



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

BOWLEE FOOTBALL & COMMUNITY WELLBEING HUB

For: Rochdale Borough Council
Version A: 13th August 2026
Reference: 2026/0258/CIS/01

designforsecurity

BOWLEE FOOTBALL & COMMUNITY WELLBEING HUB

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The external staircase on the RAFC building should be appropriately secured to prevent antisocial behaviour and restrict access to the first floor external doors.
- Glazing should be protected with shutters, grilles, or similar, to prevent vandalism.
- External doors and the car parking area should be illuminated.
- Access to the car parking area should be restricted at night with a lockable arm barrier.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Patrick Babb

Design for Security Consultant

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
1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Middleton area of Rochdale, close to the M60 junction 19.

The site is generally bound by Edgar Wood Academy to the North, to the East and South, the site is bound by Bowlee Community Park, to the West the site is bound by Heywood Old Road. The site is currently used as football pitches with an associated building/changing rooms, car parking area, and small playground. The main building is currently vacant and the surrounding vegetation overgrown. Despite the building being vacant there were no obvious signs of excessive vandalism.

The park in general was tidy and there were no obvious signs of misuse on the day of my visit; additionally, the park and fields appeared well used by dog walkers. There is a small park adjacent the community centre which appeared to be clean and free of litter.

The pitches are defined by a mixture of boundaries including 2400mm high weld mesh fencing and lower fences/railings.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Local Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2025 to 30th June 2026.

Recorded Crime within 1000m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
15	<5	79	296	39	6	<5	41	16	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is relatively high and this is due to the large number of incidents of less serious violent crime and criminal damage, with theft and vehicle crime also being relatively frequent. As this Crime Impact Statement relates sports/wellbeing facilities, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft and local vehicle crime.

2.2 General Risk Factors

- 2.2.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of user / staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of / from parked cars
- Uncontrolled access
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Cash robbery / attacks on vending machines
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups

2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.3.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting similar premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.

Possible Solution – Any external doorsets and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (e.g. BS PAS 24), Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, security personnel or passers-by. Consideration should also be given to security-certified shutters to protect particularly vulnerable/hidden doors or windows.

- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution - Any ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. In vulnerable locations, shutters or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.


- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

Possible Solution – Typically thefts occur at sports facilities when customers leave property unattended in communal areas, in changing rooms or in unsecured lockers whilst taking part in activities, returning to find property missing. Consideration should be given to providing lockers to visitors to allow them to secure their property.

There should also be secure lockers for the use of staff while at work and all staff-only areas should be fitted with self-closing, solid-core doors fitted with auditable access controls, in order to prevent unauthorised access.

2.4 Leisure Facilities: Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.




2.4.1 Day/ Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at Greater Manchester leisure facilities peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon/early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.2 Point of Entry: The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting Greater Manchester leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

2.5 Theft Risk Analysis: Leisure Facilities

The data below relates to thefts within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day/ Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Greater Manchester leisure facilities peaks on Tuesday but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development brief comprises of the following:
- Demolition of existing community building and associated car park, fence lines and intersecting pathways.
 - Create 2no. full size training pitches for use by RAFC. (1 no. 3G pitch & 1 no. grass pitch)
 - Create 4no. full size pitches (2no. 3G pitches & 2no. grass pitches)
 - 1no. grass training pitch for use by RBC.
 - Create new community health and wellbeing hub building with associated setting.
 - Create RAFC Clubhouse facilities with associated setting.
 - Create shared car parking with associated cycle parking.
 - Create appropriate wider landscaped setting to join allow the new development to sit within the wider community park.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 Existing building appears tired and without any modern security features or a good level of physical security. The proposed buildings have the opportunity to be built to a better standard to reduce the potential for them to be targeted by criminals or those antisocially minded.
- 3.2.2 The buildings are likely to be visible from the public highway, allowing for passive surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.3 The proposed boundary treatments will provide a good level of security to the site (drawing: 161/105)
- 3.2.4 Better changing facilities and lockers will be provided as part of the development.
- 3.2.5 The footprint of the proposed building is generally simple with no recessed areas or similar which could generate antisocial behaviour.

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- 3.2.6 The flat roof level is 4250mm from floor level which will high enough to deter climbing on to the roof.
 - 3.2.7 There will be more parking spaces within the development, which will reduce the burden on street parking in the local area (i.e. on Heywood Old Road).
 - 3.2.8 Better bicycle parking facilities will be provided as part of the redevelopment of the site.
 - 3.2.9 The existing grass pitches have poor drainage and not fit for purpose at certain parts of the year. The provision of better quality and artificial pitches will ensure that the development is well used during the year which will deter offenders from operating.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The external staircase on the RAFC Building could generate antisocial behaviour and it will provide access to the first floor external double doors – potentially leaving it vulnerable to being targeted by criminals. I would recommend that access to the bottom of the stairs is enclosed with a full height gate (with panic hardware on the inner face) with a transition panel on the staircase to prevent the gate being circumvented. The first floor external door should be certified to a burglary resistant standard.
- 3.3.2 On the day of my visit the height barrier to the car park was not in use and there were two campervans parked in the car parking area. Utilising the height barrier and, additionally, restricting access to the site at night with the existing arm barrier will reduce the potential for misuse.
- 3.3.3 Any exposed glazing in windows or doors should be protected by a roller shutter, grille, or similar, to prevent them being smashed by vandals.
- 3.3.4 Lighting should be provided to all external doors, operating on a dusk-til-dawn sensor, to deter offender from targeting the building.
- 3.3.5 Consider applying an anti-graffiti coating to any blank facades buildings so that any graffiti can be easily removed; alternatively, have a strict management policy that any graffiti is removed quickly to prevent further targeting by vandals.
- 3.3.6 Lighting levels in the site should be reviewed, particularly around the access road and car parking areas. Any broken fixings should be replaced, and areas of low illumination should be addressed with additional lighting sources.
- 3.3.7 The development should be covered with a basic CCTV / VSS system, ideally with monitoring facilities. Consider combining it with the use of a PA system to deter misuse out of houses.
- 3.3.8 Artificial pitches should be secured when not in use. If padlocks are used they should be certified to Sold Secure Gold/Platinum.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Windows, Curtain Walling, Cladding & Shutters

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Shutters must be tested and certified to STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.
- ☐ Solid block walls should be provided behind any lightweight cladding to a height of 2400mm to prevent attacks to the cladding to gain access to buildings.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover each building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.6 CCTV

- ☐ The proposed development should be covered by a comprehensive CCTV system.

4.7 Car Parks

- ☐ Lighting to car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.

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- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the commercial units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the units. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 5.1.2 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site and each of the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to resident or staff-only areas.
- 5.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see [Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit [Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security](#).

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
22/07/2026	Kate Goodwin	CIS application confirmed
27/07/2026	Aisha Sillah	Initial plans received
11/08/2026	Aisha Sillah	Progress update
13/08/2026	Kate Goodwin	Latest drawing package

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
161/103	Design Team Early-Stage Proposed Site	AUG 2026	P6
161/104-A	Early-Stage Cut & Fill Analysis	AUG 2026	P1
161/104	Early-Stage Earthworks	AUG 2026	P6
161/105	Site Layout Plan	AUG 2026	P4
161/106-A	Proposed RAFC Pitches Site Sections	AUG 2026	P1
161/106-B	Proposed Community Pitches Site	AUG 2026	P1
161/107	Typical Pitch Construction Sections	AUG 2026	P1
0807-010-P5	Drainage Strategy	29.07.26	P5
1341-RFM-XX-00-DR-L-0501	Planting Strategy	04.08.26	P02
MDK-XX-ZZ-DR-Y-5	Proposed Sections	25.03.2026	N/A
3230-MDK-XX-ZZ-DR-Y-1_3	Proposed Floor Plans	22.09.2025	3
3230-MDK-XX-ZZ-DR-Y-2	Proposed Elevations	15.06.2026	4
BOWLEE-POZ-XX-00-D-A-12500	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	08.08.26	P02
BOWLEE-POZ-XX-RF-D-A-12550	Proposed Roof Plan - Level Roof	08.08.26	P02
BOWLEE-POZ-XX-XX-D-A-11000	Proposed Location Plan	22.07.26	E
BOWLEE-POZ-XX-XX-D-A-11001	Existing Location Plan	08.08.26	P02
BOWLEE-POZ-XX-XX-D-A-11010	Existing Location Plan - Proposed	05.05.26	A
BOWLEE-POZ-XX-XX-D-A-11050	Demolition Location Plan	08.08.26	P02
BOWLEE-POZ-XX-ZZ-D-A-13500	Proposed Elevation - North and East	08.08.26	P01
BOWLEE-POZ-XX-ZZ-D-A-13501	Proposed Elevation - South and West	08.08.26	P01
BOWLEE-POZ-XX-ZZ-D-A-14500	Proposed GA Sections	08.08.26	P01

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	13/08/2026	

D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.
- Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

[Design For Security – Designing Out Crime](#)

– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police

[Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#)

– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies

[ParkMark - Home](#) – Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme

[NBS Source](#) – find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)

[RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book](#) – search for LPS 1175 certified products