



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

**SELF-STORAGE FACILITY
OLD HALL STREET, MIDDLETON**

For: Self-Storage Performance Management International Ltd

Version A: 22nd June 2026

Reference: 2026/0059/CIS/01

design**for**security



Old Hall Street

URN: 2026/0059/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed storage facility with ground floor commercial units is suitable for this town centre area. Further consideration should be given to the following points:

- The recessed main entrance is likely to create a vulnerable space that could encourage undesirable behaviour, negatively affecting staff, building users, nearby businesses, and passers-by. Recessed spaces should be minimised where possible; where unavoidable, mitigation measures should include CCTV coverage, high-quality lighting, regular security patrols, and proactive maintenance/cleaning.
- Access to the building outside normal operating hours should be strictly controlled through a robust, auditable access control system to ensure only authorised entry.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development and it is highly recommended that these are considered for the proposed units and the wider outline proposals.



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
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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located within the town centre area of Middleton, in the borough of Rochdale.

The site is roughly rectangular and the boundaries are formed by Old Hall Street to the North, Townley Street to the East, Middleton Arena and the River Irk to the South, and to the West a small surface parking area associated with Middleton Area.

The site is currently vacant and was last developed as a storage facility, which has subsequently been demolished. The site boundaries are currently formed with timber hoarding painted red.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Local Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st May 2025 to 30th April 2026.

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
10	10	78	365	63	25	7	16	12	8

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is high, and this reflects the location of the development site, on the periphery of Middleton town centre. Town centre areas, and associated nighttime economies, often generate high levels of crimes. The most prevalent crimes in the area are criminal damage, violent crime, and theft.
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed self-storage facility, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft and local vehicle crime.

2.2 General Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of fuel, company stock, tools and IT equipment
- Theft of employee personal belongings
- Criminal damage the buildings and vehicles
- Arson
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Bicycle and motorcycle theft
- Theft of plant and machinery and criminal damage during the construction period

2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)


- 2.3.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting self-storage facilities and industrial developments are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements/ tools to gain access.
Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
- Opening secure doors using bodily force and implements/tools to gain entry to property.
Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1).
- Damaging fencing and gates using tools in order to access the industrial unit
Possible Solution – A robust boundary treatment should be used to define the site perimeter. The boundary treatment should be capable of withstanding opportunistic attacks with hand tools. Boundary treatments should be installed on hardstanding so that offenders cannot crawl under and of a height sufficient to deter climbing.
Gates should be of robust material and to the same height as surrounding boundaries. The gap between the gate and the ground should be minimised to reduce the potential of an offender

crawling under. The design of the gate should not include any horizontal bars or exposed hinges that could assist climbing.

2.4 Industrial/Storage Units Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial/storage units, recorded in the Rochdale area.



2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at industrial units in the Rochdale area peaks on a Monday and Sunday during the evening and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target industrial properties in the evening and early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.



2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements (mostly metal bars and vehicles) in order to gain access to doors and windows located beneath.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Posing as a legitimate customer/ visitor and accessing restricted areas.
- Forcing open perimeter fencing and gates using tools and vehicles.
- Climbing onto the roof of the building and using tools in order to remove tiles and enter the property.

- Removing bricks from the wall using tools in order to gain access.

2.5 Industrial/Storage Units Theft Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial/storage units, recorded in the Rochdale area.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft from industrial units in the Rochdale area peaks on a Saturday during the morning and into the afternoon (9am – 4pm). There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property from within buildings (e.g. cash, bags, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from service yards.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Saturday just after midnight (00:00-02:00). Offenders often target vehicles in the evening when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is the redevelopment of former self-storage site to include new four storey self-storage building and new public realm space to the perimeter.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development site is vacant, and this can generate criminal and antisocial behaviour (i.e. flytipping, trespassing, and loitering).
- 3.2.2 The redevelopment of the site will generate legitimate use which can deter unwanted behaviour.
- 3.2.3 The site is located in a busy area. On the day of my site visit, there was constant passing pedestrian and traffic, contributing to a high level of passive surveillance of the site.
- 3.2.4 The building will have ground floor commercial units to three elevations, providing an active frontage to the surrounding areas and illuminating the street scene.
- 3.2.5 Middleton Arena, a popular attraction in the area lies directly to the South of the development site which will contribute to passive surveillance of the site and potentially deter offenders.
- 3.2.6 If the plot to the East is developed as a residential scheme as indicated on the proposals, that would generate significant legitimate residential activity in the area and provide overlooking of the site.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Self-storage facility

- 3.3.1 The recessed or set-back main entrance to the building could potentially be problematic, as it may encourage undesirable behaviour to the detriment of staff, building users, nearby businesses, and passers-by.
- 3.3.2 The large, recessed, area would provide shelter from the elements, which can encourage antisocial behaviour such as loitering, congregation, vagrancy, public urination, and drug or alcohol consumption. The area could also be vulnerable to defacement (e.g. graffiti).
- 3.3.3 Typically, it is recommended that spaces such as these are minimised to reduce the potential for misuse or disorder. If there is little scope to avoid the creation of this area then there should be mitigating security measures, including:
- CCTV/VSS coverage of the space, which is monitored and misuse can be responded to, with accompanying signage.
 - High quality lighting to facilitate surveillance at night.
 - Regular patrols by security teams to deter and identify misuse.
 - Regular cleaning/litter removal to deter further misuse.
- 3.3.4 Access to the site and building outside of normal hours, when the building is not staffed, should be carefully considered. A comprehensive access control system should be implemented to manage entry to the building, ensuring that only authorised users can gain access. The access control system should be fully auditable, allowing access logs to be reviewed in the event of any incidents.
- 3.3.5 The development should be covered with a comprehensive CCTV system that can be monitored by staff.
- 3.3.6 The building should be covered with a monitored alarm system which can be activated when the building is unstaffed. The alarm should be zoned that only areas required for out-of-hours use are disarmed when customers use the facility outside of staffed hours.

- 3.3.7 Shutters and sectional overhead doors have been regularly targeted by offenders to gain access to industrial properties in the Salford area. To prevent shutters or sectional overhead doors being forced open they should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR 2).

Commercial Units

- 3.3.8 The commercial units should be provided with intruder alarms, or the necessary infrastructure to enable tenants to easily install such systems.
- 3.3.9 Provision should be made for the installation of CCTV and access control systems by tenants
- 3.3.10 The shell of the commercial units should be designed to comply with Secured by Design standards.

Public Realm

- 3.3.11 Landscaped areas potentially generate antisocial behaviour or misuse if poorly designed. It is highly recommended that, to ensure good sightlines, that tree canopies do not fall lower than 2000mm and shrubbery/planting is generally kept lower than 1000mm.
- 3.3.12 Good lighting improves the sense of safety for legitimate users, particularly during darker hours, and encourages legitimate use. There should be a mix of lighting sources within the public realm space and the building footprint, to ensure it is illuminated to a high standard when it is dark, to deter misuse and allow it to be easily surveyed from inside the commercial units/self-storage entrance.

4 Physical Security (Storage Facility)

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ Sliding/revolving doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.

4.2 Windows, Curtain Walling, Cladding & Shutters

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.
- ☐ Solid block walls, or a similar resilient layer, should be provided behind any **lightweight cladding** to a height of 2400mm to prevent attacks to the cladding to gain access to buildings.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the entire building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - External doors
 - Internal access into storage areas

5 Physical Security (Commercial Units)

5.1 Doors

- 5.1.1 External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- 5.1.2 Sliding/revolving doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
- 5.1.3 External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- 5.1.4 All doors/frames to staff areas/stores/offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

5.2 Windows, Building Fabric & Shutters

- 5.2.1 Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR 2 or LPS 2081 SR B.
- 5.2.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- 5.2.3 Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- 5.2.4 Any shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

5.3 Glazing

- 5.3.1 Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.4 Alarms, Access Control & CCTV

- 5.4.1 The commercial unit should have intruder alarms installed or the infrastructure for tenants to easily install an alarm.
- 5.4.2 The infrastructure should be provided for tenants to install a CCTV system and access control.

6 Wider Site Security

6.1 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

6.2 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over any adjacent boundary treatments or to buildings. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

7 CCTV / VSS Guidance

7.1 Resolution, Identification & Retention

- ☐ Select camera resolution based on identification requirements and field of view. More megapixels provide higher detail but also increase bandwidth and storage requirements.
- ☐ Recommended resolution levels:
 - 1080p (2MP): General indoor and corridor surveillance.
 - 4MP–8MP (4K): Entrances, exits, and high-security areas for facial or number plate recognition.
 - >8MP: Large-area coverage or post-event digital zooming.
- ☐ The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

7.2 Image Quality

- ☐ High-quality imaging is the foundation of effective CCTV. Selecting cameras with the right sensor size, lens aperture, and image processing capabilities ensures accurate visual data capture across lighting conditions.
- ☐ Key considerations:
 - Larger sensors and low f-number lenses capture more light and deliver better contrast.
 - Use Wide Dynamic Range (WDR) cameras for scenes with bright and dark areas.
 - Apply Day/Night and IR-capable cameras for low-light performance.
 - Frame rates between 25–30 fps are recommended for motion clarity.

7.3 Camera Placement and Coverage

- ☐ Camera placement directly affects image usability. Ensure coverage overlap and proper mounting height to minimise blind spots.
- ☐ Placement principles:
 - Mount indoor cameras between 2.5–3 m to prevent tampering while retaining facial detail.
 - Outdoor cameras should be positioned to avoid glare and direct sunlight.
 - Slight overlap of camera fields ensures seamless coverage.
 - Combine wide-angle lenses for area coverage and narrow lenses for detail zones.

7.4 Environmental and Housing Considerations

- ☐ Outdoor and exposed cameras must withstand environmental and mechanical impacts. Select housings rated for weather and vandal resistance.
 - Minimum IP65/66 for outdoor use.
 - IK10 or equivalent vandal-resistant enclosures.
 - Integrated IR or OptimizedIR functions for low-light areas.
 - Avoid steep downward angles; maintain clear facial perspective.

7.5 Network and System Design

- ☐ Design the video system architecture around IP-based network cameras for scalability, reliability, and flexibility. Core design elements to consider:
 - Use Power over Ethernet (PoE) to simplify installation.
 - Calculate bandwidth and storage based on resolution, frame rate, and retention time.
 - Apply compression standards (H.264/H.265) to optimise storage.
 - Ensure strong cybersecurity: password protection, encryption, network segmentation.

7.6 Maintenance and Quality Assurance

- ☐ Routine inspection and maintenance are critical to sustaining image quality and reliability.
 - Perform day/night checks post-installation.
 - Clean lenses regularly and inspect mounting fixtures.
 - Review recorded footage to confirm identification quality.
 - Update firmware and review network security periodically.

8 Management & Maintenance

- 8.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable, and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 8.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV etc.)
 - A weekly physical check of all perimeters fencing to check for damage
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 8.1.3 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 8.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to certain areas.

9 Construction

- 9.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 9.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

10 Useful References

10.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 10.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see [Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit [Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security](#).

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
19/05/2026	Vicky Jones	CIS application confirmed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
MH1463	Existing site conditions		
MH1463	Proposed site massing option 2		
MH1463-SK07	Proposed floor plans	May 26	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	22 nd June 2026	

D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.
- Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

[Design For Security – Designing Out Crime](#)

– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police

[Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#)

– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies

[ParkMark - Home](#)

– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme

[NBS Source](#)

– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)

[RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book](#)

– search for LPS 1175 certified products