



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Change of use from offices (Class E) to 14 apartments (Class C3)

at 193-195 Drake Street, Rochdale

For: Rochdale Property Group Ltd

Version A: **26.01.26**

2025/0464/CIS/01

design**for**security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

We welcome investment in property in inner Rochdale town centre to provide good quality, secure housing and support redevelopment of this important pair of properties for residential purposes.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include: the development will result in the re-use of a vacant building; the building will be more animated with the (re)introduction of activity on all levels of the property; there will be an appropriate number of apartments; and the development will focus activity at appropriate areas whilst also facilitating passive surveillance of the surrounding streets.

We have some concerns about the absence of secure cycle parking and provision of amenity space for residents, which will need to be addressed. Advice is included in section 3.3 and 4 of this report that, if adopted, will enhance security of the development sufficiently to enable us to support the development. The principal recommendations relate to securing the building and individual apartments within it appropriately, as well as controlling access into the building and the car park, and, providing appropriately secure cycle parking.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Rochdale Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award, and the condition will be met.

Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*

Consultant

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Contents

1	The Site and Surroundings.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood around the site	
	2.2 Crime rate comparison	
	2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary and theft at residential and retail premises in Rochdale & measures to reduce vulnerabilities	
	2.1 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns	
3	Development Appraisal	9
	3.1 The proposed development	
	3.2 Features of the proposals that promote security	
	3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development	
4	Physical Security	11
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Window frames	
	4.3 Glazing	
	4.4 Signage	
	4.5 Intruder alarm & CCTV	
	4.6 Lighting	
5	Management & Maintenance	12
6	Management & Maintenance	12
7	Construction	12
8	Secured by Design (SBD)	12

Appendix

A	Contact Register	13
B	Associated Documents.....	13
C	CIS Version History	13
D	Glossary	14

1 The Site and Surroundings

The photographs and plan, below, show the application site and its surroundings. The site, numbers 193-195 Drake Street, edged in red on the plan, is located on the south side of Drake Street, Rochdale. Drake Street is a well-trafficked route that connects the town centre, some 900metres further along the road to the north-east of the site, with the town's main arterial road, A58, Manchester Road, around 220metres to the west. Double yellow lines and a pelican crossing restrict parking on Drake Street in the immediate vicinity of the site. To the east of the site, residential property, mainly terraced housing and apartments, dominates Drake Street, whilst to the west, commercial uses are more prevalent, including retail premises, garage and office premises. Either side of the application site, within the same terrace are four residential properties, numbers 197 and 203 appear to be single dwellinghouses, 199-201 have been converted to 13 apartments and number 191 apartments also appears to have been converted to apartments. There is a small independent school opposite the site, accessed off Broadfield Stile, and obliquely opposite to the north-west, there is a plot of undeveloped, overgrown land. Mere Street, a largely residential street of terraced houses lies immediately to the east of the application terrace, whilst Castlemere Street, a more mixed street of terraced houses and commercial and community buildings, is situated to the west. To the rear, Norfolk Street is, essentially, a service road with no properties facing the street; it does facilitate access to the rear of the application terrace and properties opposite


A view of the Drake Street elevation of the terrace of properties in which the application site is located



The Drake Street facade of numbers 193-195 Drake Street



Looking east along Norfolk Street towards the rear boundary of the application site



A view of the rear elevation and rear boundary fencing and gates to number 153-195



Number 201 Drake Street has been converted to apartments



Undeveloped land opposite the application site



Previously used as office accommodation, numbers 193-195 Drake Street, two adjoining mid-terrace properties are currently vacant. The properties are of traditional brick construction with accommodation arranged over four levels including a lower ground floor and dormer extensions to the front and rear planes of the roof. Both 193 and 195 have a prominent, elevated, entrance door, centrally positioned on the Drake Street elevation. Timber panels or welded-wire mesh has been fitted to secure or prevent damage to the ground floor windows on the front elevation. A stone wall, around 1200mm defines the front boundary to both properties. Openings in the wall, defined with gate posts but no gates, and a pathway with steps connect the street to the respective entrance door. At the rear of 193 and 195, there is an area of hard surfaced space previously laid out as a 14-space car park. The space is now strewn with debris and simple plants have colonised much of the surface. Access into this car park is gained from Norfolk Street via a pair of 1500mm high, steel-palisade gates. Either side of the gates the boundary is marked by steel railings of a similar height to the gates. The eastern and western boundaries of the car park are enclosed with brick walls around 1800mm high. Upper ground floor windows on the rear elevation are also protected by timber boards or steel bars or wire mesh. Steps connect each of the four rear entrance doors to the car park - two at upper ground level and two, lower ground floor access doors. A ramp connects the ground floor door of number 195 to the car park. There are several halogen floodlights and CCTV cameras mounted on the outriggers at the rear.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below relates to crimes committed with 500m of the site between 1st December 2024 and 30th November 2025.

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood around the site

All crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Use, or threat, of violence	Theft including shoplifting	Robbery	Drug offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
14	16	93	628	80	15	68	29	14	3

2.1.1 There were 960 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This number of is double that recorded in a typical neighbourhood within Rochdale but the area analysed covers the southern fringe of the town centre, a large number of commercial premises including shops and take-aways located on Tweeddale Road and Milkstone Road, and the railway station, all of which tend to be crime generators.

2.1.2 The most commonly crimes recorded were:



- Crimes involving the use, or threat, of violence - 61%
- Criminal damage - 13%
- Theft (including bicycle theft, robbery, and shoplifting) - 12%
- Vehicle crime - 8%
- Burglary – 4%
- Drug offences – 3%.

2.1.3 There streets experiencing the most crimes were:


- The Esplanade (219 offences)
- Tweeddale Street (154)
- Drake Street (78)
- Sparrow Hill (49)
- Milkstone Road (35)
- Maclure Road (33)

Domestic burglary

2.1.4 There were 14 burglaries committed within the neighbourhood during the period analysed, 5 of which occurred on Tweeddale Street and 2 on Drake Street.





- 2.1.5 The risk of burglary is greatest on Thursday, Friday and Sunday and in the early afternoon and late evening.



- 2.1.6 In 3 of the 14 cases of burglary in this neighbourhood, offenders have targeted the front and rear doors of homes as a means to gain entry - using force to a door open or a hand tool to damage the lock. There were 2 incidents where entry was gained via a window. There were a further 6 burglaries where offenders were likely to have entered a property via an unlocked door or window, on two occasions the offender gained entry via the wall of a property and 1 incident where the offender targeted a garden shed.



Vehicle crime

- 2.1.7 Vehicle-related crime occurs frequently. The risk is moderately high throughout the week. The most common time for such crimes to be committed is in the afternoon and late evening, which is typical for a neighbourhood on the edge of the city centre.





2.2 Crime rate comparison

Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Rochdale, Greater Manchester, and England & Wales *England & Wales data is from January – December 2021.*



- 2.2.1 The rate of burglary per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **37% lower** than the Rochdale rate, **37% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **35% lower** than the rate across England & Wales.

- 2.2.2 The rate of wounding crimes per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **30% higher** than the Rochdale rate, **53% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **192% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.



- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **83% higher** than the Rochdale rate, **107% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **152% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **37% higher** than the Rochdale rate, **53% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **86% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary and theft at residential and retail premises in Rochdale & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3.1 Communal entrance and apartment entrance doors were targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of offenders tailgating through communal doors or entering apartments through insecure doors:

- communal entry doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure;
- install a secondary set of secure doors (airlock/secure lobby), that are also self-closing and self-locking;
- install lifts that are operated by a fob or card access control system;
- install CCTV cameras in the entrance lobby;
- apartment doors should be self-closing with a thumb-turn lock on the inner side that meets fire regulations, with clear, yet discreet, permanent instructions on the door to inform the resident that the door is not secure until the lock is turned; and,
- employ a concierge to supervise the entrance lobby.

2.3.2 Doors have been forced open

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors and apartment entry doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- 'recess-free' entrances should be installed so that entrance doors are easily visible - offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- all external doors should be illuminated with dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests a property may be occupied and may deter offenders from targeting a premise. Lighting will also support CCTV systems and highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed; and,
- CCTV should be considered, to record activity within circulation spaces and around exterior of the building.

2.3.3 Ground and basement floor windows were prised open, or the glazing smashed to gain access

To minimise the risk of offenders prising open windows or breaking glass to gain entry:

- avoid installing opening windows at street-level;
- install window locks and opening restrictors to any windows that are accessible from street level;
- fit laminate glass to ground and basement floor window frames; and,
- fit ornate grilles to the most vulnerable windows.

2.3.4 Offenders have entered communal cycle stores and stolen bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders entering cycle stores:

- doors or gates to cycle stores should be self-closing and fitted with good quality locks (ideally a maglock, or similar, with a resistance force of around 4,500N), locking automatically upon closure; and,
- CCTV and PIR lighting should be installed within a store.

2.3.5 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- CCTV/security staff should patrol during non-working hours;
- lighting should be installed to illuminate activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with a tracking device.

2.1 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.1.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.1.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the Norfolk Street boundary is defined with robust, high fencing, whilst the side boundaries at the rear are secured with high boundary walls;
- although vacant, there are no signs of trespass - the property itself appears secure;
- the property is separated from the street and passing public by a modest, front garden and a boundary wall, clearly defining public space from semi-private space;
- the elevated location of the main entrance doors and 'defensible' space to the front of the property can help to deter offenders who may feel less willing to cross from public to semi-private space or feel conspicuous in the elevated position when approaching the main entrance doors;
- some of the more vulnerable windows on the upper and lower ground floors of the property are secured with timber sheet, metal grilles or steel bars;

- the site is prominently located on Drake Street, benefitting from the casual supervision by regular passing pedestrian and vehicle traffic;
- residents of neighbouring houses and apartments have a vested interest in being vigilant to crime and disorder and their presence is likely to deter some offenders;
- there nothing visible at the site that might attract offenders;
- the building benefits from lighting (streetlights and floodlighting) and some CCTV and coverage. Neighbouring properties also have CCTV on the front elevation.

2.1.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is very visible to passing offenders on Drake Street. Offenders are likely to notice the development as it emerges from early in the construction phase, and be aware of, and potentially exploit, any criminal opportunities;
- the environmental quality at the site is currently poor – debris at the rear, timber boards grilles and bars on windows, and unkempt front gardens, and there is evidence of water damage at the front of number 195 (perhaps due to damage to downpipes and/or guttering). Poor quality environments may attract offenders who, due to the lower environmental standards, might perceive that their actions will be tolerated or go unnoticed;
- the presence of for sale boards suggest the property is vacant. Vacant properties sometimes attract offender seeking to steal metals from the site or trespassers;
- the window protection (boards, grilles and bars) suggest that the property has been targeted in the past and the security measures installed are a reaction to previous crimes;
- there is little pedestrian or vehicle traffic on Norfolk Street. Offenders attracted to the site could gain entry with little prospect of being witnessed doing so; and,
- the CCTV cameras positioned on the rear elevation appear to be old and unlikely to be in working order.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

- 3.1.1 This application seeks full planning approval for the erection of a residential development comprising the conversion of numbers 193 and 195 Drake Street to create 14, one-bedroom apartments. The plans name the apartments A, B and 1-12
- 3.1.2 There will be 2 apartments, A and B on the lower ground floor and four each on the upper ground (1-4), first (5-8) and second floors (9-12).
- 3.1.3 The plans suggest that apartments A and B will have internal entrance doors, accessed via the existing entrance to number 193 facing Drake Street, Both apartments will also have a secondary entrance door at the rear of the building, via the existing doors at lower ground level accessed from the car park.
- 3.1.4 Residents and visitors to apartments 1-3, 5 and 6, and, 9 and 10 will also utilise the existing, front, entrance door to number 193 Drake Street. The communal entrance door to the remaining 5 apartments will be the front entrance door to number 195 Drake Street. All residents of the upper ground, first and second floor apartments will be able to directly access the car park from within the building via one of the two rear doors at upper ground level.
- 3.1.5 There will be a secondary, inner lobby door at each of the front and rear, communal entrances.
- 3.1.6 Externally, 8 parking spaces will be provided in the secure area at the back of the property. In addition, there will be space set out for bin storage on the periphery of the parking spaces. Though not clear, the plans suggest the existing railings and gates on the Norfolk Street boundary will be retained.
- 3.1.7 There is no indication that bin stores will be physical structures. Ther is no indication of cycle parking provision, however, though small, there are storerooms on the upper ground floor of each property that may be capable of being utilised for this purpose.
- 3.1.8 The is no indication of external amenity space for residents.

3.2 Features of the proposals that promote security

- 3.2.1 The re-use of all of these handsome properties is welcomed.
- 3.2.2 Properties, or parts of premises that remain vacant for some months are often targeted by thieves and vandals. The resulting visible signs of decay can attract further abuse, which is then likely to negatively affect neighbouring premises.
- 3.2.3 The proposed use will enhance activity and passive surveillance over Drake Street, Norfolk Street and neighbouring properties during the day and evening.
- 3.2.4 The site is in a sustainable location with the neighbourhood centre, town centre and public transport, all located close-by.
- 3.2.5 There will be 14 apartments in the development, which is considered sufficient to provide a reasonable prospect of a presence of residents throughout the day and particularly at night, who will provide activity and passive supervision within the development, which can help to deter offenders from targeting the property.
- 3.2.6 Residents of smaller developments are more likely to interact with their neighbours as they come and go, and the presence of strangers in the building, or at the entrance doors, is more likely to be questioned by residents. Such positive behaviours can deter offenders from attempting to enter the property. Whilst ill-considered, larger apartment schemes tend to be less intimate and can lead to issues with 'tailgating' at entrances, with crime and anti-social behaviour issues as offenders exploit a lack of familiarity between residents.
- 3.2.7 The location of the principal, communal, entrance doors, clearly visible on the building's front elevation are ideal.
- 3.2.8 Access controls can easily be deployed at the communal entrance doors in order to restrict access to residents and *bona fide* visitors.
- 3.2.9 Apartment windows will facilitate surveillance over the surrounding streets.
- 3.2.10 Some car parking will be provided on-site. It can be easily accessed by residents by one of the rear entrance doors and be readily overlooked by residents of apartments with windows on the rear elevation.
- 3.2.11 The car park can is, and can remain, secure.
- 3.2.12 Bins will be stored on the site.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

Control entry into the building

- 3.3.1 Security-rated entrance doors, fitted with an electronic lock and self-closing mechanism should be installed at the Drake Street elevation. If the existing doors are repaired and retained, they should be fitted with a Secured by Design approved, electronic locks and a self-closing mechanism.
- 3.3.2 The communal entrance doors on the rear elevation should be replaced with security-rated doors. Like the front entrance doors, the communal entrance doors at upper ground level should be fitted with a fob-activate, electronic lock and a self-closing mechanism.
- 3.3.3 The external doors to apartments A and B should also be security-rated.
- 3.3.4 The inner lobby doors at the front and rear, upper ground floor, communal entrances should be fitted with fob-activated, electronic locks and a self-closing mechanism to ensure the doors lock securely upon closure.
- 3.3.5 An audio-visual unit, with a link to each relevant apartment accessed from that door should be fitted at each communal entrance doors to enable residents to vet callers prior to releasing the lock and allowing access to *bona fide* visitors only. Visitors should only approach the development from the Drake Street entrance doors.
- 3.3.6 Secure mailboxes should be fitted at each of the Drake Street entrance doors.
- 3.3.7 All external doors should be illuminated during the hours of darkness.

Apartment security

- 3.3.8 Each apartment should be fitted with a security-rated, entrance door (to include secondary entrance/escape door to apartments A and B), fitted with a door viewer and opening limiter.
- 3.3.9 Existing, unsightly window bars and grilles should be removed.
- 3.3.10 Lower ground floor windows/light wells should be fitted with laminate glass and protected with ornate ironwork.
- 3.3.11 New windows frames on the lower and upper ground levels should achieve PAS 24 rating and any new or replacement glazing should include a pane of laminate glass.

The car park

- 3.3.12 To maintain security of the rear of the property, and of the cars (and bikes), and to improve the appearance of the rear boundary, the existing railings on the Norfolk Street boundary should be retained and repainted and the car park entrance gates should be replaced with a fob-activated, automated gate.

Cycle storage/parking

- 3.3.13 A secure cycle store should be provided within the building or in the car park. Open storage of bikes in the rear car park will not be supported. Poorly considered cycle parking is likely to be targeted by offenders and unlikely to be used by residents.

External amenity space

- 3.3.14 A suitable area at the rear of the development should be set out for the use of residents.

Bin storage

- 3.3.15 The provision for bin storage in the car park is accepted but should be located within a fire -resistant timber structure(s). It must be appropriately managed to avoid stray bins coming into conflict with parked cars and the cycle store (if provided).

Intruder alarm, lighting and CCTV

- 3.3.16 Ideally, each apartment should be fitted with an intruder alarm.
- 3.3.17 The car park and all external doors should be illuminated during the hours of darkness.
- 3.3.18 The developer should consider installing a modest CCTV system, with cameras capable of monitoring the front and rear entrance doors, entrance lobbies, mailboxes, cycle storage and the car park.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ The communal entrance doors should be:
 - compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2;
 - include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system; and,
 - self-closing and lock automatically on closure.
- ☐ The internal lobby doors at the main and rear entrances should be compliant FD30-rated, include an electronic lock and be fitted with a door closer that automatically secures the door upon closure.
- ☐ Any glazing within external doors (though glazing is not advised on the doors of the rear elevation) should meet the BS EN 356, P1A standard for laminate glass.
- ☐ An audio-visual, unit should be located at each of the Drake Street communal entrance doors to allow visitors to communicate with residents.
- ☐ Residents should have a handset in their apartment to speak to (and view) visitors.

-
- ☐ Residents should be able to operate the relevant, communal entry door and inner lobby door's locking mechanism remotely from within their apartment to allow *bona fide* visitors entry.
 - ☐ Individual apartment entrance doors, including those accessed externally from the car park, must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
 - ☐ Apartment entrance doors must include a door viewer, opening limiter and an apartment number.

4.2 Window frames

- ☐ Upper and lower ground floor windows should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ If Any new or replacement glazing to the lower and upper ground floors should meet the BS EN 356, P1A standard for laminate glass.

4.4 Signage

- ☐ Signage to indicate the name of the development and apartments accessed from each door should be included at the communal entrances.

4.5 Intruder alarm & CCTV

- ☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each apartment.
- ☐ A CCTV system should be considered.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting should be provided to all external doors, the car park, refuse and cycle stores.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up for the building, to address issues such as cleaning of communal areas and maintenance of lighting, CCTV, and access controls.

6 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A plan should be drawn up to address maintenance issues associated the communal areas of the building and site.

7 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved.

8 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout, and construction stages of homes and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
26.12.24	Rahul Rahman, Adept Design Ltd	Request for Crime Impact Statement
10.01.25		Site visit
26.01.26	Rahul Rahman, Adept Design Ltd	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A100	Existing site plan	05.11.25	001
A101	Proposed site plan	05.11.25	001
A200	Location plan	05.11.25	001
A01	Existing elevations and floor plans	03.12.25	002
A02	Proposed lower ground	03.12.25	002
A03	Proposed ground	03.12.25	002
A04	Proposed first	03.12.25	002
A05	Proposed second	03.12.25	002

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations in this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	26.01.26	

D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

[Design For Security – Designing Out Crime](#)

– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police

[Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) – SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies

[ParkMark - Home](#) – Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme

[NBS Source](#) – find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)

[RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book](#) – search for LPS 1175 certified products