



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
LAND OFF MAYFIELD STREET, ROCHDALE

For: Rochdale Borough Council
Version A: 20/03/2026
Reference: 2025/0013/CIS/01

designforsecurity



Land off Mayfield Street

URN: 2025/0013/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed development is suitable for this area, and the layout of the development is broadly acceptable with regards to designing out crime. There are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report including, but not limited to, the below:

- The school perimeter should be secured with a robust weldmesh or railings to an appropriate height (see section 3.3.1)
- Physical security, lighting, CCTV and access control should be carefully considered across the site, to deter criminals from targeting the school.

It is highly recommended that these points are considered, along with the remaining points in section 3.3 of the report.



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
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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent site, edged in red. The site is located in the Rochdale area, close to the town centre area.

The site is located on Mayfield Street, with forms the Eastern boundary of the site with the footpath that continues to Dean Street/Roch Street to the North, the other site boundaries include the rears of dwellings on Lower Roch Road / Millview Lane to the North, to the South by Rochdale Boroughwide Housing & car parking area, and to the West by industrial units (Hamer Lane) and Rochdale Community Fire Station (Halifax Road).

The local area is a mix commercial/industrial uses to the South and residential properties to the North.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Local Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2025 to 31st January 2026.

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
11	5	45	183	9	<5	<5	12	6	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is low. The most frequently occurring crimes in the area are criminal damage, violent crime, and vehicle crime. Schools have regularly been targeted by offenders – particularly in the evening and at night, with offenders typically forcing open doors, windows, or exploiting vulnerable single storey roofs.

2.2 General Risk Factors

- 2.2.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property
- Unauthorised access to buildings and private spaces
- Antisocial behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Internal theft
- Theft of staff / pupil belongings
- Staff, pupil and parent safety
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period

2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.3.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting schools and educational buildings are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements / tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to a relevant security standard (see section 4.1 for more details. All glazing in doors (and windows) should be laminated and certified under BS EN 356.

- Offenders have climbed onto the roof of single-storey building elements and gained access through the roof itself or through high level roof-lights / windows.

Possible Solution – Where possible eaves heights should be high enough to prevent roofs from being easily climbed. Any single storey elements should have a reinforced roof to prevent an offender from damaging it to gain entry.

- Where the point of entry is unknown / legitimate, this is likely to have been when offenders have gained access to insecure rooms / areas unnoticed, before targeting equipment (such as laptops, media / musical equipment, tools etc.).


Possible Solution – All internal doors into rooms should be robust and capable of being locked. Consideration should be given to installing a burglary resistant doorset into any rooms containing/storing valuable equipment.

- Posing as legitimate students / visitors enter restricted areas by means of insecure doors.

Possible Solution – Students and staff should be provided with lockers so that they can secure their property. All classrooms should be capable of being locked when not in use.

2.4 Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against educational facilities, recorded in the Rochdale area.





- 2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at educational facilities in Rochdale peaks on Sunday – when many are likely to be closed. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon and into the late evening/early hours of the morning. The opportunities often rise in the afternoon, when large numbers of students are entering / leaving buildings, staff presence is likely to be lower and parents / carers enter school sites – providing anonymity to offenders. Offenders often target buildings at night when they are closed, it is dark, streets are typically quieter and they perceive a lower risk of being detected.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements, gaining access.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Offenders have climbed onto the roof of single-storey building elements and gained access through the roof itself or through high level roof-lights / windows.
- Where the point of entry is unknown / legitimate, this is likely to have been when offenders have gained access to insecure rooms / areas unnoticed, before targeting equipment (such as laptops, media / musical equipment, tools etc.).

2.5 Theft Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against educational facilities, recorded in the Rochdale area.



2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft at educational facilities in Rochdale peaks on Monday. During the day, the risk of theft peaks during the early hours of the morning and during the normal school / college day, with offences frequently taking place during breaks, when pupils and staff leave personal property in unlocked rooms, where they are accessible and vulnerable to theft. Mobile phones, cash, bags and coats are the most routinely stolen items. Out-of-hours, externally stored equipment/materials have been targeted.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposed development is of new build SEND school, comprising a Pupil Referral Unit (PRU), car parking area, pupil drop off, multi-use gaming area (MUGA), and associated soft/hard landscaping. The main vehicular/pedestrian access to the site will be taken from Mayfield Street with emergency access formed on Lower Roch Road.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 Both main entrances to the building are taken from prominent locations on the building where they can easily be seen from Mayfield Street, allowing for natural surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.2 The entrances into the building will both have secure lobbies, which will be overlooked by staff offices, allowing staff to vet everyone entering the building before allowing them further access.
- 3.2.3 The staff and visitor car parking areas will reduce the potential burden on street parking and reduce the potential for conflict with local residents/businesses.
- 3.2.4 The proposed drop-off area and one-way system will reduce parking in the local area at dropping off/picking up times.

-
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The site boundary should be formed by railings or rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh and gates (please see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers) – ideally to a height of 2400mm, but at least 2000mm as currently proposed. Care should also be taken to ensure that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates and there should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing.
- 3.3.2 The design of any new vehicular/pedestrian gates should not feature any climbing aids such as horizontal bars or exposed hinges. The distance between the gate and the road should be minimal to prevent an offender crawling under.
- 3.3.3 Outside of main arriving/departing times for pupils and staff, gates should be secured to prevent unauthorised access into the school grounds (i.e. the secure perimeter of the school).
- 3.3.4 There should be an intercom on the main entrance door to restrict access into the reception lobby to legitimate visitors. There must be a secondary access control door into the school from the reception area, so that visitors cannot access the main school area directly from the lobby without being permitted access or supervised.
- 3.3.5 The school building should have a monitored intruder alarm linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognised Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.
- 3.3.6 For the purpose of community/out-of-hours use, the building and external spaces should be capable being zoned, so that people are guided appropriately to where they need to go and prevented from accessing other areas. There should be a robust access control system in place to prevent unauthorised access, and the alarm system should be zoned so that during any community use the unused areas of the school building can still be secured.
- 3.3.7 Staff should be provided with a secure area to store personal belongings (i.e. lockers) within a secure area of the school building which is restricted to staff, such as the staff room.
- 3.3.8 The landscaping of the schools' grounds should be carefully considered so that concealed or secluded places are not created, good sightlines can be maintained, and that CCTV/lighting are not adversely affected by trees and shrubbery. It is highly recommended that any low planting is kept to a maximum of 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2400mm.
- 3.3.9 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme and the development is built to Secured by Design standards.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 External Doorsets

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ Sliding/revolving doors should be tested and certified to LPS117 SR2.
- ☐ The main entrance to the school should be security-certified to one of the above standards, including a multi-point electronic lock system permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated remotely by reception staff. There should be internal doors off the entrance lobby that should also be capable of being remotely secured/released by reception staff, to ensure all visitors to the building are vetted before being allowed further access into the building.

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- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows and Shutters

- ☐ Ground floor windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR 2 or LPS 2081 SR B.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the entire building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognised Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
- External doors
 - The internal doors taken off the main entrance lobby (if speed gates or turnstiles are not used).
 - Doors needed to provide internal zoning and restrict access to parts of the building not in use (e.g. during evenings/weekends or community use)
 - Doors to staff only areas
 - IT room(s)/stores
 - All internal doors/frames to classrooms, offices and stores should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a deadlock, so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.

4.6 Car parking

- ☐ Car parking bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.
- ☐ The car parking area and main pedestrian routes should be illuminated to BS 5489.
- ☐ Bicycle stands should be Sheffield style or similar, allowing both wheels and the frame of the bicycle to be secured.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes and parking areas in accordance with BS 5489.

- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 Boundary treatments

- ☐ Any new secure fence lines within the site should be formed by 2400mm high railings or rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing and gates, to prevent unauthorised access during the day.
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that any new panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and any gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, lighting columns, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ Existing site boundaries should be inspected for any damage and replaced or repaired where necessary. Replacement boundaries should be in keeping with the existing boundaries or to the specification above.



4.9 CCTV

- ☐ The school and grounds should be covered with a comprehensive CCTV system (see section 5 for more details.)

5 CCTV Guidance

5.1 Resolution, Identification & Retention

- ☐ Select camera resolution based on identification requirements and field of view. More megapixels provide higher detail but also increase bandwidth and storage requirements.
- ☐ Recommended resolution levels:
 - 1080p (2MP): General indoor and corridor surveillance.
 - 4MP–8MP (4K): Entrances, exits, and high-security areas for facial or number plate recognition.
 - >8MP: Large-area coverage or post-event digital zooming.
- ☐ The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

5.2 Image Quality

- ☐ High-quality imaging is the foundation of effective CCTV. Selecting cameras with the right sensor size, lens aperture, and image processing capabilities ensures accurate visual data capture across lighting conditions.
- ☐ Key considerations:
 - Larger sensors and low f-number lenses capture more light and deliver better contrast.
 - Use Wide Dynamic Range (WDR) cameras for scenes with bright and dark areas.
 - Apply Day/Night and IR-capable cameras for low-light performance.

- Frame rates between 25–30 fps are recommended for motion clarity.

5.3 Camera Placement and Coverage

- ☐ Camera placement directly affects image usability. Ensure coverage overlap and proper mounting height to minimise blind spots.
- ☐ Placement principles:
 - Mount indoor cameras between 2.5–3 m to prevent tampering while retaining facial detail.
 - Outdoor cameras should be positioned to avoid glare and direct sunlight.
 - Slight overlap of camera fields ensures seamless coverage.
 - Combine wide-angle lenses for area coverage and narrow lenses for detail zones.

5.4 Environmental and Housing Considerations

- ☐ Outdoor and exposed cameras must withstand environmental and mechanical impacts. Select housings rated for weather and vandal resistance.
 - Minimum IP65/66 for outdoor use.
 - IK10 or equivalent vandal-resistant enclosures.
 - Integrated IR or OptimizedIR functions for low-light areas.
 - Avoid steep downward angles; maintain clear facial perspective.

5.5 Network and System Design

- ☐ Design the video system architecture around IP-based network cameras for scalability, reliability, and flexibility. Core design elements to consider:
 - Use Power over Ethernet (PoE) to simplify installation.
 - Calculate bandwidth and storage based on resolution, frame rate, and retention time.
 - Apply compression standards (H.264/H.265) to optimise storage.
 - Ensure strong cybersecurity: password protection, encryption, network segmentation.

5.6 Maintenance and Quality Assurance

- ☐ Routine inspection and maintenance are critical to sustaining image quality and reliability.
 - Perform day/night checks post-installation.
 - Clean lenses regularly and inspect mounting fixtures.
 - Review recorded footage to confirm identification quality.
 - Update firmware and review network security periodically.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable, and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 6.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter/graffiti removal

- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV etc.)
 - A weekly physical check of all perimeters fencing to check for damage
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 6.1.3 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- ☐ Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to certain areas.

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8 Construction

- 8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 8.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see [Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit [Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security](#).

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
15/01/2026	Ross Lockwood	CIS application received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
SEV BAP 00 DR A	Level 00 - Proposed Lower Ground Floor Plan	06/01/2026	P03
SEV BAP 01 DR A	Level 01 - Proposed Mezzanine Floor	06/01/2026	P03
SEV BAP 02 DR A	Level 02 - Proposed Upper Ground Floor	06/01/2026	P03
SEV BAP DR A	Proposed Site Plan	06/01/2026	P04

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	20/02/2026	

D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

[Design For Security – Designing Out Crime](#) – apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police

[Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) – SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies

[ParkMark - Home](#) – Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme

[NBS Source](#) – find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)

[RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book](#) – search for LPS 1175 certified products