



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land off Cowm Top Lane

Industrial (1200sqm total)

For: **Supashed Rochdale Limited**

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: **02/11/22**

design**for**security

Ref: **2022/0501/CIS/01**

Land off Cowm Top Lane

2022/0501/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

The scheme has been very well designed, will add activity, natural surveillance, and incorporate crime prevention measures and interest to this section of the business park. The proposed location of the building is appropriate, and it will help to continue the development of this neighbourhood providing a vibrant, mixed-use area. We are happy to support the proposals.

Positive aspects of the scheme include:

- Orientation of the building and uses within the development - promoting activity and natural surveillance;
- the provision of secure cycle parking

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more depth within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed when developing detailed proposals for future development, and these include:-

- Existing boundary conditions are assessed
- Access & maintenance
- Landscaping design and features
- Lighting

Please note: Greater Manchester Police; Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

David Maher *Dip Arch*
Consultant

e: david.maher@gmp.police.uk

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
	2.3 Risk Factors - Industrial	
	2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Industrial Premises): Risk Analysis	
	2.5 Theft (Industrial Premises): Risk Analysis	
	2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	9
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security	11
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Windows & Shutters	
	4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	4.4 Alarm	
	4.5 Boundaries	
	4.6 Lighting	
	4.7 CCTV	
	4.8 Landscaping	
	4.9 Other	
5	Management & Maintenance	13
6	Construction	13
7	Useful References	13
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact register	15
B	Associated Documents.....	15
C	CIS Version History	15
D	Glossary	16

1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.


The site lies within the Casleton district of Rochdale, about 3 km southwest of central Rochdale. The proposed development site seeks to create 3 light industrial units, car parking and service yard to the west of Cowm Top Lane in close proximity to the existing business Park developments off Cowm Top Lane. The site is close to the A627(M) motorway.

There are significant changes in topography across the site and much of the site covered with dense self-seeded foliage. Much of the existing landscaping will be cleared to make way for the development.

The site is currently vacant. Isolated patches across the site showed examples of fly-tipping, however this didn't appear to be the case along Cowm Top Lane or in any of the neighbouring developments.

To the west of the development site is a residential housing estate. A couple of informal footpaths cut across the development site leading down to the housing estate or further south to the open green spaces.

Cowm Top Lane is used for on-street parking when existing development car parks are full.



7 – Neighbouring commercial developments.



6 – Industrial unit opposite the site on Cowm Top Lane.



5 – Example of Fly-tipping within the site.




1 – View north along Cowm Top Lane towards the site.



2 – View south towards the site.



3 – Neighbouring commercial developments.



4 – View into site.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2021 to 30th September 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
7	<5	12	69	7	<5	<5	13	6	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the local area is low for the Rochdale division, with less serious wounding and vehicle crime most commonly reported. Offences have been concentrated to the south of the proposed site, around Albion Street and the surrounding roads. Offences have also occurred to the housing estate located to the north east of the site, around Cavendish Road.
- 2.1.2 Assaults, public order offences and harassment have been the highest recorded less serious woundings taking place in the area. Offences have mostly occurred around the residential streets to the south, around Albion Street and to the east around Cavendish Road. Offences have often involved domestic disputes and incidents between known associates.
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime has taken place throughout the area with theft from a motor vehicle and criminal damage to a vehicle being the highest recorded vehicle offences taking place. Offenders have used tools in order to remove vehicle parts (mostly catalytic converters and vehicle registration plates), as well as approaching insecure vehicles and removing items from within.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Offenders scaling buildings to gain unauthorised access to/through roof areas.

Possible Solution – Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas are not accessible, for example with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any ‘accessible’ skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself should be robust enough to withstand penetration.

