



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Rochdale Sixth Form College

Educational (1,779sqm)

For: Rochdale Sixth Form College

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: 01/11/22

designforsecurity

Ref: 2022/0513/CIS/01

Rochdale Sixth Form College

2022/0513/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported with minor security additions advised

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found acceptable and if submitted to the local planning department in its current form we will support the application.

The redevelopment of the site for the use as a school is welcomed. The proposed building is well located and presents no significant issues from a crime prevention perspective. To improve the overall security of the building and wider site, a number of recommendations are included, as follows:

- Security rated external doors, window frames and laminate glazing should be used.
- All elevations of the building to be illuminated with low intensity lighting from dusk-til-dawn.
- CCTV and intruder alarm systems are installed.
- Review the perimeter fencing, particularly in remote areas to ensure the wider site remains secure.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will recommend that Rochdale Planning be minded to approve the application, a condition be included to require the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation, which should be easily achievable.

David Maher *Dip Arch*
Consultant

e: david.maher@gmp.police.uk

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
	2.3 Risk Factors	
	2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Rochdale Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis	
	2.5 Theft (Rochdale Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis	
	2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	9
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security	11
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Windows	
	4.3 Glazing	
	4.4 Curtain Walling	
	4.5 Alarms	
	4.6 Boundaries	
	4.7 Landscaping	
	4.8 Lighting	
	4.9 CCTV	
	4.10 Other	
5	Management & Maintenance	14
6	Construction	14
7	Useful References	14
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact register	15
B	Associated Documents.....	15
C	CIS Version History	15
D	Glossary	16

1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located off the busy St Mary's Gate, A58. The site is bounded by the River Roch to the east and an Asda supermarket and car park to the west. The Asda site and existing college site areas are separated by an existing metal railing and landscaping.

The surrounding area is a popular residential location (social & private). The adjacent main roads contain small retail and commercial uses.

The site is well served by public transport. A bus stops on both Dane St and College Rd.


The site is approx. 600m west of the town centre of Rochdale.

As the site is located in close proximity to the town centre it is surrounded by a broad selection of uses associated with town centres; residential, civic, commercial and generous public realm spaces.

The existing site has been operating as a college for some time. The site is accessed by vehicles from a bridge link across the River Roch from College Rd

The existing campus site and buildings all have a metal railing boundary with access control gate for vehicles. From a Pedestrian/student point of view, the site & building can be approached via the Hopwood Hall building or from the access bridge off College Rd.

An existing footbridge crosses the river between each college campus & controlled staff.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2021 to 30th September 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
19	32	92	704	127	36	28	41	12	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high for Rochdale; however, the location of the proposed site should be taken into consideration. The proposed site is located within close proximity to the Town Centre. Town and City Centres often experience higher rates of crime and disorder due to the increased volume of foot fall in the area and the greater number of retail and licenced premises. Less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded offences taking place.
- 2.1.2 The majority of violence in the local area has occurred to the east of the proposed site where the town centre is located. Violence peaks over the weekend period, during the evening and into the early hours of the morning when licenced premises in the area are closing. Alcohol has been a common contributing factor to the violence in the area. Violent offences occurring to the north and south have mostly involved domestic disputes, occurring within the home or residential streets.
- 2.1.3 Theft offences have mostly occurred around the town centre, whereby offenders have targeted insecure bags and mobile phones. Offenders have used pickpocketing and distraction methods in order to obtain the items. Items within retail units have also been targeted by means of shoplifting.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime has occurred throughout the local area, particularly to the east around the town centre and to the south around Sparrow Hill. Theft from a motor vehicle and criminal damage to a vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime offences. Offenders have removed vehicle registration plates and smashed glazing in order to cause damage and gain entry to the vehicle. Offenders have also used implements in order to scratch paint work and damage body work.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements / tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. All windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor / accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, external bars or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

- 2.2.2 Offenders have climbed onto the roof of single-storey building elements and gained access through the roof itself or through high level roof-lights / windows.

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas are not accessible, for example with the use of high-level / overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard / soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles / bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself should be robust enough to withstand penetration.

-
- 2.2.3 Where the point of entry is unknown / legitimate, this is likely to have been when offenders have gained access to insecure rooms / areas unnoticed, before targeting equipment (such as laptops, media / musical equipment, tools etc.).

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed access to all areas. The reception should be staffed at all times whilst the building is open and all visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the school. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. Students should also be encouraged to keep items of value with them or store them securely, with signage included to remind pupils and staff to remain vigilant.

- 2.2.4 Theft of insecure property belonging to students and staff, as well as school equipment

Possible Solution – As above, areas restricted to staff and officials should operate using an access control system to restrict entry. Codes / fobs should be regularly updated so that only those currently with legitimate purpose should be able to gain entry to these areas. Legitimate users should be encouraged not to allow strangers to tailgate them into restricted areas of the buildings. Facilities should be provided for pupils and staff to store their belongings securely whilst at the premises.

- 2.2.5 Posing as legitimate students / visitors enter restricted areas by means of insecure doors.

Possible Solution – here should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed access to all areas. The reception should be staffed at all times whilst the building is open and all visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the college. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. Students should also be encouraged to keep items of value with them or store them securely.

- 2.2.6 Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

Possible Solution - Secure store rooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove, and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular community access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.


2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property
- Unauthorised access to buildings and private space
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups (particularly out-of-hours)
- Internal theft
- Theft of staff / pupil belongings
- Bullying
- Staff and pupil safety
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Rochdale Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against educational facilities, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.





2.4.1 Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at educational facilities in Rochdale peaks on Sunday – when many are likely to be closed. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon and into the late evening/early hours of the morning. The opportunities often rise in the afternoon, when large numbers of students are entering / leaving buildings, staff presence is likely to be lower and parents / carers enter school sites – providing anonymity to offenders. Offenders often target buildings at night when they are closed, it is dark, streets are typically quieter and they perceive a lower risk of being detected.

2.4.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements, gaining access.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Offenders have climbed onto the roof of single-storey building elements and gained access through the roof itself or through high level roof-lights / windows.
- Where the point of entry is unknown / legitimate, this is likely to have been when offenders have gained access to insecure rooms / areas unnoticed, before targeting equipment (such as laptops, media / musical equipment, tools etc.).

2.5 Theft (Rochdale Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against educational facilities, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft at educational facilities in Rochdale peaks on Monday. During the day, the risk of theft peaks during the early hours of the morning and during the normal school / college day, with offences frequently taking place during breaks, when pupils and staff leave personal property in unlocked rooms, where they are accessible and vulnerable to theft. Mobile phones, cash, bags and coats are the most routinely stolen items. Out-of-hours, externally stored equipment/materials have been targeted.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Tuesday and Wednesday during the early hours of the morning (12am – 4am). Offenders often target vehicles in the early hours of the morning as vehicles are likely to be left unattended, out of sight of the owner, for long periods of time creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises construction of new college teaching spaces as part of an extension to the existing building within the existing campus site to provide much needed teaching and social spaces.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed building extension is located entirely within the existing college grounds, with no areas directly exposed to the public realm. The site benefits from effective management coupled with established protocols for entry which have been largely successful in excluding potential intruders.
- 3.2.2 The existing boundary fencing is relatively new and forms an effective secure perimeter to the site. The grounds are subdivided into distinct zones to allow control of access, which is particularly useful when the grounds are used by the wider community.
- 3.2.3 The proposed building has a relatively simple footprint which reduces potential hiding places and allows for easy monitoring of activity around them. The relationship between the new and existing buildings must not establish any deep recesses, narrow passageways, or places of potential concealment / entrapment.
- 3.2.4 The internal layout appears to be free of any potential pinch points or spaces where students could be cornered. The corridors / stairwells should provide sufficient circulation space to cope with the anticipated numbers of students, avoiding potential for bumps and collisions that can lead to more serious behavioural issues.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the buildings and avoids the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Review of CCTV and lighting. The site-wide lighting and any CCTV systems should be adapted to reflect the proposed changes to the layout. CCTV cameras should be capable of identifying all vehicle and pedestrian movements into and out of the site as well as the building entrances, elevations and boundary fencing behind it. To facilitate the CCTV system, dusk until dawn lighting should be provided, particularly around the access doors / gates and any loading bays. Signage should be located at the site entrance to inform visitors that their movements will be monitored and recorded.
- 3.3.2 Use of parts of the school by the wider community may require access to parts of the new building at times when other areas are empty, often in the evenings. The design and layout of internal and external spaces should be capable of zoning, so that people are guided along safe routes to where they need to go, and prevented from accessing other areas.
- 3.3.3 Consideration should be given to the provision of secure storerooms / cages (with reinforced walls and security-certified door / gates), where expensive I.T. equipment could be stored out-of-hours. Any such valuable items should not be easy to remove and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system.
- 3.3.4 Any new cycle parking for staff and visitors. This should be located where it can be easily overlooked from routinely used rooms within the building, e.g. reception / office. Cycle stands should be specifically covered by CCTV.
- 3.3.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance

in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- All internal doors / frames to offices and stores should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a 5 lever mortise deadlock (to BS 3621 / EN 12209), so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.

4.2 Windows

- All windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 where possible. All other window designs / dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- It is recommended that all windows are fixed (i.e. non-opening). If they must open, they should key-lockable and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors, limited to 100mm.
- Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- Any shutters should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, any external shutters should have shutter-boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building – where they would be less vulnerable to attack and would be less visually intrusive.
- Any internal security grilles or blinds should be accredited to a minimum security standard of LPS1175 SR2 or equivalent.

4.3 Glazing

- Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Curtain Walling

- Secured by Design recognises four distinct types of glazed wall systems. These are:
 - Large glazed units connected by 'spider clamp' system.
 - Glazed units directly retained within a framing system (usually aluminium)
 - Framed windows installed within a separate framing system.
 - Framed windows connected to other framed windows to create a window wall.
- Glazed curtain walling (1 and 2 above) must be installed using a secure glazing retention system. The method of retaining glass must include one or more of the following:
 - Security glazing tape
 - Dedicated security sealant or gasket
 - A secure mechanical fixing system (Evidence will be required to prove the system is secure. This may be achieved by utilising the specific glazing retention test within PAS 24:2012 or by indicative test on the retention system to LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR1 or STS 202: Issue 3, BR1)

- Framed windows (3 and 4 above) used within the construction of a window wall must be certified to one of the following requirements:
 - PAS 24:2014
 - STS 204 Issue 3: 2012
 - LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 Security Rating 1
 - LPS 2081 Issue 1:2014 Security Rating A
- Glazing to windows on public-facing elevations and all windows below 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarms

- A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the entire building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.6 Boundaries

- Secure boundary treatments should be a minimum of 2400mm high, and formed of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in higher risk situations.
- There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the fence, to reduce the potential for crawling into secure areas.

4.7 Landscaping

- In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow unimpeded surveillance and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.8 Lighting

- Lighting to vehicle circulation areas, service yards and car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout / lux plan.
- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to complement the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances & lobbies, building perimeters, car & cycle parking.](#)

4.10 Other

- All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- Signage and orientation. Routes leading to and from various facilities in and around the site should be obvious to site users and visitors. Disorientation can provide legitimacy for an offender to be present in a restricted area. Clear signage should be provided throughout the site which will help to direct people to where they need to go, and discourage entry to restricted areas.
- Consideration should be given to a protective coating applied to any areas that may be vulnerable to graffiti (such as large expanses of blank walls and inside toilets) - applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal (e.g. 'easy on' – see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).
- Toilets can give rise to crime and anti-social behaviour and the following issues should be considered:-
 - Avoid areas where items such as drug paraphernalia can be hidden (e.g. suspended ceilings). Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work, etc. should be used. Services where possible should be accessed from outside the facility.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening. This will aid gaining access to collapsed persons. Opaque panels can be used to great effect to ensure no persons are collapsed inside, whilst preserving privacy. This measure discourages drug taking and facilitates staff checks. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 20 centimetres from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.

- Provide 'Chelsea Clip' / karabina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.
 - Ensure that the site management is for which the building / site was designed able to cope with the remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
- 5.1.3 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
12/10/2022	ABW Architects	CIS instruction received
13/10/2022	ABW Architects	Fee / authorisation confirmed
03/10/2022	DfS	Site visit
14/10/2022	GMP	Invoice issued
04/10/2022	GMP	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A145	Site Plan	10/05/22	
	Fifth Floor GA Plan	30/09/22	
	GA Elevations	02/08/22	
	GA Sections	30/09/22	
	Ground Floor GA Plan	30/09/22	
	Location Plan	10/05/22	
	Proposed Site Plan	10/05/22	
	Typical Upper Floor GA Plan	30/09/22	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk