



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Trub Farm, Manchester Road

162 No. Dwellings

FOR: MCI DEVELOPMENTS LTD

VERSION C: 18th July 2024

REFERENCE: 2011/0598/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity



Trub Farm, Manchester Road

2011/0598/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The proposed residential development is acceptable in general; however the following concerns should be addressed:

- Parking spaces for the Farley house type generally can't be seen from within the dwelling and this could potentially leave parked vehicles vulnerable (see section 3.3.1).

More details can be found in section 3.3 where there are a number of recommendations made which would enhance the security of the development and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



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
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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Castleton area of Rochdale, Greater Manchester.

The site is roughly rectangular. To the North and East the site is bound by the Northern Rochdale-Manchester train lines. To the West the site is bound by the Rochdale Canal, and to the South the site is bound by the M62.

The site is presently undeveloped vacant greenspace. The Surrounding area to the North and West is typically residential. The site will be access via Trub Lane which also serves the new build development that lies opposite the site on the Rochdale Canal.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2023 to 31st March 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
13	<5	26	87	6	<5	5	6	9	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the local area is 20% below the average rate of crime for the Rochdale division, with less serious wounding, domestic burglary and vehicle crime most commonly reported. Offences have been concentrated to the north of the proposed site, around the junction of Manchester Road and Queensway and the surrounding streets. Offences have also occurred to the small housing estate located to the northwest of the site, around Heywood Road and Fairway.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly around the housing estate to the northwest (Fairways and Heywood Road) and to the east around Grosvenor Street and New Church Street. Assaults, public order offences and harassment have been the highest recorded less serious woundings taking place in the area. Offences have often involved domestic disputes and incidents between known associates.
- 2.1.3 Offences of domestic burglary have taken place throughout the area, with a hotspot of offences taking place around Heywood Road and the surrounding streets, where a small housing estate is located. Offenders have targeted the rear of properties as these are often less overlooked, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime has taken place throughout the area with theft from a motor vehicle and criminal damage to a vehicle being the highest recorded vehicle offences taking place. Offenders have used tools in order to remove vehicle parts (mostly catalytic converters and vehicle registration plates), as well as approaching insecure vehicles and removing items from within.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Opening of secured doors and windows to gain entry to the premises.

Possible Solution - Front and rear doors should be certified to burglary resistant standards (i.e. BS PAS 24). Front doors should be positioned where they can be viewed from the public highway/footway and rear doors should be positioned within a secure rear garden. External doors should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting.

All ground floor and easily accessible windows should be certified to burglary resistant standards (i.e. BS PAS 24). These windows should also be fitted with opening restrictors so that they cannot be opened fully from outside if left insecure.

- 2.2.2 Breaking of glass doors and windows, in particular at the rear of the premises, in order to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor and easily accessible glazing should be laminated so that it cannot be easily smashed by offenders to gain access.

- 2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure doors, in particular rear doors, to gain entry to the property.

Possible Solution - Front doors should have split spindles or a fixed external handle so then cannot be opened from outside without a key. Rear doors should be positioned in secure rear gardens where offenders can't easily gain access.

- 2.2.4 Entering an apartment building by means of insecure doors and tailgating legitimate residents, accessing communal areas (mostly corridors - targeting insecure front doors).

Possible Solution – There should be a robust access control system restricting access into the building and residential corridors, to prevent tailgating. Communal entrances/doors should be self-closing and self-locking so that they cannot easily be left insecure.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **3% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **1% lower** than Greater Manchester and **1% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **42% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **32% lower** than Greater Manchester and **29% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **8% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **4% higher** than Greater Manchester and **26% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **25% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **16% lower** than Greater Manchester and **2% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on a Monday during the early hours of the morning (2:30am – 7am). Offenders often target properties during the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Entering the rear garden of the property and using bodily pressure and implements, gain access to the garden shed/ garage.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Monday and Thursday during the evening (6:30pm – 8:30pm) and early hours of the morning (1am – 4am). Offenders often target vehicles during the evening and early hours of the morning as they are often left unattended for long periods of time, out of sight of the owner, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is of 162 dwellings with a mix of houses (114) and apartments (48).

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The canal and railway lines provide an effective barrier to entry to the site on the East and West.
- 3.2.2 All vehicular traffic and the vast majority of pedestrians will access the development through a single point on Trub Road, this will allow residents to easily view those entering the site. The single point of entry to the site could potentially deter offenders due to the lack of potential escape routes.
- 3.2.3 Front doors are generally positioned in prominent locations where they can be overlooked from the street allowing residents to view any potential threats on approaching their property.
- 3.2.4 The apartment buildings are free from recesses or any features that might generate loitering.
- 3.2.5 Apartment residential corridors are linear and allow for good sightlines.
- 3.2.6 Bins will be positioned in secure rear gardens where they cannot be subject to misuse.
- 3.2.7 Many rear garden boundaries of dwellings will abut adjacent rear garden boundaries, allowing the rears of properties to be more easily secured.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Houses

