



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land adjacent Boarshaw Road

12 Apartments

For: **Rochdale Borough Council**

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: **09/01/23**

design**for**security

Ref: **2022/0618/CIS/01**

Land adjacent Boarshaw Road

2022/0618/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor design changes/security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Secure rear access gate to be provided to rear communal area.
- Secure cycle store provision
- External & communal lighting
- Access control to communal lobbies

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

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Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The proposed site is located on Boarshaw Road a main road connecting into the centre of Middleton.


The existing site is currently unused green space and is located adjacent to Boarshaw Working Mens Club.

A rear access road off Brassey street provides access to the site and appears to be unadopted poor quality road.

Neighbouring the proposed site on Boarshaw Road is a mixture of uses ranging from residential, various retail and commercial uses and open green spaces down to Whit Brook.

The site is situated close to public transport routes with a number of bus routes on Boarshaw Road.

The site is close to the centre of Middleton (approx. 1km east and Rochdale 7km West). There are good transport links to both towns both public and vehicle transport.



1 – Front elevation of the proposed site.




2 – View south west on Boarshaw Rd.



3 – View north east on Boarshaw Rd.




4 – neighbouring car park.



5 – View north east on Brassey St.



6 – View across proposed site.



7 – View south west on Brassey St.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2021 to 30th November 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
27	<5	59	325	25	8	6	16	22	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the local area is average for the Rochdale district, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and vehicle crime being the highest recorded offences. The majority of crime has occurred to the west of the proposed site, around Rochdale Road and Edward Street, as well as to the north east around Tennyson Road.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have mostly occurred within the residential estates, with assaults and harassments most commonly recorded. Offences have often taken place within the dwelling during a domestic dispute, or incident between neighbours/ known associates.
- 2.1.3 Dwellings and vehicles have mostly been targeted in criminal damage offences, with a hotspot of offences taking place to the west on/off Rochdale Road and Edward Street. Offenders have used implements, mostly stones in order to smash glazing. Groups of youths have commonly been reported as committing the criminal damage.
- 2.1.4 Theft of a vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle offence taking place in the local area, with offences taking place throughout the analysed site area. Offenders have targeted vehicles and mopeds, using unknown means in order to gain access and remove the vehicle.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Breaking of glass windows and doors, in particular at the rear of the property to include rear patio doors, using implements such as hammers or large objects like bricks.**

Possible Solution - An appropriate glazing specification should be used to adequately secure the building. All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. However, the layout of the building and position of windows should be designed to avoid vulnerabilities as much as possible. Ground floor windows should include locks and opening restrictors. Gardens should be enclosed with appropriately robust fencing. Secluded passageways to the sides and rear of the development should be avoided wherever possible, as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.

- 2.2.2 **Doors (all kinds) were forced open using implements.**

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doorsets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks and the fittings. They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries and lighting can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by residents or passers-by.

- 2.2.3 **Exploitation of insecure doors and windows to gain entry to the property.**

Possible Solution - All individual cluster flats/apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance door-set (see appendix 2), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

2.2.4 Vehicles have been targeted when parked on the street.

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that any residents vehicles are secured and overlooked. Any side, rear, or communal parking areas must be secured to prevent unauthorised access to where parked vehicles, as well as hidden doors and windows of the buildings themselves, could be attacked unseen. Any communal parking areas to the front of buildings should be well-overlooked from habitable room windows and should be clearly defined as in ownership/control of the residents.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Rochdale and Greater Manchester




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **4% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **6% higher** than Greater Manchester and **8% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **7% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **26% higher** than Greater Manchester and **140% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **7% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **21% higher** than Greater Manchester and **47% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **1% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **11% higher** than Greater Manchester and **34% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Monday and Friday during the afternoon (12pm – 5pm) and early hours of the morning (12am – 4am). Offenders often target properties during the day when residents are likely to be away from the property for long periods of time. Offenders are also likely to target properties during the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- In cases where the entry point is recorded as “unknown” it is likely that offenders have exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Friday during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target vehicles in the early hours of the morning when as they are likely to be left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposal seeks to construct a purpose built residential apartment building on unused empty ground. The resident main entrance will be off Boarshaw road.
- 3.1.2 The proposed development will provide a total of 12 apartments.
- 3.1.3 8 car parking spaces will be provided within the boundary at the rear of the proposed building. Vehicle access off Brassey Street will be provided at the rear of the site.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The building will present an active frontage to Boarshaw Road, enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the street.
- 3.2.3 The main communal entrance to the building will be located in a prominent position and will be capable of being clearly seen from the public realm.
- 3.2.4 The proposed layout provides habitable rooms facing out onto the communal areas providing further natural surveillance to the rear of the development.
- 3.2.5 The development will help to continue to repopulate this part of the road and add to the general activity throughout the day and at weekends.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The communal entrances must be well lit, be fitted with security-certified doors and fitted with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a programmable fob. There should also be an audio-visual link to each apartment, so that residents can remotely allow *bona fide* visitors.
- 3.3.2 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the reception area only prior to providing access further into the building.
- 3.3.3 The boundary treatments to the proposed apartment building are vitally important to secure it and to preventing unauthorised access to private spaces. The rear of the building, including the amenity areas, should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access. Care should be taken to ensure ground level changes or walls do not inadvertently facilitate scaling boundaries or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates
- 3.3.4 Residential post/parcel. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal staff to have access to internal areas of the residential blocks beyond the reception space. Mail boxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a 'through-the-wall' post box arrangement. Further design details of this facility are to be developed.
- 3.3.5 No secure cycle store has been identified within the boundary. Due to the lack of a cycle store residents could be forced to park bicycles within the site boundary; which is currently unsecure. Failing that residents might use the entrance hall or upper floor landings to park bikes, creating cluttered and hazardous spaces.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All new external door-sets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ The main communal entrance door-set should include a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification (see above), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. It should be single-leaf, self-closing and controlled by means of an audio entry phone system (linked to each individual bedroom/unit), so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ Postal delivery arrangements should ideally allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. If not, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries without providing access to all floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ The rear communal entrance off the courtyard, for the use of residents, should also be security-certified to one of the above standards and should be self-closing and operated by resident key-fob only (on access and egress).
- ☐ All individual apartment entrance door-sets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Internal doors/frames to the stores and the plant room should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a deadlock, so that they can be secured when unoccupied.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Any new windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24. Any full height windows should take into account the requirements of the standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All new glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Party walls (where of studwork construction) between communal space and accommodation, as well as between separate units, must include a skin of 9mm ply-board or expanded metal mesh, securely fixed to the studwork.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Residential - If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems

- BS 6799 for wireless systems

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Main Entrance doors
 - Secondary entrance doors off internal lobbies
 - Bin stores
 - Cycle stores
 - Communal garden to the rear

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations, such as building/site frontages and entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and along the side of the main building.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 Other

- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development. Bin stores should not be located in publicly-accessible areas.
- ☐ Mail boxes and cycle stands should be obtained from a supplier approved by Secured by Design and installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions (see www.securedbydesign.com).
- ☐ Metal theft from buildings is a significant issue in the area. Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction of the buildings, and concealment / securing of cabling.
- ☐ The external communal bin store serving the building should be enclosed with railings and a self-closing, 'slam to lock' gate (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortise latch, key operated from both sides) which cannot be left unlocked when shut, a minimum height of 2100mm. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place while retaining a secure development. It is not acceptable for bins to be left on the street for extended periods.

-
- ☐ The external cycle store should be enclosed and secured in the same way. It should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/downloads

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
09/12/22	AJ Cocker Assoc.	Application submitted
12/12/22	AJ Cocker Assoc.	Application confirmed
09/01/23	DfS	Site visit
15/12/22	GMP	Invoice issued
20/12/22	DfS	Invoice paid
09/01/23	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
R429-02	Location Plan	Oct 22	
R429-01	Proposals	Aug 22	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk