



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Outline application for two B2/B8 units

AT Birch Business Park, Whittle Lane, Heywood

FOR: Yeargate Limited

Greater Manchester Police

VERSION A: 17.06.25

designforsecurity

2011/0787/CIS/03

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

Design for Security welcome the investment in the site and support the proposed development. Our support is subject to the developer making reasonable endeavours to comply with the recommendations set out in sections 3.3 of the report. The main recommendations are as follows:

- Retain the existing security lodge and the security staff at the entrance to the business park
- Erect robust perimeter fencing
- Install security-rated external doors, roller shutters, window frames and laminate glazing when constructing the units
- Use access control systems to regulate movements into, and through, each unit, where appropriate
- A monitored intruder alarm and CCTV should be installed to each unit
- Secure and weatherproof cycle stores should be provided.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will make representations to Rochdale Planning supporting the proposals.

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1 The Site and Surroundings

The application site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The site, edged in red on the plan is located on the north-eastern fringe of the Birch Business Park, Heywood. Located to the north and east of Whittle Lane/Moss Hall Road, the business park extends some 13 hectares and is managed by Chancerygate Limited. It includes over 46,000m² of industrial, warehouse and office accommodation made up of a number of buildings of varying age and size. Access into the park is gained from Whittle Lane via a series of automated vehicle barriers that are located immediately in front of a permanently manned, security lodge. CCTV cameras monitor movements in and out as well as monitoring the circulation routes within it. Whittle Lane is a lightly trafficked route which connects Heywood Old Road to the south with Moss Hall Road to the north. The business park is a 5-minute drive to junction 3 of the M66 motorway.

A manned gatehouse and automated vehicle barriers secure the entrance to Birch Business Park



The business park circulation road approaching the site



The gated entrance to the application site at the north-western corner of the business park



Looking north across the site from the entrance gate



Modern business premises to the south-west of the site



A hedge defines the site's south-eastern boundary beyond which is undeveloped land



A 2,000mm high, steel palisade fence defines the boundaries of the park. The land surrounding the business park is largely used for agricultural purposes and includes a number of isolated farm buildings both to the east and the west of the business park. There is a small pond immediately adjacent to the north-western corner of the site. Birch Services, on the M62 motorway, is situated 400metres south-east of the park whilst Heywood Distribution Park lies 500m to the north; the nearest housing is at Whittle Brook, Heywood around 1 kilometre to the north-east off the business park. The 3.8-hectare application site itself adjoins the north-eastern edge of Birch Business Park. It comprises a slightly undulating expanse of scrubland. A public right of way adjoins the northern boundary of the business park. The path continues eastward alongside the application site's northern boundary where it connects with other rights of way that connect Moss Hall Road/Whittle Lane to Pilsworth Road, to the north, Queen Elizabeth Way, to the east, and Heywood Old Road, to the south-east.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2024 to 30th June 2025.

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood around the site

All crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Crimes involving the use or threat of violence	Theft (including shoplifting)	Robbery	Drug related offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
0	6	17	45	33	2	7	26	2	1

2.1.1 There were 139 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed, which is much lower than the average for a typical neighbourhood within Rochdale. A large part of neighbourhood comprises agricultural land, although there are significant commercial developments within the area analysed.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded, i.e., those that amounted to 4% or more of the total, were:

use, or threat, of violence	32%
theft	24%
vehicle-related	20%
criminal damage	12%
Drug-related	5%
burglary	4%

2.1.3 The places/streets where crime was most likely to occur were:

Birch Services	91
Heywood Distribution Park	8
Birch Business Park	4
Moss Hall Road	3



2.1.4 Just under 65% of the crime recorded crime occurred at Birch Services, where theft/shoplifting from shops and the hotel, and vehicle-related crimes dominated.

Crime at industrial and warehouse premises

2.1.5 There were 12 offences recorded as having taken place at industrial or warehouse premises, 4 at Birch Business Park and 8 at Heywood Distribution Park. In terms of the nature of crime, there were 3 incidents of criminal damage and 3 vehicle-related crimes as well as 2 each of burglary, theft and the threat of violence.

Vehicle crime

2.1.6 There were 28 vehicle related offences recorded during the period analysed, the majority of which occurred at Birch Services.



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- 2.1.7 .The risk is lowest on Monday and Saturdays. Risk rises in the early afternoon and again around mid-night.

2.2 Crime at industrial and warehouse premises in Rochdale

- 2.2.1 There were 153 crimes recorded at industrial and warehouse premises in the borough of Rochdale during the period analysed. The most commonly recorded crime was burglary (42% of the total), followed by vehicle related crimes (19%) and theft (11%). There were just 12 incidents involving the use or threat of violence and 9 of criminal damage. There were 3 recorded incidents of arson.

Burglary

- 2.2.2 There were 65 incidents of burglary. Offences are more commonly committed in the middle of the week and on Saturday and in the evening and during the night.

- 2.2.3 When targeting Rochdale industrial premises, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Offenders have damaged or forced shutters upwards to gain unauthorised access or to gain access to doors and windows behind them.
- In a number of cases, the point of entry was 'unknown'. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors or employees before gaining access to back-of-house/staff areas and stealing property.
- Doors have been forced open using tools or when they have been left insecure by members of staff.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Theft

- 2.2.4 Doors were forced in just under half of all burglaries carried out at industrial and warehouse premises in Rochdale; slightly less involved offenders forcing shutters. Offenders entered premises via a window on ten occasions, whilst the walls and a roof of premises were breached three times. There were seventeen incidents that involved offenders gaining entry to premises without using force before committing burglary, suggesting doors or windows were not secure or the offender was in a building for legitimate reasons before committing the crime.

2.3 Modus operandi used in burglary, theft and criminal damage at industrial and warehouse premises in Rochdale and measures to reduce risk

2.3.1 Ram-raiding walls, gates and shutters and penetrating walls and the roof

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing walls, roofs shutters and gates:

- security-certified roller shutters and fencing/gates (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible - sliding gates tend to be more secure than hinged gates;
- steel frame buildings clad in profiled metal sheet should include a 2000mm high brick or blockwork base or a suitably robust inner layer of attack resistant material, e.g. expanded metal panels;
- roofs should be high enough that they are not easily accessible, comprise of a security-rated roofing system or include a sandwich of materials which makes them difficult to penetrate; and,
- anti-ram bollards or vehicle barriers (ideally, that meet the BS PAS 68 standard) should be installed in front of gates and shutters.

2.3.2 Shutters have been forced upwards by offenders

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;

- where size limits the availability of certified shutters, intruder alarms, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings; and,
- anti-ram bollards or barriers should be deployed to help secure the most vulnerable shutters.

2.3.3 Doors have been forced open with tools and locks have been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 sr2 standard – security rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- external doors should be placed where they can be readily observed by staff or monitored readily by CCTV and fitted with alarm contacts; and,
- the deployment of visible security patrols, appropriately high boundary fencing to control access to a site, CCTV and lighting can also deter offenders.

2.3.4 Entering a building via unsecured doors and windows.

To minimise the risk of offenders committing rime by entering via unsecured windows or doors

- external doors should be self-closing and lock upon closure; and,
- windows should have opening restrictors and key operated locks fitted:

2.3.5 Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via windows:

- windows should be avoided on secluded elevations;
- window and glazed doors should be fitted with laminate glass, which, because of its structural properties, is extremely difficult to break and penetrate sufficiently to reach in and open locks; and,
- security shutters or grilles, certified to the LPS 1175 sr2 standard, should be fitted to all windows.

2.3.6 Theft of employee and company property

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing personal property from the business premises:

- tall, robust, fencing and gates (preferably fitted with access controls) should be used to secure the perimeter of a development
- access control systems should be employed to prevent unauthorised personnel from entering buildings - especially offices and staff rooms, where sensitive information, expensive equipment, or staff belongings may be stored;
- if external storage of materials is necessary, consideration should be given to storing valuable plant or machinery in suitably secure containers or hoppers e.g. steel containers
- overt signage should be used to warn against casual entry, referring visitors to appropriately located, visible reception areas; and,
- include space for employees to store personal/valuable items securely e.g. lockers or lockable drawers.

2.3.7 Theft of bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing bicycles from business premises:

- there should be a limited number of well-supervised, entry points into the site;
- the perimeter should be secured with tall fencing and gates;
- secure, weatherproof cycle parking should be available to employees and visitors;
- cycle parking should be located in well-supervised places; generally, some distance from the site perimeter and, ideally, out of view of passers-by.

2.3.8 Committing criminal damage to buildings and fencing

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via windows:

- access onto the site outside of business hours should be restricted by robust perimeter fencing and gates, i.e., steel railings or welded wire mesh; and,
- unprotected windows should be avoided on secluded elevations.

2.3.9 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol or visit during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be suitably arranged to prevent forced access onto the site and theft; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with tracking devices.

2.4 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood where relatively few crimes are committed;
- crimes that directly affect affecting industrial and business premises across Rochdale are not common;
- the volume of crime committed at industrial and warehouse premises in the immediate neighbourhood is very low;
- there is nothing on the site of value;
- there is only a single point of entry into Birch Business Park, and it is secured with automated, vehicle barriers and a manned gatehouse;
- Whittle Lane is not heavily trafficked and being isolated from built-up, residential areas, pedestrian usage is particularly low. Therefore, the number of passers-by, who may have criminal intentions, wishing to exploit any weaknesses in the security of business park or cause criminal damage to property, is less than it would be on a more heavily trafficked street in a built-up neighbourhood;
- there is on site management of the business park, with site-wide lighting and CCTV coverage;
- the quality of buildings on the business park, visually and from a security perspective, is constantly improving.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the presence of the public right of way alongside the site's northern boundary allows the public, some of which may have criminal intent, to approach the site with little prospect of being witnessed doing so;
- premises on isolated business parks with very large boundaries can be vulnerable to breaking and entering or trespass, particularly if: a) the quality of the parks boundary fencing is not consistently high and robust; b) perimeter fencing is erected on poor ground, where intruders can undermine the it; and c) fencing is affected by the growth of nearby trees and shrubs, i.e. tree and plant growth directly interferes with the fence structure or trees, in particular, or provide an aid with which to scale the fence, or obscure sightlines, which provides cover for offenders to interfere with the fence out of view of staff or CCTV;
- some of the older business premises on the business park may lack the more sophisticated security measures that the modern buildings possess making them a possible target for offenders;
- the lack of security when using unsecured service areas for storage of plant and materials has attracted criminal and contributed to a series of thefts; and,
- at least one of the premises on the very edge of the business park have adapted their perimeter fencing to enhance security, suggesting that this fencing has been breached in the past.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development involves the construction of two industrial/warehouse units, Unit and Unit B.
- 3.1.2 Unit A will be erected on the western part of the site. It will be a rectangular building with a ground floor area of 6,030m² and 422m² office space at mezzanine level. The unit's service yard will be on the eastern side of the building and a 65-space, car park on the western side.
- 3.1.3 Unit B will have a slightly smaller footprint, with a ground floor area of 5,410m² and a 379m² office space at mezzanine level. A 56-space car park will be laid out on the western side of the building and the service yard will be on the eastern side.
- 3.1.4 Running alongside the site's south-eastern boundary, a single road will facilitate access to each unit. The new road will connect with the business park's circulation road at the south-western corner of the site currently marked by a pair of steel-framed, wire-mesh gates. The remainder of the site will be landscaped.

3.2 Elements of the proposed development that are likely to promote public safety and deter crime and disorder

- 3.2.1 Investment in new business premises is welcomed, particularly when security is integral to the design of the scheme.
- 3.2.2 There is only one access into Birch Business Park as well as into this part of the business park. It is easier to maintain a secure development when limiting the number of entrances.
- 3.2.3 The Business Park is very secure - benefitting from having a 24-7 security presence, comprehensive CCTV, controlled entrance and exit gates and robust perimeter fencing.
- 3.2.4 The development will be located in a neighbourhood with a lower-than-average level of crime affecting industrial and warehouse premises.
- 3.2.5 The proposals will result in the development of a vacant site. Although this one doesn't present any issues, such sites can be prone to acts of crime (criminal damage to fencing) or anti-social behaviour (fly-tipping and trespass) leading to health and safety concerns.
- 3.2.6 I understand that the premises will be managed Chancerygate who, along with the rest of the business park, will have a vested interest in the upkeep and security of the building and its surroundings.
- 3.2.7 Industrial developments occupied by a single or two business tend to be more secure than those with multiple tenants.

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- 3.2.8 The proposed/indicative layout of the site is very clear and logical.
 - 3.2.9 The regular shape of the proposed units makes it easier to monitor by staff during business hours and CCTV when the premises are closed.
 - 3.2.10 The development is orientated in such a way as to continue to focus activity and supervision over the unit entrances, service yard and car parking.
 - 3.2.11 Whilst details are not currently available, experience suggests that the proposed units will be of a similar portal-framed design and height as modern units elsewhere on the business park.
 - 3.2.12 The proposed building is very likely to be sufficiently tall as to make breaking and entering via the roof extremely unlikely.
 - 3.2.13 Staff and visitor parking will be provided within the site.

3.3 Recommendations to enhance the security of the development

The Business Park

- 3.3.1 Retain the existing security lodge, the security staff and vehicle barriers at the entrance to the business park.

The units

- 3.3.2 Security-rated doors and roller shutters should be specified, whilst laminate glass should be used in all external glazing, including within, and to the side of, the pedestrian doors.
- 3.3.3 External entrance doors should be secured with a mechanical or an electronic lock that forms part of the door's certification. Internal doors should be secured with an electronic lock operated by a code or fob, or a mechanical lock, that is operated by a key and/or code.
- 3.3.4 External and internal doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.
- 3.3.5 Consider fitting security shutters to the ground floor, windows and to any pedestrian, entrance doors and glazed, side panels. The shutters may be installed internally (to deter intruders) or externally (to deter intruder and to reduce the risk of criminal damage to glazing).
- 3.3.6 Consider fitting anti-ram bollards to restrict access to vehicles to vulnerable parts of each unit, such as the main entrance doors and service shutters.
- 3.3.7 Staff should be able to vet visitors prior to allowing entry via an audio(-visual) link. This is particularly important when there may be only one or two members of staff present.
- 3.3.8 Consider creating a secure office. The office should contain a safe for cash and valuable documents, and CCTV recording equipment. The door to this room should be certified to BS PAS 24 or be a 44mm solid core door with at least one key-operated, BS certified lock, preferably two, and be self-closing and self-locking. Ideally, the walls to this office should be constructed using blockwork or a similarly robust material.
- 3.3.9 Storerooms should be secured with a BS 3621 lock.
- 3.3.10 Lockers or other suitably secure space should be available to staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

Monitored intruder alarm & CCTV

- 3.3.11 A monitored, intruder alarm should be fitted to each unit.
- 3.3.12 A monitored CCTV system should be installed with cameras capable of monitoring the service road and approaches to the development along the road, site entrances, the service yards, all entrance doors and service shutters, the means of escape doors/shutters, and all car and cycle parking. The CCTV system should include a public address system, allowing security staff to issue an audible warning to alert to intruders that they have been detected and a response generated.

Fencing & gates

- 3.3.13 A 2,100-2,400mm high, steel-mesh, fence should be installed around the northern, eastern and southern boundaries of the site. The location of the fence line should respect existing trees and hedges with sufficient separation so as to minimise the risk of tree/hedge growth compromising the security of the fencing.

- 3.3.14 You may consider securing each unit and its car park and service yard. In which case, the boundary fencing should enclose the domain of each unit with similarly-styled, pedestrian and vehicle entrance gates restricting access to the service yards (and car parks). The gates should be fitted with robust locks –sliding vehicle gates would be ideal, particularly motorised gates that require a code or fob to activate it. If motorised gates are installed, an audio-visual unit should be installed at each gate to allow visitors to communicate with staff prior to entry. Staff should be able to release the gates remotely from the office/warehouse. Entrance gates should always be secured outside of business hours.

Cycle/motorcycle parking

- 3.3.15 Cycle parking should be provided at each unit. It should be located within a lockable, weather-resistant shelter that includes 'Sheffield' style stands to allow cyclists to secure the wheels and frame, and ground anchors so that motorcyclists are able to secure their bikes.

Lighting

- 3.3.16 Low intensity, dusk-to-dawn lighting should be installed to illuminate the service road, entrance gates, the service yards, all external doors and service shutters, and the car and cycle parking.

Signage

- 3.3.17 Clear signage should be used to indicate the name of tenant, that CCTV is in operation, and the parking spaces allocated to staff and visitors.

External areas

- 3.3.18 In order to reduce the risk of accidental damage caused by vehicles turning or reversing against the building or the perimeter fencing, I recommend the installation of Armco™ barriers around at vulnerable locations.
- 3.3.19 If fuel is stored on the site, a fuel management system that allows only authorised users to dispense fuel, as well as only allowing authorised vehicles to be refuelled, should be installed.
- 3.3.20 Plant, machinery, and vehicles should be fitted with tracking devices and stored overnight within the premises rather than in the service area or in parking bays.

4 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. The latest SBD guidance relating to new residential developments can be found at <http://www.securedbydesign.com/industry-advice-and-guides/>.

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
25.06.25	WSP	Request for Crime Impact Statement
25.07.25		Site visited
17.06.26	WSP	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawing:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
PR1772-HFR-AV-XX-DR-A-9111-P1_	Proposed Site Layout Option 7		

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		17.06.26