



## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

28 NO. DWELLINGS

LAND SOUTH OF QUEENS DRIVE KIRKHOLT ROCHDALE OL11 2NP

For: Mosscafe St. Vincents Housing group LTD

Version A: 05/11/2025

Reference: 2025/0351/CIS/01

designforsecurity

---

# Land South of Queens Drive, Kirkholt, Rochdale OL112NP

URN: 2025/0351/CIS/01

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The proposed residential development is acceptable in general; however the following concerns should be addressed:

- The dwelling should have secure rear passageways with full-height, lockable gates to restrict access to residents.
- Properties backing onto open space should have 2100mm high fencing with trellis and defensible planting to deter climbing.
- The South-East elevation of the apartment building should be secured to prevent unauthorised access to areas not visible from public roads.
- Ground floor apartments should have clearly defined private space using low railings or similar barriers to discourage intrusion and antisocial behaviour.

More details can be found in section 3.3 where there are a number of recommendations made which would enhance the security of the development and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



Patrick Babb

**Consultant**

e: [patrick.babb@designforsecurity.org](mailto:patrick.babb@designforsecurity.org)

---

# Contents

|   |                                                |    |
|---|------------------------------------------------|----|
| 1 | Visual Audit.....                              | 4  |
| 2 | Crime Statistics & Analysis.....               | 5  |
|   | 2.1 Local Crime Summary                        |    |
|   | 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi) |    |
|   | 2.3 Risk Factors - Residential                 |    |
|   | 2.4 Crime Rate Comparison                      |    |
|   | 2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis           |    |
|   | 2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis               |    |
| 3 | Layout Appraisal.....                          | 10 |
|   | 3.1 Proposed Development                       |    |
|   | 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal           |    |
|   | 3.3 Points for Further Consideration           |    |
| 4 | Physical Security .....                        | 11 |
|   | 4.1 Doors                                      |    |
|   | 4.2 Windows                                    |    |
|   | 4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric                  |    |
|   | 4.4 Alarms                                     |    |
|   | 4.5 Access Control                             |    |
|   | 4.6 Bicycle Stores                             |    |
|   | 4.7 Landscaping                                |    |
|   | 4.8 Lighting                                   |    |
| 5 | Management & Maintenance .....                 | 12 |
| 6 | Construction .....                             | 13 |
| 7 | Useful References .....                        | 13 |
|   | 7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)                    |    |

## Appendix


|   |                           |    |
|---|---------------------------|----|
| A | Contact Register.....     | 14 |
| B | Associated Documents..... | 14 |
| C | CIS Version History ..... | 14 |
| D | Glossary .....            | 15 |

# 1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Kirkholt area of Rochdale.

The site is roughly bound by Queens Drive to the North, to the East by existing apartments and footpath, to the South by a wooded area, and community gardens to the West.

The site is currently vacant but has been previously developed with a healthcare centre which has been subsequently demolished. The site is currently seeded, open space, with the boundary defined with a low timber knee rail. There is an established vehicular access/egress point which is blocked with boulders to restrict access into the site.



## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1<sup>st</sup> October 2024 to 30<sup>th</sup> September 2025 within 500m of the site.

### 2.1 Local Crime Summary

| Recorded Crime within 500m of Site |                       |                 |                       |       |         |                  |                          |                        |               |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------|---------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| Domestic Burglary                  | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
| 20                                 | <5                    | 39              | 175                   | 16    | 5       | <5               | 11                       | 5                      | <5            |

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is relatively high with large volumes of criminal damage and violent crimes. Crimes against property, such as dwellings and vehicles are low in the area, which is reflected in the rates of crime which can be seen in section 2.4 of this report.

### 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting residential properties and vehicles are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

2.2.1 Theft of parcels from accessible areas

*Possible Solution – A secure parcel store should be provided for residents within the ground floor lobby area. It should be accessible via fob and monitored by CCTV. Alternatively, parcels should be delivered directly to residents with no safe places permitted.*

2.2.2 Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to apartments

*Possible Solution - All apartment entrance doorsets should be certified to a burglary-resistant standard, such as BS PAS 24.*

2.2.3 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.

*Possible Solution - Access-controlled secure doorsets should restrict entry to the building's circulation core, reducing the risk of tailgating by unauthorised individuals.*

2.2.4 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors to gain access into communal areas and apartments

*Possible Solution – All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and automatic locking mechanisms to prevent them from being left open.*

*Publicly accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split spindle or fixed external handle to prevent external opening when unlocked.*

*Accessible windows should be fitted with restrictors to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.*

### 2.3 Risk Factors - Residential





The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary

- 
- Anti-social behaviour
  - Neighbour disputes
  - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
  - Unauthorised access to private spaces
  - Poor maintenance of access control systems

## 2.4 Crime Rate Comparison




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **21% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **19% lower** than Greater Manchester and **17% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **41% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **31% lower** than Greater Manchester and **32% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **27% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **17% lower** than Greater Manchester and **0% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **48% lower** than Rochdale as a whole, **42% lower** than Greater Manchester and **29% lower** than England & Wales.

## 2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Tuesday just after midnight (00:00-01:00). Offenders often target dwellings at night when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as 'unknown', it is likely that the offenders has exploited insecure windows or doors.
- Smashed glazing in the windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors.

## 2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Tuesday just after midnight (00:00-01:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

---

## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposed development comprises of the following:

1. A three storey apartment building containing 23 no. 1 bedroom apartments.
2. Five, four bedroom, terraced houses.
3. Associated access, landscaping, and car parking.

### 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

- 3.2.1 The site is currently vacant, which can attract misuse, antisocial behaviour, and criminality, to the detriment of the local community. The proposed development will bring legitimate, residential, activity to the local area which can deter unwanted behaviour.
- 3.2.2 The proposed landscaped area is well overlooked by the apartment building and houses, allowing residents to detect, and report, any antisocial or criminal use of the space. The landscaped area being overlooked will also be a deterrent to misuse.
- 3.2.3 There is ample car parking provided within the development for residents and visitors. Vehicles parked in formalised residential car parks are less likely to be targeted than those parked on streets.
- 3.2.4 The car parking spaces for the apartments are well overlooked by the apartment building, allowing residents to view parked vehicles.
- 3.2.5 The existing footpath does not pass too closely to the dwellings and is unlikely to be a source of antisocial behaviour to the detriment of residents.
- 3.2.6 The rates of burglary and vehicle crime are lower than the rates experienced across Rochdale and Greater Manchester.

### 3.3 Points for Further Consideration

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

- 3.3.1 The passageway to the rear of the houses should be secured with a full-height gate. Access should be restricted to residents with a lock that can be operated from both sides (e.g., a GateMate or similar dual-access lock).
- 3.3.2 Dwellings that back onto the open space to the rear should have a 2100mm high boundary comprising a robust concrete gravel board base, close-boarded timber fence panels, and 300mm of trellis. It is recommended that defensible planting or shrubbery be installed on the outer face to deter climbing.
- 3.3.3 The rear of the apartment building (South-East elevation) should ideally be secured to restrict access to residents and reduce the potential for misuse in areas not visible from the public highway.
- 3.3.4 Ground floor apartments should have clearly defined defensible space to reduce the risk of antisocial behaviour and criminal targeting. Amenity space for ground floor apartments should be delineated with a low railing or similar barrier to restrict access from surrounding landscaped areas.
- 3.3.5 Windows in ground floor apartments should be fitted with restrictors to prevent them from being opened from the outside if left insecure.
- 3.3.6 External communal access doors must comply with and be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2 standards. They should include a lock operable via an electronic access control system. Communal entrance doors must be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock integrated with the access control system.
- 3.3.7 Access to the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system, with the image viewable on the phone unit. This allows residents to vet visitors before granting access. There should be no unrestricted trade access to the building.

- 3.3.8 Secondary entrances to communal areas (from the entrance lobby) should operate on an access control system. Having two access-controlled doors between public areas and apartments helps reduce the risk of tailgating.
- 3.3.9 The car parking area and pedestrian routes should be illuminated to a high standard, in accordance with BS 5489. Communal entrance doors and external apartment doors should be equipped with dusk-to-dawn lighting.
- 3.3.10 The apartment building and dwellings should be built to Secured by Design standards.

## 4 Physical Security

*The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.*

### 4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

### 4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

### 4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

---

## 4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

## 4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
  - Communal entrances
  - Circulation cores
  - Cycle store

## 4.6 Bicycle Stores

- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

## 4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

## 4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ The car parking areas should be illuminated to an average illuminance of 20lx.

# 5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
  - Litter removal
  - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
  - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

- 
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

## 6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

## 7 Useful References

### 7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see [Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit [Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security](#).

## A Contact Register

| Date       | Contact With  | Summary of Contact        |
|------------|---------------|---------------------------|
| 26/09/2025 | Oliver Porter | CIS application confirmed |
| 03/11/2025 | Oliver Porter | Progress update           |
|            |               |                           |
|            |               |                           |
|            |               |                           |
|            |               |                           |

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No.  | Drawing Title                                       | Date | Rev |
|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------|------|-----|
| 22-042       | Triangle Drawing Register (11.09.25)                |      |     |
| 22-042_SK01  | Location Plan (30.11.22)                            |      |     |
| 22-042_SK23C | Proposed Site Plan Option 11 (23.07.25)             |      |     |
| 22-042_SK24  | Proposed Massing Visualisations - Opt.11 (17.10.24) |      |     |
| 22-042_SK30A | Proposed House Type Layouts (04.12.24)              |      |     |
| 22-042_SK31A | Proposed Flat Type Layouts (04.12.24)               |      |     |
| 22-042_SK32A | Proposed House Block Layouts (04.12.24)             |      |     |
| 22-042_SK33A | Proposed Flat Block Ground Floor Layout (04.12.24)  |      |     |
| 22-042_SK36  | Proposed House Block Elevations (04.12.24)          |      |     |
| 22-042_SK37  | Proposed Flat Block Elevations (04.12.24)           |      |     |

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

## C CIS Version History

| Version | Date       | Revisions |
|---------|------------|-----------|
| A       | 05/11/2025 |           |
|         |            |           |

## D Glossary

### Physical Security Standards

#### PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

#### STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

#### STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

#### LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.
- Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.

#### BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

#### BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

### Useful Websites

#### [Design For Security – Designing Out Crime](#)

– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police

[Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) – SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies

[ParkMark - Home](#) – Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme

[NBS Source](#) – find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)

[RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book](#) – search for LPS 1175 certified products