- 3.3.1 The vehicle parking spaces for plots no 4, 8, 76, 115, 116, 127, 128, 142, 148, 165, 168, 172 & 177 (Farley house type) cannot easily be seen from inside the dwelling, potentially leaving vehicles parked in these spaces vulnerable. It is highly recommended that they parking spaces are positioned within the secure rear boundary, or they should be illuminated to a high standard with a visually permeable boundary treatment used to allow residents to view their vehicles from within the dwelling.
- 3.3.2 Where driveways are located at the side of dwellings it is highly recommended that dusk-til-dawn lighting is provided on the gable end of the property to deter offenders from targeting vehicles.
- 3.3.3 Vegetation in the public open spaces should be carefully selected so that it does not create areas of concealment that could generate antisocial behaviour.
- 3.3.4 Access into rear gardens from the front garden should be restricted to residents. Gates into rear gardens, from front gardens, should be positioned as close to the front elevation as possible to restrict access to the sides of properties to residents. Gates should be a minimum of 1.8m high and lockable from both sides. Where a passageway is created between two houses it should be secured with access restricted to residents.
- 3.3.5 Where there is a shared passageway between houses, to access the rear garden, it is highly recommended that these are gated as close to the front of the properties as possible. The gate should be robust and a minimum of 1800mm in height, with a shared padlock or key operated deadlock. If a stable and hasp is used it should be positioned on the mid-rail where it is out of reach from the outer face of the gate.

Apartments

- 3.3.6 Access into apartment buildings should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them. How mail is delivered should be carefully considered.
- 3.3.7 A secure system for the delivery of post that does not require access to all floors of the building should be implemented. For apartment blocks the size of those proposed, it is recommended that external

through-the-wall mailboxes are provided for residents, so that postal workers do not need access to the building; alternatively, a secure mail lobby should be provided.

- 3.3.8 External cycle stores should be secure, robust, and weatherproof enclosures. Cycle store doors should be illuminated to allow the cycle store to be safely used when it is dark.
- 3.3.9 The sides and rear of apartment buildings should be enclosed to restrict this space to residents and prevent offenders or those antisocially minded from reaching the rear of these buildings where they offenders could target the building or loiter.
- 3.3.10 Any ground floor apartments not within the secure rear boundary should be afforded defensible space either with a low boundary or with shrubbery.

Site

- 3.3.11 Footpaths within the site should be wide enough to accommodate pedestrian traveling in both directions. Where possible, footpaths should be as linear as possible to allow for good sightlines. Shrubby adjacent footpaths should be limited in height to 1000mm, and tree canopies should fall no less than 2000mm. Where footpaths aren't sufficiently ambiently illuminated there should be dedicated lighting sources to deter antisocial/criminal behaviour and allow for safe use at night.
- 3.3.12 The proposed access roads should be illuminated to adoptable standard, to reduce the potential for crime and fear of crime. The apartment car parking areas and any pedestrian routes in the site should be illuminated in accordance with BS 5489.
- 3.3.13 The entrance to the development should be defined with a change of surface colour/texture or another symbolic barrier (i.e. rumble strip).
- 3.3.14 The roads should be illuminated to adoptable standards, to reduce the potential for crime and fear of crime.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ Any external French/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors in to houses, from garages, should be certified to BS PAS 24, alternatively the garage door should be certified to LPS 1175 SR1, STS202 BR1.

4.2 Doors (Apartments)

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.

- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors in to garages and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ Rear boundaries should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- ☐ Rear boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- ☐ Rear boundaries adjacent publicly accessible open space should have a strip of defensible planting should protect rear boundaries.
- ☐ Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.
- ☐ The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
- ☐ Gates into the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
 - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or

- A key operable deadlock

- ☐ The passageway between plots no. 59 & 60 leaves the gable end of plot 59 exposed which could leave it vulnerable to antisocial behaviour such as loitering/congregation. It is recommended that this passageway is omitted or restricted to residents with gates at either end of the passageway.
- ☐ The parking spaces for plots no. 26 & 33 are to the rear of the property and should be positioned behind lockable gates. Gates into rear gardens of these properties should be lockable from both sides.
- ☐ Parking areas to the front of houses (i.e. plots no 35 - 37) should be illuminated to a high standard.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.
- ☐ Garage doors should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ The proposed access road should be illuminated to adoptable standards.

4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas.
- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
24 th April 2024	Izzi Garvey	CIS confirmation
15 th May 2024	Izzi Garvey	Updated plans/CIS
18 th July 2024	Izzi Garvey	Updated plans/CIS

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
MCI-000-DR-A-501	Coloured Site Layout	July 2024	-
5220	The Padbury Working Drawing Pack		
5320	The Fewston Working Drawing Pack		
5310	The Westbourne Working Drawing Pack		
5050	The Holgate Working Drawing Pack		
5140	The Farley Working Drawing Pack		
5060	The Swarbourn Working Drawing Pack		
5270	The Winterborne Working Drawing Pack		
5300	The Oulston Working Drawing Pack		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Revised site plan	17/05/2024
C	Revised site plan	18/05/2024