouses and storage facilities) both Rochdale and Bury have been analysed due to the site located across the boundary of these boroughs. A broad look at crimes that occur at the proposed potential supporting uses so that these can be considered.
- 2.1.3 The recommendations made in the report will be based on the frequency of crimes in the area, crimes at similar developments in the Bury/Rochdale areas, emerging trends within Greater Manchester and crimes that have been historically prevalent at these types of development. (i.e. metal theft and theft of plant/machinery.
- 2.1.4 The frequency of crimes in the local area is not particularly high but this is typical of more rural areas where there are fewer opportunities for crime.

2.2 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 1500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	9	13	36	12	<5	<5	30	5	<5

- 2.2.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months has been low, with less serious wounding having been the most reported offence. The majority of offences have taken place at a hotspot at the service stations off the M62 to the east of the site, as well as a number of offences occurring along Whittle Lane and Moss Hall Road. Assaults and public order offences have been the most common less serious woundings, the majority of which have involved acts of road rage and disputes between commuters passing through the area at the hotspot mentioned above.

2.3 Risk Factors




The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Controlled access (staff/user only)
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Robbery
- Employee theft
- Theft of personal belongings at work

- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space

2.4 Burglary Risk Analysis (Rochdale Industrial Premises)

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Rochdale industrial premises remains relatively consistent – peaking slightly on Thursday. The risk of burglary rises in the afternoon, peaking late at night and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target industrial premises at these times when it is dark, industrial areas are typically quiet, units are often closed or operate with fewer staff and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** When targeting Rochdale industrial premises, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Offenders have damaged or forced shutters upwards to gain unauthorised access or to gain access to doors and windows behind them.
- In a number of cases, the point of entry was 'unknown'. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors, or employees before gaining access to back-of-house/staff areas and stealing property unnoticed.
- Doors have been forced open using tools/implements or when they have been left insecure by members of staff.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.


2.5 Burglary Risk Analysis (Bury Industrial Premises)

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail, recorded in the Bury area.



2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at industrial premises in Bury is low and fluctuates throughout the week. It is greatest on Monday, Friday, and Saturday. Burglary is more common in the evening after premises are closed for business and members of staff have left for the day. Offenders tend to target industrial premises during the hours of darkness when the level of supervision is reduced, and offenders perceive there to be a lower risk of being witnessed or apprehended.



2.5.2



2.5.3 **Point of Entry:** More than half of the burglaries carried out at industrial premises in Bury have involved forcing roller shutters; offenders also forced open doors using bodily pressure or hand tools. On fewer occasions, offenders gained entry by smashing glazing in doors and windows and, in fewer still instances, offenders simply forced their way through the walls or roof of a building or removed external cladding.

2.6 Theft Risk Analysis (Bury Industrial Premises)



The data below relates to thefts within/against retail, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft at industrial units in Bury is very low. Whilst rare, it is more likely to happen on a Monday or a Wednesday, and during the late afternoon and early evening. Offenders have targeted copper pipping as well stealing stock and equipment from service yards.

2.7 Theft Risk Analysis (Rochdale Industrial Premises)


The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The greatest risk of theft at Rochdale industrial premises is experienced during the working week (i.e. Monday to Friday). During the day, the risk peaks during the late afternoon and into the evening. There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property from within buildings (e.g. cash, mobile phones, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from warehouses or service/storage yards.

2.8 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 1000m of the centre of the site.



- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest just before midday (11:00-12:00) throughout the working week. These offences have occurred within the service station to the east/southeast of the proposed site, and it is likely that the offences are highest at this time when there is a larger number of vehicles passing through the area, meaning more opportunities and targets for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Proposed Development: Outline application for employment development (up to 600,000 sqm), including logistics, warehousing, industrial and manufacturing uses, with a range of other supporting ancillary mixed uses (up to 5,000 sqm) and associated other works

3.2 Common Industrial Use Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

3.2.1 Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements/ tools to gain access

To prevent unauthorised access through shutters, security-rated shutters and sectional overhead doors should be installed as a priority. When external shutters are used, it is essential to integrate the shutter boxes and guides into the building's structure. This integration minimises the risk of tampering or targeted attacks by potential offenders. Openings in these systems should be deliberately located in visible and monitored areas, as concealed or secluded locations provide opportunities for offenders to operate undetected.

To further enhance security:

Lighting: Ensure that all shutters and sectional overhead doors are illuminated to a high standard, reducing shadowy areas where criminal activity might go unnoticed.

CCTV Coverage: Deploy high-quality, monitored CCTV systems that cover all access points. This both acts as a deterrent and provides critical evidence in the event of an incident.

3.2.2 Opening secure doors using bodily force and implements/tools to gain entry to property

For maximum security against forced entry the following recommendations should be followed:

Certified Doors: All external doors should comply with recognised security standards, such as BS PAS 24 or LPS1175 SR2, which ensure resistance against common attack methods.

Strategic Positioning: Doors should be located in areas with clear visibility to deter offenders. For rear or side doors, they should be placed within a secure, fenced boundary to make unauthorised access more challenging.

Lighting & Surveillance: External doors must be well-lit to eliminate dark spots that encourage criminal activity. Coupling lighting with CCTV surveillance provides dual-layer security and evidentiary support.

To further enhance security:

Intruder Alarm: Industrial units should incorporate a monitored intruder alarm system linked to security response team or police to ensure swift action in the event of an attempted breach.

3.2.3 Theft of externally stored materials, plant, and machinery

To mitigate theft of valuable items stored outdoors the following should be considered essential:

Secure Compounds: External storage should only occur within secure compounds featuring robust boundaries with a minimum height of 3000mm, constructed to deter climbing or penetration.

CCTV & Illumination: The compound should have consistent, monitored CCTV coverage alongside bright and strategically placed lighting to eliminate blind spots.

Property Marking & Tracking: Use visible property marking systems on stored materials and equipment. High-value machinery should also be equipped with GPS trackers to aid recovery in the event of theft.

Signage: Display warning signs prominently to communicate that CCTV monitoring and property marking systems are in use, further deterring potential offenders.

3.2.4 Open access to service yards has allowed offenders to enter freely before targeting restricted areas

Preventing unauthorised entry into service yards requires the following measures:

Robust Boundaries: Install strong boundary treatments around the perimeter to deter unauthorised access.

Controlled Entry Gates: Gates should remain closed and only open when the authenticity of drivers and vehicles has been verified. This could involve manual checks or advanced systems like ANPR (Automatic Number Plate Recognition) technology.

Monitorable Perimeter: The building perimeter should be designed for easy monitoring, avoiding recessed areas or protrusions that could serve as hiding spots for offenders.

By ensuring clear sight lines and maintaining unobstructed CCTV coverage, along with robust lighting, offenders are less likely to exploit these areas. Avoid placing vehicles or stored materials in ways that obstruct surveillance systems or provide cover for criminal activity.

3.2.5 Theft of staff property or unattended / insecure items of personal property.

To protect personal belongings within the workplace:

Access Control Systems: Implement robust access control measures to ensure visitors are vetted before gaining access to the premises. Visitors should either be met by a staff member or escorted at all times to prevent unauthorised access.

Lockers for Staff: Provide secure locker facilities within designated staff rooms so employees can safely store personal belongings while at work.

3.2.6 Damaging fencing and gates using tools in order to access the industrial unit

To prevent breaches to the perimeter:

Robust Boundary Treatments: Use durable fencing and gates to define the site perimeter. These should be designed to resist opportunistic attacks with basic hand tools.

Hardstanding Installation: Install boundary treatments on hardstanding surfaces to prevent offenders from digging or crawling underneath.

Height and Design: Fencing and gates should be at least 3000mm high to deter climbing. Gates should be free of horizontal bars, exposed hinges, or other design features that facilitate climbing.

Additional considerations:

Gap Minimisation: Ensure minimal gaps between gates and the ground to prevent offenders from crawling under.

Material Strength: Consideration should be given to using a fencing product certified to a burglary resistant standard such as LPS 1175 SR2. High-grade, tamper-resistant materials for gates and fencing can also be used, ensuring they can withstand physical attacks.

By adopting these measures, businesses can significantly enhance the physical security of their premises, deterring opportunistic criminals and reducing the risk of property loss or damage.

3.3 Design Guidance

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

Landscaping & Boundaries

- 3.3.1 Effective boundary treatments will be required to provide secure enclosure to the proposed premises and prevent informal routes developing, particularly along the eastern boundary. High security rigid-panel welded-wire mesh fencing provides much greater security than Palisade fencing, as it is harder to scale, penetrate or damage. Care should be taken to ensure ground level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing over boundaries or leave space underneath fencing / gates that could leave the perimeter vulnerable to penetration.
- 3.3.2 The proximity of bushes and trees to the fence line can undermine the security of the boundary by creating cover for an intruder or providing potential climbing aids. Overhanging branches and dense vegetation should be removed where it could be exploited in this way. The boundary where it adjoins the woodland and fields needs particular consideration, as the vegetation can conceal activities of intruders or mask damage to the fencing – the vegetation should be kept well clear of the fence line to avoid potential climbing aids developing.
- 3.3.3 In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow unimpeded surveillance and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to. Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by. Care must be taken to ensure that the landscaping in and around the site is maintained at an appropriate height, in order to prevent it impeding views to and from the site and avoid the creation of hiding places that could be exploited by offenders. Arrangements for maintenance of amenity space / woodland within and around the edges of the development should be established prior to commencement of any construction.
- 3.3.4 Redevelopment of the site must not create obstacles to surveillance along the existing footpath routes and should take the opportunity to review sight lines and where possible, improve overlooking of the route from within the site. Security of pedestrians would be increased if some passive surveillance from the proposed premises is provided.
- 3.3.5 There are level changes in level in and around the site, and the developer should be careful not to allow any retaining structures or terrace features to facilitate climbing aids that would allow easy access into otherwise-secure areas.

Layout & Building Design

- 3.3.6 Accessible parts of the proposed buildings on the site should have footprints which are relatively simple and contain few recesses that could provide cover for covert criminal activity. Doors for emergency egress should be positioned flush with the outer elevation of the buildings, which removes potential concealment on the less-well-used elevations.
- 3.3.7 Office windows should provide staff with views over the open frontage of the sites. The location of the reception / office should be readily apparent on entering the plots and thus visitors (or intruders) have no business to be present in other parts of the site. The route to the reception area should lead visitors directly to the entrance. Entrance points should be readily apparent on approaching premises.
- 3.3.8 There should be a clear distinction between private and accessible areas of building/units. There should be secondary fence lines / gates to prevent unauthorised access to the side/rear elevations of the building, where hidden doors could be vulnerable to attack if left openly accessible. Service yards and storage areas should be enclosed within a secure boundary. Barriers should be installed at the vehicular entrances in order to prevent unauthorised access when the premises is closed.

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- 3.3.9 The position of ancillary structures, parked trailers and any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the potential to block sightlines or CCTV coverage.
 - 3.3.10 Solid block walls should be provided behind any lightweight cladding to a height of 2400mm to prevent attacks to the cladding to gain access to buildings.

Access, Roads & Car Parking

- 3.3.11 To deter criminals and those antisocially minded, it is recommended that the proposed estate access roads have a form of vehicular control to restrict access to genuine vehicles during the night when the industrial building are staffed at lower levels and targeted more frequently.
- 3.3.12 Consideration should be given to gatehouses at the entrance to industrial estates, to restrict access and to vet those visiting/deliveries before allowing them entry.
- 3.3.13 Access to the individual car parking areas within the development should be restricted with an arm barrier or gates, restricting access to legitimate users, and preventing misuse.
- 3.3.14 Long stretches of road should be avoided as they can generate antisocial and criminal behaviour such as joyriding and street racing. Where long stretches of roads cannot be avoided then traffic calming measures should be installed to reduce the speed of vehicles.
- 3.3.15 Visitors to the site should be clearly directed to appropriate entrances and exits. Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people to and through the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to restricted areas. Lack of orientation can provide legitimacy to an intruder being present in private spaces.
- 3.3.16 The location and detailing of these utilities such as substations needs careful consideration. They can be targets for criminal damage and provide hiding places if they are not effectively enclosed. Boundary treatments of utilities should not obscure site lines or provide climbing aids that could undermine the integrity of any adjacent secure fence lines.

Construction phase

- 3.3.17 During the development, internal roads must include measures to prevent access to remote parts of the site where development is not taking place in the short term, to prevent abuse from joyriders or unauthorised access to vacant plots. The phasing should also be considered in relation to the creation of hidden or concealed areas where disorder could occur unseen, which may cause nuisance to existing and new occupants of the site, and the protection of sight lines along pedestrian routes.
- 3.3.18 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials to smash windows and attempt to gain entry to buildings, or the site compound. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible, and accountable.
- 3.3.19 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

4 Useful References

4.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 4.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
24/10/2024	Helen Hartley	CIS application confirmed
31/10/2024	Helen Hartley	Meeting
19/10/2024	n/a	Site visit
12/12/2024	Helen Hartley	Revisions

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Application Boundary Plan		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Minor amendments	13/02/2025

