



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

185 MANCHESTER ROAD, ROCHDALE

CARE SCHEME (COMPRISING OF 21 no. DEMENTIA CARE BEDROOMS, 48 no. NURSING BEDROOMS & 5 no. RESPITE BEDROOMS), WITH ASSOCIATED PARKING & LANDSCAPING

FOR: City-Side (T/A CS Manchester Road Ltd.)

Greater Manchester Police

VERSION A: 17/06/2025

designforsecurity

REFERENCE: 2023/0378/CIS/03

185 Manchester Road, Rochdale

URN: 2023/0378/CIS/03

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Boundary treatments to securely enclose private space to the sides (including the hidden recessed areas to the north and south) and rear of the building - particularly robustly where adjacent to the publicly accessible car park to the rear of the site. Definition along site frontage to deter unauthorised access.
- Secure access controls into/around the building.
- Prevention of unauthorised access to first floor roof terraces.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the east side of Manchester Road (A58), a busy arterial route to the south-west of Rochdale town centre.


The site is currently occupied by a large detached dwelling, with high walls/timber fencing/hedging and vehicular gates along the street frontage and private gardens to the sides and rear enclosed with timber fencing.

To the north of the site is a pair of semi-detached residential properties, beyond which is a pair of large semi-detached Victorian properties (known as The Hollies and Hollies Lodge). Between these pairs of properties is a narrow vehicular access route, leading to a cottage and an informal, unlit, hard standing parking area located to the east (rear) of the site (beyond which is a bowling club). There are mature trees/scrub vegetation along the rear boundary of the site.

When publicly accessible land or routes exist to the rear of sites and dwellings, they can often leave them vulnerable to unauthorised access (particularly when they benefit from little/no natural surveillance) – as they can provide easy access/escape routes for offenders to utilise unseen.

To the south of the site, there is a mews of residential properties fronting towards Manchester Road (with a rear access route serving garages/off road parking driveways to their rears) and residential properties fronting onto Sparthfield Avenue.

Manchester Road is a wide dual-carriageway busy with vehicular movement and less so with pedestrian footfall. Although the site benefits from good levels of passive surveillance, there is dense woodland directly opposite the site (on the edge of Mandale Park) and relatively few dwellings, meaning the site benefits from limited levels of direct overlooking. While the existing walls/fencing/hedging to the street frontage of the site provide a level of screening from the road, they also somewhat impede views of and from the site itself.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime Summary



The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2024 to 31st May 2025.

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
19	<5	47	210	11	6	<5	31	13	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area over the past 12 months has been above average for the Rochdale division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and vehicle crime having been the most reported offences taking place. The majority of these offences have taken place in the residential areas to the north-east of the proposed site.
- 2.1.2 Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates and neighbours. In cases of criminal damage, offenders have targeted vehicles (by using objects/implements to smash the glazing and dent/scratch the bodywork) and dwellings (using objects or bodily pressure to knock over garden fences/gates, smash the glazing in windows and front doors) – typically during disputes. Theft from motor vehicle has been the most reported vehicle crime taking place, with offenders mostly targeting vehicles parked on the street throughout the local area. Offenders have primarily used implements to smash windows before removing items, as well using tools to remove vehicle parts and registration plates.
- 2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to proposed care scheme, the more detailed analysis below will look at local residential burglary and vehicle crime, as well as crimes at Greater Manchester care homes/sheltered schemes.


2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)

The crime rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.




- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **32% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **31% lower** than Greater Manchester and **29% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **36% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **24% lower** than Greater Manchester and **44% higher** than England & Wales.

Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (km), Rochdale and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (km), Rochdale and Greater Manchester




2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **20% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **10% lower** than Greater Manchester and **9% higher** than England & Wales.

2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **12% higher** than Rochdale as a whole, **25% higher** than Greater Manchester and **52% higher** than England & Wales.


2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Local Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Time Range




Local Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area stays relatively consistent – peaking slightly on Sunday and at its lowest on Wednesday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning – when it is dark, streets are quiet and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:
- Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed.
 - Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.
 - Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area stays relatively consistent – peaking slightly on Tuesday and at its lowest on Saturday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks in the late afternoon and late at night/during the early hours of the morning – when offender perceive a lower risk of being identified. Vehicles parked within open communal areas or on-street are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within the curtilages of individual properties or within secure garages/parking facilities.

2.5 Care Home/Sheltered Scheme Burglary, Theft & Criminal Damage: Risk Analysis

The information below relates to burglary, theft and criminal damage offences within/against care homes/sheltered schemes, recorded across the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.

- 2.5.1 In terms of care homes/sheltered schemes across Greater Manchester, the risk of burglary is concentrated in the late evening and the early hours of the morning. At these times, residents are likely to be asleep or in their rooms and staffing levels are likely to be lower, allowing criminals to operate without being detected. The majority of burglaries at Greater Manchester care homes/sheltered schemes have occurred through doors to the front and the rear of premises and through rear windows. In a number of burglaries, force has not been required to gain entry - offenders have often exploited freely accessible areas and open bedroom windows/doors to steal property. Most miscellaneous thefts occur during the afternoon and the evening, when residents are likely to be out of their rooms for longer periods of time - leaving insecure rooms, items of personal property and cash vulnerable to theft unseen/unnoticed. Care homes/sheltered schemes have also suffered from incidents of criminal damage – particularly the smashing of external glazing in the evening.

2.6 General Risk Factors

2.6.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.7 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting residential properties/vehicles in the local area and Greater Manchester care homes/sheltered schemes are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Local Residential:** Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed

Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow staff/residents to vet visitors to the building before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the building should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to ‘airlock’ lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

- **Local Residential:** Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

All individual apartments/bedrooms should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (also see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents or staff. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. There should be no balconies/terraces that would be publicly accessible, with doors that could be left insecure.

- **Local Residential:** Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

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- **Local Vehicle Crime:** Vehicles have been targeted primarily when parked on-street or within open car parks

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that staff/resident/visitor vehicles are secured and overlooked. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving the building should be located directly in front of it, clearly separated from the street or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured with automatic gates/shutters to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

- **Greater Manchester Care Homes/Sheltered Schemes:** Offenders with legitimate access, or appearing to be legitimate, stealing property from residents

Possible Solution – All external doors should be security-certified and there should be a secure access control system in place to vet legitimate visitors and prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.1). All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour, as well as encourage residents to store their personal valuables securely. Procedures should also be in place to control/manage access to those other than everyday visitors e.g. tradesmen, deliveries etc.

- **Greater Manchester Care Homes/Sheltered Schemes:** Theft of insecure property through open ground floor windows and burglary where access is gained through insecure windows/doors

Possible solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should be security-certified with key operated locks and opening restrictors (see Section 4.2). Any external patio doors to ground floor apartments/living spaces fronting onto the street/publicly accessible areas may be vulnerable to unauthorised access - either from bogus callers, being forced open or being left insecure - and it is recommended they are not incorporated into such schemes. Staff should try and encourage residents to be vigilant and to close and lock windows and doors to rooms which are not being used.

- **Greater Manchester Care Homes/Sheltered Schemes:** Incidents of criminal damage, where external glazing has been smashed.

Possible solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should be laminated and any accessible residential windows at ground floor level should be protected by some defensible space, to define them as entirely separate from the street and protect them from unauthorised access (as well as damage, nuisance and anti-social behaviour).

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a part single storey, part 4 storey care building, comprising of 21 no. dementia care beds, 48 no. nursing beds and 5 no. respite beds, with associated communal facilities, parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The building will front towards Manchester Road, with a parking area across the building frontage (comprising of 11 no. spaces). A further 3 no. vehicle parking spaces and a sheltered bike rack (for 24 no. cycles) will be located within a recessed area to the north side of the building and a mobility scooter store (comprising of 5 no. lockers) within a recessed area to the south side of the building.
- 3.1.3 The building itself will incorporate a reception lobby, a visitor lounge/café, staff room and security office, a prayer/multi-function room, a main dining room and kitchen, laundry/hairdressers/medical rooms, 5 no. respite rooms and plant room, stores/bin store at ground level. At first floor, 21 no. dementia bedrooms are proposed along with an assisted bathroom, a dementia lounge, a store and 2 no. external roof terraces to either side of the building. The second and third floors of the building will each house 24 no. nursing bedrooms, along with a nursing lounge and assisted bathroom.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.


- 3.2.1 The proposed development will provide additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The landscaped areas to the sides/rear of the building will be capable of being securely enclosed, preventing unauthorised access to where criminals could attack the building/exploit opportunities.
- 3.2.3 The proposed building will be staffed on a 24 hour basis and will have a clearly identifiable main entrance, which is capable of being robustly managed to control access. People arriving or leaving via the main entrance should be easily viewed by reception staff.
- 3.2.4 The proposed dementia and nursing bedroom will be provided above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively prevented. This also reduces the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.5 The internal layout of the communal areas of the building are generally uncluttered with few obstacles to surveillance.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The proposed building will take the form of a front and rear wings running parallel with the street, joined by a narrower link element. As a result, the site features two recessed areas to the north and south sides of the building, sat between the front and rear wings of the building. The recessed area to the north will house 3 no. vehicle parking spaces and a cycle shelter and the recessed area to the south will house mobility scooter lockers. If left open/publicly accessible, the hidden parked vehicles, cycles and mobility scooters (as well as the hidden windows/doors of the building itself) could be vulnerable to attack and unauthorised access unseen. Any doors left insecure could be exploited by offenders to circumnavigate the staffed/access-controlled main entrance of the building. The sides and rear of the building should therefore be enclosed and gated along the front building line, to prevent unauthorised access (see illustration below and Section 4.5 for more information). The 3 no. parking spaces to the

north side of the building should be for the use of staff only and should be accessed via a vehicular gate (ideally automatic – again, see Section 4.5), allowing all public use to be concentrated along the frontage of the building where surveillance opportunities are maximised.



- 3.3.2 The rear boundary of the site directly abuts a publicly accessible parking area, which could leave it vulnerable to damage and unauthorised access unseen. As such, the rear boundary of the site must be particularly robustly defined to prevent damage, penetration and scaling (see Section 4.5 for more information relating to boundary treatments). If at all possible, it is highly recommended that low-level defensive planting (i.e. low-level, densely branched, thorny shrubs) is utilised on the public side of the boundary to further deter access and scaling. Where this is absolutely unachievable (given the area may be outside of the developer's ownership/control), it could be provided on the private side of the boundary - although this is likely to be less effective. There should also be no publicly accessible trees/branches adjacent to the fencing, which could form a climbing aid.
- 3.3.3 The frontage of the site along Manchester Road should be demarcated by low-level walls and/or railings and planting/hedging, to define the car park as entirely separate from the street, in ownership/control of the facility, without impeding views of and from the street (see Section 4.5). There should also be a symbolic barrier at the vehicular entrance/egress point (e.g. brick pillars, change of road surface texture/colour etc.) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the staff and residents, psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate reason from entering. The parking areas should also be clearly signed as for the use of staff/residents/visitors only.
- 3.3.4 Access into/around the building itself must be robustly controlled to prevent unauthorised access. The reception desk adjacent to the main entrance should be staffed (at least during the day/peak visiting times) to ensure visitors are greeted and vetted before being allowed further access into the building. A high and wide reception desk will allow staff to have full surveillance of everyone entering and exiting the building and across publicly accessible external areas. If the entrance lobby is not to be staffed at any time of the day or night, the main entrance doors should be secured and should be capable of being controlled remotely by means of a video entry phone system linked to a staffed base/security office, so that staff can vet callers to the building before allowing them access. All internal back-of-house areas/staff facilities should be accessible to authorised staff only (see Section 4.1 for more information relating to access controls).
- 3.3.5 The balustrades to the first floor external terraces to the north and south sides of the building should be fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that could provide a climbing aid. All first floor windows, doors and glazing potentially accessible from single-storey elements should be to the same physical security standards as those at ground level (see Sections 4.1, 4.2 & 4.3).
- 3.3.6 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents, visitors and staff.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doors at ground and first floor levels (including any single-leaf, double-leaf, sliding or bi-folding doorsets) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted for use under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main entrance doorset/s to the building will be formed by double-leaf doorsets, which must be compliant with and certified BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The reception desk/office adjacent to the entrance foyer should be staffed at all times (at least during the day/peak visiting times) to allow staff to greet visitors, vet them and control access into the building. The main entrance door should be capable of being operated remotely from the reception desk if/when required. It should also be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system linked to an out-of-hours staff base/office, so that staff can vet callers to the building before allowing them access if/when the reception desk is not staffed (e.g. at night).
- ☐ Reception staff should manage postal deliveries to ensure that they can be made within the entrance lobby without providing access to all floors of the building. Any postboxes should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures).
- ☐ Any side/rear communal doorsets providing access to/from the private landscaped gardens and first floor communal doors providing access to the roof terraces must be security-certified to one of the above standards, be self-closing/locking and operated by staff or resident key-fob only. The external bin store doors and any service doors should also be secured and operated in the same way.
- ☐ Internal entrance doorsets to individual bedrooms should be solid-core doorsets/frames (min. 44mm thick) with 3 hinges and a manual locking mechanism to BS 3621/8621 or an auditable electronic locking mechanism (such as Vingcard or Salto). These doors should have either a door viewer or a fixed sidelight, containing laminated glazing.
- ☐ The internal doors/frames to any offices, kitchens and back-of-house/staff rooms (as well as general stores, plant areas, bin stores etc.) should be solid-core and capable of being deadlocked to secure them when unoccupied. Any drug stores or record rooms should be fitted with a security-certified doorset (to BS PAS 24) and auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys or passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ☐ The access control system used throughout the building should be operable by staff or resident key-card/fob and not numeric key pads, which can be observed or shared and are rarely changed. The system should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff/resident key-cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All ground floor windows and first floor windows accessible from the roof terraces should be certificated to BS PAS 24 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ All ground floor/accessible first floor opening lights, escape requirements permitting, must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors not releasable from the outside, limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor/accessible first floor glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be no other features of the building (such as projecting window cills, projecting brickwork/cladding features, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows, terraces or over boundaries.
- ☐ The balustrades to the first floor roof terraces to the north and south sides of the building should be fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that could provide a climbing aid.

4.4 Alarm

- ☐ All ground and first floor external doors to communal areas should be fitted with alarm contacts, linked to the building intruder alarm system, to alert staff if anyone attempts to gain unauthorised access. Any escape only doors should be alarmed 24/7 and should be signed as such to deter casual use.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The sides (up to the front building line) and rear of the building should generally be enclosed and defined as private space by 2100mm high walls, railings or close-boarded timber fencing and gates (1800mm high along adjoining private space). Care should be taken to ensure that railing or fencing panels are fixed securely to any posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates.
- ☐ The vehicular gate/s to the north side of the building (providing access to the 3 no. staff parking spaces) should be 2100mm high and ideally automatic, ensuring it cannot be left insecure. It should be operated using a staff key fob/proximity reader system with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the hidden vehicles or doors/windows of the building and escape. Sliding or single-leaf gates are preferable where possible, as they are often easier to secure. If double gates must be used, they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open. The pedestrian gate to the south side of the building should also be 2100mm high, self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key or fob operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to either the vehicular or pedestrian gates, which would aid climbing, and they should be located away from other climbing aids (such as low walls, lighting columns etc.). Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ The exposed and potentially vulnerable rear boundary directly abutting the publicly accessible parking area to the rear of the site should be formed by 2100mm high walls or double-skinned close-boarded timber fencing (with a solid masonry/hardwearing base), along with defensive planting on the public side if possible or on the private side if not (see Section 3.3 for illustration/description). Any existing immediately adjacent/overhanging tree branches should also be removed or pruned where possible, to ensure they do not form a climbing aid over the secure boundary.
- ☐ The frontage of the site/car park should be defined by low-level walls/railings (to a minimum height of 1200mm). There should be a symbolic barrier at the access/egress point to the site (e.g. defined by brick pillars, change of road surface texture/colour etc.) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the staff and residents, psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate reason from entering.
- ☐ The bin store should be a 1800-2100mm high enclosure with a lockable gate.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.



4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to all parking areas should also be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

4.7.1 Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *Acceptable Standard* that will allow for *Identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *Overview* and *Recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *all parking areas (vehicle and cycle), external facades of the building, the main entrance lobby, any drug stores/vulnerable areas and internal circulation spaces.*

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.9 Other

- ☐ Cycle parking areas for staff/residents should be located within private space, ideally well-overlooked from routinely occupied rooms, and should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). Cycle parking areas for visitors/members of the public should be located to the front of the building. Please see www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/ for more information relating to cycle parking.
- ☐ The mobility scooter storage lockers should be to a police preferred specification (see [Secured by Design - Search](#) for SBD licenced suppliers).
- ☐ A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the scheme must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All residents and staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 All high value equipment to communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items in each of the buildings.
- 5.1.3 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas.
- 5.1.4 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (access controls, fencelines, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.5 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as gable walls, boundaries to private space or hidden corners/recesses).

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
29 th May 2025	Mosaic Town Planning	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
29 th May 2025	Mosaic Town Planning	Quote issued
30 th May 2025	Mosaic Town Planning	Confirmation of instruction & fee
8 th June 2025	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
57.22 E00	Site Location Plan	Jan 2024	-
57.22 P100	Proposed – Ground Floor Building Plan	13/05/25	B
57.22 P110	Proposed - First Floor Building Plan	13/05/25	B
57.22 P120	Proposed – Second Floor Building Plan	13/05/25	B
57.22 P130	Proposed – Third Floor Building Plan	13/05/25	B
57.22 P200	Proposed – Elevations – Sheet 1	13/05/25	B
57.22 P210	Proposed – Elevations – Sheet 2	13/05/25	B
-	Typical Apartments and Lounge Layout	01/04/25	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk