



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Development of 4 houses and 21 apartments
AT Land west of the Junction of Drake Street and Broadfield Stile, Rochdale

FOR: **Great Places Housing Group**

Version A: **08.05.26**

2026/0060/CIS/01

design**for**security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

We welcome investment in sites within inner Rochdale and support redevelopment of this site for residential purposes.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include: the development will result in the re-use of a vacant site; the buildings will animate the adjoining streets with the introduction of activity and passive surveillance; there will be an appropriate number and mix of houses and apartments; and parking has been included on the site.

We have some concerns about the permeability of the development in particular, but advice is included in section 3.3 and 4 of this report, which, if adopted, will greatly enhance security, and enable us to support the proposals. The principal recommendations relate to:

- securing the car park and site boundaries;
- other than at the main entrance to the apartments building, restricting access to the site non-residents;
- the security of the doors and windows;
- apartments and houses;
- controlling access into the apartment building and the car park; and,
- providing appropriately secure cycle parking.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Rochdale Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award, and the condition will be met.

Adrian Murphy MRTPI

Consultant

e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

Contents

1	The Site and Surrounding	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood around the site	
	2.2 Crime rate comparison	
	2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary & theft at houses and apartments in Rochdale, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities	
	2.4 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns	
3	Development Appraisal	9
	3.1 The proposed development	
	3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals	
	3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the scheme	
4	Physical Security	11
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Window frames	
	4.3 Glazing	
	4.4 Intruder alarm	
	4.5 Landscaping	
	4.6 Lighting	
	4.7 Meter cupboards	
	4.8 Downpipes	
5	Management & Maintenance	13
6	Construction	13
7	Secured by Design (SBD)	13


Appendix

A	Contact Register	13
B	Associated Documents.....	13
C	CIS Version History	13
D	Glossary	14

1 The Site and Surrounding

The photographs and plan, below, show the application site and its surroundings. The site, edged in red on the plan, is located on the north side of Drake Street at its junction with Broadfield Stile, Rochdale. Drake Street is a well-trafficked route that connects the town centre, some 900metres further along the road to the north-east of the site, with the town's main arterial road, A58, Manchester Road, around 220 metres to the west. Double yellow lines and a pelican crossing restrict parking on Drake Street in the immediate vicinity of the site. In terms of land use, Drake Street includes a mix of residential and commercial premises. Broadfield Stile adjoins the site's eastern boundary; it is a lightly-trafficked, short, connector road that links Drake Street with St Alban's Street to the north. Parked cars line the street. Beech House Lower Preparatory School and its main entrance are situated directly opposite the site on the eastern side of Broadfield Stile. Congested with parked cars, St Alban's Street lies immediately north of the site. This street also includes a mix of commercial and residential property. A pedestrian entrance to Broadfield Park and a children's playground within Park itself is situated to the north of St Alban's Street, whilst a series of pathways within the park facilitate access to Rochdale town centre about 500metres north-east of the site. There are two vehicle repair workshops adjoining the site's western boundary, one facing Drake Street and the other facing St Alban's Street.


The Drake Street edge of the site with commercial properties in the background to the west



A southerly view across the site towards Drake Street



Looking north along Broadfield Stile with the site on the left and Beech House School opposite



Looking across St Alban's Street from Broadfield Park towards the site's northern boundary



Looking north-west across the site with commercial premises to the west and terraced housing to the north



The western approach to the site on St Alban's Street



This prominently located, rectangular site, formerly the Rochdale DVLA test centre at 206-208 Drake Street, covers an area of around 0.32 hectares. Following demolition of the test centre, site has been vacant for over 17 years and is now overgrown with vegetation. It has been subject to fly-tipping and there appears to be a tent on the site suggesting it is being used by a homeless individual. It is in a very unattractive, untidy condition. The former vehicle access into the site is still evident on Drake Street, located mid-way between a pedestrian crossing and a bus stop/shelter. The site boundaries are defined by a mixture of neighbouring workshop buildings and brick and stone walls of varying height supplemented with timber and wire-mesh, fencing. Despite the boundary treatments, entry into the site can be easily gained from Broadfield Stile. Planning permission for 17 houses was granted in 2010, but this consent was never implemented.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below relates to crimes committed with 500m of the site between 1st April 2025 to 31st March 2026.

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood around the site

All crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Use, or threat, of violence	Theft including shoplifting	Robbery	Drug offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
7	19	85	723	137	23	92	32	20	0

2.1.1 There were 1138 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This number of is two-three times that recorded in a typical neighbourhood within Rochdale, but the area analysed covers the southern fringe of the town centre, a large number of commercial premises including shops and take-aways located on Tweeddale Road and Milkstone Road, and the railway station, all of which tend to be crime generators.

2.1.2 Expressed as a percentage of the total crimes recorded:

- Crimes involving the use, or threat, of violence - 64%
- Theft (including bicycle theft, robbery, and shoplifting) - 12%
- Drug offences – 8%
- Criminal damage - 7%
- Vehicle crime - 5%
- Burglary – 2%
- Robbery – 2%.

2.1.3 The streets experiencing the most crimes were:



- The Esplanade (220 offences)
- Tweeddale Street (185)
- Dane Street (79)
- Drake Street (64)
- Packer Street (55)
- Manchester Road (30)
- Sparrow Hill (43)
- Milkstone Road (36)
- Maclure Road (32)

Domestic burglary

2.1.4 There were 7 burglaries committed within the neighbourhood during the period analysed, whilst there was no particular concentration of offences, 2 of which occurred on Tweeddale Street and 2 on Ann Street. There were too few to incidents to suggest a pattern of offences, though more burglaries occurred towards the end of the working week and in the late evening/at night. Offender gained entry by forcing a door on one occasion, forcing a window on another and by entering via unsecured doors or windows on the remaining.

Vehicle crime



2.1.5 Vehicle-related crime occurs more frequently – there were 52 incidents. The risk of being victimised falls towards the middle of the week before rising again as the weekend approaches.





- 2.1.6 The most common time for such crimes to be committed is in the afternoon and late evening, which is typical for a neighbourhood on the edge of the town centre.

2.2 Crime rate comparison

Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Rochdale, Greater Manchester, and England & Wales *England & Wales data is from January – December 2021.*



- 2.2.1 The rate of burglary per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **69% lower** than the Rochdale rate, **69% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **68% lower** than the rate across England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of wounding crimes per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **58% higher** than the Rochdale rate, **85% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **254% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.



- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **77% higher** than the Rochdale rate, **100% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **143% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.

-
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **44% higher** than the Rochdale rate, **60% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **95% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary & theft at houses and apartments in Rochdale, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3.1 Communal entrance doors and apartment doors were targeted when left unsecured by residents.

To minimise the risk of offenders tailgating through communal doors or entering apartments through unsecured doors:

- communal entry doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure;
- install a secondary set of secure doors (air-lock/secure lobby), also self-closing and self-locking;
- install lifts that are operated by an access control system;
- install CCTV cameras in the entrance lobby;
- employ a concierge; and,
- apartment doors should be self-closing with a thumb turn lock on the inner side that meets fire regulations, with clear, yet discreet, permanent instructions on the door to inform the resident that the door is not secure until the lock is turned.

2.3.1 Doors and windows have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors and windows:

- all external doors and windows should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors and windows are difficult to force open;
- internal doors to staff-only rooms should be fitted with suitable locks and self-closing mechanisms that ensure the door locks automatically upon closure;
- defensible space should be provided to the front of a building. A degree of separation between public and private space can act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are then less willing to cross from public to clearly defined private space. Such boundary definition can also reduce the risk of criminal damage to property;
- gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and a locking gate, so that rear doors and windows are only accessible to residents (staff); and,
- all external doors should be illuminated by dusk-to-dawn lighting.

2.3.2 Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry or commit criminal damage

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground floor of the development;
- windows should be fitted with locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to private amenity space should be restricted by installing high fencing and locking gates.

2.3.3 Breaking into garden sheds using force to gain entry.

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing entry into garden sheds:

- shed doors should be fitted with a Sold Secure™ hasp and staple, which is coach-bolted through the frame, and secured with a Sold Secure padlock.

2.3.4 Offenders have stolen bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting bicycles:

- secure cycle parking should be provided at each house;

- a cycle store should be provided within a secure part of the apartment site;
- CCTV should monitor activity in and around cycle stores; and,
- PIR lighting should be installed to illuminate the cycle stores.

2.3.5 Vehicles were targeted when parked in unsecured car parks or on the 'street'

To minimise the risk of vehicle-related crime:

- car parking should be located on a gated driveway within the boundaries of the property where it can be supervised by its owner; and,
- car parking should be located within the boundaries of the development, or within an area that is both very secure, well-overlooked by residents or monitored by an effective CCTV system. Consideration should be given to installing automatic vehicle gates and fencing around communal car parks.

2.3.6 Offenders have damaged boundary fencing

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting fencing:

- fence panels should be especially robust when they are exposed to the public realm.

2.3.7 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol or visit during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be suitably arranged to prevent forced access onto the site and theft; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with tracking devices.

2.4 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the site is prominently located on Drake Street, benefitting from the casual supervision by regular passing pedestrian and vehicle traffic;
- the potential for additional supervision over the site boundaries is provided by the presence of staff of neighbouring businesses during the working day and by parents and staff associated with the prep school at pick up/drop off times during term times;
- residents of neighbouring houses and apartments, and proprietors of adjoining businesses and the prep school have a personal stake in being vigilant to crime and disorder and their presence is likely to deter some offenders;

- the presence of the park with its playground attracts parents with their children. The presence of parents near to the site may deter offenders;
- there is nothing at the site that might attract offenders;
- easy access into the site by vehicle is not easy as much of the site boundary is defined with high walls or fencing;

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is very visible to passing offenders on Drake Street. Offenders are likely to notice the development as it emerges from early in the construction phase, and be aware of, and potentially exploit, any criminal opportunities;
- the environmental quality at the site is currently poor. Poor quality environments may attract offenders who, due to the lower environmental standards, might perceive that their actions will be tolerated or go unnoticed;
- three of the four site boundaries are 'exposed' to the public realm, making them easier to target by passing offenders;
- there are several routes around the site perimeter, on- and off-road, via which an offender can approach or escape;
- given the presence of a tent, the site appears to be used by homeless person; and,
- the perimeter walls and fencing do not adequately secure the site.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

- 3.1.1 This application seeks full planning approval for the erection of a residential development comprising the construction of four houses and twenty-one apartments.
- 3.1.2 The houses will be erected in a single terrace at the north-eastern corner of the site. Each house will have four bedrooms, a front door facing Broadfield Stile, a modest front garden and a more generous, rear garden. Car parking for the houses, two spaces per dwelling, will be located to the rear in a communal parking area, accessed from St Alban's Street. Rear doors and rear garden gates will provide a more direct route from each house to their respective parking bays.
- 3.1.3 A single, three-storey, apartment building is proposed which will occupy most of the southern half of the site. There will be seven apartments per floor with a mix of one- and two-bedrooms. The principal entrance will be on the eastern elevation facing Broadfield Stile. The door will open into an entrance lobby. Parking bays will also be located in the same communal area as the houses at the rear. Fourteen spaces will be allocated to apartment residents.
- 3.1.4 The fringes of the site will be landscaped with a mix of plants, grass and trees. A bin store will be located at western edge of the site between the site boundary and the car park. There is no indication of cycle parking provision.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals

- 3.2.1 A residential development is an appropriate use for the site given the proximity of other residential properties.
- 3.2.2 Sites like this are prone to attracting anti-social behaviour in the form of fly-tipping fire raising or graffiti. The redevelopment of the site will restrict the ability for such activities to take place.
- 3.2.3 Great Places Housing Group have an excellent record of development and housing management.
- 3.2.4 There are an appropriate number and mix of houses and apartments within the development, which increases the likelihood of residents being from a broader age range, including young singles, older residents and families with children. Such a mix increases the likelihood of some of the residents of the houses and apartments being present throughout the day. The presence of residents or even just visible signs of people present - car in the car park, lights on in apartments/houses, external lighting on at entrance doors, for example - will help to deter offenders.

-
- 3.2.5 The apartment building is suitably located, and includes parking and a small area of amenity space on the site. The proposed location of the communal entrance door is appropriate, and a secure lobby can be created with the installation of access controls to the inner doors on each floor and rear access door.
 - 3.2.6 Front doors and principal room windows of the houses face the 'street', which helps to promote street activity and promotes natural surveillance. The school on the opposite side of Broadfield Stile will benefit from mutual supervision of the street from the proposed houses and apartments.
 - 3.2.7 'Defensible space' is provided to the front of the houses and the apartment building.
 - 3.2.8 Private amenity space is provided within rear gardens of the houses, which can be appropriately secured with suitably high, boundary fencing and gates.
 - 3.2.9 The landscaping of the apartment grounds and modest front gardens of the houses will support the quality of the local environment. Well-maintained verdant environments tend to attract less crime and anti-social behaviour.
 - 3.2.10 The proposed parking arrangements set within a defined boundary will facilitate the security of vehicles. Car parking provision that is separated from the passing public is less likely to be targeted by offenders than cars parked on the street.
 - 3.2.11 A refuse store is provided within the grounds of the apartment building.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the scheme

Security of the houses and gardens

- 3.3.1 Security-certified, external, front and rear doors, and ground floor window frames should be installed at each property. Laminated glass should be fitted to ground floor windows and external doors. An intruder alarm is advised.
- ☐ 3.3.2 Rear gardens should be secured with 1800mm high fencing and gates. Inter-garden boundaries at the rear of the houses should be formed with close-boarded, timber fencing and include an 1800mm high, privacy screen, perpendicular to the house. The fencing may be reduced to 1500mm for the remainder of the boundary or include a 1200mm/1500mm fence, finished with a 300mm high section of trellis.
- 3.3.2 The St Albans Street boundary of Plot 1 should include a 300mm section of trellis raising the height to 2,100mm. The locking mechanism of the rear garden gates should be capable of being operated from either side of the gate so that residents can enter or leave the garden to reach their car. Ideally, the gates should be self-closing and self-locking.

Security of the apartment building

- 3.3.3 Security-certified, external, front and side entrance doors, apartment entrance doors, and ground floor window frames should be installed at each property. Laminated glass should be fitted to ground floor windows and external doors.
- 3.3.4 To minimise the risk of offenders 'tail-gating' legitimate residents/visitors via the communal entrance door, the inner lobby door should include a fob-operated, electronic lock.
- 3.3.5 The communal entrance door should be brightly illuminated.
- 3.3.6 Individual, robust and lockable, postal boxes for each apartment should be located in the entrance lobby or on the external wall adjacent to the communal entrance door.

Communal car park entrance and access road

- 3.3.7 Given the local on street parking issues relating to the school and local businesses in particular, to prevent abuse of the car park by non-residents, fob-activated, 1,800mm high, motorised gates that match the height of the adjacent wall/railings should be fitted at the vehicle entrance.
- 3.3.8 In order to emphasise ownership and suggest that a threshold has been crossed into a space that is more private, where one's actions may be under greater scrutiny, the application of a high-quality surfacing of the entrance to the pathways and car park is recommended. Rather than a standard, tarmac finish, consider blockwork or a coloured tarmac.
- 3.3.9 Install planters, bollards or knee-rails to prevent any vehicles parking in undesignated areas, particularly on the pathways, where they may obstruct the flow of vehicles and restrict access.

Restrict access along pathways

- 3.3.10 To avoid the site being used as a cut-through by non-residents, the pathway linking Broadfield Stile to main entrance should be fitted with a 1,000mm high, self-closing, pedestrian gate. Fencing and gates around 1,500mm high, should be installed at an appropriate point north of the communal entrance door to control access between the communal entrance door and the car park. The gate should be fitted with a fob-activated electronic lock and be self-closing and lock upon closure.
- 3.3.11 The pathway linking Drake Street to the western side of the building should be secured with a 1,800mm high, gate – fitted with panic hardware, if necessary.

Site boundary fencing

- 3.3.12 The St Alban's Street boundary should be defined and secured with 1800 high wall or railings.
- 3.3.13 The Drake Street boundary should be defined with a 1200mm high railing which returns onto Broadfield Stile to the apartment entrance pathway.
- 3.3.14 The Broadfield Stile boundary, between the apartment entrance pathway and Plot 4, should be 1500-1800mm high railings.
- 3.3.15 The Broadfield Stile boundary of the houses should be defined with 1,000-1,200mm high railings with a similarly styled entrance gate.

Rear access to car park from 27, 29 and 33 Newall Road

- 3.3.16 The digital locks fitted to the new gates to be installed to facilitate access to the car park for the residents of 27, 29 and 33 Newall Road should be BS8607 rated. Alternatively, products such as the Jacksons Fencing, Gate Latch Deluxe, 2-way lockable gate latch or a Gatemate would be suitable.

Rear access to car park plot 04

- 3.3.17 There appears to be no reason to install a garden-to-car park gate to plot 04 or the pathway along the edge of plots 04 and 05.

Pathways at the front of plots 01, 02 and 03

- 3.3.18 Like those at plots 04-08, the paths connecting the street to the front door should be straight and direct.
- 3.3.19 Stone setts, or similar, should be used to form a visible dividing/ownership line between pathways/driveways.

Cycle parking

- 3.3.20 Houses should include a garden shed with their doors secured with a Sold Secure™, padlock and hasp and staple, and fitted with a Sold Secure™, ground anchor.
- 3.3.21 A secure, cycle store should be provided within the secure grounds of the apartment building. The gate to the store should include a fob-activated electronic lock and be self-closing and lock upon closure. Within the store, Sheffield stands set in concrete are ideal for residents to secure their bikes.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

Apartments

- ☐ The communal doors should be:
- compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2;
 - include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system; and,
 - self-closing and lock automatically on closure.
- ☐ An audio-visual unit should be located at communal, entrance door to allow visitors to communicate with residents.
- ☐ Residents should have a handset in their apartment to speak to (and view) visitors arriving at the front entrance door.

-
- ☐ Residents should be able to remotely operate the communal entry door's locking mechanism from within their apartments to allow bona fide visitors entry.
 - ☐ Other than in an emergency, the communal entrance should be the sole means of entering and leaving the building.
 - ☐ Apartment entrance and garden/terrace access doors must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2:
 - ☐ Apartment entrance doors must include a door viewer and chain, or similar opening limiter.
 - ☐ Each apartment should be clearly numbered.
 - ☐ The means of escape door must also be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2:

Houses

- ☐ Front doors and back doors must all be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS 202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Front doors should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key when closed.
- ☐ Front doors should have fixed sidelights or a door viewer, as well as an opening limiter fitted, so that residents can identify visitors prior to opening the door fully.
- ☐ Letter plates should meet the Door Hardware Federation's Technical Standard 008 (TS 008), be fitted with deflector plate, and be located a minimum of 400mm away from the internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Each house should be clearly numbered with the number visible from the street.

4.2 Window frames

- ☐ Ground floor windows of houses and apartments must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within, and surrounding, all external doors and all ground floor windows of the houses and apartments must incorporate at least one pane of glass compliant with the BS EN 356 P1A standard.

4.4 Intruder alarm

- ☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each property. Alarms should be linked to contacts on all external doors, with PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms that have windows. In the absence of an alarm a 13amp fuse spur should be provided to allow future residents to fit their own alarm.

4.5 Landscaping

- ☐ In order to facilitate natural surveillance across the development, any shrub planting within front gardens should not exceed 1200mm in height and tree canopies throughout the public realm of the site should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn, LED lighting must be provided to the car park, the rear garden-to-car park gates, and all front, side and rear doors of all houses and the apartment building.

4.7 Meter cupboards

- ☐ Unless smart meters are installed, meters should be located in ground level boxes to the front of each house, not with the secure area at the side or rear of the properties. Meters to the apartments should be located in a secure cupboard in, for example, the lobby

4.8 Downpipes

- ☐ Wherever possible, downpipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the brickwork to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address maintenance of the apartment building, car park and access road, vehicle gates, access controls, and amenity areas.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out. The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme and site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved.

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
17.03.26	Connor Tulip, Paddock Johnson Architects	Request for Crime Impact Statement
23.03.26		Site visited
08.05.26	Connor Tulip, Paddock Johnson Architects	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawing:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
19146-PJA-00-ZZ-DR-A-1200-G	Proposed Site Plan	22.12.25	

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations in this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		08.05.26

D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

[Design For Security – Designing Out Crime](#) – apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police

[Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) – SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies

[ParkMark - Home](#) – Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme

[NBS Source](#) – find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)

[RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book](#) – search for LPS 1175 certified products