
Crime Impact Statement

Site/Project:	Development of 64 residential units over four floors
Location:	Duke Street Mill, No1 Queen Street, Rochdale, OL12 0LW.
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Date:	6 th April 2026 (v1.0)

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1: Introduction

This Crime Impact Statement:

- Has been produced by Dobson Owens Security Consultants, an independent consultancy who have not been involved in the design process prior to this instruction.
- Analyses the existing crime and disorder in the surrounding areas to the site and any potential impacting factors.
- Assesses the proposed development against the principles of CPTED (Crime Prevention through Environmental Design) to offer proposals to reduce opportunities and the negative perception or fear of crime.
- Provides recommendations to reduce the proposed development's and the surrounding area's vulnerability to crime.
- Provides physical security standards based upon the Secured by Design test standards and British Standards/PAS.
- Will assist in reducing resistance to the development from the local communities and help maintain positive links between the developer and the affected stakeholders.

2: Executive Summary

This application has been assessed against the existing crime environment and the potential concerns created by project activity and proposed residential use. It is concluded that every effort has been made to negate such concerns through thoughtful design and to reduce opportunities for crime and fear of crime.


A crime analysis in the immediate vicinity of the proposed site and the broader neighbourhood has been conducted in line with the anticipated use and controls under the proposal. Based on this intelligence and the current, somewhat dilapidated condition of Duke Street Mill, the refurbishment of the building and residential use offer significant benefits from a historical perspective, and local aesthetics and facilities. A formal function that provides legitimate activity at all times of the day and night can only have a positive influence on the area and reduce opportunities for crime and fear of crime.

Recommendations have been made throughout this document to increase resilience to crime and compliance with the relevant Secured by Design standards.

3: Proposal Overview


The proposal is to develop a residential apartment block of 64 units at Duke Street Mill, No. 1 Queen Street, Rochdale. The proposed site is located on the northern outskirts of Rochdale town centre, 200m north of the A58 and 50m west of Whitworth Road (A617). The M62, M66 and A627M are within easy reach and offer excellent travel links to and from the neighbouring towns and Manchester city centre.

The site falls into the Rochdale Central policing team, in the Rochdale area of P Division within the Greater Manchester Police jurisdiction. This is illustrated in the plan below.



The image below shows the site's footprint within the surrounding area. It is easily accessible from all directions due to its urban location. The main routes in the area are Howard Street and Whitworth Road, but numerous minor roads feed off these to provide access to the site.

Duke Street Mill is currently operational as a multi-let commercial building occupied by a range of small businesses.



4: Site Analysis

The proposed development is located in the northern outskirts of Rochdale, a medium-sized town with a population of 111,261. This extends to 223,773 for the wider borough (2021 census). Rochdale is in the foothills of the South Pennines and lies in the dale valley of the River Roch, eight kilometres northwest of Oldham and 16km northeast of Manchester.

Transport

Transport links in the immediate area of the proposed site are excellent. It lies 200m north of the east/west A58, and 50m west of north/south Whitworth Road (A617). The M62 is four kilometres to the south and the M66, eight kilometres to the west. The M60 outer Manchester ring road is ten kilometres to the south.

Rochdale town centre tram stop is 500m to the south of the site, with Rochdale train station one kilometre away. There are several easily accessible bus stops on Howard Street to the north and Whitworth Road to the east. Whilst these strong transport links provide easy escape routes for adversaries, the prevalence of ANPR and associated traffic and public CCTV cameras in the area will offer additional detection capabilities.

Surrounding Area

The immediate surrounding area has a largely urban feel with expanses of residential housing and commercial/industrial buildings. However, Rochdale is sufficiently distanced from the metropolitan reach of Manchester to bring wider areas of agricultural and woodland within easy reach.

The area continues to strengthen commercially and benefits from active neighbouring occupiers. There are upcoming Starbucks and Farmfoods openings nearby, and an established Dunelm is already operating as part of a wider retail park to the south of the site.

To the north and east of the site in particular, the urban spread begins to break up quickly to reveal larger green areas and parks, including Sykes Wood, Falinge Park and Hollingworth Lake Country Park. One and a half kilometres to the northeast is HMP Buckley Hall, which is a long-term category C prison that houses inmates with sentences of four years or more.

200m to the northwest is Rochdale Infirmary. This is a large 24-hour hospital, although it operates only an Urgent Care Centre for minor injuries and illnesses as opposed to a full Accident and Emergency service. Large hospitals attract many specific crime threats and these are associated with:

- Complex building layouts and multiple points of access
- 24/7 activity and high public footfall
- Large staff base
- Drugs stored and dispensed on site
- Potential for personal distress and mental health issues.

The lack of a full emergency department is a positive attribute in relation to crime, although 24-hour care services can still exacerbate the wider threats outlined above due to intoxication (alcohol/drugs), emotional relatives, frustration relating to waiting times and serious violence/disorder, which can often be related to gangs or organised crime. Given the proximity of the site, there is the potential for these issues to disseminate and impact the building, especially as the main pedestrian route from the hospital to Rochdale town centre is Whitehall Street, which runs along the west elevation.

One and a half kilometres to the west is the Crown Oil Arena, which is the home of Rochdale AFC, who play in the National Football League. The stadium has a capacity of 10,000, but match days usually attract 2,500 to 3000 fans. There is the potential for some traffic congestion on match/event days.


Moving south feeds into Rochdale town centre, where there is an abundance of shops, bars, restaurants and wider facilities that would be expected in a medium-sized town. Baillie Street and Butts Avenue are 400m to the south of

the site, and this is where the highest concentration of bars and nightclubs is located. Whilst Duke Street/Queen Street are a thoroughfare from the town centre to the residential areas to the north, the multiple route options will help to spread congestion of people travelling home after a night out. This will minimise any arising anti-social behaviour in the immediate area.

Housing in the immediate area is a mix of traditional terraces and blocks of flats, which are indicative of the urban area. Moving further north and outside of Rochdale town centre, modern residential estates with larger properties become more prevalent.



The residences themselves are generally very well cared for, although given the urban area, other properties nearby create more of a negative aesthetic with barbed wire topped fences, roller shutters and boarded windows, and waste being openly stored externally. There is also frequent litter and graffiti markings throughout the area. Such traits are known to attract crime, as there is the perception that nobody will notice or care.



There is supporting LED (converted) street lighting adjacent to the site and in the surrounding streets.

Greater Manchester Police

Rochdale is the nearest Greater Manchester Police Station and is 750m to the southwest. This is a part-time provision that is open 0800-2000 Monday to Friday and 1000-1800 on a Saturday and Sunday. There are supporting stations in Oldham and Bury.

Existing Site Analysis

Duke Street Mill is one of the many surviving buildings from the town's textile-industrial past. Built in the mid-late 19th century, during the height of the cotton industry, it is constructed mainly from brick, with stone facades on parts of the exterior. It is a four-storey (plus basement) standalone building with a flat roof, that lies within a square created by the four surrounding roads. The windows are Georgian style.

The site is currently operating as a multitenant facility and is fully alarmed and monitored, with a 24-hour manned guarding security presence. The ground floor windows on all elevations are secured with welded mesh panelling, and in some areas, this is supported by grilles.



The north elevation lies on Princess Street, and this incorporates a palisade-fenced section that feeds through double gates into a car park located at the northwest corner of the site. The rest of this elevation has a red-brick façade with a roller shutter that is in a good state of repair.

There is a series of round down pipes, some of which are of a traditional metal composition and others that are plastic. These allow hand and footholds for climbing.



The eastern elevation runs along Duke Street, and this side of the building sees the red brick façade merge with the stone. There are no access points on this elevation. However, at the southeast corner, there is what appears to be a redundant telegraph pole, and this facilitates an easy climbing aid to the upper windows, with footholds on the adjacent horizontal barred windows and decorative corncicing.

The south side of the building lies on Queen Street, and this has a stone frontage and incorporates two access points into the building. One is roller-shuttered, and the other is a steel door with a numeric digital lock.

This elevation of the building again has round down pipes that lie proud to the building, and there are traditional fire escape ladders and platforms on the second, third and fourth floor levels. These appear decorative as opposed to functional, as the ground floor ladder has been removed and the escape doors replaced with PVC windows (below right).



At the southwest corner of the building, there is a separate two-storey building with a pitched roof and rendered façade. This is not incorporated into the renovation. The remainder of the western side of the site is a palisade fence defining the car park.

Whilst attractive and clearly historic, the building itself has rather a tired and dilapidated feel, with many windows missing or boarded up. The frames appear to be extensively decayed, aside from the handful that have had modern replacement windows installed. As mentioned above, such characteristics are known to attract crime

Proposed Site Design and Footprint

The proposed design offers accommodation over four floors and a total of 64 residences: 28 studios, 12 one-bedroom units and 24 two-bedroom units. The plan below reflects the ground floor footprint.



The main access points are featured above.

1	Main entrance off Queen Street. This is a double-leaf door that uses the double-height mezzanine feature to create a grand entrance to the building. This entrance feeds into the ground-floor residential areas and provides access to the lift and stairwells to the upper floors. Double-leaf doors are inherently weak and should be secured to ensure that each leaf is independently locked. Rack bolts on the second leaf can be manipulated to render the door insecure.
2	This is another double-leaf door off Princess Street that opens out over. This leads from the external amenities area and into the ground-floor residential corridors.
3	Adjacent to door 2 is a single-leaf door that provides access to the central stairwell and the upper floors. There is also a subsequent door that leads into the ground-floor residential corridor.
4	Door 4 is again an outward-opening single-leaf door. This provides access to units 13 and 14 only.
5	This outwardly opening single-leaf door feeds off Princess Street and into the ground-floor residential corridor.
6	An outwardly opening single-leaf door that leads from Queen Street into the ground-floor residential corridor.


7	An outwardly opening single-leaf door that leads from Queen Street into the southwest stairwell, providing access to the upper levels of the building with a side door into the ground floor.
8	Door 8 provides access to the cycle storage facility, which houses up to 50 cycles.
9	Door 9 provides access to a plant area and the bin store.

Whilst this is a sizable building, having multiple access points does create increased vulnerability that an entrance will be left insecure by a less vigilant resident. If possible and without creating inconvenience for users, reducing the number of access points is desirable. This increases supervision and natural activity and reduces the likelihood of a door being left insecure for an extended period of time. For example, doors 2 and 6 could be retained as emergency exits only, as doors 3 and 8 provide access to the same area.

Security and convenience do need to be carefully balanced, as frustrated users will create ways to bypass arrangements, increasing vulnerabilities further. All doors should therefore be of solid construction and be access-controlled at all times with auto-closers.

The site does not provide any car parking, and the existing inner facility will be converted into a landscaped amenity space. This will encourage street parking, which may subsequently increase the risk of vehicle crime. However, given the excellent transport links in the area, it is likely that not all residents will have cars.

A secure cycle facility is provided, and the access door to this area should be of the same security standard and locking mechanism as the entrances to the building. Whilst this is a useful addition, in reality, this would likely be unused by many residents with high-value cycles, as they would choose to store these within their apartments. However, it is important to encourage cycles to be individually secured in this area to mitigate internal theft.




The roof on the plant area and bin store above door 9 is a lean-to style, and this creates a climbing aid to access one of the upper-level studio windows. Consideration of installing windows that do not open for this residence would be beneficial.

5: Crime Analysis

5.1 Crime Statistics – Immediate site vicinity

A crime analysis of a 1.6-kilometre (one-mile) radius around the Duke Street Mill site has been completed. The map below demonstrates the area captured within this.

The plan to the right shows the relative deprivation (English Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 2025) of the area of the proposed site. This shows that the immediate and surrounding areas, particularly to the south and in Rochdale town centre, are in the most deprived deciles. Moving in a northwesterly direction, deprivation becomes more varied, but generally reduces. This follows the general pattern of deprivation following more densely populated areas and town centres. This is an important consideration as most crime and anti-social behaviour are likely to be constrained to built-up areas and are proportionally elevated in deprived areas.



Crime data for the above area has been compared from March 2025 to February 2026 and from March 2024 to February 2025.

Crime Type	Total No. Crimes Mar 25 – Feb 26	Total No. Crimes Mar 24 – Feb 25	+/- %
Anti-social behaviour	1,743	1,756	-1%
Burglary	234	265	-12%
Robbery	92	96	-4%
Vehicle	274	399	-32%
Violent/sexual	1,572	1,627	-3%
Shoplifting	313	509	-39%
Criminal damage and arson	449	464	-3%
Other theft	420	416	+1%
Drugs	364	257	+42%
Cycle theft	22	29	-24%
Theft from person	43	58	-26%
Weapons	89	85	+5%
Public order	796	903	-12%
Other	1,326	1,191	+11%
Total	7,737	8,055	-4%

(Other crime includes crimes such fraud, forgery, going equipped and other Home Office notifiable crimes. Other theft includes theft from building and handling crimes). Statistics obtained from Greater Manchester Police.

5.2 General Observations

The above statistics show a moderate to high level of crime that has shown a decrease of 4% or 318 incidents over the reporting period.

In most areas, the crime rates are relatively consistent, although in the lower frequency categories of crime, the statistics show some considerable increases and decreases. For example, theft from person has reduced by 26%, but this relates to only 15 occurrences.

It is noted that Greater Manchester Police do not record anti-social behaviour as a crime, and as such, this is not directly included in the crime data above. These are recorded as incidents, and so the data may provide an unrealistic view of frequency due to how this is reported and logged. However, this can still have a considerable impact on communities and neighbourhoods and the perception of safety/levels of crime. Notwithstanding the above, this category is the most prevalent in the reporting area.

Anti-social behaviours are actions that harm or lack consideration for the well-being of others, or any type of conduct that violates the basic rights of another person or is considered to be disruptive to others in society.

Violent and sexual crime is the next most frequent type of crime. This has reduced by 3% or 55 instances. Whilst this initially appears concerning, this category covers a variety of offences ranging from common assault to murder. This means that the offence does not necessarily need to be physically violent and can be threatening language or gestures that make another person think that they may be about to be attacked.

The next category is other crime. This incorporates wider Home Office notifiable crimes such as information/cybercrime, fraud, going equipped, bigamy, handling crimes, blackmail and employee theft. This has increased 11% or 135 incidents.

Public order offences are the next most frequent category of crime. This relates to a range of criminal behaviours that jeopardise public peace, order or safety. These include actions such as rioting, disorderly conduct, affray, public nuisance, and threatening or abusive behaviour. This has reduced by 12% or 107 instances.

Other notable statistics that may impact this site are criminal damage and arson, which have reduced by 3%; burglary, which has reduced by 12% and vehicle crime, which has reduced by 32%. The only crimes in the area to increase over the reporting period are robbery, shoplifting and crimes involving drugs, the latter has shown a significant upturn of 42%.

Overall, the statistics illustrate a moderate to high prevalence of crime in the surroundings of the proposed site, which is largely typical of an area on the outskirts of a medium-sized town that falls into the most deprived deciles.

5.3 Analysis of the Impact of the Proposed Site on Crime

Violent/Sexual Crime and Robbery

As discussed above, violent/sexual crime is the most prevalent category for the area studied, and there have been 92 instances of robbery.

The existing site, in its current condition and operation, will have minimal impact on this crime. The building and external areas are not directly accessible from the surrounding streets.

Renovating and upgrading the condition of the building and the creation of a formal residential area with defined boundaries and good illumination will likely have a positive impact on violent and sexual crime and the fear of such an incident.

Anti-Soc Behaviour/Public Order/Criminal Damage/Drugs

The current dilapidated feel of the building may contribute to this crime, although it is again noted that the inner areas are not accessible from the surrounding streets and there is 24/7 manned guarding on site. Contagion crime theory suggests that where an area or building is viewed as uncared for, it attracts crime and as the perception of being noticed is reduced.

There is evidence of graffiti on the west elevation of the building and on surrounding properties. This could become more prevalent if the building remains in its current condition.

Again, the provision of a formal residential space that is clearly defined, well illuminated and cared for can only positively influence this area in relation to anti-social behaviour and public order offences. This will

increase legitimate activity in the area, which will deter crime.

Burglary/Other Theft

As highlighted in the overview section, burglary has seen a positive reduction of 12% or 31 crimes. It should be noted that this statistic incorporates commercial and domestic burglary.

Burglaries tend to occur during the hours of darkness, when the risk of being noticed or caught is perceived as lower. This also correlates to adversaries anticipating residences to be empty, as they generally do not want a confrontation with an occupant.

Access is primarily made through the rear of properties, as there is a lower likelihood of being seen. Back doors and ground-floor windows are often attacked to gain entry. Climbing points such as fencing, drain pipes, windowsills and flat/sloping roofs may also provide access to upper windows.

Apartment blocks such as the one proposed tend to be less targeted than individual houses due to the community development and increased activity on site; it would be rare for all of the units to be unoccupied at the same time, and this increases the likelihood of an adversary being detected.

There are, however, several climbing aids around the building, including historical fire escapes, which may create vulnerabilities for the adjacent units, down pipes and the sloping roof above the bin store. Such areas should be protected by having windows that do not open.

The building also has numerous access points, and as discussed in the previous section, it is important to balance security with user convenience. Reducing entry points helps to funnel users through legitimate points, and this improves monitoring. It also helps to ensure that doors are not left insecure for an extended period of time due to multiple users.

There are also opportunities to employ compartmentalisation by floor. This is discussed further in Section 6.

Vehicle Crime and Cycle Theft

Both of these categories of crime have shown positive decreases in prevalence for the reporting periods.

There is no parking provision provided at the site, and this will result in resident vehicles being displaced to street parking, where there is arguably a higher risk of theft of and theft from.

There is a large car park at the adjacent retail park where parking is permitted overnight, but there are restrictions and costs associated, which will likely deter use.

It is anticipated that a high percentage of residents at the site will not own vehicles due to the proximity of Rochdale town centre and the wider transport links to the surrounding towns and cities. This will reduce the potential impact on this crime category.

A secure cycle storage area is planned for the site, which is a positive inclusion, especially if the access door is robust and access managed. In reality, residents of apartment blocks tend not to utilise public storage areas as they are targeted by thieves, and there is the potential for internal theft. They will be more likely to store their cycles in their apartment, even if a facility is provided.

Building Site

During the construction phase of the proposed site, there is a risk of burglary, theft (internal and external) and potentially sabotage/protests, especially if the plans have been disputed publicly.

The site should be robustly hoarded with a single point of access. CCTV and security signage should be utilised to provide an active deterrent. The restriction from the public road will deter most adversaries as they will have to carry stolen items a considerable distance to load a vehicle.

Care should also be taken not to leave facilitators for crime in view and accessible (e.g., tools, ladders, scaffold, pipes, bricks etc.)

Policing Priorities

The following are the priorities for the Rochdale Central policing team, issued 10th March 2026:

- **Burglary reduction and detection:** Targeted patrols in hotspot areas, crime-prevention visits, and intelligence-led enquiries to identify offenders and protect homes.
- **Anti-social behaviour:** Regular engagement with residents, swift response to reports, partnership work with housing, youth services and local

agencies to reduce repeat issues and support those affected.

- **Speeding and inconsiderate driving:** High-visibility traffic operations, use of speed-monitoring equipment, and enforcement against dangerous or irresponsible motorists.

- **Organised crime and drug supply:** Active intelligence gathering, joint work with specialist teams, and targeted activity to disrupt criminal networks operating in the area.
- **Vehicle Crime:** Conducting strategic patrols in high-risk areas and checking for insecure vehicles.

6: Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

The following section will analyse the proposed site in relation to the four core principles of CPTED.

Natural Surveillance

This principle is about increasing visibility that will help ensure that deviant behaviour is noticed, and this subsequently provides an active deterrent to potential adversaries. In this instance, creating clear lines of sight will increase the feeling of safety for legitimate users of the space.

The image below illustrates the surveillance opportunities in the different areas of the site. Green arrows show good visibility, whereas the red arrows demonstrate where this is restricted. Orange arrows suggest partial sightlines depending on tree growth and time of the year (e.g., fewer leaves on trees in winter) and limited operating hours of the surrounding commercial buildings.



The north, east and south elevations of the building create clear straight lines which enhance natural surveillance. Upper-level residential windows provide excellent visibility of the streets below and beyond.

To the east on Duke Street, there is a two-storey industrial unit with offices that have windows on both levels. This will provide activity and observations during working hours, but this will likely be restricted overnight. Traffic on the busy Whitworth Road will also offer some passing surveillance.

To the south is a retail outlet and a large car park. Again, during the day, the activity in this area will provide a strong level of casual surveillance. However, this is separated from the building by a hedge and a row of medium-sized trees, which block the view at ground level. Upper-level windows in the building may have a view over these trees.

The door into the southwest stairwell (door 7 on the earlier plan and circled in red) is recessed behind the projecting wall of the main entrance and so is not visible from the west. Good illumination in this area is consequently important to deter undesirable activity.

The west elevation again provides good surveillance from upper-level windows. Whilst the bin store and cycle store will generate useful activity, this will be limited and short-term. The amenities space at the northwest corner of the site will facilitate communal activities and again, some promising opportunities for casual surveillance. However, this will be intermittent and weather-dependent. Use will likely be lower during the dark winter months when the risk of adversary behaviour is potentially higher. Care should also be taken to predict growth rates of trees and hedging so that these are easily maintained and do not restrict the passing view of the access doors adjacent. Ensuring that this area is well-tended and does not become overgrown will help maintain its effectiveness in this regard.

The north side of the building on Princess Street facilitates good outward surveillance from the different floors and residential spaces. The neighbouring buildings are largely industrial and have no windows. Visibility and observations from this direction will subsequently be limited. The door leading to units 13 and 14 (door 4 on the earlier plan and circled in red) appears slightly recessed, which may create blind areas and opportunities for deviant behaviour to go unnoticed. Again, illumination in this area should be enhanced to offer mitigation.

Generally, visibility across the building is good, and the range of studios, one-bedroom and two-bedroom units will attract different users who have different schedules. This will provide natural activity at all times of the day and night. The active zones within the residential spaces are mixed, with some areas having bedrooms adjacent to the window and others having the living room. Aiming to have the active spaces of the kitchen and living room nearer to the windows provides better connectivity to the outside and, consequently, better natural surveillance.

Natural Access Control

This is the control of vehicles and pedestrians through structures such as physical barriers, lighting or landscaping. Where possible, access routes should be clearly delineated – for example, in this instance, pedestrian access points and footpaths. The vast majority of people will comply with simple and subconscious guidance such as this, and those not complying, become immediately visible.

There are seven access points into the residential spaces of the building. Whilst this is a sizeable building, this is still a lot. The more access points there are, the more difficult it is to monitor entry and retain security of the doors. This could result in doors being left insecure for an extended period of time, and an adversary gaining access. Whilst it is appreciated that a balance has to be struck between user convenience and security, efforts should be made to reduce the number of entrances, rendering some as emergency exits only. Opportunities exist to do this at doors 2 and 3 and doors 6 and 7.

As this building has more than 26 units, it is advised that corridor access at each level from the stairwell/lift lobby is restricted where possible (Secured by Design – New Homes 2024). Residents should be provided access to only their residential corridor. This creates additional compartmentalisation and will help to mitigate anti-social behaviour and free movement through the building. This can also aid natural access control by facilitating access to only the building entrance doors adjacent to their apartment.

Management and Maintenance

As discussed previously, in areas, the building appears in disrepair and provides a rather dilapidated impression with windows broken or boarded up, and window frames decaying. A positive reinforcer for this development from a crime perspective is to create a legitimate and well-cared-for environment that provides a natural deterrent. It is

important that on completion, the physical environment is maintained to give the impression of care. Markers such as graffiti, litter or abandoned personal belongings can suggest that this type of behaviour is tolerated and encourages further and elevated levels of criminal activity.

