



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

**186 no. RESIDENTIAL HOUSES & APARTMENTS
HARESHILL NORTH, SOUTH HEYWOOD, ROCHDALE**

For: Northstone Development Ltd.
Version A: 20/11/2025
Reference: 2025/0273/CIS/01

designforsecurity



Hareshill North, South Heywood, Rochdale

URN: 2025/0273/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor design changes/security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- General boundary treatments, including secure enclosure of private gardens, gating of any rear access alleyways and defined defensible space to dwelling frontages.
- Additional protection to exposed and potentially vulnerable rear boundaries of dwellings backing onto public open space/pedestrian routes (e.g. Plots 135 to 165) and the dwellings/parked vehicles immediately adjacent to links to the proposed pedestrian footpaths/cycleways (e.g. Plots 157 & 158, the parking area serving Plots 165-167 and the front garden/driveway of Plot 135). Care taken to ensure acoustic bund to sides/rear of Plot 161-165 does not inadvertently aid climbing over boundaries to private space.
- Any rear off-road parking spaces at corner plots (e.g. at Plots 39, 42 & 50) securely enclosed or treated to ensure they can be overlooked by the residents themselves.
- Definition and management/maintenance of public open space and prevention of unauthorised vehicular/motorcycle access.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Bradley Hart

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the north side of Hareshill Road and Queen Elizabeth II Way in the South Heywood area of Rochdale.

It is currently formed by undulating open grassland, with scrub vegetation/mature trees along the eastern and western boundaries and timber post and rail fencing along the street frontage to the south, with 2 no. junctions already constructed and secured with concrete blocks and landscape mounds.

To the north-west of the site are some large industrial warehouses accessed off Hill Top Road, with dense woodland between their rear elevations/service yards and the site itself. There are also similar units surrounded by parking areas and landscaping to the east of the site.


To the north-east is an open field surrounded by hedgerows, currently separated from the site by temporary hedges fencing, which is also to be redeveloped to provide residential units.

To the north of the site is an existing estate of detached and semi-detached residential properties. At the end of Gloucester Avenue, there is a pedestrian link leading to some informal pedestrian routes running across the site and the adjacent open space, as well as to the rear of some of the properties.

Open land/routes adjacent to (and particularly to the rear of) buildings and dwellings can often lead to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and secluded routes can leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly after dark. Adjacent properties can also often be vulnerable to unauthorised access, as they can provide easy access/escape routes that benefit from little/no natural surveillance or direct overlooking.

The site sits within a larger redevelopment area, which includes the new link road between Junction 19 of the M62 and Pilsworth Road, the widening of Pilsworth Road itself, up to 1,000 dwellings, up to approx. 135,000sqm of employment uses, a new primary school and up to 2,500sqm. of A1/A2/A3/A5 uses with associated landscaping, infrastructure and cycle/footpath routes.

There is currently development works underway to the south of the site.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2024 to 31st October 2025 within 1km of the site.


2.1 Local Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 1km of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
13	5	13	84	17	<5	<5	11	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area over the past 12 months has been below average for the Rochdale division. This is likely due to the large areas of open space and low density industrial premises that make up a large portion of the study area, which typically attract fewer crime and disorder incidents.
- 2.1.2 The majority of recorded crime occurs around the higher density, primarily residential estates and the college to the north and north-west of the site and around/off the arterial route of Manchester Road (A6045) to the east. Less serious wounding has been the most prevalent type of recorded crime (particularly assaults, harassment and public order offences), with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential scheme, the more detailed analysis below will focus on local domestic burglary and vehicle crime.


2.2 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 1km of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.




- 2.2.1 The rate (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) of domestic burglaries in the local area is **47% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **47% lower** than Greater Manchester and **45% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings in the local area is **71% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **66% lower** than Greater Manchester and **35% lower** than England & Wales.

Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site, Rochdale and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site, Rochdale and Greater Manchester




- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage in the local area is **75% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **72% lower** than Greater Manchester and **66% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime in the local area is **54% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **49% lower** than Greater Manchester and **38% lower** than England & Wales.


2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Local Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Time Range





Local Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning. At night, when it is dark and street a quiet, offenders can perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:
- Doors have either been forced open with implements/bodily pressure, or have been targeted when left insecure by residents.
 - Glazing within doors has been smashed to gain entry.
 - There have been a number of incidents where the means of entry was unknown/legitimate – this is likely to have been when offenders have targeted insecure doors or windows unnoticed.

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area also peaks on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the greatest risk of vehicle crime peaks during the early hours and during the evening - when it is dark, streets are quiet and offenders perceive a lower risk of being witnessed or identified.
- 2.4.3 Vehicles parked on streets or within open communal parking areas, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked on the driveways of individual properties or within secure garages/parking facilities.

2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:
- Domestic burglary
 - Bogus callers and distraction burglary
 - Criminal damage to property and vehicles
 - Anti-social behaviour
 - Theft of/from parked vehicles
 - Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
 - Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
 - Neighbour disputes
 - Poor maintenance of access control systems
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent MOs used by offenders when targeting local residential properties and parked vehicles are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have either been forced open with implements/bodily pressure, or have been targeted when left insecure by residents.

Possible Solution - All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1/4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

The locks to the front doors of houses should be fitted with split-spindles, essentially meaning they are key only entry and are secure from the exterior of the dwelling when shut. This will ensure that they cannot be left open and accessible (see Section 4.1). All ground floor/accessible windows should be fitted with key-operated locks and opening restrictors (see Section 4.2).

Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' can a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties. Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

All private spaces to the sides/rears of the dwellings should be robustly enclosed (see Section 4.5), particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of the buildings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.6).

- Glazing within doors has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should ideally be small and set well-away from locking points.

- There have been a number of incidents where the means of entry was unknown/legitimate – this is likely to have been when offenders have targeted insecure doors or windows unnoticed.

Possible Solution – see above.

- Vehicles have been targeted for theft of, theft from and damage, particularly when parked in open car parks or on-street

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Any surface communal parking areas serving apartments or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured with automatic gates/shutters to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect 186 no. apartments and houses, with associated parking, landscaping and infrastructure works. The scheme will comprise of 8 no. 1 bed apartments, 1 no. 2 bed bungalow, 6 no. 2 bed houses, 70 no. 3 bed houses, 88 no. 3 bed houses, 12 no. 5 bed houses and 1 no. 6 bed house.
- 3.1.2 Vehicular access to the scheme will be via the existing access point off Queen Elizabeth II Way to the south-east, with an additional narrower access point to the south-west for emergency access only (fitted with bollards), with separate pedestrian links to Queen Elizabeth II Way to the south, to the existing public right of way to the north-west (linking to Hill Top Road), to the existing housing estate to the north (linking to Gloucester Avenue) and to the future development plots to the east. A proposed cycleway will also link Gloucester Avenue to Queen Elizabeth II Way.
- 3.1.3 The proposed low-rise apartments and houses themselves will largely form perimeter blocks, with dwellings backing onto each other and fronting onto a new access road/cul-de-sac/shared driveway network and surrounding areas of public open space (including a large wet SUDs basin, swale and proposed substation and pumping station). Each of the dwellings will have enclosed private gardens and will be served off-road parking driveways to their front, side or rear (with some having the option for car ports or garages).

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The proposed houses will front onto the proposed access roads/cul-de-sacs/shared driveways, resulting in good levels of surveillance of and from dwellings and parked vehicles.
- 3.2.3 The majority of the proposed dwellings will have rear gardens that back onto one another or onto existing dwellings – leaving their rear boundaries inaccessible and less vulnerable to damage/scaling.
- 3.2.4 The houses will have habitable room windows to their front elevations (at ground floor level), maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.
- 3.2.5 The design of the dwellings has been kept simple, with no front doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).
- 3.2.6 The proposed houses will be served by in-curtilage off-road parking spaces, allowing residents to secure/overlook their own vehicles and limiting opportunities to criminals.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The boundary treatments to the houses are vitally important to secure them, any parked vehicles and prevent unauthorised access to private spaces. In general, the sides (including gables up to or as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the dwellings should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access, particularly robust where adjacent to publicly accessible space. Any side/rear communal access alleyways should be gated at their outermost point to prevent unauthorised access. All front/gable elevations of the dwellings exposed to the public realm should be protected by some defensible space defined by low-level railings/picket fencing and planting - creating garden areas/parking driveways in front of each property entirely separate from each other and from vehicular/pedestrian access routes and communal areas of landscaping, in ownership/control of

the residents themselves. Please see Section 4.5 for more information relating to boundary treatments. Clearly defined defensible space between residential windows and the public realm provides a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and acts as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny if they enter the space. Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

- 3.3.2 The proposed properties on the edges of the scheme (i.e. adjacent to the existing/proposed areas of public open space and immediately adjacent to links to pedestrian footpaths/cycleways e.g. at Plot 135, 157/158 etc.) are perhaps more exposed and susceptible to unauthorised access, anti-social behaviour and criminal damage than those within the heart of the scheme, as they will benefit from lower levels of activity, overlooking and natural surveillance and the open land/routes could provide easy access/escape routes for offenders to utilise unseen. All access roads/shared drives immediately adjacent to the open space and routes described above should be defined and separated from them by low-level railings and low-level, dense planting with a limited number of formalised, well-overlooked entrance points where required (set well away from dwellings/driveways), in order to concentrate legitimate activity and deter casual access around/between parked vehicles – where damage can easily occur, both accidentally or maliciously. Any such pedestrian links themselves should be wide, straight and well-lit to aid surveillance of and from them, with measures to prevent unauthorised vehicular access.
- 3.3.3 It is noted that Plots 135 to 165 will back onto the existing/proposed public right of way route along the north-western edge of the scheme. Pedestrian routes and open land running directly to the side and rear of dwellings, where they would benefit from little/no overlooking or natural surveillance, could leave the adjacent dwellings vulnerable to unauthorised rear access unseen and should ideally be avoided. It is preferable for dwellings to front towards such routes, to maximise surveillance opportunities (of both dwellings and pedestrians) and avoid providing opportunities that offenders could exploit unseen. If this arrangement must remain, the following measures must be in place to protect the adjacent dwellings (see Section 4.5 for more details):
- The proposed 2400mm high acoustic fencing along the rear boundaries of the dwellings must be robustly constructed, with posts set in concrete to avoid leaning/damage and any frame/horizontal elements on the private side of the fenceline to avoid inadvertently providing climbing aids.
 - The exposed rear boundaries of the properties should be protected by belts of mature defensive planting (i.e. densely branched, thorny shrubs or hedges) to funnel pedestrian movement away from them and deter/discourage damage and scaling.
 - There should be no new trees planted immediately adjacent to the rear boundaries of the properties, which could aid scaling. If any existing trees are retained, any branches immediately adjacent or growing over boundaries should be removed or pruned to ensure they do not form climbing aids or cause damage to the fencing itself.
 - Care must be taken to ensure the proposed acoustic bund to the sides/rears of Plots 161-165 does not inadvertently aid scaling over the boundaries treatments to their private gardens. The proposed acoustic fenceline should be 2400mm high from external ground level.
 - The pedestrian link running between Plots 157 & 158, the parking area serving Plots 165-167 and the front garden/driveway of Plot 135 serving the defined and protected as described above (with low-level railings and dense defensive planting), to funnel pedestrian/cycle movement away from the dwellings and parked vehicles.
- 3.3.4 Any off-road parking spaces for corner plot dwellings located to the rear of the properties/gardens themselves (e.g. at Plots 39, 42 & 50), could leave parked vehicles where they cannot be easily overlooked by the residents themselves and, therefore, potentially vulnerable. The parking spaces should either be incorporated into the rear curtilages of the dwellings, behind high vehicular gates (lockable from both sides), where they can be secured and overlooked by the residents themselves, or the adjacent boundaries between any such driveways and rear gardens should be partially visually permeable (formed by 2100mm high walls/railings - see Section 4.5 for more information) to allow some surveillance through.
- 3.3.5 As proposed, there will be areas of public open space throughout the scheme. Care must be taken to ensure they do not create areas which attract nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal damage. The spaces themselves should incorporate low-level dense planting to funnel pedestrian and cycle movement along formalised routes (detering shortcuts through areas of landscaping) and consideration should also be given to the prevention of unauthorised vehicular access (e.g. with the use of hard or soft

landscaping features, such as bollards, boulders, trees, mounds/ditches etc.). Any existing or proposed vegetation/trees should not impede surveillance opportunities of/from dwellings or inadvertently create hiding places that could be exploited by offenders. Any seating areas should ideally be positioned away from the principle circulation routes or dwellings, so that any gathering groups are less likely to cause nuisance to or intimidate passers-by. Please see Section 4.7 for more information relating to landscaping areas.

