



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Waterfold Lane

36 Apartments

For: **Mr David Gibbons**

Version A: **10/08/22**

Ref: **2021/0629/CIS/02**

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Waterfold Lane, Heywood.

2021/0629/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported - Minor design changes

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Effective street lighting
- Designated boundary treatment
- Landscaping design and features
- Secure cycle & bin stores

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The development site is located on land bounded by the M66, the River Roch and Waterfold Lane. The site is situated approx. 2km east from the centre of Bury.

The site can be accessed via Waterfold Lane off the A58 main road linking Bury to Heywood.


There are a limited number of bus stops on the A58 a short walk from the site.

In close proximity to the site on the A58 are a number of commercial premises. Leading from the A58 Waterfold Lane contains a small number of terrace houses.

The surrounding area of the site to the south east is predominately farmland. However dominating the area is the M66 to the immediate west. Waterfold Lane provides secondary access to a commercial/industrial site on the west side of the M66.

The mixture of properties within the area contain on & off-street parking however on-street car parking is prominent within the area.


The site appears to be partially concreted. Within the site it was apparent that it had been used for fly-tipping.



7 – View into the proposed site.



6 – View along Waterfold Lane.



5 – View along Waterfold Lane towards the M66 underpass.



1 – View of the site off Waterfold Lane.



2 – View along Waterfold Lane across the site towards M66.



3 – Neighbouring farm fields and terrace houses beyond.



4 – Neighbouring farm fields.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2020 to 30th November 2021.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	<5	13	55	69	<5	<5	14	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall number of crimes in the local area is low for Rochdale, with theft, less serious wounding and vehicle crime being most commonly reported. The proposed site is located within close proximity to motorway infrastructure and undeveloped land, which experiences a low volume of footfall leading to less crime and disorder in the area. The majority of crimes have occurred to the east and west of the site where residential estates are located (along Rochdale Road and Bury New Road).
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the area, particularly around Rochdale Road and the surrounding streets. Public order offences and assaults have mostly been reported, with offences often involving road rage incidents, aggressive behaviour towards staff at the local fast food restaurant and domestic disputes.
- 2.1.3 Whilst theft in the area is high, it is concentrated to one area around Bury New Road where a fuelling station is located. Offenders are entering the forecourt and making off without payment.
- 2.1.4 Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle offence taking place in the area, particularly just off Rochdale Road. Offenders have targeted vehicles in car parks, using tools in order to remove vehicle parts (mostly catalytic converters).

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.**

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to BS PAS 24 security standard. PAS 24-rated doors are very difficult to force open. All ground floor or otherwise accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- 2.2.2 **Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.**

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doorsets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks and the fittings. They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, security personnel or passers-by. Consideration should also be given to security-certified shutters (see Section 4.2) to protect particularly vulnerable/hidden doors.

2.3 Risk Factors





The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles

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- Theft of, or from, vehicles
 - Bogus callers and distraction burglary
 - Anti-social behaviour
 - Neighbour disputes
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
 - Unauthorised access to private spaces
 - Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Rochdale and Greater Manchester


The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **57% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **56% lower** than Greater Manchester and **55% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **121% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **159% higher** than Greater Manchester and **395% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **165% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **199% higher** than Greater Manchester and **263% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **305% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **352% higher** than Greater Manchester and **449% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.2 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary in the local area is very low, due to the location of the proposed site. In the last 12 months less than 5 offences have occurred. The risk peaks on a Wednesday during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target properties during the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Entering the rear garden of the property and using tools gain access to the garden shed.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Monday through to Wednesday during the afternoon and evening. Offenders often target vehicles during the afternoon and evening as they are left unattended for long periods of time, often out of sight of the vehicle owner, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The existing site is currently vacant but was last used as the site for Waterfold Mill and Ben Mill.
- 3.1.2 This proposal seeks to provide two residential blocks set against the embankment with views over the open aspect and the river. It will include associated resident and visitor parking, communal gardens and access roads all set within a landscaped setting. In total 36 apartments will be created.
- 3.1.3 Extensive landscaping of the public realm to the streetscape and green spaces will complement the proposed site.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 In its current vacant state, it has become overgrown and has attracted anti-social activities, namely fly-tipping, this is having a direct effect on local residents.
- 3.2.2 Redevelopment and population of the site should help to foster a sense of ownership and responsibility and improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.3 Many of the flats will have routinely occupied rooms overlooking the communal areas and adjacent public realm, which will help to increase natural surveillance in the public realm around the site and communal areas around the new block.
- 3.2.4 The residents' entrances to the building have scope to be laid out with a double door entry system, creating a lobby area and inner access-controlled doors to allow further entry to the inner hall and stair well. This helps to discourage tailgating into the blocks, which is the most common method of entry for intruders.
- 3.2.5 Arrangements for delivery of post should not allow or require postal delivery staff to have unrestricted access to internal areas of the residential block. Any mail boxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a "through-the-wall" arrangement allowing external delivery / internal collection.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can appear hostile and increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.
- 3.2.7 The main circulation routes are obvious, leading people directly to where they need to go. The proposals are intended to integrate with surrounding circulation routes.
- 3.2.8 The new road layouts will create an interesting landscape opportunity across the Masterplan. The hard & soft landscaping will help to generate a sense of place, pride and ownership in the community and create new links to existing neighbourhoods.
- 3.2.9 The proposed development will result in an increase in footfall in the area, improving vitality across the wider area, providing additional natural surveillance, which can help promote a greater sense of safety on the street.
- 3.2.10 The mix and size of properties will offer a broader range of individuals and families the opportunity to live within the district of Heywood and Bury. A diverse resident population brings with it a likelihood of a level of activity around the development throughout the day, and a greater prospect of a more stable population as residents may be more likely to remain. Residents who remain for the long term are more likely to develop social ties with the area and with other long term residents who then have more of a vested interest in the maintenance and security of the development. Developments with greater social cohesion, and active management, tend to be less prone to the effects of crime and disorder.
- 3.2.11 Security measure carefully incorporated into the environment and building design can ensure that buildings and the environment is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features

built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The design and layout of the public realm surrounding the blocks should be carefully considered. It should not include any hard/soft landscaping features that may impede surveillance opportunities or foster loitering/gathering, nuisance, anti-social behaviour or misuse. The following issues should be addressed with the public realm/landscaping strategy (also see Section 4.8):
- The proposed public realm features and any changes in ground levels, with step/ramp features to accommodate them. Such features can sometimes impede surveillance opportunities and provide features that can be mis-used. These features, as well as benches and any other hard landscaping features, should be designed to deter and withstand any such treatment and to maximise surveillance opportunities of/from them.
 - Public realm furniture items should be robust to sustain constant daily use and form part of the management and maintenance regime. Damaged features which are not tended to over a period of time can lead to further decline and respect for the area.
 - In particular, the potential to foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues at night. The central public realm area will benefit from levels of footfall, activity and will rely on passive surveillance from the residential properties overlooking this area. The area must be well-lit and designed to maximise surveillance opportunities and eliminate hiding places. Any windows or doors adjacent to these areas may also need additional protection.
- 3.3.2 Any cycle parking areas located throughout the public realm area should be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied areas.
- 3.3.3 The communal entrance must be well lit, be fitted with security-certified doors and fitted with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a programmable fob. There should also be an audio-visual link to each apartment, so that residents can remotely allow *bona fide* visitors.
- 3.3.4 Access in to the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access in to the reception area only prior to providing access further into the building.
- 3.3.5 To minimise the risk of offender's tail-gating legitimate residents/visitors, the secondary doors into lobby entrance, residents' parking courtyard should also include access controls. Access controls will need to be used at the communal entrances to restrict entry into the development to residents and their authorised visitors.
- 3.3.6 Residential post - Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal staff to have access to internal areas of the residential area beyond the reception space. Mail boxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a 'through-the-wall' post box arrangement. Further design details of these ancillary spaces are to be developed.
- 3.3.7 Bin storage – Currently no bin storage has been identified on the drawings provided. Space(s) should be identified within the proposed building and/or site to accommodate waste bins which avoids the need for free-standing bins across the site.
- 3.3.8 Cycle storage. Currently no cycle storage has been identified on the drawings provided. Where possible it is preferable for cycle storage for residents to be contained within the building(s) or within a dedicated cycle store shelter. Cycle stands must be either located within a secure cage or room, or within separate cycle lockers, only accessible to cyclists. Racks within the enclosure should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels, and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com for details).
- 3.3.9 CCTV. It is strongly advised that a comprehensive CCTV system is installed to cover the most vulnerable parts of the site, such as cycle store, lobby, mailboxes and communal entrance points (see section 4.10).
- 3.3.10 The creation of a shared surface/'home-zone' design for the street, rather than a standard engineering solution will emphasise 'territoriality', promote 'ownership' of the 'street' amongst residents, and

encourage play/socialising in the street – all of which adds to the overall supervision of the public spaces and deters crime. .

- 3.3.11 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation and parking arrangements for larger vehicles.
- 3.3.12 Communal facilities. The robust management of such features is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
- 3.3.13 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post boxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrance.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Any external french/double doors or sliding doors to easily accessible balconies or terraces should also be certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2 and should include laminated glazing (see below).
- ☐ The doors to the cycle store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2, or be steel gates within steel frames. These doors/gates should both be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and be accessible by a programmable fob.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems

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- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ Secure boundaries should be formed around the car park and residential boundaries. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:
- LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
 - STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
 - Sold Secure Gold
- ☐ PAS 68: 2013

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Lighting in the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Lighting to undercroft parking areas should display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances](#), [foyer](#), [stairs](#), [lift lobbies](#), [landings](#), [cycle stores](#), [bin store entrances](#).

4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

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- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
18/07/22	Client	Application received
29/07/22	Client	Client confirmation
12/01/22	DfS	Site visit
10/08/22	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Design and Access Statement	Jul 22	
M21-13-08	Site Layout Plan	Jul 22	5
M21-13-LP	Location Plan	Mar 22	2

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk