



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

BROWN STREET, LITTLEBOROUGH, ROCHDALE
RESIDENTIAL (40 no. APARTMENTS)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: P Casey & Co Ltd

VERSION A: 17/08/2021

REFERENCE: 2021/0372/CIS/01

Brown Street, Littleborough, Rochdale

URN: 2021/0372/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust enclosure of the sides/rear of building (particularly where exposed to the narrow footpath to the west), as well as to the north and south of the site and the clear definition along the Brown Street frontage of the car park (to define it as in ownership/control of the residents, entirely separate from the street and the adjacent open spaces).
- Where possible, defensive planting should be provided along the exposed boundary to the west, in order to deter damage, scaling or penetration. Existing tree branches should be assessed for their potential to form climbing aids.
- Robust control of access into the building, including a secure system for the delivery of post.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the west side of Brown Street, to the west of Littleborough town centre in north-east Rochdale.

The site is currently occupied by a part single-storey, part two-storey commercial building in use as a self-storage facility. The site also includes a parking area to the north (enclosed with timber fencing) and an external storage area, occupied by steel shipping containers (enclosed with Palisade fencing, timber fencing, chain link fencing and barbed wire) - both of which are accessed off Brown Street.


Brown Street itself is a partially tarmacked, partially gravelled route with terraced housing on the opposite side - providing direct overlooking over the eastern frontage of the site. The streets to the east and south of the site are primarily occupied by terraced residential properties and are busy with on-street vehicle parking.

Terraced residential properties often front directly onto the street, meaning their front elevations are not protected by any defensible space - leaving windows/doors exposed to nuisance, anti-social behaviour, unauthorised access (if left insecure) and attack. Residents' vehicles must be parked on street as they cannot be parked within the curtilage of the dwellings - leaving them exposed to damage/attack. Rear communal alleyways can also leave terraced dwellings vulnerable to unseen rear access.

To the immediate south-east of the site are the private gardens of the terraced dwellings fronting onto Victoria Street. To the immediate south-west are terraced properties fronting towards the southern boundary of the site accessed via a short pedestrian route off Brown Street, with dense vegetation along the boundary itself.

To the west of the site is a narrow, wooded area between the site and the commercial sites to the west, with an informal/unsurfaced pedestrian route linking Brown Street to the south to the open land to the north. The route benefits from no direct overlooking and very little footfall, activity or passive surveillance. The existing boundary to the site along the route is formed by dilapidated timber fencing, chain link fencing and barbed wire, although there are steel containers placed along the inside of the boundary itself. To the north, the site abuts open space, with open areas of grassland and areas of dense woodland/vegetation crossed by a network of informal footpaths.

Open land/routes adjacent to (and particularly to the rear of) buildings and dwellings can often lead to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and secluded routes can leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly after dark. Adjacent properties can also often be vulnerable to unauthorised access, as they can provide easy access/escape routes that benefit from little/no natural surveillance or direct overlooking.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.





2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
20	13	39	83	14	5	<5	28	18	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is slightly below average for the Rochdale area, although the study area does include large areas of open space that are not densely populated, which typically attract fewer crime and disorder incidents. The most prevalent types of crime in the local area are less serious wounding, vehicle crime and criminal damage. The majority of recorded crime occurs to the east (around the district centre of Littleborough) and around/off the main arterial routes of A58 Featherstall Road to the west and Whitelees Road to the north-west.
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will look at local residential burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparison




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **25% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **27% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **5% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **13% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **5% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **2% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **30% lower** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **14% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **28% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **37% higher** than the rate for Rochdale as a whole, **77% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **209% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Monday, Tuesday and Saturday. During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target properties at these times, when it is dark and streets are typically quieter - meaning they perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.
- 2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:
- Doors have been targeted most frequently, with offenders forcing them open with bodily pressure/implements or targeting them when left insecure by residents.
 - Glazing within doors has been smashed to gain entry.

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Tuesday and Saturday. During the day, the risk peaks late at night/during the early hours of the morning, when it is dark, streets are quiet and they perceive a lower risk of being witnessed.
- 2.4.2 Vehicles parked within open communal areas or on-street, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within the curtilages of individual properties, within secure garages or secure parking facilities.

2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently, with offenders forcing them open with bodily pressure/implements or targeting them when left insecure by residents.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the apartment block before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

- **Glazing within doors has been smashed to gain entry.**

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should ideally be small and set well-away from locking points.

Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' can provide a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties (see Section 4.5). Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour. All private spaces to the sides/rear of the apartment block should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access (see Section 4.5). Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.6).

- **Vehicles have been targeted for theft of, theft from and criminal damage when parked on-street or within open car parks**

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving apartments or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured with automatic gates/shutters to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a 4 storey building, comprising of 40 no. residential apartments with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The building will front onto a car park (comprising of 40 no. spaces and a bin store), accessed directly off Brown Street. The main communal entrance will be located to the front of the building (off the car park) and the building will back onto a narrow area of landscaping between it and the existing narrow footpath to the west.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 For residents and visitors to the block, there will only be one communal entrance, which allows security to be focussed on this location.
- 3.2.3 The building will have habitable room windows to its front elevation, providing surveillance opportunities over the parked vehicles, any visitors to the block and towards the street.
- 3.2.4 Many of the apartments will be provided above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively deterred. This also reduces the potential impacts of any excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.5 The car park serving the building will be located directly in front of it, where residents can directly overlook their own vehicles, and it will be capable of being enclosed/defined as entirely separate from the street and the adjacent open space. The sides and rear of the building will also be capable of being enclosed and defined as private space, in order to deter unauthorised access to where hidden doors and windows could be vulnerable to attack unseen.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The south side and rear of the building should be enclosed and defined as private space to prevent unauthorised access to the hidden windows and patio doors, which could be vulnerable to unauthorised access/attack unseen if left open and accessible (see illustration opposite). Care should be taken to ensure that the western boundary accessible from the adjacent narrow footpath route is particularly robustly defined and protected where possible (see below). The remaining boundaries of the site to the south (abutting the open land/private gardens adjacent to the existing terraced housing) and north (abutting the existing open space) should also be secured with secured/defined as shown. The frontage of the site along Brown Street should be demarcated by low-level railings, to define the car park as entirely separate from the street, in



ownership/control of the residents, without impeding views of and from the street (see Section 4.5). There should be a symbolic barrier at the entrance to the site/car park off Brown Street (e.g. brick pillars, change of road surface texture/colour etc.) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents, psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and deterring anyone without a legitimate reason from entering.

- 3.3.2 The existing narrow footpath link to the west of the site could provide an easy access/escape route for offenders to exploit unseen and could leave the proposed building vulnerable to unauthorised rear access. In addition to a particularly robust boundary definition along the route (see Section 4.5), if at all possible (although it is understood that it may be outside of the developer's ownership/control), it is highly recommended that low-level defensive planting (i.e. low-level, densely branched, thorny shrubs) is provided on the public side of the eastern and southern boundaries of the site to deter access and scaling. Where this is absolutely unachievable, it could be provided on the private side of the boundary - although this is likely to be less effective. Any immediately adjacent existing tree branches should also be removed or pruned where necessary to ensure they do not form a climbing aid over the boundaries to private space.
- 3.3.3 The communal entrance itself should be formed by a security-certified, single-leaf, self-closing doorset, fitted with secure video access controls. In addition to a robust access control system for visitors, there should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that ensures access to all floors of the building is not required (see Section 4.1 for more information).
- 3.3.4 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents, visitors and staff.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted for use under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery. Security-certified louvered doorsets are available if required to plant rooms (see www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search for SBD-compliant products).
- ☐ The main communal entrance doorset must also be security-certified to one of the above standards, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. It should be single-leaf, self-closing and controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ Ideally, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. If this is not possible, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries without providing access to all floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ All individual apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. These doors should have either a door viewer or a fixed sidelight, containing laminated glazing.
- ☐ Any patio doors to ground floor apartments must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. Any such doors should be enclosed within secure private gardens areas and should not be

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Any ground floor/easily accessible curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ All ground floor and any first floor opening lights accessible from single-storey elements (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor and any first floor glazing accessible from single-storey elements must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be no other features of the building (such as projecting canopies/window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting brickwork/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, handrails, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows or onto the roof of single-storey elements.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If alarms are to be installed to each apartment, they should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems, or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.

All doors should be fitted with alarm contacts and PIR detectors should cover all ground/accessible rooms with windows.

- ☐ If alarms are not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm if required.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The south side and rear of the building should be enclosed and defined as private, resident-only space by 2100mm high walls and/or railings and pedestrian gates (see Section 3.3 for illustration). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railing panels should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ☐ Any pedestrian gates to private space should be 2100mm high, self-closing and self-locking, operated by staff/resident key or fob on access and egress. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds. They should also be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street furniture, lighting columns etc. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ The remainder of the site perimeter to the south (abutting the open land/private gardens adjacent to the existing terraced housing) and north (abutting the existing open space) should also be secured with 1800mm high walls, railings or close-boarded timber fencing.
- ☐ The frontage of the site along Brown Street should be formed by low-level railings (e.g. 1200mm high) and low-level planting. The design of any low railings should be carefully considered to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them – which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.



4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, parking areas and the site frontage, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Other

- ☐ Any external cycle store should be enclosed with 2100mm high walls, railings or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and a self-closing and 'slam-to-lock' gate, which cannot be left unlocked when shut. It should include 'Sheffield' style racks (that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar) or cycle storage lockers. For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ The proposed bin store should be similarly enclosed and secured. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (such as access-controls, fencelines/gates, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
27 th July 2021	P Casey & Co Ltd	Receipt of CIS instruction form & site plan
28 th July 2021	P Casey & Co Ltd	Quote issued & confirmation of instruction/fee. Additional info to follow
3 rd August 2021	P Casey & Co Ltd	Receipt of location plan, floorplans & elevations
17 th August 2021	P Casey & Co Ltd	Email sent re: report completion & payment
31 st August to 1 st September 2021	P Casey & Co Ltd & GMP Finance Dept	Email correspondence re: invoice
7 th September 2021	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
3601 03	Site Layout as Proposed (SUPERSEDED)	April 21	A
3601 04	Plans as Proposed (SUPERSEDED)	April 21	A
3601 03	Site Layout as Proposed	April 21	A`
3601 04	Ground and First Floor Plans as Proposed	April 21	A
3601 05	Second and Third Floor Plans as Proposed	April 21	A
3601 06	Proposed Elevations	April 21	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstdesign.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk