



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

**DEVELOPMENT OF SEN PRIMARY SCHOOL
LAND OFF HEYWOOD OLD ROAD, MIDDLETON, OL10 2HZ**

For: Rochdale Borough Council
Version A: 20th March 2026
Reference: 2025/0017/CIS/01

designforsecurity

Redwood SEN Hub

URN: 2025/0017/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The design team have produced a scheme which is very well considered from a crime prevention perspective, including a number of features that will minimise the risk of criminals targeting the school.

There are several recommendations in the report which should enhance security at the site, namely:

- Existing site boundaries should be inspected for any damage and repaired.
- The reception should be staffed at all times when the building is operational. The external entrance doors should be capable of being secured and controlled remotely by reception staff if required (e.g. if the building is open late), to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby.
- There should be a robust access control system in place to prevent unauthorised access and the alarm system should be zoned so that during any community use the unused areas of the school building can still be secured.
- Staff should be provided with a secure area to store personal belongings (i.e. lockers) within a secure area of the school building, which is restricted to staff, such as the staff room.
- All elevations of the school buildings, and particularly doorways, should be illuminated with dusk-to-dawn lighting.
- A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the entire building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

Matthew Granelli

Design for Security Consultant

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
1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located in Middleton with the vehicle entrance to the west of the site off Haywood Old Rd. The site is currently vacant green space.

The site appears to be well maintained and moderately secure with the existing fencing. The existing boundary around the north and east is shared with the rear boundary of many residential properties and is a mixture of high and low timber fences. The south boundary is 1.8m high weld mesh fencing and the east is share with the Edgar Wood Academy and is formed of weld mesh fencing.

The surrounding area is predominantly residential properties to the north and east. Edgar Wood Academy is a newly built secondary school which is located to the west of the site.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Local Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2025 to 28th February 2026.

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	<5	6	26	<5	<5	<5	5	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 There were just 44 crimes recorded in the neighbourhood around the site in the period analysed. This low volume of crime can be partially attributed to the low density of the population within the neighbourhood and the presence of large areas of undeveloped, agricultural and recreational, land.
- 2.1.2 At 59% of the total crime recorded, the most common crime in this neighbourhood is less serious wounding, that is, Violence with injury, stalking and harassment, violence without injury and public order offences.
- 2.1.3 There are four crime 'hotspots', although nowhere has a high number of incidents, they are high relative to other places or streets in the neighbourhood. The hotspots are at Heywood Old Road at the junction of Langley Ln, where assaults and theft are most common; Edgar Wood Academy, where assaults dominate; Bowlee Community Organisation CIC, where assaults have occurred and, around Knight and Martindale Crescent - where burglary, assault and criminal damage have occurred.
- 2.1.4 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed educational development, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft and local vehicle crime.

2.2 General Risk Factors

- 2.2.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property
- Unauthorised access to buildings and private spaces
- Antisocial behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Internal theft
- Theft of staff / pupil belongings
- Staff, pupil and parent safety
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period

2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting educational uses are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- 2.3.1 Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors or have been targeted when left insecure by staff or students.

Possible Solution – All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, users or passers-by. In

vulnerable locations, shutters, external bars or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

2.3.2 Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

2.3.3 Offenders have climbed onto the roof of single-storey building elements and gained access through the roof itself or through high level roof-lights / windows.

Possible Solution - Where possible eaves heights should be high enough to prevent roofs from being easily climbed. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard / soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles / bars to prevent unauthorised access. Any single storey elements should have a reinforced roof to prevent an offender from damaging it to gain entry.

2.3.4 Theft of insecure property belonging to students and staff, as well as school equipment.

Possible Solution - All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. Staff-only areas/rooms should not be accessible to students. Students should also be encouraged to keep items of value with them or store them securely in lockers.

2.3.5 Posing as legitimate students / visitors enter restricted areas by means of insecure doors.

Possible Solution – There should be a robust access control system governing entry into the building, to prevent unauthorised access. The reception should be staffed at all times whilst the building is open and all visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the school.

2.3.6 Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.


Possible Solution – Secure store rooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove, and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular community access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.

2.3.7 Offenders have climbed perimeter fencing to gain access to the outbuildings/sheds.

Possible Solution – School site perimeters should be defined by 2400mm high rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing (ideally 358 gauge, with small apertures to deter scaling and cutting) with anti-tamper fixings to secure the panels to posts. Secondary fencelines and gates also should be incorporated within the site to prevent unauthorised pedestrian access to external student/play areas and through the staff parking areas during the day.

2.4 Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against educational facilities, recorded in the Rochdale area.





2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at educational facilities in Rochdale peaks on Sunday – when many are likely to be closed. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon and into the late evening/early hours of the morning. The opportunities often rise in the afternoon, when large numbers of students are entering / leaving buildings, staff presence is likely to be lower and parents / carers enter school sites – providing anonymity to offenders. Offenders often target buildings at night when they are closed, it is dark, streets are typically quieter and they perceive a lower risk of being detected.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements, gaining access.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Offenders have climbed onto the roof of single-storey building elements and gained access through the roof itself or through high level roof-lights / windows.
- Where the point of entry is unknown / legitimate, this is likely to have been when offenders have gained access to insecure rooms / areas unnoticed, before targeting equipment (such as laptops, media / musical equipment, tools etc.).

2.5 Theft Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against educational facilities, recorded in the Rochdale area.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft at educational facilities in Rochdale peaks on Monday. During the day, the risk of theft peaks during the early hours of the morning and during the normal school / college day, with offences frequently taking place during breaks, when pupils and staff leave personal property in unlocked rooms, where they are accessible and vulnerable to theft. Mobile phones, cash, bags and coats are the most routinely stolen items. Out-of-hours, externally stored equipment/materials have been targeted.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Friday in the morning (09:00-11:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time during the working week when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is for the construction of a new education building with associated external works including the creation of a car park, new access road and site wide landscaping works.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The reception office is located where staff will have a good view of everyone entering and leaving the building. Visitors to the school should be contained within a secure lobby area to allow staff to vet them prior to granting further admission inside the building.
- 3.2.2 An “air lock” arrangement at the reception allows visitors to be monitored prior to further admission to the building.
- 3.2.3 The building is rectangular in shape, avoiding any problematic, secluded recesses.
- 3.2.4 New larger carparking area will reduce reliance on street parking and improve relations with neighbouring properties.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Existing site boundaries should be inspected for any damage and repaired. The below damage was seen on the day of the site visit.



- 3.3.2 The reception should be staffed at all times when the building is operational. The external entrance doors should be capable of being secured and controlled remotely by reception staff if required (e.g. if the building is open late), to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby.
- 3.3.3 If the school building is to be used out-of-hours for community use (i.e. sports facilities), the design and layout of internal and external spaces should be capable being zoned, so that people are guided appropriately to where they need to go and prevented from accessing other areas. There should be a robust access control system in place to prevent unauthorised access and the alarm system should be zoned so that during any community use the unused areas of the school building can still be secured.

-
- 3.3.4 Staff should be provided with a secure area to store personal belongings (i.e. lockers) within a secure area of the school building, which is restricted to staff, such as the staff room.
 - 3.3.5 All elevations of the school buildings, and particularly doorways, should be illuminated with dusk-till-dawn lighting.
 - 3.3.6 A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the entire building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows.
 - 3.3.7 The landscaping of the schools' grounds should be carefully considered so that concealed or secluded places are not created, good sightlines can be maintained, and that CCTV/lighting are not adversely affected by trees and shrubbery. It is highly recommended that any low planting is kept to a maximum of 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2400mm.
 - 3.3.8 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ Sliding/revolving doors should be tested and certified to LPS117 SR2.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All internal doors / frames to classrooms, offices and stores should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a 5 lever mortise deadlock (to BS 3621 / EN 12209), so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.

4.2 Windows and Shutters

- ☐ Ground floor windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR 2 or LPS 2081 SR B.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

4.3 Glazing and Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the entire building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognised Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - External doors
 - The internal doors taken off the main entrance lobby (if speed gates or turnstiles are not used).
 - Doors needed to provide internal zoning and restrict access to parts of the building not in use (e.g. during evenings/weekends or community use)
 - Doors to staff only areas
 - IT room(s)

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ The proposed boundary treatment arrangements are ideal and should be implemented in full. The perimeter boundary should be erected at the earliest opportunity in the construction contract.
- ☐ The main vehicle entrance gates should be 2400mm high, and kept closed outside of core school hours, with management arrangements put in place by the school for access for out-of-hours community use.
- ☐ With all gates, there should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing. Exposed hinges and sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with a shroud/protective plate (see image) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of the entrance gates and any other gates within the site should be sufficiently small as to prevent anyone crawling through.
- ☐ Hedges containing beech, hawthorn or similar, should be used to further deter entry as well as soften the appearance of the boundary fencing. The height of the hedges should be managed so that views are allowed into the site where appropriate, e.g., from Heywood Old Road and around the secondary entrance.
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that any new panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and any gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, lighting columns, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through
- ☐ Existing site boundaries should be inspected for any damage and replaced or repaired where necessary. Replacement boundaries should be in keeping with the existing boundaries or to the specification above.



4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes and parking areas to a high standard.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.9 Car parking

- ☐ Car parking bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

4.10 Other

- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors / televisions, tools etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- ☐ Signage and orientation. Routes leading to and from various facilities in and around the site should be obvious to site users and visitors. Disorientation can provide legitimacy for an offender to be present in a restricted area. Clear signage should be provided throughout the site which will help to direct people to where they need to go, and discourage entry to restricted areas.

5 CCTV Guidance

5.1 Resolution, Identification & Retention

- ☐ Select camera resolution based on identification requirements and field of view. More megapixels provide higher detail but also increase bandwidth and storage requirements.
- ☐ Recommended resolution levels:
 - 1080p (2MP): General indoor and corridor surveillance.
 - 4MP–8MP (4K): Entrances, exits, and high-security areas for facial or number plate recognition.
 - >8MP: Large-area coverage or post-event digital zooming.
- ☐ The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

5.2 Image Quality

- ☐ High-quality imaging is the foundation of effective CCTV. Selecting cameras with the right sensor size, lens aperture, and image processing capabilities ensures accurate visual data capture across lighting conditions.
- ☐ Key considerations:
 - Larger sensors and low f-number lenses capture more light and deliver better contrast.
 - Use Wide Dynamic Range (WDR) cameras for scenes with bright and dark areas.
 - Apply Day/Night and IR-capable cameras for low-light performance.
 - Frame rates between 25–30 fps are recommended for motion clarity.

5.3 Camera Placement and Coverage

- ☐ Camera placement directly affects image usability. Ensure coverage overlap and proper mounting height to minimise blind spots.
- ☐ Placement principles:
 - Mount indoor cameras between 2.5–3 m to prevent tampering while retaining facial detail.
 - Outdoor cameras should be positioned to avoid glare and direct sunlight.
 - Slight overlap of camera fields ensures seamless coverage.

- Combine wide-angle lenses for area coverage and narrow lenses for detail zones.

5.4 Environmental and Housing Considerations

- ☐ Outdoor and exposed cameras must withstand environmental and mechanical impacts. Select housings rated for weather and vandal resistance.
 - Minimum IP65/66 for outdoor use.
 - IK10 or equivalent vandal-resistant enclosures.
 - Integrated IR or OptimizedIR functions for low-light areas.
 - Avoid steep downward angles; maintain clear facial perspective.

5.5 Network and System Design

- ☐ Design the video system architecture around IP-based network cameras for scalability, reliability, and flexibility. Core design elements to consider:
 - Use Power over Ethernet (PoE) to simplify installation.
 - Calculate bandwidth and storage based on resolution, frame rate, and retention time.
 - Apply compression standards (H.264/H.265) to optimise storage.
 - Ensure strong cybersecurity: password protection, encryption, network segmentation.

5.6 Maintenance and Quality Assurance

- ☐ Routine inspection and maintenance are critical to sustaining image quality and reliability.
 - Perform day/night checks post-installation.
 - Clean lenses regularly and inspect mounting fixtures.
 - Review recorded footage to confirm identification quality.
 - Update firmware and review network security periodically.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 6.1.2 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 6.1.3 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site and each of the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to resident or staff-only areas.
- 6.1.4 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see [Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit [Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security](#).

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
31/08/2025	Equilibrium	CIS application
01/09/2025	DfS	CIS fee proposal
05/03/2026	Equilibrium	CIS confirmation
06/03/2026	DfS	Site visit

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	ED0064-00 - SLP		
	ED0064-03 - Rev B - Feasibility Layout 2		
	ED0064-04 - Rev B - Proposed Massing and 3D Views		
	ED0064-05 - Elevations		
	ED0064-06 - Wider SLP		
	ED0064-20 - Rev E - Proposed Site Layout		
	ED0062-30 - Proposed Floor Plan		
	ED0064-25 - Boundary Treatment Details		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A		