- 3.3.6 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 B3/SR2 or STS 201. Any rear french/double doors, sliding doors or bi-folding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key. Full instructions should be provided to residents to ensure that they understand that the key must be used to fully lock/secure the door.
- ☐ Front doors should also have either fixed sidelights or door viewers. Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential. Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Any integral garage doors to houses (if there is a connecting internal door with the dwelling) must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR1. Alternatively, the internal connecting door must be to the same burglary resistant specification as the front door (normally BS PAS 24). If there is to be no internal connecting door (or the garage itself is detached), the garage door should be of robust construction with a multi-point locking mechanism.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ All ground floor and any other easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside), limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ All ground floor and any other easily accessible glazing (e.g. above single-storey elements) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Each house should ideally have an intruder alarm to comply with BS EN 50131 (wired and wire free systems). Alarms should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows.
- ☐ If intruder alarms are not to be provided, there should at least be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur installed to each dwelling, to allow future residents to connect an alarm if required.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The sides (including gables up to/as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the houses should generally be enclosed with 2100mm high close-boarded timber fencing (1800mm high fencing with 300mm robust integral trellis above would also be acceptable). Boundaries to private space that are adjacent to publicly accessible space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base. Any side/rear pedestrian gates to the private spaces of the houses should also be 2100mm high and should be fitted with either a pad-lockable bolt (to the mid-point of the internal face) or a key operable deadlock. Sub-divisional rear boundaries should be 1500-1800mm high.
- ☐ Any side/rear boundaries exposed to/accessible from the existing/proposed surrounding open space or any public rights of way should be formed by a 2400mm high acoustic fencing (with any frame/horizontal elements on the private side of the fenceline), with defensive planting (i.e. densely branched, thorny shrubs) provided on the publicly accessible side of the boundaries to deter casual

access, damage and scaling. The location of boundaries should be amended if necessary to allow for this requirement. Care should be taken to ensure the proposed acoustic bund to the sides/rears of Plots 161-165 should not inadvertently aid climbing over the adjacent boundaries to private gardens (which should be 2400mm high from the public side of the fence).

- ☐ Any off-road parking spaces located to the rear of the properties/gardens themselves, such as on corner plots (e.g. at Plots 39, 42 & 50), should ideally be incorporated into the rear gardens behind 2100mm high steel-framed vehicular gates (either double-gates or bi-folding gates) that are lockable from both sides (see opposite for example). If not, the rear boundaries of the dwellings should be formed by 1200mm high walls and 900mm railings above, in order to allow the residents to overlook their own vehicles. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls/railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. Where rear gardens are to incorporate car ports, these should be similarly gated to prevent unauthorised access.



- ☐ Any communal side/rear access alleyways serving dwellings should be gated at their outermost point to prevent unauthorised access to where the dwellings could be attacked unseen. The gates themselves should be 2100mm high and ideally self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut.

- ☐ Any access roads/shared drives or communal parking areas immediately adjacent to existing/proposed areas of public open space or pedestrian/cycle paths/links should be defined and separated from them by low-level railings (to an approximate height of 1200-1400mm) and defensive planting, in order to deter casual access and funnel pedestrian movement along formalised routes. They should be similar boundaries between private drives serving dwellings (e.g. between the drives serving Plots 42-45 & 46-48, serving Plots 182/183 & 184-186 etc.).



- ☐ The front gardens/driveways of the houses should be defined/segregated by low-level railings or timber picket fencing and low-level planting/hedging, to an approximate height of 1000-1200mm.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher (see opposite for example).

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to all access roads/cul-de-sacs/private drives and adjacent footpaths/cycleways should be to adoptable standards (to comply with BS 5489).
- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Landscaping & Public Realm

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around dwelling entrances/frontages, around parking areas and along pedestrian routes, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Any landscape features (hard or soft) to areas of landscaping along streets and pedestrian/cycle routes should not impede natural surveillance off/from dwellings or reduce the effectiveness of lighting. Bollards or similar hard/soft landscaping features should be incorporated to prevent vehicles from accessing pedestrian/cycle-only routes. There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently

create seating or loitering spots (except within designated/intended areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

- ☐ The proposed areas of public open space (including any ponds, SUDs basins or swales) should be enclosed with low-level railings (e.g. 1200-1400mm high) or robust timber/steel knee-rails, with a limited number of formalised, well-overlooked access points that incorporate features to deter motorcycle/vehicular access. The design of any other proposed hard landscaping features or street furniture (such as benches) should be designed to withstand and discourage the potential for mistreatment and damage (e.g. from vandalism, skateboarding etc.). Any such features should be reduced in number to the minimum practicable and should be located where surveillance and overlooking opportunities are maximised. Where there are numerous benches in isolated locations or within very close proximity of dwellings, they can often attract and foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour problems.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people, dwellings and vehicles (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over any boundary treatments. The security of fences and buildings can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ The robust management of any communal landscaping areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. If signs of disorder (such as criminal damage, graffiti, littering etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse.

4.8 Other

- ☐ If timber sheds are to be provided within rear garden spaces, they should have a concrete foundation, minimum 38x50mm planed timber frame; floor and roof constructed from minimum 11mm boards; and minimum 11x125mm tongue & grooved board walls and doors. The doors should have coach-bolted hinges and hasp and stables/padlocks to meet at least Sold Secure Silver standard and there should be a secure ground anchor system or a cycle stand to lock cycles to within the structure.
- ☐ Ideally, meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of houses only and not in the private areas, in order to deter bogus callers.
- ☐ There should be no features of the dwellings (such as projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting brickwork/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as trees, lighting columns, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids over boundaries to private space or up to upper floor windows.
- ☐ The phasing of building works and bringing into use parts of the site while others are undeveloped or under construction can significantly affect security. Uncompleted access roads/footpaths should be secured until such time as they are completed and surveillance opportunities are maximised from occupied dwellings. Care should also be taken to ensure that any hoardings erected around development sites do not create secluded passageways and blind spots, or become targets for criminal damage. It is recommended that while construction work progresses and occupancy levels of completed properties are low, an on-site security presence is maintained.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (such as boundaries, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see [Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit [Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security](#).

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
25 th July 2025	Northstone	Receipt of CIS application form & plans
25 th July 2025	Northstone	Quote issued & request for additional info
19 th September 2025	Northstone	Dwelling numbers reduced – revised quote issued
15 th October 2025	Northstone	Confirmation of instruction/fee & receipt of up-to-date plans
3 rd November 2025	Avison Young	Receipt of revised site plan
11 th November 2025	Northstone & Avison Young	Email sent re: report completion & payment
12 th to 13 th November 2025	Northstone	Email correspondence re: payment & version of site plan report is based on
18 th November 2025	Avison Young	Receipt of updated site plan
20 th November 2025	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
SH01-S-LP-0001	Location Plan	July '25	-
SH01-S-SL-003	Proposed Layout (SUPERSEDED)	-	A
SH01-S-SL-003	Proposed Layout (SUPERSEDED)	July '25	A
SH01-S-SL-003	Proposed Layout (SUPERSEDED)	July '25	C
SH01-S-SL-003	Proposed Layout	17.11.15	D
SH01-P-BP-001	Boundary Treatment Plan	Oct '25	-
563/633 V12	AR 1 Bed Apartment Floor Plans & Elevations	-	B
760 V7	N 2 Bed House, 1 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	A
765 V4	AR 2 Bed House, 2 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	B
765 V12	AR 2 Bed House, 2 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	A
923 V4	AR 3 Bed House, 2 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	-
923 V12	AR 3 Bed House, 2 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	-
923 V19	AR 3 Bed House, 2 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	-
990 V12	N 3 Bed House, 2 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	A
990 V19	N 3 Bed House, 2 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	B
1047 V12	N 3 Bed House, 2 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	B
1047 V18	N 3 Bed House, 2 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	B
1164 V13	N 4 Bed House, 2 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	A
1300 V13	N 4 Bed House, 2 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	A
1300 V19	N 4 Bed House, 2 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	A
1354 V14	N 4 Bed House, 3 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	A
1385 V13	N 4 Bed House, 2 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	A
1620 V6	N 4 Bed House, 2 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	A
1620 V8	N 4 Bed House, 2 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	A
1940 V1	N 5 Bed House, 2 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	B
2205 V3	N 6 Bed House, 2 Storey Floor Plans & Elevations	-	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C

CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A		

D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

[Design For Security – Designing Out Crime](#)

– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police

[Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#)

– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies

[ParkMark - Home](#)

– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme

[NBS Source](#)

– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)

[RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book](#)

– search for LPS 1175 certified products