



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Smith Street, Rochdale

Sports Complex/Gym & Bar/Restaurant (2,938sqm)

FOR: TDM Architectural Ltd

VERSION A: 2nd May 2023

REFERENCE: 2023/0147/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Smith Street

2023/0147/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The development is broadly acceptable, in terms of designing out crime; however, the recommendations made in section 3.3 should be addressed, including but not limited to:

- The service areas to the rear of the building should be upgraded.
- Lockers should be provided for customers.
- Areas of the building highlighted in section 3.3.3 should be addressed where possible.
- Physical security, CCTV, lighting, and access control into and around the building.

If the recommendations contained within section 3.3 are implemented, we would be supportive of the planning application.



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
1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the town centre area of Rochdale.

The site is triangular, and the boundaries are defined by Smith Street to the North, to the East by Molesworth Street, to the South by the River Roch, and to the West by Milton Street.

The site is currently developed and was the building was last previously used as a bingo hall. The associated car parking area is currently being ran as a pay and display car park operated by Rochdale MBC. The building is positioned on the prominent junction of Smith Street and Milton Street, with the car parking areas to the rear of the building.

There is a small fenced off service area to the rear of the building, which was damaged on the day of visiting the site. The building has been defaced a number of times, particularly to the escape doors to the rear of the building. There were a number of areas of the building where there were obvious signs of misuse/antisocial behaviour such as littering of alcoholic drink cans/bottles. The recessed escape doors on the Northern elevation of the building, which is partially concealed from view, due to level changes had signs of misuse including excrement of the day of visiting the site.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2022 to 31st March 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
19	66	123	895	115	31	19	47	35	24

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high for Rochdale; however, the location of the proposed site should be taken into consideration. The proposed site is located within close proximity to the Town Centre. Town and City Centres often experience higher rates of crime and disorder due to the increased volume of foot fall in the area and the greater number of retail and licenced premises. Less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded offences taking place.
- 2.1.2 The majority of violence in the local area has occurred to the west of the proposed site where the town centre is located. Violence peaks over the weekend period, during the evening and into the early hours of the morning when licenced premises in the area are closing. Alcohol has been a common contributing factor to the violence in the area. Violent offences occurring to the north and east have mostly involved domestic disputes, occurring within the home or residential streets.
- 2.1.3 Theft offences have mostly occurred around the town centre, whereby offenders have targeted insecure bags and mobile phones. Offenders have used pickpocketing and distraction methods in order to obtain the items. Items within retail units have also been targeted my means of shoplifting.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime has occurred throughout the local area, particularly around Rochdale Town Centre Metrolink stop and Water Street. Theft from a motor vehicle and criminal damage to a vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime offences. Offenders have removed vehicle registration plates and smashed glazing in order to cause damage and gain entry to the vehicle. Offenders have also used implements in order to scratch paint work and damage body work.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Opening secure doors (all door types) using bodily pressure and implements to access the premises.
Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4.2) which are designed to withstand a prolonged attempt to gain entry.
- 2.2.2 Breaking glazing in doors and windows, to the front of the premises, using implements to gain access.
Possible Solution – Any ground floor or easily accessible glazing should contain a pane of laminate glazing, which cannot be easily smashed or shattered to gain entry.
- 2.2.3 Entering premises as legitimate customer and tailgating staff/ exploiting insecure doors to access staff only areas.
Possible Solution – Personnel gates or turnstiles should restrict access from the office foyer into the circulation core of the building. Any external doors should operate on an access control system.
- 2.2.4 Forcing open shutters using implements and bodily force to gain access.
Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to a recognised security standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR2). Shutters certified to a burglary resistant standard are able to withstand prolonged, opportunist, attacks by criminals.
- 2.2.5 Theft of valuable items such as phones, wallets and laptops from changing rooms that have been left insecure.
Possible Solution – Lockers should be provided to allow customers to secure their property whilst at using the centre.


2.3 Risk Factors – Leisure Centres

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of user / staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of / from parked cars
- Uncontrolled access
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Cash robbery / attacks on vending machines
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at leisure facilities in the Greater Manchester area peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon/early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

2.5 Theft (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at leisure facilities within the Greater Manchester area peaks on Tuesday but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Tuesday and Saturday during the afternoon (14pm – 18:00pm). Offenders have mostly targeted vehicles using private car parking and on street parking facilities. Vehicles are often left unsupervised for long periods of time in areas where footfall is reduced, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is a change of use from a bingo hall to a sports facility.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The building is located in the town centre area of Rochdale in a prominent location where it is subject to high levels of passive surveillance from those passing by.
- 3.2.2 The car parking areas to the rear of the site where well used on the day of visiting the site. The car park being well used will generate high levels of activity which can deter criminals.
- 3.2.3 The proposed use will bring people to the site regularly and at various times during the day and in the evening.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The service area to the rear of the building which is currently defined with a timber fence and gate which is in a state of disrepair. This boundary should be replaced with a secure and robust boundary treatment such as a close-boarded timber fence or a close-knit paladin fence to a minimum of height of 2400mm.
- 3.3.2 There should be lockers provided for users of the sports facility to securely store their personal belongings if necessary. Lockers should be positioned in a highly visible location to deter offender from targeting them.
- 3.3.3 There are areas of the building and hard landscaping that generate loitering which can be to the detriment of staff, customers, and those using the car parking area. It is highly recommended the following areas are addressed to reduce the potential for antisocial and criminal behaviour.



1. There is a recessed escape door on the Northern elevation of the building. The changes in levels make this space concealed from view and it was evident on the day of my site visit that it is subject to misuse. It is highly recommended that this doorway is reinstalled flush with the building elevation to reduce the potential for misuse and that lighting is installed to this elevation to illuminate the space which is concealed by the changes in levels.
2. Further along this elevation, the level changes are greater and there is a high brick wall that conceals this area from view. It can be seen in the photograph that there was extensive littering and the position of the door, concealed from view, leaves it vulnerable to burglary attempts. It is highly recommended that this area should be secured to restrict access (i.e. with a railing to the top of the wall and a gate restricting access).
3. On the Southern elevation of the building, near the entrance to the car park, there is an escape door and a brick planter with dense/overgrown shrubbery. On the day of visiting the site this was frequented by smokers who were congregating in this area and could generate antisocial behaviour especially in the evening. It is highly recommended that the planter is removed to reduce the potential for concealment in this area.

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- 3.3.7 Any alterations to the external fabric of the building such as new doors, windows, glazing, or roller shutters should be to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4 for more details) which are designed and tested to withstand a determined attack by an offender.
 - 3.3.8 There should be a comprehensive CCTV system covering the building, which can be monitored by staff at either the reception or the serving area. CCTV cameras should cover the elevations of the building, all exterior doors, service areas, the reception area, and internal spaces.
 - 3.3.9 A review of the external lighting should be undertaken. Broken light fittings should be repaired or upgraded where necessary, and any areas of poor illumination should be addressed with the introduction of new lighting sources.
 - 3.3.10 All staff only areas of the building should be restricted to staff with a robust access control system. Rooms that are used infrequently can be key lockable.
 - 3.3.11 The building should be covered with a monitored alarm system with a response facility (either staff or security team).

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation and should be followed when installing any new external fittings.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery, with signage to deter casual use.
- ☐ Any revolving doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 or BS ENV 1627 (RC2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ Any ground floor and other easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any security shutters or grilles must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required).

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All accessible glazing (i.e. below a height of 2000mm from external ground level) must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any louvres at ground floor level to plant areas/refuge stores should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed or damaged. If onward access into the building can be achieved from these spaces, then expanded metal or weld mesh should be installed to the inner face of the louvers.

4.4 Alarm

- ☐ A monitored intruder alarm system should cover the building, with a keyholder or security team response.

4.5 Access control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The main entrance into the office building
 - Staff only areas
 - External doors
 - Plant areas and areas restricted to maintenance staff
 - Access into the service area
- ☐ Staff key-fobs/cards should be capable of being quickly activated or disabled when required, to ensure they are not misused. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work.
- ☐ Infrequently used rooms can be key lockable.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all pedestrian routes, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ External lighting must also be provided to all external doors, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ Publicly accessible elevations of the building should be illuminated.
- ☐ Landscaping fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.7 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV camera system should be installed. Cameras should be capable of monitoring all building elevations - with particular emphasis on external doors (cameras should be able to observe people coming and going), and the entrance lobbies.
- ☐ Recording equipment should be located within a secure room or images may be recorded off-site at a suitable monitoring facility.
- ☐ CCTV monitoring screens should be located at the reception desk and or security office.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security and maintenance regime for the management of the units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
 - Opening and closing the offices, including staff arrival and departure.
 - Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
 - Details of staff security training.
 - Location and management of any smoking areas.

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- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc.
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc.
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 5.1.2 All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
29/03/2023	Dan Llado	CIS application received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Location Plan		
PL01	Proposed GF Plan	Sept 22	
PL02	Existing GR Plan	Sept 22	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		