2.2.2 Use of implements or power tools to force open or cut through shutters.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see appendix 2) has an independently proven level of resistance and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

2.2.3 Use of implements such as crowbars to open doors, particularly fire doors, and gain entry to the premises.

Possible Solution - Although the location of doors should be considered (ideally placed where they can be readily observed, so that potential criminals would be more easily detected), it is inevitable that some will be located where they will benefit from lower levels of natural surveillance. All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

2.2.4 Smashing through walls using implements such as sledgehammers to break through walls.

Possible Solution – There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (behind or within any cladding to the building at ground floor level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack (see Section 4.3). Boundary treatments, lockable gates, vehicle barriers or bollards should be incorporated to prevent unauthorised vehicles from getting close to the building out-of-hours.

2.2.5 Offenders posing as legitimate customers before gaining access to unauthorised ‘staff-only’ areas to commit theft.

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to the building/site are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.


2.3 Risk Factors - Industrial

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Controlled access (staff/user only)
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Robbery
- Employee theft
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Industrial Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Rochdale industrial premises remains relatively consistent – peaking slightly on Thursday. The risk of burglary rises in the afternoon, peaking late at night and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target industrial premises at these times when it is dark, industrial areas are typically quiet, units are often closed or operate with fewer staff and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** When targeting Rochdale industrial premises, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Offenders have damaged or forced shutters upwards to gain unauthorised access or to gain access to doors and windows behind them.
- In a number of cases, the point of entry was 'unknown'. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors or employees before gaining access to back-of-house/staff areas and stealing property unnoticed.
- Doors have been forced open using tools/implements or when they have been left insecure by members of staff.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

2.5 Theft (Industrial Premises): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The greatest risk of theft at Rochdale industrial premises is experienced during the working week (i.e. Monday to Friday). During the day, the risk peaks during the late afternoon and into the evening. There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property from within buildings (e.g. cash, mobile phones, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from warehouses or service/storage yards.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Tuesday and Saturday during the afternoon (11am – 3pm) and early hours of the morning (12am – 3am). Offenders often target vehicles during the day as they are often left unattended for long periods of time, out of sight of the owner, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The development comprises the construction and arrangement of an industrial building separated into 3 units within the business Park estate. The building will have a simple rectangular footprint and include office accommodation. Enclosed storage / service yards and staff parking areas are located within specific area of the site.
- 3.1.2 The existing site buildings have long since been demolished, cleared and the site is vacant apart from dense self-seeded foliage to the majority of the boundaries.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The site sits within an established business park estate that is popular across the day.
- 3.2.2 The development will bring greater levels of activity and surveillance to the area, particularly during the day.
- 3.2.3 The principle elevation of the building will be overlooked from the proposed parking area and will be capable of being overlooked from the street.
- 3.2.4 The proposed buildings will have a simple footprint that will provide few potential places of concealment and will also be sufficiently tall enough to make unauthorised access to the roof difficult.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the units are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Review of boundaries. The condition of the boundary fencing should be reviewed to ensure that it can provide a consistent level of security to the site. Any sections of deficient fencing should be replaced with a robust fencing system. Any new boundary fencing should be 2.4m high minimum (see section 4.8). This should include the division between the site and the neighbouring premises to the east.
- 3.3.2 Permeability within the site. Access to the sides and rear of the business units should be controlled using fence lines aligned with the front or side elevations of the buildings, to create an obvious division between the communal frontage of the site and the more secluded areas behind the buildings, where an intruder could operate without fear of detection. It is recommended the installation of gates and / or fencing panels should be undertaken to control access to the rear of the new buildings.
- 3.3.3 Protection of buildings and fence lines from vehicular movements. Perimeter fencing and buildings should be protected from accidental vehicle damage by installation of wheel stops in parking bays or installation of crash barriers, bollards or kerbing. Areas for vehicle movement within the site should be well-defined and distinguished from parking areas and pedestrian routes – parking bays must be demarcated to clearly indicate where parking is permitted / not permitted.
- 3.3.4 Entrance positions. Footpath routes should lead directly to the entrances, and landscaped areas around the building should be well-defined to avoid creating ambiguity of purpose.
- 3.3.5 The position of ancillary structures, parked trailers and any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
 - Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
 - Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.

-
- Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit or entry over boundary fencing.
 - Their potential to obscure damage to fence lines.

3.3.6 Vegetation along boundaries. The proximity of bushes and trees to the fence line can undermine the security of the boundary by creating cover for an intruder, or providing potential climbing aids. Overhanging branches and dense vegetation should be removed where it could be exploited in this way. Care must be taken to ensure the landscaping to the perimeter of the site is maintained at an appropriate height (see Section 4.8), in order to prevent it impeding views to and from the site, and avoid the creation of hiding places that could be exploited by offenders.

3.3.7 Cycle parking. Any provision intended for staff should be within a secured enclosure, preferably within the buildings - external cycle stores should be within the secure boundary and covered by the site CCTV system and utilise SBD-approved cycle stands.

3.3.8 Further Recommendations

- CCTV cameras should be capable of identifying all vehicle and pedestrian movements into and out of the site as well as each building. An audible warning system should be employed to alert to intruders that they have been detected and a response has been generated. To facilitate the CCTV system, dusk until dawn lighting should be provided for the site, particularly around the access doors/gates and loading bays. Signage should be located at the site entrance to inform visitors that their movements will be recorded.
- Signage should be used to direct people through the development - to the appropriate parking spaces, service areas and office entrances.
- Staff lockers should be provided, and in a location where there is a high level of activity and surveillance, so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.
- Internally, the buildings should be capable of zoning so that entry to parts of the premises can be effectively controlled. Movements in and out of the buildings should be confined to specific areas and access controls used to ensure only authorised staff can enter controlled areas.

3.3.9 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main entrance door to the building should include a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via staff key-fob. It should also be capable of being controlled remotely by staff, to ensure any visitors are vetted or are greeted/escorted before being allowed access into the building.
- ☐ Any sectional loading bay doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ Internal doors/frames to any offices, stores etc. should be robust/solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and capable of being secured when unoccupied. Staff should be able to store their belongings in a secure area while at work.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ Any windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should ideally be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any opening lights should be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ If any shutters are to be installed, they should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, any shutters should have shutter-boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building – where they would be less vulnerable to attack and less visually intrusive.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Any glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarm

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ If the existing boundary along the street frontage of the site are to be replaced, it should be formed by 2400mm high rigid-panel welded-wire mesh fencing (with no mid-rails that would aid climbing) and lockable vehicular gates, returned to the adjacent building at the north-west corner of the site – see illustration within Section 3.3. Care should be taken to ensure that fencing panels are fixed securely to

the posts (with anti-tamper fixings) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. The fencing/gates should also be located away from any other climbing aids, such as lighting columns, trees etc.

- ☐ The site boundary treatments should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- ☐ Boundary treatments should be subject to regular inspections and maintenance in order to detect any potential weak points or any signs of damage or attack.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all parking/servicing areas within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors/shutters.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [the main entrance to the building, all external facades and all servicing/parking areas](#).

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances and parking areas, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow unimpeded surveillance and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.9 Other

- ☐ The position of ancillary structures, parked trailers and any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
 - Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
 - Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.
 - Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
 - Their potential to obscure damage to fence lines.
 - Any proposed lighting columns, street furniture, tree/shrub planting etc. within or external to the site perimeter should also be reviewed in relation to the above issues.
- ☐ There should be no features of the building (such as projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications

and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
05/10/2022	Cambell Driver Partnership	CIS instruction received
10/10/2022	Cambell Driver Partnership	Fee / authorisation confirmed
31/10/2022	DfS	Site visit
14/10/2022	GMP	Invoice issued
07/11/2022	GMP	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
22.113.001	OS Plan	02/03/22	A
22.113.002	Proposed site plan	02/03/22	D
22.113.007	Proposed plans and elevations	28/09/22	B
22.113.008	Existing site plan	30/09/22	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk