



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Heywood Distribution Park

Storage/Distribution building with Offices
accommodation

For: **Indurent**

Version A: **15/05/25**

Ref: **2021/0187/CIS/04**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

Heywood Distribution Park

2021/0187/CIS/04

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported - Minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Secure boundary treatments

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The proposed development site is an urban fringe location, spread over a large area of land to the southwest of Heywood, consisting largely of pasture and open fields over a former landfill site.

Adjacent areas are established residential zones, farmland and the major industrial / distribution depots around Pilsworth and Hareshill Industrial estates.




Hareshill Road footways alongside the roads are relatively narrow and not particularly well used by pedestrians.

The site is crossed by a network of roads that link into the adjacent residential and industrial areas. Fly tipping is evident in some less-monitored sections on the outer perimeter of the site.

There is very little on-street car parking provision in the vicinity of the site, and overt measures have been installed to prevent misuse of roadside verges.

The main site currently benefits from entry control via a staffed barrier and gatehouse. The proposed areas for development are currently concrete service area and grass and treelined areas within the Heywood Distribution Industrial Park.

Generally, the overall park is in a well-managed and in a good maintained state.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st May 2024 to 30th April 2025.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	<5	16	30	<5	<5	<5	<5	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 The rate of crime in the local area over the past 12 months has been low for the Rochdale division, with less serious woundings and criminal damage having been most commonly reported. The majority of offences have occurred in the residential neighbourhoods to the northeast around Dumbarton Drive, as well as at a hotspot to the southwest at the junction of Moss Hall Road and Pilsworth Road. Assaults have been the most reported less serious woundings, with these offences mainly involving disputes between known associates and students from nearby schools, as well as some cases of domestic violence.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Offenders scaling buildings to gain unauthorised access to/through roof areas.

Possible Solution – Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. Care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas are not accessible, for example with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any ‘accessible’ skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself should be robust enough to withstand penetration.

- 2.2.2 Use of implements or power tools to force open or cut through shutters.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see appendix 2) has an independently proven level of resistance and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

- 2.2.3 Use of implements such as crowbars to open doors, particularly fire doors, and gain entry to the premises.

Possible Solution - Although the location of doors should be considered (ideally placed where they can be readily observed, so that potential criminals would be more easily detected), it is inevitable that some will be located where they will benefit from lower levels of natural surveillance. All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- 2.2.4 Smashing through walls using implements such as sledgehammers to break through walls.

Possible Solution – There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (behind or within any cladding to the building at ground floor level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack (see Section 4.3). Boundary treatments, lockable gates, vehicle barriers or bollards should be incorporated to prevent unauthorised vehicles from getting close to the building out-of-hours.

-
- 2.2.5 Offenders posing as legitimate customers before gaining access to unauthorised 'staff-only' areas to commit theft.

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to the building/site are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.


2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Controlled access (staff/user only)
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Robbery
- Employee theft
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Industrial Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Rochdale industrial premises remains relatively consistent – peaking slightly on Thursday. The risk of burglary rises in the afternoon, peaking late at night and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target industrial premises at these times when it is dark, industrial areas are typically quiet, units are often closed or operate with fewer staff and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** When targeting Rochdale industrial premises, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Offenders have damaged or forced shutters upwards to gain unauthorised access or to gain access to doors and windows behind them.
- In a number of cases, the point of entry was 'unknown'. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors or employees before gaining access to back-of-house/staff areas and stealing property unnoticed.
- Doors have been forced open using tools/implements or when they have been left insecure by members of staff.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

2.5 Theft (Industrial Premises): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The greatest risk of theft at Rochdale industrial premises is experienced during the working week (i.e. Monday to Friday). During the day, the risk peaks during the late afternoon and into the evening. There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property from within buildings (e.g. cash, mobile phones, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from warehouses or service/storage yards.

2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.





2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at office premises in Rochdale is consistently high throughout the week, with the exception of Thursday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night/into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** When targeting Rochdale offices, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries against Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors/windows behind them.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- A number of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' or 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.7 Theft (Offices): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Rochdale offices is greatest on Wednesday/Thursday and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours/staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking late morning and mid-afternoon. During these times, many office workers will take breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out. Purses/wallets, cash, mobile phones and other items of technology (such as laptops) were the most frequently stolen items.

2.8 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Wednesday and Sunday around midday and in the afternoon (16:00-17:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at these times when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The application seeks reserved matters approval for the development of flexible employment space comprising warehousing, ancillary office, associated parking, pedestrian and vehicular access arrangements, landscaping, and associated infrastructure, at Heywood Distribution Park, Heywood. The site has a total area of 19.23 acres (7.78 Ha).
- 3.1.2 The development will fall within the following use classes: E(g)(iii) industrial processes / B2 general industrial / B8 storage and distribution and has a proposed floor area of 47,352m² GIA.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The site sits within an established business estate that is already securely enclosed with high fencing and gates to prevent unauthorised access at night/when closed.
- 3.2.2 The development will bring greater levels of activity and surveillance to the north-western corners of the site, particularly during the day.
- 3.2.3 The principal elevation of the buildings will be overlooked from the proposed parking area and will be capable of being overlooked from the neighbouring office buildings.
- 3.2.4 The proposed buildings will have a simple footprint that will provide few potential places of concealment and will also be sufficiently tall enough to make unauthorised access to the roof difficult.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the units are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Essential Requirements

- Boundary evaluation of the existing fence lines should be reviewed to ensure that it can provide a consistent level of security to the site. Overhanging branches of trees should be removed where they could provide a climbing aid.
- Supervision of access gates. Entry to the service yards of both units should use monitored barriers so that access to and egress from these areas can be effectively controlled.
- Control of access within the site. The position of the secure boundary fencing should be reviewed to prevent unauthorised access around the building.
- Cycle parking provision intended for staff should be located within part of the site with restricted access. This area should be specifically covered by the site CCTV system.

3.3.2 Further Recommendations

- The CCTV system and site lighting should be adapted to reflect the changing layout of the site. CCTV cameras should be capable of identifying all vehicle and pedestrian movements into and out of the site as well as each building. An audible warning system should be employed to alert to intruders that they have been detected and a response has been generated. To facilitate the CCTV system, dusk until dawn lighting should be provided for the site, particularly around the access doors/gates and loading bays. Signage should be located at the site entrance to inform visitors that their movements will be recorded.
- Signage should be used to direct people through the development - to the appropriate parking spaces, service areas and office entrances.
- Staff lockers should be provided, and in a location where there is a high level of activity and surveillance, so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.
- Secure cycle parking should be provided well within the site boundary, ideally located in view of the main entrance to the offices or another suitably supervised area.
- Internally, the buildings should be capable of zoning so that entry to parts of the premises can be effectively controlled. Movements in and out of the buildings should be confined to specific areas and access controls used to ensure only authorised staff can enter controlled areas.
- The position of ancillary structures and temporary facilities, external storage and trailer parking areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following: -
 - Potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
 - Potential to obscure CCTV and lighting
 - Potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit / entry over boundary fencing.
 - Their potential to obscure damage to fence line.

- 3.3.3 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Shutters

- ☐ All external doors (at ground and first floor levels) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main entrance door to the building should include a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via staff key-fob.
- ☐ Any shutters or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ The doors/frames to internal offices and welfare/meeting rooms should be robust/solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and capable of being secured when unoccupied.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All windows should be certificated to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the buildings, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ The construction of any potentially accessible roof areas should also be carefully considered to prevent criminal intrusion. Certificated lightweight roof systems are available to LPS 1175 SR1. Alternatively, expanded metal or welded-mesh should be incorporated between the skins of double-skinned roof coverings or within the roof space.

4.4 Roof construction

- ☐ Lightweight roofing systems must be certified to a minimum of:
 - LPS 1175: issue 5 or above, SR1
 - STS 202: Issue 1 or above, BR1

4.5 Alarm

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all 'accessible' rooms with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

- ☐ Lighting to vehicle circulation areas, service yards and car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

4.7 Boundaries

- ☐ The whole of the site should be secured with rigid-panel welded-wire mesh fencing (with no mid-rails that would aid climbing) and gates, minimum height of 2.4m. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures / locking points to gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding / protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The fencing/gates should also be located away from any other climbing aids, such as lighting columns, trees, junction boxes etc.
- ☐ The site boundary treatments should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- ☐ Where exposed, the perimeter fencing should be protected on the inner side from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary. The condition of fencing along the perimeter of the site should be regularly inspected for damage/attack.



4.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are ‘Overview’ and ‘Recognition’, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [the main entrance and the external facades of the building](#). It is highly recommended that the CCTV system is monitored at the site entrance security lodge, so that security staff can provide an immediate response to any incidents being recorded.

4.9 Other

- ☐ The position of ancillary structures, parked trailers and any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
 - Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
 - Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.
 - Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
 - Their potential to obscure damage to fence lines.

Any proposed lighting columns, street furniture, tree/shrub planting etc. within or external to the site perimeter should also be reviewed in relation to the above issues.

- ☐ There should be no features of the building (such as projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper-level windows or onto roof areas.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
17/03/2025	Black Cat Building Consultancy	CIS instruction received
24/04/2025	Black Cat Building Consultancy	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
24/04/2025	GMP	Invoice Issued
02/05/2025	Indurent	Invoice Paid
20/05/2025	DfS	Site visit
21/05/2025	DfS	CIS completed
22/05/2025	DfS	CIS issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
25007_UMC_0100_00_DR_A_1001[P01]_	GF Layout	09/05/25	
25007_UMC_0100_RF_DR_A_1003[P01]_	Roof Plan	09/05/25	
25007_UMC_0100_SI_DR_A_0601[P03]_	Site Plan	09/05/25	
25007_UMC_0100_SI_DR_A_0701[P01]_	Cycle Shelter Details	09/05/25	
25007_UMC_0100_SI_DR_A_0704[P01]_	Ancillary Building Details	09/05/25	
25007_UMC_0100_ZZ_DR_A_0702[P01]_	Fencing and Protection	09/05/25	
25007_UMC_0100_ZZ_DR_A_0705[P01]_	External Finishes	09/05/25	
25007_UMC_0100_ZZ_DR_A_1002[P01]_	Office Layouts	09/05/25	
25007_UMC_0100_ZZ_DR_A_1101[P02]_	Office Section	09/05/25	
25007_UMC_0100_ZZ_DR_A_1103[P02]_	Warehouse Section	09/05/25	
25007_UMC_0100_ZZ_DR_A_1301[P02]_	Elevations	09/05/25	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk