



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

DISCOUNT FOODSTORE (2,184sqm.)
LAND SOUTH OF WALLIS AVENUE, ROCHDALE

For: Lidl GB Limited
Version A: 05/05/2026
Reference: 2026/0119/CIS/01

designforsecurity

Land South of Wallis Avenue, Rochdale

URN: 2026/0119/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Secure enclosure of narrow, potentially hidden space to the rear (west) of the building and the service area/ramp to the north (in addition to the plant equipment compound), in order to protect the doors/shutter and the hidden elevations of the building and prevent loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour.
- Definition/enclosure to the street frontages of the site/store parking areas, including the prevention of unauthorised vehicular access out-of-hours.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

Bradley Hart

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site is bounded by Sir Isaac Newton Way to the south, Michael Faraday Avenue to the east and Wallis Avenue to the north, in the Kingsway Business Park area to the south-east of Rochdale.


The site is currently vacant, with grass/scrub vegetation, mature trees and low hedging to the Sir Isaac Newton Way site frontage and high hedging to the Michael Faraday Avenue street frontage.

To the north, on the opposite side of Wallis Avenue are two-storey detached, semi-detached and mews residential dwellings directly overlooking the site.

To the immediate west is a strip of vacant land similar to the site, beyond which is The Hornet public house and restaurant at the junction of Sir Isaac Way and Rochdale Bypass, which has a large car park accessed via Wallis Avenue.

On the opposite side of Sir Isaac Way from the site to the south is similar open space (also with mature trees and hedging along the street frontage) and sports facilities in the grounds of Kingsway Park High School, which provide little/no direct overlooking over the site. To the east of the site lies the large JD Sports Warehouse Distribution Centre which, given its largely blank facades and screen planting, provide little overlooking/surveillance over the site.

In terms of the wider area, there are industrial/commercial estates to the south-east and north-west, as well as residential estates to the north, west and south and large areas of open space to the north-east.



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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Local Crime Summary



The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2025 to 31st March 2026.

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	<5	16	92	10	<5	<5	6	7	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is relatively low for the Rochdale division. This is likely to be affected by the presence of large scale industrial developments and large areas of open space within the study area, which lower the density of development and typically attract fewer crime and disorder incidents.
- 2.1.2 The most prevalent type of recorded crime is less serious wounding, the incidents of which are concentrated at the nearby educational facility as well as the residential estates to the north, north-west, east and south. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported types of less serious woundings taking place, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates or neighbours, as well as some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed retail development, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft and local vehicle crime.

2.2 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis


The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site between 1st April 2025 to 31st March 2026.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime within the local area peaks on Tuesday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk fluctuates throughout the day and night. Vehicles parked on streets or within publicly accessible car parks, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within secure car parks/basement parking facilities.

2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary (Rochdale Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Rochdale retail premises remains consistently high, with a slight peak on Monday and Wednesday.



2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning when it is dark, the majority of such premises are closed/unoccupied, streets are quiet and offenders perceive a lower risk of being witnessed.

2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** When offenders have targeted Rochdale retail premises, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Shutters have been forced open with tools/implements, bodily pressure and vehicles to gain access or to target doors/windows behind them.
- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using implements and bodily pressure.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Where entry points were 'legitimate' or 'unknown', offenders are likely to have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have penetrated through walls and roofs using tools to gain access to premises.

2.4 Theft (Rochdale Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against retail, recorded in the Rochdale area during 2018 - 2019.



2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Rochdale retail premises peaks on Thursday.

2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or personal property stolen from customers (e.g. purses/wallets, mobile phones etc.). Theft of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.

2.5 General Risk Factors

2.5.1 **Retail:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Rochdale retail premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Rochdale Retail:** Shutters have been forced open with tools/implements, bodily pressure and vehicles to gain access or to target doors/windows behind them

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

-
- **Rochdale Retail:** Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using implements/tools and bodily pressure

Possible Solution - All external doors and accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1 & 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified windows and doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by (see Sections 4.5, 4.7 & 4.8).

- **Rochdale Retail:** Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Glazed shopfront areas should be protected by bollards or similar hard/soft landscaping features to prevent ramming and secured with shutters out-of-hours (also see Section 4.3).

- **Rochdale Retail:** Where entry points were 'legitimate' or 'unknown', offenders are likely to have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 4.1).

- **Rochdale Retail:** Offenders have penetrated through walls and roofs using tools to gain access to premises

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc (see Section 4.3). There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a Lidl food retail store, with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The building will occupy the western portion of the site, with a delivery ramp/service area and plant equipment enclosure to the north of the building. The entrance to the food store will be located at the south-eastern corner of the building and the store itself will include a large sales area (with customer W/C), a DRS room, a warehouse, a bakery, a bakery freezer, a chiller, storage and delivery area, as well as a cash office, IT room and staff facilities (including cloak room, canteen and W/Cs).
- 3.1.3 There will be a customer car park to east of the building, comprising of 122 no. spaces (including 6 no. disabled spaces, 9 no. parent and child spaces and 2 no. electric vehicle charging stations). The car park and service area will be accessed off Wallis Avenue to the north, with a separate pedestrian access points also off Michael Faraday Avenue to the east and Sir Isaac Newton Way to the south.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and, possibly, into the evening.
- 3.2.2 The proposed building will have a relatively simple footprint that will provide few potential places of concealment and facilitate efficient surveillance of external areas.
- 3.2.3 The proposed customer parking areas will be visible from the street, increasing natural surveillance opportunities. The parking areas will also be laid out in straight rows, with relatively few obstacles to views across them, further aiding surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.4 The main entrance to the store will be located in a prominent position, where it can be easily seen from the car park as well as the street.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The narrow and potentially hidden space along the rear of the store (between western boundary of the site and the adjacent Disposal Land) should be enclosed and secured with fencing and lockable gates (see Section 4.5 for more information) to prevent it from fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and protect the rear elevation/rear doors of the store from attack unseen. It is also highly recommended that the service/ramp area to the north side of the building is capable of being securely enclosed and gated to prevent unauthorised access, in addition to the plant equipment compound. This enclosure will protect the loading bays doors from attack/unauthorised vehicular access (and from unauthorised access if left insecure at any time), as well as prevent the service ramp from fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance, anti-social behaviour and mis-use - particularly out-of-hours and given its proximity to residential dwellings.
- 3.3.2 The street frontages of the site and car park should be defined by low-level railings or robust knee-rails and defensive planting beds and the vehicular access/egress point should be secured with vehicle arm barriers or retractable bollards when the store is closed, to prevent unauthorised vehicles getting close to the building and prevent mis-use of the car park out-of-hours (see Section 4.5 for more information).
- 3.3.3 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme as a whole. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doors (both single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 BR2 or LPS 1175 B3/SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ If the main entrance to the food store is to be formed by sliding doors, they should be tested and certified to BS EN 1627 RC2+, with multi-point locking (preventing sliding and lifting) and laminated glazing (see below). They should also be protected by a shutter (certified to LPS 1775 SR1/2) out-of-hours.
- ☐ Any external staff entrances to the building should be single-leaf, self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via staff proximity reader/key-fob.
- ☐ The cash office within the store should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a security-certified doorset to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 B3/SR2. All other internal doors to back-of-house/staff-only areas (including staff rooms, stock rooms, stores etc.) should have solid-core doors/frames with proximity-reader or swipe card auditable access controls, to prevent unauthorised access. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ☐ The dock level shutter/loading bay door should also meet at least LPS 1175 B3/SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

4.2 Window & Shutters

- ☐ Windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 B3/SR2 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards).
- ☐ Any shutters to be installed should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 B3/SR2 (or A1/SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, any external shutters should have shutter-boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building – where they would be less vulnerable to attack and would be less visually intrusive.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any areas of external cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ Any fully glazed elevations to the building should be protected by anti-ram bollards or hard landscaping features. Any louvered elevations should be of robust construction i.e. the louvres themselves should not be easily removable, easily damaged/bended and should be aligned to deter climbing. Security-certified louvered doorsets are also available if required (see [Product Category Search](#)).

- ☐ The eaves of the building should be as high as possible, in order to discourage unauthorised access to the roof. The design of the eaves should also discourage climbing e.g. with rounded or overhanging eaves and there should be no other features of the building (such as louvered features that could be used as a ladder, projecting window cills, canopies below the level of the eaves, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids onto the roof. The construction of any 'accessible' areas of roof should also be carefully considered to prevent criminal intrusion. Certificated lightweight roof systems are available to LPS 1175 SR1. Alternatively, expanded-metal or welded-mesh should be incorporated between the skins of double-skinned roof coverings or within the roof space.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to an anti-graffiti coating to any large expanses of blank walls (e.g. such as 'easy-on' protective coating, please see www.urbanhygiene.com for more information) that prevent it from adhering to the surface. If the surface is defaced, it can then be easily and quickly removed.

4.4 Alarm

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the food store, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room. The alarm itself should have two secure signalling paths (one being GSM radio back-up).

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The service area/ramp to the north of the store, the plant equipment compound and the narrow route to the rear (west) should be secured with fire-retardant acoustic/screen fencing, railings or rigid-panel welded-wire mesh fencing and vehicular/pedestrian gates, to a height of 2400mm. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and boundaries/gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as adjacent low walls, lighting columns, trees, street furniture etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through. Boundary treatments should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary. Boundary treatments and gates should also be subject to regular inspections and maintenance, in order to detect any potential weak points.
- ☐ Any pedestrian gates required for staff access should be self-closing and self-locking, operated by staff fob/card on access and egress. Where pedestrian gates may be required for emergency egress purposes, the release mechanism on the internal side of the gate should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the fenceline/gate.
- ☐ The street frontages of the site/car park should be defined by low-level railings (e.g. 1200mm high) or low-level, robust knee-rails along with low-level/dense defensive planting beds/hedges. The dedicated pedestrian routes into the site should be a formalised, well over-looked routes, set away from immediately adjacent parked vehicles. The vehicular access/egress point on Wallis Avenue should be secured with a vehicle arm barrier or retractable bollards when the store is closed.



4.6 Car Park

- ☐ Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ The surface of the car park should be even concrete/tarmac. The integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.
- ☐ Traffic calming measures should be incorporated to limit the speed of vehicles within the site.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all access roads/pedestrian routes within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Suitable locations for this scheme would be: [the main entrance to the store, all pay points/the cash office and all external areas \(including the car park, service area, all façades of the building\)](#). Where CCTV is to be installed, it should be compliant with BS EN 62676 and registered with the Information Commissioners Office (ICO) – see [Data protection and your business: Using CCTV - GOV.UK](#) for more details. There must also be clear signage to indicate recording is taking place, measures in place to control who can view recordings and controls to ensure the system is only used for the purpose it was intended for and no other reason. Designers should consider the following guidance when planning a CCTV strategy:

- [Resolution and Identification](#) - Select camera resolution based on identification requirements and field of view. More megapixels provide higher detail, but also increase bandwidth and storage requirements. Recommended resolution levels:
 - 1080p (2MP): General indoor and corridor surveillance.
 - 4MP–8MP (4K): Entrances, exits, and high-security areas for facial or number plate recognition.
 - >8MP: Large-area coverage or post-event digital zooming.
- [Image Quality](#) - High-quality imaging is the foundation of effective CCTV. Selecting cameras with the right sensor size, lens aperture, and image processing capabilities ensures accurate visual data capture across lighting conditions. Key considerations:
 - Larger sensors and low f-number lenses capture more light and deliver better contrast.
 - Use Wide Dynamic Range (WDR) cameras for scenes with bright and dark areas.
 - Apply Day/Night and IR-capable cameras for low-light performance.
 - Frame rates between 25–30 fps are recommended for motion clarity.
- [Camera Placement and Coverage](#) - Camera placement directly affects image usability. Ensure coverage overlap and proper mounting height to minimise blind spots. Placement principles:
 - Mount indoor cameras between 2500–3000mm high to prevent tampering while retaining facial detail.
 - Outdoor cameras should be positioned to avoid glare and direct sunlight.
 - Slight overlap of camera fields ensures seamless coverage.
 - Combine wide-angle lenses for area coverage and narrow lenses for detail zones.
- [Environmental and Housing Considerations](#) - Outdoor and exposed cameras must withstand environmental and mechanical impacts. Select housings rated for weather and vandal resistance.
 - Minimum IP65/66 for outdoor use.
 - IK10 or equivalent vandal-resistant enclosures.
 - Integrated IR or Optimized IR functions for low-light areas.
 - Avoid steep downward angles; maintain clear facial perspective.

- **Network and System Design** - Design the video system architecture around IP-based network cameras for scalability, reliability, and flexibility. Core design elements:
 - Use Power over Ethernet (PoE) to simplify installation.
 - Calculate bandwidth and storage based on resolution, frame rate, and retention time.
 - Apply compression standards (H.264/H.265) to optimise storage.
 - Ensure strong cybersecurity: password protection, encryption, network segmentation.
- **Maintenance and Quality Assurance** - Routine inspection and maintenance are critical to sustaining image quality and reliability:
 - Perform day/night checks post-installation.
 - Clean lenses regularly and inspect mounting fixtures.
 - Review recorded footage to confirm identification quality.
 - Update firmware and review network security periodically.

4.9 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 600mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots. These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.10 Other

- ☐ It is preferable for any shopping trolleys should be secured at night/when the store is closed to prevent theft/mis-use.
- ☐ It is also preferable to have cycle lockers for customers to use. If not, there should be 'sheffield' style racks (or similar) provided in a highly visible location. Cyclists should be encouraged to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar and, therefore, a design of cycle stand that enables this method of locking is recommended (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ Any external bin store should be a secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosure. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development and servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

5 Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of the store should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell:

- 5.1.1 Careful consideration should be given to the location of paypoints to ensure that staff have full surveillance over the entrance to the store.
- 5.1.2 Internal aisles and product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrances of the units.
- 5.1.3 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 5.1.4 Public toilets can give rise to anti-social behaviour problems. The following issues should be considered:
 - Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the store must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of the store, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash storage/management within the unit;
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices;
 - Management of stock deliveries and waste collection;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. lighting, alarm systems, CCTV cameras etc; and
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc.
- 6.1.2 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 6.1.3 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the unit, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only areas.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see [Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit [Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security](#).

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
30 th March 2026	Rapleys LLP	Receipt of instruction form & site plan
2 nd April 2026	Rapleys LLP	Quotation issued & request for further information
9 th April 2026	Rapleys LLP	Confirmation of instruction/fee. Further plans to follow
16 th April 2026	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
1 st May 2026	Rapleys LLP	Receipt of Setting Out Plan

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
2544 F416	Proposed Site Plan Option 9 (SUPERSEDED)	30/09/25	B
2544 P412	Proposed Setting Out Plan	10/04/26	B

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A		

D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.
- Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

[Design For Security – Designing Out Crime](#)

– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police

[Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#)

– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies

[ParkMark - Home](#) – Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme

[NBS Source](#) – find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)

[RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book](#) – search for LPS 1175 certified products