As a domestic apartment block, this is less likely to occur than in a commercial site, as residents usually develop a community feel and take pride in their homes and the surroundings. Management services to the building should include regular inspections, and any instances of litter and graffiti should be removed quickly to deter further occurrences.

Natural Territorial Reinforcement

There are two parts to Natural Territorial Reinforcement:

- Creation of a sense of ownership and security culture within the site
- Create a sense of owned space where space is clearly defined and strangers stand out

As mentioned above, apartment buildings such as the proposed site, generally create a small community and can identify out of the normal activity.

The site proposed will have a clear demarcation of land through a perimeter fence/hedge at the northwest corner and the building shell itself. This will help to minimise 'accidental' access.

Good quality signage should also be maintained to offer guidance as to the authority to enter, as well as signposting key routes to help ensure visitors or contractors do not get lost.

7: Recommendations

The following recommendations have been synthesised from the previous analysis and are also based on the standards outlined in Appendix 1.

Site Perimeter/External Areas

- Installation of effective, uniform lighting with particular attention paid to the building entrances, especially those recessed from the main building facade. These should be illuminated at all times during hours of darkness (preferably by time switch or photoelectric cell) and not operated by PIR. Bollard lighting should not be utilised as the main illumination source.
- Appropriate signage to advertise restricted access arrangements.
- Consideration as to the future growth of trees and shrubbery to retain surveillance and effective illumination.

Building Shell

- Consider designating some of the building access points as emergency exits only to reduce the number of entrances. Such doors should have no external access furniture installed.
- Entrance doors into the building should meet minimum industry standards for a building of more than 11 dwellings. Doors should be installed with a robust door closer to help ensure they remain secure at all times.
- A door entry system with a vandal-resistant external door entry panel with a linked camera should be provided at the main entrance (north door) to enable audio/visual communication between visitors and residents within their rooms. There should be the ability to display the image of the caller before the call is answered, and an automatic release button. The system should comply with the technology outlined in UL 293.
- Tradesperson or timed-release mechanisms should not be installed.

- Access into the building should be via a security-encrypted electronic key (i.e., fob, card, mobile device, etc.). The same locking mechanisms can be used for areas such as the bin store and cycle store.

Inner Building Areas

- Installation of a bank of secure mailboxes located in an area that allows secure mail delivery, accessed via a private, dedicated entrance door. This should facilitate the delivery of mail and small packages.
- Access from stairwell and lift lobbies into residential corridors, especially the upper-levels, should be restricted to the designated residents only. This is a Secured by Design recommendation for buildings of over 26 dwellings.
- The provision of an intrusion detection system for each house and individual flat. This will preferably be wired as opposed to wireless devices.
- Any CCTV installed should have the specific needs and purposes of the system established by a Video Surveillance System (VSS) Operational Requirement completed by a credible contractor (National Security Inspectorate (NSI) or Security Systems and Alarms Inspection Board (SSAIB) accreditation for CCTV systems).

8: Conclusion

This application has been assessed against the existing crime environment and the potential concerns created by the proposed site. It is concluded that every effort has been made to negate such concerns through thoughtful design. The restoration and refurbishment of Duke Street Mill offers significant benefits from a historical perspective and local aesthetics and facilities. Given the current site condition, this development can only have a positive influence on the area and reduce opportunities for crime and fear of crime.

Recommendations have been made throughout this document to increase resilience to crime and compliance with the relevant Secured by Design standards.

9: Appendix 1: References

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- www.data.cdrc.ac.uk/dataset/index-multiple-deprivation-imd
- www.securedbydesign.com
- <https://www.sia-group.co.uk/property1/mtown-centre-mill-multi-storey-potential-investment-development-opportunity-sale/>
- Secured by Design Homes Guide 2024
- Site plans provided by CJ Partnership

9: Appendix 2: Standards

The following standards and features are recommended and are required for this development to demonstrate appropriate physical security to meet Secured by Design test standards.

LPS 1175 (Loss Prevention Standard)

Requirements and testing procedures for the Loss Prevention Certification Board (LPCB) certification and listing of intruder-resistant building components, strongpoints, security enclosures and free-standing barriers.

LPCB's Loss Prevention Standards (LPS) are now widely recognised and applied in fire and security sectors around the world. LPCB offers third-party certification confirming that products and services have met and will continue to meet these standards

Doors

- All external doors and windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 (2022), LPS 2081: Issue 1.1 B3 rating or higher, LPS 1175: Issue 8 B3 rating or higher.
BS PAS 24 (2022) supersedes PAS 24 (2016) which was withdrawn on 20/09/24 and provides a method for testing and assessing enhanced security performance requirements of doorsets and windows.
- Glazing in doorsets and lower-level windows should be compliant with BS EN 356: 2000.
- External doors and access doors into the individual units should have 3 hinges and a 5-lever mortice deadlock (to BS 3621/98) – assumed keyless egress.
- BS EN 1125 (for panic hardware) and BS EN 179 (for emergency exit devices).
- Multipoint locking assemblies equivalent to BS8621, including those on double or folding doors.

Windows

Note that BS7950 (1997) has now been withdrawn. Where stated, BS7950 must be supported by the following performance standards relevant to the material used:

- PAS 24:2022 standard
- STS 204 Issue 6:2016
- LPS 1175 Issue 7.2:2014 Security Rating 1;
- LPS 1175 Issue 8:2018 Security Rating 1/A1;
- STS 202 Issue 7:2016 Burglary Rating 1;
- LPS 2081 Issue 1.1:2016 Security Rating A

Variants for window material

- BS 4873 (2005) Specification for aluminium windows
- BS 7412 (2007) Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.
- BS 644-1 (2003) Wood windows. Specification for factory-assembled windows – various types.
- BWF: TWAS Timber window accreditation scheme.
- BS 6510 (2005) Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.
- LPS 1270 (2010) Burglary resistance of security glazing and glazing films. Based on LPS 1175, this standard enables specifiers to select glazing films that offer resistance to manual attack equivalent to the building products in which the glass or film is to be used.

Illumination

- External areas of the proposed site should be illuminated to BS5489-1: 2020.

Access Controls

- AACS should be installed in line with BN EN 60839 – 11-1: 2013 and 11-2: 2015

Video Surveillance (CCTV)

- BS EN 62676-4:2015: Video surveillance systems for use in security applications
- BS EN IEC 62676-5:2018: Video surveillance systems for use in security applications - data specifications and image quality performance for camera devices.

Fencing

- LPS 1175 Issue 7 Security Rating 1, or LPS 1175 Issue 8 Security Rating A1.
- All fencing must be installed by the manufacturer provided by the manufacturer. BS 1722 offers installation advice.

Building Intruder Detection System

- The building intrusion detection system should be installed in line with BS EN 50131 (wired systems are preferable to wireless devices).

Appendix 3: Assessor/Author Qualifications

Assessor/Author

This report was completed by Andrea Dobson BSc CSMP® F.ISMI®

Relevant Qualifications

- Degree of Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice
- Subsidiary Degree of Bachelor of Science in Sociology
- Certified Security Management Professional (Level 6) (Distinction)
- NEBOSH Certificate (Distinction)
- Level 4 Award in the Internal Quality Assurance of Assessment Processes and Practice (RQF)
- Level 3 Award in Assessing Vocationally Related Achievement

Professional Memberships

- Fellow of the International Security Management Institute
- Full member of the Association of Security Consultants (ASC) and has achieved Registered Independent Security Consultant (RISC) status

Experience

- 30 years within the security industry, 18 of which in a management role with direct crime prevention responsibilities

Ongoing Personal Development

- Attendance at exhibitions, conferences and online training sessions/webinars
- Actively teach and coach crime prevention and security design topics in a Level 6 security programme
- Development of new materials and library sources for students on a Level 6 security management programme

Additional details of the author's qualifications, experience and competencies are available at:

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